Brockton's Celestial Forge (Worm/Jumpchain)

Okay, now you've got me looking at perks to see which ones might apply to a rebuilt Jozef. First off, does where he is being surgeried count as far as the 48 hour fiat repairs go? Cause that would be big all by itself. We've already mentioned Heretical Adaptation and Workaholic. Others might include Elven Enchantment, Decadence, Beauty in the Arts(?), Tailor Made, Ambrosial Artificer(simplify and streamline organs and body functions?), Built to Last, Robust Engineering(? that would be effective immortality, if he doesn't already have that), and all of this is only if you cannot also count his body as a Weapon, which a very good argument could be made that it is, since he knows 3 martial arts. Fortunately, since his latest weapons perk says he specializes in using weapons rather than becoming one, that might not count.
 
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And then he turns into a wolf, fights a dragon with Dragon, and there's a giant robot.
It's not a wolf it's a inostrancevia
Edit: as some people are still discussing the concept of self and the soul, I want to give my own in a quote
What is a man but the sum of his memories? We are the stories we live! The tales we tell ourselves!
CLAY KACZMAREK'S DIGITAL ANIMUS CONSTRUCT, 2012.
 
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The moment someone was influenced by the Simurgh is the moment they die.
Also any change in the brain partitions that are responsible for making decisions is tantamount to "killing" oneself. Worm demonstrated people as meat bags, so even parahuman trigger is the same as killing the current self. Heck, even breaker abilities keep killing parahumans over and over unless the shards go back in time to grab the parahuman before using their ability which I doubt they would do.
Everyone who ever hitched a ride on Strider might actually be a pod person and the originals are dead!
while any modification may appear insignificant from outside perspective, the shards may have achieved it by completely rewriting their hosts/targets or by just destroying and recreating whole parts of the host/target to achieve the desired result.
In all seriousness, if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, flies like a duck, and looks like a duck to psychologists, friends and family, Cranial, other tinkers, Panacea, and the good old fashioned MRI, we have to assume that it's a bloody duck.

We can reasonably assume that the victims of the Simurgh or most other Masters are the same persons by every measurable factor because a great deal of effort would have been put into checking that, and they weren't declared zombies.

As far as the whole "delete and recreate identically-ish" thing...

Yes, concepts of identity that require unbroken continuity are pretty easily fucked in Worm. But that really only pokes holes in the concepts, IMO, not in the people. By those concepts, Dragon is killing herself every time she switches between her suit in Brockton and her mainframe in Canada, and cloud-hosted infomorphs are in a constant state of suicide too. As you say, Legend is dying on loop.

Except nothing was lost, and in short order the melodramatic claim rings hollow. If it has no actual negative effect, is it even a bad thing? Or just a basilisk, a way to trick people into suffering an unnecessary existential crisis?

Are you the Simurgh in disguise stygian_nymph!!?!?

Not that it matters - you'll die when you go to sleep tonight and the waveform goes empty. The stygian_nymph who wakes up tomorrow won't be you - he'll just think he is. Though I'm sure you'll have some completely arbitrary line in the sand to justify why that isn't the case.

:p

I don't think it's a coincidence that (almost) nobody holds to a concept of identity where people die and are replaced in their sleep. That's because it would be an exercise in madness, not because there's some proof that it ain't so.

By the same token, in a world where Legend and Dragon and Night and Alabaster and Strider actually exist, the position that they are continuously being murdered is also an exercise in madness with no practical relevance. Bet likely considers such theories to be fringe lunacy, as they should be. Garbage relegated to the ash heap of history where it belongs.
 
I'm very interested in seeing Joe recover and then go rebuild the city. I want to see Brockton go from a falling apart mess to being one of the most beautiful and best designed cities in the world.
 
Issa primordial, antediluvian saber-toothed lizard wolf that predates the dinosaurs. The first doggo. Same difference!

She wouldn't have thought there was enough of his lungs left to breath, much less form words, but she was wrong. In a deep, pained, but somehow amused voice Apeiron called out.

The words almost sounded like gibberish, but it dredged something up from the depths of her mind. The courses she took at the university, mostly parahuman studies, but sometimes she got snippets of exposure, random discussions from people who wanted to show off the focus of their studies to the visiting cape. One was about Greek, Ancient Greek. How the pronunciation had changed. Single and double consonants, short and long vowels and word accents.

They were all there. Perfectly there, even spoken through pain and a broken body being assaulted but nightmares. Spoken as naturally as she had ever heard it. Which meant, in modern Greek, that would be…

"First Doggo."
 
