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Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

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Or at least have them suffer significantly less damage than they did originally.
On a side note, I really want to see Schreiber`s backstory of how he got here and what he did until his reveal.
 
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BF110C4 said:
Not so simple.

Savo Island was partly due to overconfidence in the technology, using destroyers with radars unable to give full coverage as pickets. During the Second Naval Battle of Guadacanal Admiral Lee, hands down the best radar operator in the Navy, made some serious misidentification errors both of friendly fire over a destroyer and being unable to recognize a fellow battleship over the enemy's.

The fact is that the technology itself was very new and very gamechanging, and adapting such a groundbreaking tech during a war got a steep learning curve which cost is measured in lives and ships.
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Granted the misidentification thing, you can't fault him for that. Radar back then had no Friend or Foe identification. So he didn't know who was who, he could only guess by the size of the returns and the positions, even then it's quite literally, best guess. That's why he held his fire when he got the target lock on the battleship return, he didn't know if it was Kirishima or South Dakota, until South Dakota got illuminated by the Japanese and proceeded to wail on her. Allowing Admiral Lee and USS Washington to be like this to Kirishima:



Yes I went their.
 
Savo island probably would stay the same. All the ships there had CXAM sets, which tended to be unreliable.
However, moving forward the SG radar became available. These sets were much more reliable and precise, but again were ignored because of the distrust caused by experience with the CXAM.
If any headway can be made with proving the value of the SG sets, then several battles would have much different outcomes.

In Cape Esperance for example, the SG equipped cruiser Helena had established contact with the Japanese fleet long before shooting started, but its reports were ignored.

At First Guadalcanal the same thing happened. Helena and the SG equipped destroyers spotted the Japanese, but were ignored. In fact, one of the most disputed points of that battle is Admiral Callaghan's descision to place his flag aboard the San Francisco, a ship outfitted with the older, more unreliable radar.

And Cavity Magnetrons were developed by the Germans and British simultaneously, just like how the British and Germans developed jet engines simultaneously.
 
Spectre said:
and we have the fact that if Thompson pulls off his original mission (saving battleship row) the cruisers in those fights might have more and bigger backup with them.
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Hell, ABDA might not be the total cluster f**K it was in canon, actually, getting Houston and a few other ships out of the Asiatic fleet wouldn't hurt one bit ETHIER.

Contrary to what some are implying, Pearl Harbor itself... as _sick as this sounds_, _was_ GOOD for the US Navy.

Yes, the loss of the BB's was bad in terms of lives and material. the airfields themselves was _really_ bad. BUT! Anyone who thinks the battleline at Pearl would have made a difference equal or superior to the cost in Ironbottom sound, is high as a kite. THOSE ARE STANDARDS.

NOT the Standard 2 series (NoCal, SoDak, Montanas) (Contrary to some I don't consider the NorCal or SoDak's fast BB's, when you look at the Big Sky's proposed speed, you note something. All 11 were proposed/desgined (didn't happen, I know) to be 27 knots. Gee... sounds a lot like the Standard 21 knot requirement, doesn't it?)or the fast BB's.

Standards have 21 knots, TDS of ... while not _bad_ for design/refit, not great, and in a lot of cases, in desperate need of AA refit in some cases. While, yes, sending the Standards out, might mean a few more kills, it'll mean you'll LOSE a Standard or two, or three, _with_ their crews, and FAR more crew losses than at Pearl. Someone flat out mentioned this (this thread, possibly, in fact), sending the battleline out during Dec 7th, _is_ asking for massive losses. As bad as it sounds, the roughly 4k total 'effective' naval personnel lost at Pearl, would have been easily exceeded if a pair or 3 standards were lost at sea.


Oh, on jet engines? EVERYONE pretty much developed them at the same time (US, UK, Germany). US just didn't fast track them at all. Same with helos.

