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Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

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Oh, since I forgot, also add in there:

5. Scharnhorst doesn't get torped in sinking Glorious. Gneis by extension does not get torped covering her sister's return to Germany. As such, both are able to sortie out into the Atlantic like they were originally supposed to.

6. Whereupon they are caught by Hood and Repulse, severely mauling the former, but getting Gneis sunk and Lutjens captured.
 
Copius note taking and a lot of research.*








*no, seriously, I put more research into this than is probably healthy.
 
Exterminatus said:
A few things to note:
  • Many USN admirals have served on a wide variety of ships. Having experience from serving surface and carrier, or surface and submersible (I cannot recall anyone who did surface, carrier, and submarine at this moment) is a pretty common thing. Spruance was known for commanding cruisers before Midway and yet he made many correct calls during Midway, Hailstone, and the Philippine Seas. He went down in popular history as having gutted the carrier arm of the IJN and for helping prove that a carrier task force can overwhelm land-based air.
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NOT true, not really. Generally, (still true today, in fact more obvious), you pretty much do your branch (service pin) and staff work. Where it breaks is when you are a commander. Generally, commanding a battleship is the mark of an Admiral potential pre war (though carriers were the same, btw, in fact, that's why King and Bull GOT their stars.) the same as a carrier, or a boomer today. (Side note, Spruance's 'cruiser' man view, is actually inaccurate, hilariously, never commanded one directly, never served on one pre stars)
Every admiral starting WW2 with one exception, commanded either a BB or a CV, but before that strictly commanded his branch's ships.
(The one exception? King. He did all three major branches.)
It's the ARMY that allows fairly wide cross assignments, and even we don't do THAT much of it. (An infantry officer can on occasion be offered an armor slot, or vice versa, though the usual path for infantry who stray outside their branch is SF, or Signal corps, while Armor tends to do Aviation.)

  • Thompson has to deal with the fact that he is the only one with hindsight and future data. His peers of similar rank do not have the statistics nor the experience. This means that he will get demolished academically and be discredited when the other admirals ask him for proof. This is especially so if Thompson is coming in with mathematical equations and data that have a lot of war and post-war experience baked into it.
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Some things just require a little thinking. Musing. Just stuff that others (Hey, Bill, captains of Sara and Lexy, or Little E, et al) have noticed, or even their CAG's)
That's the fuel lines, elevator issues.
(and given that Wasp had that testbed elevator which was quickly added to the Essexs shows that people WERE thinking about carrier design, and paying attention)
Tactical planning? He's got THACH as his CAG. Thach was unquestionably the most forward leaning CAG/Squadron commander of the time, and from all indications had already begun thinking (and scheming to get AVG's reports) about the Japanese and that US tactics/information might be not ready for it.
He's also in the branch that's quite aware of it's position/situation, and that in a lot of ways is still feeling out what to do. They're really where the dolphin boys were in WW1.
Thompson is not in charge of the shore-base institutions nor is he an advisor to them. Thus construction, munitions, training, etc. are not within his purview. What this means is that he can at most impose changes on the small squadron of ships under his command and at most make suggestions that his changes correlate to a better fighting force. If he cannot cough up the hard numbers, then any changes he make will likely only stay within his squadron.
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He's got a CarDiv as his command, one of 2. NAS's are paying attention to his and Hasley's reports. And note: A LOT of 'suggestions' and 'ideas' can be floated as 'musings' to other fellow officers. Ie, instead of being a official report writer/suggestor... toss it around in bull sessions, meals with fellow officers when you have a few beers/glass of wine/scotches. This is what James' biggest problem is, he's not doing the SOCIAL stuff he's expected to do. Could be a reason King hates him.
And then of course there is the matter of technology (both breakthrough and incremental), doctrine, and management simply not being there in the first place! Vague recollections and suggestions don't really help as much since there are many assumptions that Thompson would have to methodically write down before the people he's asking miracles from can even come up with a workable idea given contemporary constraints.
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Some tech, the stuff that CAN be done _Right_ now (angled flight deck, moving ALL elevators to the outside on the Essexes) purging the airlines...
yeah.
Most of the other stuff, no. Pushing HELOCOPTORS, faster, yes, can be done. Part of Siskory's problem pre war, is that he didn't get lots of money, and it took time to build up the factories