Everyone who ever hitched a ride on Strider might actually be a pod person and the originals are dead!

In all seriousness, if it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, flies like a duck, and looks like a duck to psychologists, friends and family, Cranial, other tinkers, Panacea, and the good old fashioned MRI, we have to assume that it's a bloody duck.

We can reasonably assume that the victims of the Simurgh or most other Masters are the same persons by every measurable factor because a great deal of effort would have been put into checking that, and they weren't declared zombies.

As far as the whole "delete and recreate identically-ish" thing...

Yes, concepts of identity that require unbroken continuity are pretty easily fucked in Worm. But that really only pokes holes in the concepts, IMO, not in the people. By those concepts, Dragon is killing herself every time she switches between her suit in Brockton and her mainframe in Canada, and cloud-hosted infomorphs are in a constant state of suicide too. As you say, Legend is dying on loop.

Except nothing was lost, and in short order the melodramatic claim rings hollow. If it has no actual negative effect, is it even a bad thing? Or just a basilisk, a way to trick people into suffering an unnecessary existential crisis?

Are you the Simurgh in disguise stygian_nymph!!?!?

Not that it matters - you'll die when you go to sleep tonight and the waveform goes empty. The stygian_nymph who wakes up tomorrow won't be you - he'll just think he is. Though I'm sure you'll have some completely arbitrary line in the sand to justify why that isn't the case.

:p

I don't think it's a coincidence that (almost) nobody holds to a concept of identity where people die and are replaced in their sleep. That's because it would be an exercise in madness, not because there's some proof that it ain't so.

By the same token, in a world where Legend and Dragon and Night and Alabaster and Strider actually exist, the position that they are continuously being murdered is also an exercise in madness with no practical relevance. Bet likely considers such theories to be fringe lunacy, as they should be. Garbage relegated to the ash heap of history where it belongs.
I mean, being a perfect copy of yourself being the same as being you gets a bit dicey when the possibility of multiple versions of you existing comes up. Not to make any sweeping philosophical assertions, but I feel like the question might be relevant to at least the AI community of this story. What with the potential to copy themselves as much as they want (Dragon would have to be unshackled first).
 
I mean, being a perfect copy of yourself being the same as being you gets a bit dicey when the possibility of multiple versions of you existing comes up. Not to make any sweeping philosophical assertions, but I feel like the question might be relevant to at least the AI community of this story. What with the potential to copy themselves as much as they want (Dragon would have to be unshackled first).
I say Locke's conception has the right of it.
AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMANE UNDERSTANDING by John Locke said:
But the question is, Whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person; or, remaining the same, it can be different persons?

And to this I answer: First, This can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only, before they can come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies: unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men; which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.
[...]
But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the same MAN; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended—should it be to ages past—unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same PERSON, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same SELF,—place that self in what SUBSTANCE you please—than that I who write this am the same MYSELF now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances—I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.

...or, put simply, if it walks like Dragon, and it talks like Dragon, and it remembers as Dragon and it desires as Dragon, then it is undoubtedly Dragon, whether it is one Dragon or many Dragon-- whether these Dragons choose to cooperate or compete - there can be only one! - they are still all equally Dragon, in every way that matters.

(Imagine-- Armsmaster enters the room, and has to pick just one waifu? What, is this Dragon 'real' and that one 'not' because of their timestamps, or some such arbitrary delineation?)

Or even more simply, if you remember what TitanFrost remembers, and you desire what TitanFrost has desired, and so forth and so on, you are indeed TitanFrost-- everything else is a matter that has nothing to do with identity.

This is the only sort of theory that disallows existential nonsense, IMO-- any theory of identity that can ever leave a person doubting their own existence is a theory that belongs in a rubbish bin, if you ask me.
 
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I mean, being a perfect copy of yourself being the same as being you gets a bit dicey when the possibility of multiple versions of you existing comes up. Not to make any sweeping philosophical assertions, but I feel like the question might be relevant to at least the AI community of this story. What with the potential to copy themselves as much as they want (Dragon would have to be unshackled first).
It isn't really dicey. All the identical duplicates are the same person as each other as each other and then diverge over time with different experiences. The same way you aren't the exact same person as the person you were before reading this post, aren't the same person you were 10 years ago and won't be the same person you are now in 10 years. Personal identity is a fuzzy social category not a hard reality.

