Remove ads

Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

Reader mode
BF110C4 said:
Yeah, Guadalcanal was a serious mistake that basically gave the americans the chance to fight a ground and naval battle in terms that weren't the best for either side but still better than having those same battles in other locations. I can only imagine the nightmare scenario of a counterattack of the scale of the Battle of Savo Island during the first night of the 2nd Marine division assault on Tarawa when the Marines were barely holding their positions and were a strong banzai charge away from being thrown to the sea. Without naval artillery and reinforcements during the next day who knows how many of the leathernecks would have survived?
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...
Jrandom said:
None other than Raizo Tanaka regarded Guadalcanal as a waste to defend, and argued strongly to pull the Japanese defense line back to anchor at Rabual. He was also openly critical of gradually feeding in reinforcements, fighting the decisive naval battles around the island, and how the logistics were handled, His outspoken criticism was why he was blamed for the failure of the campaign and put on the beach in Burma at the start of 1943, never to hold major command at sea again during the war.


Yes, Tarawa would have been far more difficult without naval gunfire and air support. What would have happened if IJN submarines were given a no limit hunting license on the invasion fleet? I mean, I-175 got in and nailed an escort carrier, then slipped away unharmed. What would have happened if a group of them went after the warships and transports? As it was, the Marines were in a world of hurt, when the low tide left them more than a half mile from the beach, because the Higgens boats couldn't get them over the exposed reefs. The Japanese forces were well dug in, and even the naval air and gunfire support available didn't do enough to suppress the opposition they faced on the beach.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...
actually the IJN wouldn't be able to do much. Remember that the USN pre war plan was for something like 15 fleet carriers, the full battleline, and all the pre-war cruisers and destroyers plus all the Cleveland/Baltimore/ fletcher swarm we'd built to that point.

The issue Guadalcanal created fir the IJN was that they gutted the entire South Pacific front trying to retake the island. After February 43 the allies had complete control of the airspace over New Guinea, and because of surface loses (for example half the IJN Heavy cruisers were sunk or heavily damaged by mid November) the 8th fleet was little more than an oversized desron. Its largely the reason (along with the lessons the allies learned from watchtower) that Cartwheel was as much of a cake walk as it was.
 
I've been reading a very interesting book called Kogun. It an evaluation of the Imperial Japanese army during the pacific war written by a Colonel Saburo Hayashi who was in the japanese general staff. It a pretty interesting read especially considering it was written for a japanese readership. It pretty interesting so far. The copy I have is a translated first edition that was published by the Marine Corps Association.
 
Last edited:
Spectre said:
you really can't. Bases like Rubaul and Truk are to well defended or to far into Japanese territory at this point. The USN strategy was all about playing the long game, only for the combination of strategic necessity combined with multiple egos deciding to compare dick sizes to force us into an invasion we weren't ready to pull off. Thankfully the IJN high command had next to no strategic intelligence and poured all their resources into retaking a insignificant, not to mention unusable island.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

Well IOTL, the Japanese did not attack Rabaul until January 23rd, using the force organization that took Guam. I suspect the same is playing out in our AU with the Japanese timetable not quite at the 'secure Rabaul and push into the Solomons/New Guinea to anchor the SE defensive line and protect Truk' step.

Certainly if Second Wake turns into a disaster for the IJN, they will have to either write Wake off, or pull troops and ships from somewhere to take Wake.

At this point in time, the long game is the way to go for the USN and the longer we can keep the Japanese diverted with the specter of Wake Island the better. Time is very much not on Tokyo's side, and they have a surplus of missions compared to their force structure that have to be wrapped up before the USN can build up to a point where they seriously challenge the current Japanese superiority in the Pacific.
 