You know... that's something for James to REALLY push for
Helos for the US started acutally _right now_ or a bit ealier. MASS adoption of the R-4, 'spc for Convoy work, would be horrific for the poor subs. And honestly, the Navy could use those for SAR, BIG time.

Sikorsky R-4 - Wikipedia (Yep. Germany really missed the ball here, so did Russia)
 
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On the topic of weather or not war with Japan does occur I read in a book year ago the Commodore Matthew Perry and the opining of Japan.
At some point the Japanese were going to try for empire the second time. This impulse combined with their victory over the Russians set the stage for the Pacific war.
 
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The radar issue... the only thing I could possibly see to work around it would be more training. Reliability issues were mentioned, and I'm not sure if battleship signatures all sound the same, not to mention that in combat situations, every ship looks like the enemy, except when it isn't. Still, if you could roughly tell apart sides from radar signatures, that would be a huge step forward, at least when you were very sure on the returns.
 
HolyDragoon said:
The radar issue... the only thing I could possibly see to work around it would be more training. Reliability issues were mentioned, and I'm not sure if battleship signatures all sound the same, not to mention that in combat situations, every ship looks like the enemy, except when it isn't. Still, if you could roughly tell apart sides from radar signatures, that would be a huge step forward, at least when you were very sure on the returns.
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Training and specific doctrine for both the CXAM and the SG radar sets that take into account their strengs and weaknesses. Proper operational doctrine does wonder for battle formations and tactics, especially when the operators themselves are not completely sure of the way their tools work.
 
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pjmoyer said:
Sing a song for Sister Sara:


(Ok, so technically Sara didn't get the 5" turrets until after Pearl Harbor - she had 8" turrets before then. Just imagine this picture is from later in the war - I drew it so that it could be applicable to more fics.)
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I have to say, you are a damn good artist, particularly since it's MS Paint, you really know your stuff!
 
... um, no, I don't touch MS Paint. I use Staedtler pigment liners, smooth bristol, a scanner, and Photoshop. This is Inktober, after all.

(also, I do all my work on a Mac.)
 
MageOhki said:
Hell, ABDA might not be the total cluster f**K it was in canon, actually, getting Houston and a few other ships out of the Asiatic fleet wouldn't hurt one bit ETHIER.

Contrary to what some are implying, Pearl Harbor itself... as _sick as this sounds_, _was_ GOOD for the US Navy.

Yes, the loss of the BB's was bad in terms of lives and material. the airfields themselves was _really_ bad. BUT! Anyone who thinks the battleline at Pearl would have made a difference equal or superior to the cost in Ironbottom sound, is high as a kite. THOSE ARE STANDARDS.

NOT the Standard 2 series (NoCal, SoDak, Montanas) (Contrary to some I don't consider the NorCal or SoDak's fast BB's, when you look at the Big Sky's proposed speed, you note something. All 11 were proposed/desgined (didn't happen, I know) to be 27 knots. Gee... sounds a lot like the Standard 21 knot requirement, doesn't it?)or the fast BB's.

Standards have 21 knots, TDS of ... while not _bad_ for design/refit, not great, and in a lot of cases, in desperate need of AA refit in some cases. While, yes, sending the Standards out, might mean a few more kills, it'll mean you'll LOSE a Standard or two, or three, _with_ their crews, and FAR more crew losses than at Pearl. Someone flat out mentioned this (this thread, possibly, in fact), sending the battleline out during Dec 7th, _is_ asking for massive losses. As bad as it sounds, the roughly 4k total 'effective' naval personnel lost at Pearl, would have been easily exceeded if a pair or 3 standards were lost at sea.
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here's the thing, the issue on December 7th is that there is no way the Americans can achieve even air neutrality which means the battleships are sitting ducks against 6 fleet carriers with the best pilots they would have in the war. Even in OTL the Kido Butai was a shadow of its former self, and this is before we take into account the havoc Thompson's going to cause to it both in Pearl and beyond. Also Standards are a lot harder to kill than you think. Arizona was killed by a modified 16 in naval shell dropped from 10,000ft hitting perpendicular on its deck armor, a hit that would be impossible to reproduce outside of another bombing attack, and Oklahoma and West Virginia both took an abnormally high number of torpedo's. Even if one is sunk, there's a good chance most of the crew will survive to fight again.