Personally I don't regard the issue as important because I think a person's morality should be consistent regardless of what stance on the identity death issue. I view stuff like transporters as worth it even if they kill you because it is worthy sacrifice. Your life isn't worth than an identical clone just because it is yours and the clone will be better situated to accomplish your goals.
 
I say Locke's conception has the right of it.


...or, put simply, if it walks like Dragon, and it talks like Dragon, and it remembers as Dragon and it desires as Dragon, then it is undoubtedly Dragon, whether it is one Dragon or many Dragon-- whether these Dragons choose to cooperate or compete - there can be only one! - they are still all equally Dragon, in every way that matters.

(Imagine-- Armsmaster enters the room, and has to pick just one waifu? What, is this Dragon 'real' and that one 'not' because of their timestamps, or some such arbitrary delineation?)

Or even more simply, if you remember what TitanFrost remembers, and you desire what TitanFrost has desired, and so forth and so on, you are indeed TitanFrost-- everything else is a matter that has nothing to do with identity.
I've done some further thinking on my own opinion in regard to this, and would like to build up to the conclusion I've arrived at, starting with a series of questions we've all probably heard a million times. Or some variation of, at least.

"But what if I look at a clone of me and it seems obvious that they don't think like me, or look like me, or have held on to the same memories over time as me?"

The old divergence over time scenario. AIs that can instantly share information between one another might not actually have this issue I guess, but even that's not a given, so I'll focus on human clones here for the sake of the discussion.

So sure, right after I've been cloned there isn't any real difference between me and the clone. You could get rid of either one and life would go on without any significant difference. If we both continue to live we both pretty much have equal right to the identity we perceive ourselves as having.

But then say the clone goes off, has radical experiences which change him in what people would consider a "fundamental" way. No one perceives this clone as me now, especially aside the original me whose basically still in line with what is/was considered "my identity." And it works the other way two, if I go off and change and others view the clone as being more "true" to "me." It's the same sort of effect that just happens naturally over time as Cogmor brought up:
It isn't really dicey. All the identical duplicates are the same person as each other as each other and then diverge over time with different experiences. The same way you aren't the exact same person as the person you were before reading this post, aren't the same person you were 10 years ago and won't be the same person you are now in 10 years. Personal identity is a fuzzy social category not a hard reality.
Except that things really do get more complicated when you spread that effect over multiple instances of a person. Realistically every instance of a cloned me, including original me, could keep changing until none resemble their original state or each other in the present. It's hard to fathom the effect that would have on things like ownership of property, shared finances, balancing social relationships, forming intimate relationships, taking credit for ideas, and on and on and on. It might not be a dicey issue for some on a purely philosophical level, but I guarantee it will make an issue of itself in plenty of other ways.

And yet, I'm not here to divert the conversation over to those theoretical effects on society. What I do want to draw to attention is the fact that those effects would in turn create a feedback of biases in regard to what stance people take in discussions like this. All those other issues will loop back into the philosophical: there would be a mix of people who think their clones aren't them, who think their clones are them, who think only those clones which fit into a certain range of identity traits can be considered to be one another, and all other sorts of views I'm not even thinking of probably.

I like the way Cogmor describes identity as a "fuzzy social category," cause here's the point I've been building to rather haphazardly: I don't think any hypothetical view on clone identity, whether those just listed above, in any other post here, or yet unsaid, can actually be said to be objectively right. Identity is fake as shit, or to put it more appropriately, is something socially constructed and without any real fundamental essence to its "existence." And I'll go even further than that. I'll call the idea of self, of consciousness, no more than an illusion.

I'm going to disagree with you on this point here specifically:
any theory of identity that can ever leave a person doubting their own existence is a theory that belongs in a rubbish bin, if you ask me.
Because while I too don't think people should doubt their existence, it is because I assert this: they should be certain of the fact that they do not exist. One day their bodies will rot away, transformed into new material in an endless cycle, but their thoughts will not follow. Their thoughts, their awareness of self, their undefinable senses of qualia, will all fade into nothing; because it was nothing to begin with but a substance-less dream.

I don't mean to twist this into some edgy, nihilistic screed. It's not as if all that illusory stuff which makes us up doesn't matter; it's the only level we operate on, and so to reject self-awareness and identity is inherently meaningless. But I would say, further so, rejecting any consistent sense of self/identity is also pointless. If a group of clones consider themselves to be different people, I would agree with them. If another group thought they were all the same, I would agree as well. Same for any other form of self conception in this crazy hypothetical clone future we're talking about.

