Their actions were part of a combined whole; Eaton deliberately set up Nash to sit on the Gammon reinforcement line. The possible vectors for reinforcement were reduced to just Gammon and Morshadd, and then Nash was able to easily pick out reinforcements because she had been positioned along one of their possible paths and knew exactly where the second possible path was. It was not "happy coincidence" whatsoever, enabling the possibility of intercepting reinforcements was a deliberate action on the part of Eaton to support operations in the Ixaria system.
Point of information: Nash was disobeying her own orders to intercept the Imperial fleet as it headed to Ixaria.
Eaton's overall strategy provided no second force to stop an Imperial fleet headed for Ixaria; the role of said second force was to stop Imperial ships headed for Gammon.
And once the Imperials committed to Ixaria, Eaton was prepared to strike Gammon with TF3. That was also mentioned in the lead-up to Ixaria. Eaton set up the entire theatre to take advantage of the Ixaria assault's possible effects.
Yes, but this wasn't "indirect approach," it was just a matter of Eaton's fleet outnumbering the entire Licori navy by about two-to-one, especially when the Ked Peddah are factored in. Eaton hit two of the the hardest, best-defended targets in Licori space, because (not coincidentally) those were
also the targets the Licori had spent five years trying hard to protect.
Not all successful commanders are users of the indirect approach, and one of the big
downsides of Liddell-Hart's approach is his tendency to engage in tortured reasoning to explain why things are 'indirect,' or why they make use of his ideas when they actually don't. Eaton's approach to generalship, at least in the Licori War, looked very little like "indirect approach" and very much like "bigger hammer."
As far as I'm concerned, the culmination of these efforts pitted our strength against their weakness...
It's not that it
didn't do so. It's that it did so for a combination of interlocking reasons that don't have a lot to do with the 'indirect approach.' If you hit the enemy with enough strengths all at once, sooner or later one of your strengths will in fact hit them in a weak spot.
Eaton's campaign against the Licori was a great example of how to comprehensively kick an enemy's butt by
both drawing out their fleets
and crushing key bases- if you have overwhelming strength and good field commanders who know when to creatively reinterpret the letter of their orders. But they're not a good example of the indirect approach.
I point out later how each doctrine would attempt to use operations outside their, uh, expertise for lack of a better word. Furthermore, I make it very clear that threatening bases is a necessary precondition of both doctrines back in my original post on this subject and in all subsequent posts. Heck, I talk about threatening bases literally one post previous in the quote chain, and in the subsequent post, and in the post you quote!
You're strawmanning hard here and I suggest you should stop.
SWB, I'm going to be honest, your reasoning in posts like this tends to be... involuted. You say a great many things; in some cases you make what appears to be a strong declaration of X, then imply not-X. This makes it extremely labor-intensive to
not inadvertently 'strawman' you by making a good-faith effort to interpret what turns out, in hindsight, to be the wrong part of your post sequence. Especially with multiple rounds of discussion batted back and forth per day.
You've said so enough different things, and implied enough different things, that I no longer have any real hope of sorting out what you
think with certainty that I won't be accused of misrepresentation, for trying to remember what you said while keeping in mind what you're saying
now. I'll do my best. But accusing me of misrepresenting you isn't going to make it easier for me to parse multiple layers of shifting and interlocking positions at the same time.
The point, which I again made very clear in posts you didn't bother to respond to, is that the objectives of each doctrine are different, and operations support those objectives. Under Decisive Battle you could smash up some bases to get attention, to change the routing of the enemy, or as consolation prizes which will affect their strength. Under Base Strike you could hit ships if they were defended a crucial objective, to enable mop-up of now-undefended bases, or as consolation prizes which will affect their capability. Obviously if you could blow up anything of the enemy's for free that would be welcome no matter what the doctrine. But the objective, as in the thing that the doctrine says "kill enough of this and we'll win the war", is infrastructure for Base Strike and warships for Decisive Battle.
And Nix already addressed this. You are describing a situation where we pursue Objective A. But the enemy takes such desperate lengths to
avoid letting us attain Objective A, that we instead attain Objective B and win the war.
I would argue that this is a moral victory for Objective A, because it implies that the enemy preferred to pursue a course of action
ending in defeat, rather than run the risks associated with letting us attain Objective A. If the enemy is so afraid of a decisive battle with our fleet that they allow most of their own colonies to be overrun rather than fight the battle, this is hardly a mark against the desirability of fighting a decisive battle!
I mean, imagine a strategy that leads to us trapping an enemy army in burning buildings. Their only escape is to jump out of third-story windows. If they repeatedly elect to do so, until so many of their soldiers have been injured falling out of windows that they cannot go on fighting... Does that in any way whatsoever invalidate the 'burning building' strategy? I think not. It would be folly to say "well, our objective was to set them on fire, so our strategy didn't work, they lost because they got hurt in falls."
Because what's going on is that 'burning building' strategy is so effective that the enemy prefers to lose the war rather than allow it to reach its full potential against them. They'd prefer a broken leg to being trapped in a fire.
Sure. But doctrine is a set of habitual guidelines, a description of the objective and methods that we consider "best" and strive towards. If we have a habit of building a fleet advantage and we destroy an outpost instead, we aren't really making progress unless the entire war goes the same way, which would call into question the viability of our doctrine choice. So if we have to settle for something outside of our doctrinal objectives, the result is usually quite a bit worse than if we got a win according to our doctrinal objectives. And in that way, the enemy can deny us overall victory.
In the scenario we were actually talking about that brought this on, the intent is to force the enemy to give battle by making it part of a true forced choice. There are a variety of ways to do this in warfare- to force the enemy to sacrifice something in order to avoid engaging your fleet. Then do it again, and again.
I suspect this is the reason why Decisive Battle doctrine actually takes time to research, rather than just being Lathriss going "uh, have you considered attacking their ships?" Because the best and brightest of Starfleet Tactical are spending
years compiling examples of ways the enemy can be compelled to give battle.
You [that is, Nix] mistake me, then. I'm saying that the wide uncertainty you proposed isn't a pin at all. It's not a forced move if there isn't a clear "best" option, and because of the uncertainty, there isn't. You aren't presenting a slate of bad options, you're presenting a slate of unknown options, some of which will be bad and some of which will be good. That's not nearly as desirable from our perspective, because we can presume some competence on the part of our opponents to reduce what's unknown and to estimate how bad and how good their choices.
This is why war isn't chess. It is usually impractical to present an enemy with a
true forced move in wartime, where there is literally only one thing they can possibly do.
And that's okay.
It is, as a rule, enough to present an opponent with decisions that are 'merely' unpalatable. Decisions like "do I lose five thousand men storming that ridge, or plunk my butt down for three days shelling it and accept a delay in my advance?" Or like "do I continue pursuing the enemy until my supply lines are cripplingly overstretched, or do I let them regroup comfortably out of range of my counterattacks?" Or like "do I reinforce all three forts and accept a risk of defeat in detail, or do I reinforce one fort and risk losing the other two quickly?"
And yes, the enemy will assess this situation, try to find ways to reduce their losses, and estimate which of their choices are least appalling. But that's inevitable. Striking at enemy bases or transports won't avoid that. War, unlike chess, does not reduce to a small integer number of choices for "what's my next move?" It can look that way when summarized at the highest level, but it isn't.