More to the point at Guadalcanal we had Light Cruisers using guns that were outranged by the type 93 allowing for the torpedo's effective use. The combination improved understanding and use of radar combined with those 14's and 16's are going to play hell with Japanese planning.

also about Savo, given the role Thompson's likely to play isn't there a chance the Japs might run into a problem that looks suspiciously like 3 carriers that weren't around in OTL.
 
Spectre said:
here's the thing, the issue on December 7th is that there is no way the Americans can achieve even air neutrality which means the battleships are sitting ducks against 6 fleet carriers with the best pilots they would have in the war. Even in OTL the Kido Butai was a shadow of its former self, and this is before we take into account the havoc Thompson's going to cause to it both in Pearl and beyond. Also Standards are a lot harder to kill than you think. Arizona was killed by a modified 16 in naval shell dropped from 10,000ft hitting perpendicular on its deck armor, a hit that would be impossible to reproduce outside of another bombing attack, and Oklahoma and West Virginia both took an abnormally high number of torpedo's. Even if one is sunk, there's a good chance most of the crew will survive to fight again.
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Which is _exactly_ why I stated Pearl was a GOOD thing (as you measure 'good' in the sense of "how bad it could get") IF the Battleline had warning and got out?
those ships would have been LOST in deep ocean, and with far more crew loss. That's the point.
More to the point at Guadalcanal we had Light Cruisers using guns that were outranged by the type 93 allowing for the torpedo's effective use. The combination improved understanding and use of radar combined with those 14's and 16's are going to play hell with Japanese planning.
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14/45's still are effectively outranged by the 93 without radar, and even with a slightly better (as someone pointed out CMAX was.. iffy) radar, its' still the learning curve, Spectre. My point wasn't that Savo would go better, that the Standards there (which were the ships in the Harbor, btw...) would _not be justifiable_ given the costs they'd incur. 14"s aren't THAT much longer ranged, and accuracy of those at the ranges to keep them OUT of getting nailed by Long Lance swarm, isn't... the best. These aren't the late war "RADAR MASTER RACE!" Standards/Standard 2/Iowas... would they even be refitted as some were during their repairs?
21 knots. I repeat. 21 knots.

also about Savo, given the role Thompson's likely to play isn't there a chance the Japs might run into a problem that looks suspiciously like 3 carriers that weren't around in OTL.
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That would be the BIGGEST help, yes.
More DD's and CL's, too.
 
MageOhki said:
14/45's still are effectively outranged by the 93 without radar, and even with a slightly better (as someone pointed out CMAX was.. iffy) radar, its' still the learning curve, Spectre. My point wasn't that Savo would go better, that the Standards there (which were the ships in the Harbor, btw...) would _not be justifiable_ given the costs they'd incur. 14"s aren't THAT much longer ranged, and accuracy of those at the ranges to keep them OUT of getting nailed by Long Lance swarm, isn't... the best. These aren't the late war "RADAR MASTER RACE!" Standards/Standard 2/Iowas... would they even be refitted as some were during their repairs?
21 knots. I repeat. 21 knots.
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The standards, however, did have full torpedo defense systems, whereas the cruisers seen in the Solomons did not have any sort of torpedo protection beyond compartmentation. So while the Standards wouldn't have been able to just outrange the Type 93s, they would have had a better chance of tanking them than the cruisers did.