SisterJeanne said:
Certainly if Second Wake turns into a disaster for the IJN, they will have to either write Wake off, or pull troops and ships from somewhere to take Wake.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...
And Wake was considered to vital too keep in American hands (The Japanese were convinced we'd take a shot directly at Tokyo the first chance we got, and without Wake in Japanese hands theres a several hundred mile hole in their imaginary defensive lines we could use to hit Japan without them ever finding out until its too late.) We both know what choice they'll make.
 
asqwerty3345 said:
And if the US just doesn't completely pull out of Wake, then they will pour everything that can and turn it into an island fortress that I doubt the Japanese would be able to take without a massive commitment of resources.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...
Not likely. Remember everything I said about the Japanese at Guadalcanal throwing men and material at a strategically useless objective. That goes double for Wake. It's at the end of a very vulnerable supply chain, and isn't close enough to anything to justify the expenses
 
"Wake Stands, Tokyo Falls" makes for a pretty decent propaganda slogan, come to think of it.
 
Spectre said:
Not likely. Remember everything I said about the Japanese at Guadalcanal throwing men and material at a strategically useless objective. That goes double for Wake. It's at the end of a very vulnerable supply chain, and isn't close enough to anything to justify the expenses
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

Also at this point in the war, Japan has superior naval forces and the initiative. If the Japanese really really want to take Wake, they can take Wake by throwing their whole battle line and the Kido Butai at it. However, monofocusing on Wake comes with substantial opportunity costs. For instance, if this attack gets smashed by Sara and E, it is likely that Fourth Fleet will move from Guam to take Wake in the next attack instead of taking Rabaul, which means that their window of opportunity to secure Rabaul and therefore establish a perimeter in the Solomons will be substantially narrowed. Plus the IJN also needs to secure the Phillipines, and key objectives in and around the DEI like Borneo/Java/Singapore.

Japan cannot afford slippage in their timetable and losses of ships because come mid to late '42 their lead in terms of combat power in the Pacific will evaporate (leaving carrier losses aside, the numbers will be 6-5 CVs (discounting Wasp) with the Essexes about to arrive (one in December '42 then six in 1943)). Barring them smashing the Yorktown triplets, Wasp, and Sister Sara/Lady Lex with minimal carrier losses of their own by say November '42, they won't have the strategic initiative to do more than grimly hang on in the face of a wall of steel. By Summer 1943 it will be all over save for the casualty toll since the USN will have expanded to the point where Japan is doomed (seriously, at that point the USN had 12 fleet carriers commissioned by November '43 with 7 more commissioned out of Newport News, Brooklyn, Philadelphia,and Fore River in '44).

So if they have to put off Rabaul until Summer '42 because the troops and ships that took it historically get diverted to Third Wake, the USN counterattack will be starting from there versus Guadalcanal.
 
Last edited:
Plus the IJN also needs to secure the Philippines, and key objectives in and around the DEI like Borneo/Java/Singapore.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

Wouldn't REALLY throw a wrench into the works, that because of moving Fourth Fleet and other IJA resources to deal with Wake, and the attendant cascade effect of other forces being moved to fill in on other high priority objectives , Bataan, Corregidor and Ft Drum hold out until August or September?​
 
Jrandom said:

Wouldn't REALLY throw a wrench into the works, that because of moving Fourth Fleet and other IJA resources to deal with Wake, and the attendant cascade effect of other forces being moved to fill in on other high priority objectives , Bataan, Corregidor and Ft Drum hold out until August or September?​
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

Bataan definitely not, since by this point the IJA has already landed in Luzon (OTL landings started on the 10th and 12th of December with a major reinforcement convoy on the 20th). Once the land campaign starts Bataan, Manila, Corregidor, and the other forts like Drum are pretty much doomed since Japan had sufficient force allocated to overrun Luzon.

Taking Manila was one of the top priorities of the early stages of the conquests and the troops/ships allocated there are way too far out of the region to be diverted to the Central Pacific for Wake. Which is why I suggested 4th Fleet and the IJA units that took Guam and then Rabaul would get diverted to Wake first since I believe the Japanese put a higher priority on Wake to plug that 'gap' in their defenses than Rabaul to screen Truk and the Carolines.
 
Last edited:
Another question is how bad is the morale of the japanese is going to be if they lose 2nd Wake? Many of the stupid choiced they made were at least partially motivated by the huge success of Pearl and the smashing blows they did against the fleets fo all the western powers operating in the Pacific and Asia during the first few months of the Pacific War. Right now they just lost that justification for the overconfidence of their naval command, maybe to the point that Yamamoto's usual threat of quitting in case of not having his way will be neutralized so its at least possible that the japanese will lose the nerve regarding some of the most involved offensive operations of this period.
 