My suggestions pretty much boil down to this:
Outside elevators complete (possible to put on the Essex.), Angled flight decks (not possible at this point on the Essexes, in their design, since they're already laid down, likey, but the Midways?)
Purging the gas lines
Pushing helos (tech's there, infrastructure ISN"T) He can EASILY push this "Better SAR for our pilots and we can put them on DD's and Battleships as spotters, I think... might work, wouldn't it?)
Developing rockets (see helos)
Tatical planning (and the marines would get behind the rockets on planes, and helos, they're NOT dumb!)

MOST tech stuff, he really doesn't NEED to push. It's either coming and honestly, about as fast as it can as is, or frankly, cost/reward isn't worth it
The ONE thing that'd radically be worth it, REALLY worth it, is if he remembers how to make a TRANSISTOR.

They're not that difficult to produce (not IC, basic transistors), but wasn't til 1955 they were commercialized.
Transistor radar and radio in 1943+?
YES please.
 
If we want to introduce teching up, without breaking the setting wildly, have Thompson mention late-war or immediate post-war refit plans for the various hulls. Considering he did lead a kanmusu fleet in the future he almost assuredly knew exactly what their armaments were during each of the girl's upgrade 'stages'. So mentioning dual-purpose mounts, bofors, okerlons(?), etc, might not be a bad idea.

It'll be a stretch, but then again, he *IS* an admiral, which is something a lot of people are forgetting.

If an admiral wants to suggest something and puts in a R&D request, it WILL be looked at seriously until otherwise said so. By the same token, if an Admiral nixes an idea, and puts pressure on it, he can pretty much kill a line of development for a decade or longer.

To whit: Vice Admiral Ralph Christie, USN (may the fucking bastard forever burn in hell).

1. Pushed forward the Mark 14 Torpedo.
2. Pushed forward the Mark 6 exploder (magnetic).
3. Outright ignored, later censored, any wartime reports on just how bad #1's & #2's service was.
4. Outright canned veteran/seasoned wartime captain(s) that tried to publicly argue the point.
5. Ignored orders(!) and even had orders reversed that were to see the Mark 6 exploder removed and replaced by the older model (which actually worked great) on all submarines under his command.

Thompson could easily go toe-to-toe with Christie at this point, and not only either countermand him, but also put forwards his *OWN* R&D requests. All he has to do is be subtle about the upgrades - give a list of several different ideas, including some that are deliberately added to the list that he knows won't work out, including possibly 'leaning on' one of said non-workable designs, while also listing one or two that he knows (late-war/immediate post-war) turned out to work perfectly.

Work with the tech base of the era. Don't try to push the envelop. Or at least, not until all hell breaks loose and wartime R&D kicks in, at which point there's going to be all KINDS of requests that, previously, would be outright ignored, that now are being taken dead serious.
 
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MageOhki said:
Some tech, the stuff that CAN be done _Right_ now (angled flight deck, moving ALL elevators to the outside on the Essexes) purging the airlines...
yeah.
Most of the other stuff, no. Pushing HELOCOPTORS, faster, yes, can be done. Part of Siskory's problem pre war, is that he didn't get lots of money, and it took time to build up the factories