While Nevada and Tennessee likely wouldn't have gotten as extensive refits as they did OTL, and WeeVee didn't have a chance (Colorado and Maryland were barely refitted at all during the war as, with their 16"/45s, they were considered "too valuable" to take off the line), they likely would have gotten the same sort of incremental-upgrade Radar Master Race refits as the fast battleships got during the war, since those could be carried out relatively quickly (a couple of weeks, as opposed to six months for the massive bulges and AA refits).

That would be the BIGGEST help, yes.
More DD's and CL's, too.
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CVs, not so much. Most of the Solomons battles were night actions, and carriers didn't start fighting after dark until the Big E became CV(N)-6 in 1944 with the Navy's first night-fighting air wing.

What would have been very helpful, though, would have been to concentrate CLs in the Solomons region and assign CAs elsewhere; doctrine said night fighting should be done with the fast-firing 6" guns, due to the short engagement ranges, but the fleet was so scattered that we were throwing together 8", 6", and 5" ships into mixed formations. Result: The 5" ships couldn't reach out far enough, the 8" ships couldn't fire quickly enough to deal with rapidly maneuvering targets, and the 6" ships ended up getting confused in the mass of shell splashes. Homogenous groups of CLs would have worked much better.
 
rdfox said:
The standards, however, did have full torpedo defense systems, whereas the cruisers seen in the Solomons did not have any sort of torpedo protection beyond compartmentation. So while the Standards wouldn't have been able to just outrange the Type 93s, they would have had a better chance of tanking them than the cruisers did.

While Nevada and Tennessee likely wouldn't have gotten as extensive refits as they did OTL, and WeeVee didn't have a chance (Colorado and Maryland were barely refitted at all during the war as, with their 16"/45s, they were considered "too valuable" to take off the line), they likely would have gotten the same sort of incremental-upgrade Radar Master Race refits as the fast battleships got during the war, since those could be carried out relatively quickly (a couple of weeks, as opposed to six months for the massive bulges and AA refits).


CVs, not so much. Most of the Solomons battles were night actions, and carriers didn't start fighting after dark until the Big E became CV(N)-6 in 1944 with the Navy's first night-fighting air wing.

What would have been very helpful, though, would have been to concentrate CLs in the Solomons region and assign CAs elsewhere; doctrine said night fighting should be done with the fast-firing 6" guns, due to the short engagement ranges, but the fleet was so scattered that we were throwing together 8", 6", and 5" ships into mixed formations. Result: The 5" ships couldn't reach out far enough, the 8" ships couldn't fire quickly enough to deal with rapidly maneuvering targets, and the 6" ships ended up getting confused in the mass of shell splashes. Homogenous groups of CLs would have worked much better.
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one of the other issues with Savo is that Fletcher pulled his carriers away from the strait whole sale on the morning of the 8th without telling Turner or Crutchley, who we under the impression that Fletcher was backing them up until the transports were offloaded. One of the common ideas thrown around is that had Fletcher stuck around, there's a good chance the Japanese force would have at least been spotted if not attacked while still enroute to the island.
 
Spectre said:
one of the other issues with Savo is that Fletcher pulled his carriers away from the strait whole sale on the morning of the 8th without telling Turner or Crutchley, who we under the impression that Fletcher was backing them up until the transports were offloaded. One of the common ideas thrown around is that had Fletcher stuck around, there's a good chance the Japanese force would have at least been spotted if not attacked while still enroute to the island.
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The force was spotted en route by an Australian floatplane. But Crutchley discounted the report because the pilot reported several seaplane tenders and gunboats, rather than what they actually were, cruisers.
 
Well, if the wiki is anything to go by (it isn't, but humor me), apparently the 2016 Fall Event will introduce KanColle's first USN carrier. My guess is either Enterprise or Lexington (if Nimu's line in confusing a CV for Sara is anything to go by), but the possibility for Sara is still there. This could get interesting.
 
I'd say it's probably Big E. They've got a bit of a tradition of sticking to the more famous foreign ships from each nation, and in terms of CVs it's really just all Enterprise. Hell there's a reason that name became so popular following the war.
 
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