Running off my readings, it gets written off as a fluke and ignored. The sheer overweening arrogance of the naval staff in Tokyo is hard to understate.
 
BF110C4 said:
Another question is how bad is the morale of the japanese is going to be if they lose 2nd Wake? Many of the stupid choiced they made were at least partially motivated by the huge success of Pearl and the smashing blows they did against the fleets fo all the western powers operating in the Pacific and Asia during the first few months of the Pacific War. Right now they just lost that justification for the overconfidence of their naval command, maybe to the point that Yamamoto's usual threat of quitting in case of not having his way will be neutralized so its at least possible that the japanese will lose the nerve regarding some of the most involved offensive operations of this period.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

About the only operation that I can definitely see getting canned is the Indian Ocean raid/strike on Ceylon in early 1942 (which was a historical mistake on their part). A early carrier battle at Second Wake (barring Hiryu and Kaga sinking E and Sister Sara for minimal damage taken) will lock down the bulk of their carrier forces to counter the USN in the Pacific rather than putz around in the Indian Ocean. This is even more true if one or more of the IJN carriers present goes down, since the Japanese know that in a month or so Yorktown will arrive in the Pacific with Hornet soon to follow. Although Japanese reporting of ship kills was...overoptimistic...at best.

About the only thing that could pull additional IJN ships to the DEI is if that campaign really runs into trouble thanks to the Asiatic Fleet/Force Z, or the attack on Malaya stalls out before Singapore is captured.

Basically the IJN's strategic priorities are in order #1: Protect the Home Islands (hence taking Guam and Wake to establish defensive outposts, also you want to KANTAI KESSEN! the USN to destroy them as a strategic threat), #2: Secure the oilfields of the DEI (the Phillipines to secure sea lanes, Borneo for the fields proper, Java and Singapore to shield the DEI from counterattack from Ceylon and Western Australia), #3: Expand the perimeter in the Pacific (this would be Rabaul/New Guinea to shield Truk and the Carolines, followed by pushing down the Solomons to Fiji to cut sea lanes between the USA and Australia/New Zealand).
 
The other way a lack of japanese overconfidence can have an effect on the war effort is in their tactics, Yamamoto and his croonies were so confident that the americans would dance to the tunes of their overly complex multi-staged Midway plan that the war games performed based on their plans declared illegal any movement that might point to anything but absolute strategic surprise and complete tactical domination.

After this battle I doubt the IJN is going to assume that the enemy will be so accomodating as to arrive at the correct time and place to be slaughtered in proper order so what chances would less complex tactical planning and a more honest effort to improve fleet intelligence would have?
 
Current plan, provided something job-related doesn't crop up and keep me from doing it, is to write tomorrow. If, again a big if, everything goes right...maybe update. Maybe.

It helps that I've been reliving my childhood via-youtube to get the muse cooperating.



I'll be the first to admit it hasn't aged well, but the old Discovery Wings documentaries were my thing as a kid. Since sucky lungs and history thing meant watching these were better than going outside.
 
BF110C4 said:
more honest effort to improve fleet intelligence would have?
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

This is worthy of hysterical laughter.
These are some things quoted from Hagakure and other famous Japanese works of military/rulership literature, as I've seen in Shogun 2 quotes, which make this very much an absolute impossibility.

"The way of the warrior is death. This means choosing death whenever there is a choice between life and death. It means nothing else."

"To perceive victory when it is known to all is not really skilful… It does not take much strength to lift a hair, it does not take sharp eyes to see the sun and moon, it does not take sharp ears to hear the thunderclap."

"Beginning is easy - Continuing is hard."

"If a man does not investigate into the matter of bushido daily, it will be difficult for him to die a brave and manly death."

"One should make his decisions within the space of seven breaths."

"A real man does not think of victory or defeat. He plunges recklessly towards an irrational death. By doing this, you will awaken from your dreams."