My suggestions pretty much boil down to this:
Outside elevators complete (possible to put on the Essex.), Angled flight decks (not possible at this point on the Essexes, in their design, since they're already laid down, likey, but the Midways?)
Purging the gas lines
Pushing helos (tech's there, infrastructure ISN"T) He can EASILY push this "Better SAR for our pilots and we can put them on DD's and Battleships as spotters, I think... might work, wouldn't it?)
Developing rockets (see helos)
Tactical planning (and the marines would get behind the rockets on planes, and helos, they're NOT dumb!)
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And would be a good extra side reason for trimaran hulled destroyers, landing pads.
It also gives him a job for Lex & Sara, if they manage to survive the war, Helo-carrier, for Marine and Seal teams Helocopters.
MOST tech stuff, he really doesn't NEED to push. It's either coming and honestly, about as fast as it can as is, or frankly, cost/reward isn't worth it
The ONE thing that'd radically be worth it, REALLY worth it, is if he remembers how to make a TRANSISTOR.

They're not that difficult to produce (not IC, basic transistors), but wasn't til 1955 they were commercialized.
Transistor radar and radio in 1943+?
YES please.
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Might I suggest you look at the Crystal Radio page?
Look up Crystodyne, can do the same thing, invented in 1920, in Russia.
Yes, a shortcut.
Or at least a way to get two different development tracks going, that pull off the same thing.
Skywalker_T-65 said:
As such, trying to do something as radical as upgunning Hood or completely stripping her down (LEWD.Haruna.jpeg) to rebuild her from the ground up isn't going to fly. Everyone involved knows that. Everyone involved also knows that the Admirals aren't going there to actually make suggestions on refitting her, of which only Richardson is really qualified to do. And his engineering experience (remember his time on Delaware that let him see Utah) is tilted to boilers, turbines and all that than anything else.

3. Changing designs. There have been good points brought up before of monkeying around with the Essex design, and that is something that Thompson could suggest without being out of left field. But as I've said before, he can't do much more than suggest things. If I made him an engineer who could point at the Essex and say 'hey, angle the deck like this and do it this *insert engineering jargon here* way and you'll make a better ship!' then he'd be verging on Sue territory.

The man can make suggestions, but he can't do them himself. And the validity of his suggestions to anyone comes down on how much they are willing to listen. Tactics are one thing, engineering is an entirely different kettle of fish.

He could say that the ships need more anti-aircraft guns, and to fast-track Bofors production. This is reasonable.

He could say that the torpedo bulges that Sara and E historically got are needed, which would do a lot of good for Hornet and Yorktown.

He could even say that we need more escorts for the carriers, or more carriers in general.

But if Thompson starts going off on funky tangents and trying to push for things that don't make sense in the time period, he's going to run into trouble. One could say it would push people to look at the designs, and maybe it would. But it would also get our Admiral committed to a loony bin at worst, constantly looked at with suspicion and mistrust at best. Going out of your way to try and do a bunch of radical things and only being able to say 'umm...well...this may work...?' when pressed is not a good thing.

In other words, don't expect him to start sprouting random things that don't make sense with the '40s tech base. Even if theoretically, and I emphasize the theoretically, possible.

Now, this is WoG on the subject.\
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How good is Thompson in sketching?
Because if he is reasonable in it, he could make a sketchbook to give to Richardson (while the other admirals are there, can Richardson talk about it with King, for one), with the stuff in it.
Thus sketches and explaining texts next to them.
Like how the the more modern and highly swept back version of the 'Tumblehome' style bow (that is being introduced in todays world), cuts true water like a knife true paper, jello (or so), using gravity as a form of cutting power, besides the speed of movement.
Comparison sketches between current ways and the proposed one, might also work, like how the waves break on the various bow types.
This could help in explaining the ideas and get them considered more serious.
 
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Vianca said:
And would be a good extra side reason for trimaran hulled destroyers, landing pads.
It also gives him a job for Lex & Sara, if they manage to survive the war, Helo-carrier, for Marine and Seal teams Helocopters.

Might I suggest you look at the Crystal Radio page?
Look up Crystodyne, can do the same thing, invented in 1920, in Russia.
Yes, a shortcut.
Or at least a way to get two different development tracks going, that pull off the same thing.