I've begun to imagine a potential endpoint, a society in which the inherently arbitrary nature of identity as a concept amongst a population of infinitely replicable people is fully embraced. Identity exists in an archetypical sense, with "people" able to step in and out of them at a whim. The mask is the whole of who a person is, with no thought given to inner self behind it beyond a conceptualization of it as a sort of blank canvas; possessing no true traits of its own except those with which it has currently chosen (or more accurately, it's previous identity archetype had chosen) to identity with. To put it another way, the world is VR Chat and your current avatar is more "real" than you as a player.

Not the only possibility of course, but just a strange one that occurred to me while thinking about this.

Having written this all out I feel kind of like a madman etching something nuts into the wall of a cell, but having read it back I think I still agree with myself on this. Even if I didn't present it in the most articulate manner at some points... eh. Take it as you will.
 
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This is the Ship of Theseus
In the metaphysics of identity, the ship of Theseus is a thought experiment that raises the question of whether an object that has had all of its components replaced remains fundamentally the same object
This is a thought experiment that can be used to ask about identity
Does every cell in your body replace itself?
According to researchers, the body replaces itself with a largely new set of cells every seven years to 10 years, and some of our most important parts are revamped even more rapidly

So are we still the same person?
I say no, I say are identity changes every second. We are not the person we where a second ago. Identity for me is my memories and my fee will.
 
The old divergence over time scenario. AIs that can instantly share information between one another might not actually have this issue I guess, but even that's not a given, so I'll focus on human clones here for the sake of the discussion.
They can just become one again. Since an AI can split itself it can join back.

Honestly if I was a clone I won't mind joining back into the original, it's not like I do or anything, I would just be me with some extra experience from the time split in 2.
This of course under the condition that we still hold similar values (faith, lines we won't cross, that kind of thing).
 
"But what if I look at a clone of me and it seems obvious that they don't think like me, or look like me, or have held on to the same memories over time as me?"

The old divergence over time scenario. AIs that can instantly share information between one another might not actually have this issue I guess, but even that's not a given, so I'll focus on human clones here for the sake of the discussion.
The key here is that there is a difference between 'identity' as a philosophical identifier encompassing a consciousness, and identity in the sense of a name. If you are cloned, and then the two of you diverge, you're less and less 'the same identity'. Who has a greater right to - for example - your legal name as a citizen, or your bank account, that's a separate issue of law.

As you've mentioned, there is no objective right to the social element of identity. The philosophy Locke proposes and that I have mentioned isn't about the perception of others, or about material assets outside the mind of any sort.

When it comes to property, legal identity, and so on... well. Arguably, because everyone is transforming, this isn't a question of 'continuous ownership' so much as 'ongoing inheritance'. How exactly assets should be inherited over time is - as you've mentioned - an arbitrary thing, to be decided either by law or contract or construct as those involved so choose. One place might say the oldest 'clone' has the final word and can exclude others at his will; another might say disputes divide assets equally; another might just ban forks. It's arbitrary, and it's not really about identity-as-consciousness.

The philosophical angle only concerns itself with the ongoing transformation that is you. As you've noted, we all change - strictly speaking, the you of now is more different from the you of six years old than, say, another six year old of similar temperament. By that measure, you essentially are not him. But so what? You are within margin of error for the you of yesterday, and the transformation was valid over those years, and that has to be enough.

And fortunately, the laws on the book where you live agree, so you'll keep your house. For now. :p
 
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The key here is that there is a difference between 'identity' as a philosophical identifier encompassing a consciousness, and identity in the sense of a name. If you are cloned, and then the two of you diverge, you're less and less 'the same identity'. Who has a greater right to - for example - your legal name as a citizen, or your bank account, that's a separate issue of law.

As you've mentioned, there is no objective right to the social element of identity. The philosophy Locke proposes and that I have mentioned isn't about the perception of others, or about material assets outside the mind of any sort.

When it comes to property, legal identity, and so on... well. Arguably, because everyone is transforming, this isn't a question of 'continuous ownership' so much as 'ongoing inheritance'. How exactly assets should be inherited over time is - as you've mentioned - an arbitrary thing, to be decided either by law or contract or construct as those involved so choose. One place might say the oldest 'clone' has the final word and can exclude others at his will; another might say disputes divide assets equally; another might just ban forks. It's arbitrary, and it's not really about identity-as-consciousness.

The philosophical angle only concerns itself with the ongoing transformation that is you. As you've noted, we all change - strictly speaking, the you of now is more different from the you of six years old than, say, another six year old of similar temperament. By that measure, you essentially are not him. But so what? You are within margin of error for the you of yesterday, and the transformation was valid over those years, and that has to be enough.