Do you know what this all sums up to? Gambler Lemming Train Trying For Suicide By Enemy.
Because they refuse to bother with noticing the obvious things, insist on continuing no matter what, make hasty (rash) decisions, and actively try to get killed in the stupidest ways they can find.

EDIT: One wonders how, if the way of a warrior is to choose death whenever it is possible to choose, they did not all choose to starve themselves to death on purpose. (EDIT 2: Oh right, Operation Starvation could have done this, so the Japanese military did in fact try to choose it.)
 
Last edited:
BF110C4 said:
After this battle I doubt the IJN is going to assume that the enemy will be so accomodating as to arrive at the correct time and place to be slaughtered in proper order so what chances would less complex tactical planning and a more honest effort to improve fleet intelligence would have?
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

It couldn't hurt for them to try something closer to reality-based planning. That said, they still tried incredibly complex tactical planning after Midway, specifically at Leyte Gulf and also off Guadalcanal the night Washington sunk Kirishima (three tactical units crisscrossing each other in the dark, really?).

As well the time to get your excrement collated to fix major flaws in your doctrine, officer training and fleet intelligence is not after the shooting starts and the countdown clock on 'time remaining until the USN becomes stronger than we can hope to fight' starts counting down rapidly. That particular ship has sailed and the IJN was not set up to digest and absorb lessons learned to make needed changes in a hurry. Remember this is the bunch that tried their best to hide what happened at Midway from their own superiors.

I suspect that self delusion will kick in and they will say 'oh, bad luck happened' as an excuse for Second Wake just like the excuse for Coral Sea was "it was the Concubine's kids" in reference to CarDiv 5.
 
SisterJeanne said:
It couldn't hurt for them to try something closer to reality-based planning. That said, they still tried incredibly complex tactical planning after Midway, specifically at Leyte Gulf and also off Guadalcanal the night Washington sunk Kirishima (three tactical units crisscrossing each other in the dark, really?).

As well the time to get your excrement collated to fix major flaws in your doctrine, officer training and fleet intelligence is not after the shooting starts and the countdown clock on 'time remaining until the USN becomes stronger than we can hope to fight' starts counting down rapidly. That particular ship has sailed and the IJN was not set up to digest and absorb lessons learned to make needed changes in a hurry. Remember this is the bunch that tried their best to hide what happened at Midway from their own superiors.

I suspect that self delusion will kick in and they will say 'oh, bad luck happened' as an excuse for Second Wake just like the excuse for Coral Sea was "it was the Concubine's kids" in reference to CarDiv 5.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...
Yeah, I suspected as much, but hope springs eternal. At least Yamamoto is going to lose his status of 'cannot afford for him to quit'.
 
Last edited:
Always Late said:
Hasn't aged well. Yeah. That's... that's one way to describe it.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

Hey, I warned you. And I never said it was objectively good by modern standards :V

(this being said, the old Wings documentaries are 30 years old, depending on the episode. They started airing in '88.)


I like Luftwaffe mostly for nostalgia reasons. I know it isn't good and hasn't aged well and so on and so forth. It was still my childhood, so I'll still watch it when I need a nostalgia kick.

On the other hand:



Wings FILTHY COMMIE EDITION of the Red Star is more interesting. Not because it's necessarily better, but for the same reason as watching something like Victory at Sea. This was made right at the fall of the Soviet Union, so the context makes it more interesting. Since you're seeing what people knew at the time and what they extrapolated at the time that turned out to be wrong or misinformation.

As a historian, it's interesting for that, even if the material is outdated and all. Like my nuke book written back in the...

*goes to check*

Late '60s. Interesting view into the past.

(since I am now out of fast food, and admittedly into retail since no one is hiring teachers right now, I'm going to write today to celebrate)
 
Deus said:
Two words: Doolittle Raid.

True that it have nothing to do with Wake but it definitely have something to do with a very angry hornet unloading her stingers of B-25s.
Click to expand...
Click to shrink...

He means the IJN was convinced that the US would do what they'd do - launch an invasion at the first chance they got,damn the logistics, not drop bombs.
 
Reader mode
You must login or register to reply here.
Remove ads
Back
Top