How good is Thompson in sketching?
Because if he is reasonable in it, he could make a sketchbook to give to Richardson (while the other admirals are there, can Richardson talk about it with King, for one), with the stuff in it.
Thus sketches and explaining texts next to them.
Like how the the more modern and highly swept back version of the 'Tumblehome' style bow (that is being introduced in todays world), cuts true water like a knife true paper, jello (or so), using gravity as a form of cutting power, besides the speed of movement.
Comparison sketches between current ways and the proposed one, might also work, like how the waves break on the various bow types.
This could help in explaining the ideas and get them considered more serious.
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The Tumblehome hull isn't gonna happen. Too radical.
MABYE the crystal radio (though transistors have LOTS of benfits, and in a lot of ways are far superior)

Work within, not push outside.
 
MageOhki said:
The Tumblehome hull isn't gonna happen. Too radical.
MABYE the crystal radio (though transistors have LOTS of benfits, and in a lot of ways are far superior)

Work within, not push outside.
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The Submarine Branch might find it useful, since it is a hull shape that has a good change to flow well both above and under water.
Maybe not a modern cigar nose, but still better then the boat noses they where using at that time.
So there is a way to go about it.

As for radical, that's why I suggested a sketchbook.
Let the others decide what is to radical or would take too much time to introduce right now.
But done right and the big gun admirals will understand that you are dissing them not because you hate the big guns, but because their equipment is too outdated.
Genolution said:
Stop trying to make trimaran hulls happen. They aren't going to happen.

Because it's a goddamn daft idea.
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A Extreme Radical destroyer with a trimaran hull, might thus sport a single big gun (the side outriggers provide extra stability).
If noted that Thompson himself considers it a possible, if extreme, idea.....
Then ad other drawings that use those side outriggers, like Helo-copter landing pads, extra AA mounts and so on...
It will show that he has thought things true, at least, in a effort to figure out more then one reason for such a idea.
And that is needed for some of the more simple to do stuff, that else would be blocked more heavily, since he is a carrier guy.
Let others figure out if it is doable (which it is, not that they know), it lets him show he does not hate the non carrier departments, just the state and utility of their equipment.

Still leaves one big question.
Sky, can Thompson sketch anything worth the money it is drawn on?
Else the above is garbage can value, a pic says more then a thousand words, but if you cannot draw...
 
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Vianca said:
Sky, can Thompson sketch anything worth the money it is drawn on?
Else the above is garbage can value, a pic says more then a thousand words, but if you cannot draw...
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Even if he could draw a picture, he's a carrier Admiral, not an engineer. And simple sketches of designs that are ugly as I'll get out aren't gonna be worth jack if he doesn't explain the-

Why am I even bothering to argue? We aren't getting Burkes. We aren't getting Independence-class Littoral Combat Ships. We aren't getting Virginias. Thompson starts rattling on about or drawing designs that are far too ahead of their time with intent to get them into production, the whole debacle with shipgirls are going to be the least of his problems.
 
Word of the author has said "No" to future tech. Please have the respect for the author's wishes to drop it. To continue to bring it up is to derail the thread into off-topic land.
 
The Sherman tank was the cheapest tank the US Government could buy, at that time, there where better designs that could do the same thing, if more costly in production.
Thus I would expect most of such a sketchbook, only to be looked into, from 1947 onwards.
If it happens to also cover late WWII BB AA suits...
Or maybe the final design look of the Montana class.....
 
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The thought of the wave-piercing bow for submarines would be valid--even if he's not a submarine officer, he could pitch it as, "Hey, I was just thinking, and realized--if we cut down the deadwood forward, wouldn't our subs have less drag and turn better underwater, like if you cut down the deadwood aft on a surface ship?" That's a simple enough explanation to put the idea in C&R's head, though I doubt it'd be something they'd be able to get into production before the end of the war, since the Gatos are pretty much fully designed already, and the Balao and Tench classes were wartime upgrades of that.