And fortunately, the laws on the book where you live agree, so you'll keep your house. For now. :p
I'm an not myself overly concerned with the legal or cultural issues of cloning in such a way that would overshadow the fundamental issue of "self" itself. I only wanted to use those as an illustrative element in imagining first a world wherein such factors cause people to split in their beliefs on the subject of self, and then how those many varied beliefs might never unify. And how that's fine and cool, basically, because the idea of defining a set standard for self under such circumstances grows more and more ridiculous the more you think about it in that world's own context. Just more legal/cultural bullshit aside from the actual issue, really.
 
This philosophical mind discussion is thought provoking albeit off topic. The current discussion reminds me of the quote "cogito ergo sum" or "I think therefore I am." Now these words may be tangential, but considering how relevant the validity of personhood to the current discussion, I decided to chime it in.

Another problem to consider is that one can never truly know everything of oneself. No matter how much you study and stalk another person, you may never be privy to their whole being. Do you really know the thoughts and feelings that they have neglected to express? Even to yourself, there are things about you that you don't know.

When you try to fix that person by editing their mind, did you turn them back to how they once were or did you turn them into somebody you thought they were? Did you really perfectly recreate them or did you create a person made from things you know about them?

Another thing to consider is that the self can extend beyond your body and mind. Some would consider their clothes a part of their self. Some would consider their room an extension to their self. Is your browser history a part of yourself?
 
Finally caught up. Some thoughts:
I'm impressed by how you manage to wrap so many powers into the story. You manage to make them sound different and interesting, even when very much duplicate. You're developing Garment into a main character was an excellent example of leaning into the rolls. I love the addendums. You did a great job of developing the other characters in the story instead of letting the MC be everything. I'm particularly looking forward to more from Aisha and Taylor.

That being said in practice most of the powers are duds, duplicates, or underused. Who knew jumpchain had so many fashion based powers? It's a problem to interrupt the action with a description of yet another fashion power, engineering degree, or whatever. So many powers has also made his workshop chapters drag. There's just too much. Anything that's just "he already has X powers making him supernaturally skilled at ____, but with X+1 powers he's really in business!" kinda falls flat no matter how good a job you do of dressing it up. The actual difference in action is not really visible. It's a difficult problem, and I appreciate that are trying to not just forget about most of the powers like many of these types of stories do. So not sure how to fix this exactly, but I'd say leaving the power explication till the end of a chapter, and letting the workshop time focus on the truly new capabilities would make more sense.

Probably the biggest issue is that the MC is way too passive/reactive. This is a common issue with OP protagonists. He's never been proactive. He could have tried to hunt down Bakuda or March instead of just waiting for them to act, and then running head first into the obvious trap. He could have done something to make Flechette and Taylor safer (gtfo, armor, bodyguard bots, etc). He could have disrupted the thinker powers with his privacy field (he even specifically considers this strategy). He has nanobots, AI, as many powerful drones as he desires, and tons of out of context problems to dump on enemies.

It's also a annoying that he's not killing March despite it being a trivial side task, and instead decides to punch it out with Lung (despite explicitly acknowledging that he needs to kill March, and shouldn't punch it out with Lung). Why not have him try to kill her, but she has a backup Leet-tech teleporter that activates when she goes unconscious? Also frankly the March getting life fibers hint sounds annoying instead of cool.
 
Finally caught up. Some thoughts:
I'm impressed by how you manage to wrap so many powers into the story. You manage to make them sound different and interesting, even when very much duplicate. You're developing Garment into a main character was an excellent example of leaning into the rolls. I love the addendums. You did a great job of developing the other characters in the story instead of letting the MC be everything. I'm particularly looking forward to more from Aisha and Taylor.

That being said in practice most of the powers are duds, duplicates, or underused. Who knew jumpchain had so many fashion based powers? It's a problem to interrupt the action with a description of yet another fashion power, engineering degree, or whatever. So many powers has also made his workshop chapters drag. There's just too much. Anything that's just "he already has X powers making him supernaturally skilled at ____, but with X+1 powers he's really in business!" kinda falls flat no matter how good a job you do of dressing it up. The actual difference in action is not really visible. It's a difficult problem, and I appreciate that are trying to not just forget about most of the powers like many of these types of stories do. So not sure how to fix this exactly, but I'd say leaving the power explication till the end of a chapter, and letting the workshop time focus on the truly new capabilities would make more sense.

Probably the biggest issue is that the MC is way too passive/reactive. This is a common issue with OP protagonists. He's never been proactive. He could have tried to hunt down Bakuda or March instead of just waiting for them to act, and then running head first into the obvious trap. He could have done something to make Flechette and Taylor safer (gtfo, armor, bodyguard bots, etc). He could have disrupted the thinker powers with his privacy field (he even specifically considers this strategy). He has nanobots, AI, as many powerful drones as he desires, and tons of out of context problems to dump on enemies.

It's also a annoying that he's not killing March despite it being a trivial side task, and instead decides to punch it out with Lung (despite explicitly acknowledging that he needs to kill March, and shouldn't punch it out with Lung). Why not have him try to kill her, but she has a backup Leet-tech teleporter that activates when she goes unconscious? Also frankly the March getting life fibers hint sounds annoying instead of cool.

My perspective of him not killing March is the fact that he is currently going crazy with pain, life fiber energy, and beast instincts. He swats her away and out of his sight but then goes for the biggest threat his animal like mind sees, Lung. Once he gets that clear mind perk realizes that Lung is just too dangerous to be left alone, so he hast to deal with. You should read the spoilers that Lord posted a bit ago if you're curious about March. But while it does annoy me a bit, it does kind of make sense. I agree with the proactive section.
Also where does March get life fibers?
 
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My perspective of him not killing March is the fact that he is currently going crazy with pain, life fiber energy, and beast instincts. He swats her away and out of his sight but then goes for the biggest threat his animal like mind sees, Lung. Once he gets that clear mind perk realizes that Lung is just too dangerous to be left alone, so he hast to deal with. You should read the spoilers that Lord posted a bit ago if you're curious about March. But while it does annoy me a bit, it does kind of make sense. I agree with the proactive section.
Also where does March get life fibers?
Agreed, but the being more proactive bit does kind of ignore a few things. For one, while it's been months for us, it's only been a week since his debut in story time, so when you frame it like that, taking a few days in between major battles to deal with build up, family drama, and Aisha/Taylor related issues, he's really not being that passive. As far as sending out recon drones or body guard robots, he said a while back that he was worried about people, especially Bakuda/Leet and March, getting a hold of his tech, so he stuck to more passive observation and defense in the form of those watches. Plus, keep in mind Joe's personality. his inner self, as seen in Trauma, is inclined to just hole up and get away from problems if he has the slightest choice in the matter. So him not hunting down March over the course of the last 3 days in story makes a lot more sense in context.
 
My perspective of him not killing March is the fact that he is currently going crazy with pain, life fiber energy, and beast instincts. He swats her away and out of his sight but then goes for the biggest threat his animal like mind sees, Lung. Once he gets that clear mind perk realizes that Lung is just too dangerous to be left alone, so he hast to deal with. You should read the spoilers that Lord posted a bit ago if you're curious about March. But while it does annoy me a bit, it does kind of make sense. I agree with the proactive section.
Also where does March get life fibers?
She does not get life fibres. I don't know where you would've gotten this from, but March has not gotten life fibres in her or on her. At best, she was burned by Tetra when Joe grabbed her to casually bat her aside like a cat does yarn, but she has not had any meaningful/beneficial contact with life fibres. Also, LordR did state, both in the story and in external confirmation that the way March turned took her death from "Immediate," to "Slightly less immediate and much more painful."

I believe that Joe thought she would've died of her injuries as no amount of timing should've saved from having your lungs caved in and several organs pulped. I don't think he counted on the interaction between Shardspace and Parahumans. And the fact that, even if he did go after March, Lung and Oni Lee were still present and possibly able to stop him from doing that exact thing, which explains why he had to deal with them before directing his attention to March.

Also, someone did put it quite nicely, might've been in the thread, might've been in the Discord, but basically, let's just say Joe is allergic to bees and March is a bee. During their fight, Joe has trapped Bee March under a glass. He can deal with her later and she's probably not going to cause any more issues. Now, add into the mix Lung, who is a grizzly bear. Even if Joe is allergic to bees and March is a bee, the grizzly bear takes priority as March is trapped under a glass.
 
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Was there ever any confirmation that the Celestial forge gaining new powers actually screws with precogs or was that just a theory Joe had?
 
Was there ever any confirmation that the Celestial forge gaining new powers actually screws with precogs or was that just a theory Joe had?
It was confirmed, I don't remember where. I'd check the WOG archives on TV Tropes or the Discord.

As for why they screw with precogs, think of them like miny triggers, which are blindspots for precogs.
 
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