Remember that the Essexes were ordered in multiple batches; you had the ones ordered pre-war as part of the Two-Ocean Navy act, and then you had the later ones built as "long-hull" ships with hurricane bows; IIRC, those were ordered after the outbreak of war. If Thompson floated the deck-edge elevator and angled deck today, it's entirely possible that the latter group would be ordered with those upgrades and come out looking like SCB-125 ships; no guarantees, but C&R pushed hard to get updated designs into production during the war when they wouldn't slow the rate of production--hence the change from the Atlanta-class CLAAs to the Juneau-class CLAAs, and the changeover to the "long hull" Essexes. Indeed, it was even proposed (by King, who made improved AA a top priority at the outbreak of war) that Illinois and Kentucky (and, had they been built, the Montanas) would have their secondary battery arrangement modified, moving the center pair of waist 5"/38 mounts onto the centerline fore and aft, in a variation on the standard USN cruiser secondary arrangement, both increasing the broadside and the end-on fire rate. Again, small changes, but with significant benefits.

Trying to push major future advances is a bad idea. On the other hand, suggesting the Forrest Sherman class destroyer arrangement (with three twin 5"/38s in place of the five singles in the Fletchers) might not go badly--"I know my destroyer captains keep wanting more torpedoes, but don't have anywhere to put them with all those gun mounts. Couldn't we reduce the number of mounts and free up space on the centerline, without giving up guns?"
 
MageOhki said:
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The fundamental problem is that Thompson is yet another officer in the USN. The only thing he brought back with him from the time-traveling event is literally himself. No one else has to take him seriously especially if they are his superiors and/or experts in their field. Unless he is actually doing the mathematics or science himself, there is nothing to distinguish his ramblings and suggestions from every other odd sailor and officer's ramblings.

Edit: What did it take for the torpedo firing solution of the IJN to be changed?

Article:
Despite Captain Nagumo's daily interest and encouragement, I failed to pass the Staff College entrance examinations. Instead, in September 1932 I was appointed an instructor. This may sound puzzling, but such a development was not unusual in the Imperial Navy. My choice of this program meant that I was giving up the chance of a career as a headquarters staff officer to become a specialist.

In the three years following my marriage I had been tackling a private project. I did not discuss its details with anyone, knowing too well the audacity and the possible impact of my studies. I knew, too, that the reaction of my colleagues would be to scoff if they learned of my intentions.

...

My project was completed in mid-1932. It had involved thousands of complicated calculations. In short, I had proved mathematically the faults of Japanese torpedo doctrine and established a new manual. The published results created a sensation in the Imperial Navy.

It is very hard to establish new doctrine in a military organization. Most career officers trained in an old theory are conservative-minded and react unfavorably to anything new. I was exceptionally fortunate. There was practically no objection to my new theory, and the Imperial Navy torpedo manual was in fact scrapped and replaced with a manual based on the results of my work. Thus it was that I came to be assigned to teach my theory at the Staff College.

I still take more pride in my achievement of correcting Japanese torpedo doctrine than in any other activity of my naval career, including my accomplishments in World War II. It is not easy to explain my theory in detail without using many calculations involving algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and calculus. Simply told, however, it evolved in this way.
Source: Japanese Destroyer Captain


How was it discovered in the first place though?

Article:
After graduating from the Yokosuka Specialist School in 1923, I was generally assigned to destroyer duty, and usually as torpedo officer. I studied and trained religiously on the subject of torpedo firing. For almost three years the torpedo manual was my bible. Every week our squadron would go out on torpedo-firing maneuvers. The torpedoes were fired without warheads, as an economy measure, but were set to run just below the target to simulate a direct hit. After three years of intense training and practice, my score was such that I began to have doubts about my marksmanship. I seldom scored any direct hits.

My early reaction at the failures was to berate myself and work harder to improve. I trained frantically until I could tell at a glance through binoculars the distance and speed of the targets. After checking my judgment with instrumental measurement and finding that I was accurate, and still not scoring hits in practice, I began to be suspicious of the Navy's torpedo doctrine.

...

My destroyer was, thus "sunk" many times while I could only stand on the bridge, watch my "fish" miss the target, and grit my teeth. When I observed that other destroyer torpedo scores were as poor as mine, I gradually came to the conclusion that direct hits were little more than pure chance. I began to doubt the basic formula.

The accepted doctrine was to cover a total spread of 20 degrees in firing the eight torpedoes. After careful analysis of all the many factors concerned, I concluded that the 20-degree spread resulted in hits only if my destroyer, describing a hyperbolic curve at 30 knots, released its torpedoes at the peak of the hyperbola, at a target 2,000 meters distant, starting to draw away on an evasive curving course at 20 knots. Over a period of many weeks of maneuvers I discovered that the opposing squadron was apt to start its evasive turning before my ship was ready to release torpedoes. Also I discovered the necessity of considering every element of computation anew, including the 2-second interval between each of the eight torpedoes.
Source: Japanese Destroyer Captain


In other words, the problem was diagnosed about 3 years prior to Hara doing his project. But even then the project took 3 years to finally wrap up and it was under very fortuitous circumstances too. Tameichi Hara also had the fortune to be working for the IJN staff college instead of being on the front lines too. All of this was just for fixing a problem with the IJN's torpedo firing solution and simply coincided with the finalized development and procurement of the Type-93 torpedo.

Thus in order for Thompson to make lasting changes ahead of time, he must do the herculean work of resolving a lot of mathematics and physics without the help of any portable calculators at all. The other way to make changes of course is to gather data from past observations and to parse that data. Obviously it presents a small problem of being able to gather that data if that useful data is in likely enemy hands and the likely friends are not yet officially allied with you.
 
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Skywalker_T-65 said:
Hood will be refit, but it won't be as dramatic as some of these suggestions.
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Realistically, they can fix the structural battle damage, overhaul the engines and the rest of the ship's installations, install British radar sets and most importantly, add an ice cream fountain or two in the ward room and galley.

If they have enough time and depending on how little of the original superstructure is left, rebuilt the bridge superstructure into the desired KGV-like block structure. Built up the quarterdeck a few feet without interfering with Y turret to make it less wet perhaps.

I doubt that the British have enough 5.25" secondary turrets lying around given that several Dido class cruisers were delivered with one or all turrets missing. The US is not going to install 5" and Mark 37 fire control in 1940. Perhaps add another twin 4" AA gun, upgrade the close-in armament with a mix of shipped in pom-poms and 20mm Oerlikon, get rid of the UP launchers. Any changes to the armor scheme will likely take too long for a hurried refit and repair.

Sakuya's Butler said:
To whit: Vice Admiral Ralph Christie, USN (may the fucking bastard forever burn in hell).

1. Pushed forward the Mark 14 Torpedo.
2. Pushed forward the Mark 6 exploder (magnetic).
3. Outright ignored, later censored, any wartime reports on just how bad #1's & #2's service was.
4. Outright canned veteran/seasoned wartime captain(s) that tried to publicly argue the point.
5. Ignored orders(!) and even had orders reversed that were to see the Mark 6 exploder removed and replaced by the older model (which actually worked great) on all submarines under his command.
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Bad example.

1. The Mark 14 was not a bad torpedo, it was just not thoroughly tested and debugged due to secrecy and lack of funds. It remained in use by US submarines until 1980 (!) once fixed.
2. Every torpedo these days uses a magnetic exploder. The Mark 6 magnetic exploder idea was ahead of its time, but again secrecy and lack of money prevented proper testing which would have revealed serious teething problems.
3 - 5. Yes, he did, and he is badly remembered for it. However, this was not a hint for new research or blocking an idea, this was blindly insisting that he made no errors in *his* innovation and as such, a bad example if you want to argue admirals can stop any research they feel like for a decade.

Even if you want to put up the idea of stopping investigations into existing weapon performance as 'nixing research into new ideas' it failed here because of Admiral Lockwood.

Sakuya's Butler said:
Thompson could easily go toe-to-toe with Christie at this point, and not only either countermand him, but also put forwards his *OWN* R&D requests.
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No, he can't actually declare bureaucratic war on BuOrd in general and the Newport Naval Torpedo Station in particular. Not without a hell of a lot of data backing him up. Which he doesn't have.
 
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The biggest problem with the Hoods refit is that unless the RN brought their own armor metal the US is not giving any up.
​
At this time all the armor metal, which is different then the standard steel, is literally all booked for the USN and manufacturing of it is stretched to its limits with the new US Battleships and other ships types. We got none to spare at this time. Not to mention what the Army needs for its stuff.

And Hood IS going to need several plates of her armor replace cause of battle damage. Yes none penetrated but the plates that were hit are now compromised and need replacing.

So no Class A or B armor for the Hood.
 
Vianca said:
The Sherman tank was the cheapest tank the US Government could buy, at that time, there where better designs that could do the same thing, if more costly in production.
Thus I would expect most of such a sketchbook, only to be looked into, from 1947 onwards.
If it happens to also cover late WWII BB AA suits...
Or maybe the final design look of the Montana class.....
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I thought we ended the tank discussion. But you are demonstrating a level of knowledge of tanks that would correlate with seeing "Death Traps" as a valid source and German tank ace kill counts as not, like, inflated by an order of magnitude.

AND THAT SKETCHBOOK IS LITERALLY USELESS.
He is NOT an engineer, not a naval architect, nothing he can put in that book will amount to anything more than doodles. He makes minor suggestions AT BEST.
 
Alright, since this discussion won't seem to die, I've decided to weigh in with my own two cents.

1) There is literally nothing that Thompson can do about the Tanks. Yes, he's a high-ranking Flag Officer, but he's a Navy Man, and the Army has absolutely no reason to listen to him about their equipment. What's more, he's a Carrier Man, making him rather unpopular with the current upper echelons of his own Service, so he's really got no clout to throw around with the Army, at all.

2) Thompson is not an Engineer, either in truth or on his made-up records. Navy R&D has absolutely no reason to give any credence to his ideas about advanced technology and design philosophies that won't be developed for decades yet.

3) While he could introduce some new ideas, particularly in regards to Carriers and possibly their Escorts, he's NOT AN ENGINEER! As such, he would have to start things by going to an Engineer, preferably the Saratoga's, and discussing what he wanted, and maybe offering some advice based on what he knows from the future, coached as simple ideas he had. From there they can work things out together, possibly calling in Halsey or some other COs to help flesh things out, and then present it to Admiral Richards, who may or may not see enough potential in it to pass it along to R&D. That is pretty much the extent of his ability to influence the current technology, as demonstrated earlier by his requests to get the torpedoes tested.
 
Information: Official Staff Communication
  • Staff Post
    • official staff communication Another reminder to keep things on topic. Please. Once again, I like the story @Skywalker_T-65 is writing, and I really don't want to have to hand out threadbans and/or infractions for excessive off topic discussion.

    But that doesn't mean I won't if I have to. I don't really like playing the role of the villain but I will if I have to. Looking at you @Vianca.

    Ominous vaguely-worded warnings aside, this discussion on tanks and future tech and all that really needs to be going somewhere else. Not here.
     
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  • Staff Post
    • And that would be why I put the WoG post.

    Moving back to regularly scheduled stuff: As things go forward, I'm probably going to split between Thompson and Schreiber to keep things going on both fronts and to keep either angle from getting overdone. Not on a basis of alternating chapters (that never works well) but in general.

    Also: Yes, I know the news vis-a-vis KC and the USN CV going to be a Lexington class. No, I do not want to talk about it because I have exactly zero faith they'll do Sara any justice.

    So please, don't bring that in here just because of my personal preference in waifu ship.
     
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