[]Scientific Focus: Despite the importance of prestige achievements, far more science can be done with an unmanned program for far cheaper. The main goals of the overall program will thus rest in the launch of probes well outside of the earth's gravity, with an audacious mission such as a lunar sample return. Current capabilities are sufficient for such an approach, and it would likely contribute the most to the sciences, but it has its major limitations in a lack of promise and thus a lack of additional funding. (No Funding Changes)
[]Development of Near-Earth Technologies: While the capability to send probes everywhere would be well and good, there is no reason to limit ourselves there. Economic activity in space has been theorized several times, and a number of stations can be launched for both military and civilian purposes. This will focus the program on near-term goals, but as developments will have already been made, a secondary unmanned program will also be initiated. (Additional 50 RpT, Docking in Orbit by 1965, 10 Orbital inhabitants by 1970)
[]Moonshot: Talking of an expectation of a manned moon excursion will raise technical doubts and several broader challenges, but the Union stands ready to attempt it. The Politicians are more than happy to allocate some additional funding towards the development of rockets and their further utilization for a limited manned excursion. In theory, if Korolev is correct, developing the heavy rockets used for this project will enable the completion of several smaller initiatives without issue and for a lower cost. Glushko has even agreed with him, though he has placed more emphasis on a sizeable standardized system. (Additional 100 RpT, Moon Landing by 1970) (Projects Changed)
Hrm. I have to say, I am not super happy with the Army being blamed for the failure to get to orbit first. Malenkov (and OOC us) and Glushko were more at fault.
But really the issue is that the Army is the main customer of the rocket industry. And now that the Army has been run off and taken Yangel with them, coordination between our rocketry assets and their rocketry assets will be harder, and Soviet weapons and civilian launch vehicles will suffer. Also, we must ask what we want the rocketry program to even do now it is more of an MNKh-only problem.
So what civilian utility do rockets have? Well, ground observation (for weather sats, for example) and communications are super important and can add enormous value to the Soviet economy. Blue-sky research (including landing probes on other planets) has important, if hard to quantify benefits for the economy. And there is real value in scoring propaganda wins, not only as a way of scoring political points for the Union and the ministry, but also in firing up young students to apply themselves to a wide variety of science and engineering fields. We could probably achieve all of those things with fairly modest investments.
But then we need to ask what went wrong with the space program so far? Other than bad luck, two things have been consistently singled out in updates:
1) Glushko struggling with low resources and unhappy with the directions given to him from above.
2) The R7M being barely adequate and an offense to Glushko's sensibilities.
We've also not prioritized rocketry for resources or for dice, and other than over-investing in rocket factories early on, we mostly let the sector coast.
Personally, I am fairly satisfied with the R7M - the full 5 core/3 stage version will be very capable for the late 50s/early 60s. It is a shame that the vehicle and Sputnik weren't ready for primetime earlier, but that failure is probably down to Malenkov/us not giving the engineers the resources needed to achieve those goals earlier. But are my hopes of being able to delay a major rocket design until 1962 or 1964 tenable?
If nothing else, I am thinking that politically, it isn't. The Supreme Soviet wants glorious space race victories it seems, and since we chose to back Glushko in the previous vote, delaying a major rocket design will cause serious political issues between Voz and the man Voz has backed to deliver those space race victories. Glushko, bluntly put, always wanted a giant rocket, because he is an engineer, and he knows that from an engineering standpoint, the bigger the rocket, the more efficient it is. Also, Glushko is a giant space nerd who wants to send people to the moon.
And with the program we are overseeing being cut off from the Army, piggybacking on their development of smaller rockets for ICBMs and IRBMs just got a whole lot more difficult, so we have less reasons to want to lean towards the smaller end of the rocket scale anyway.
So I am thinking that there are sound reasons to go for the moonshot here. It comes with an extra 100RpT and it means that we are pursuing policies that our chief rocket engineer backs, rather than fighting against the man leading the program.
Developing the large rockets that Glushko wants even comes with upsides for other, more interesting programs. Interplanetary probes launched by a big rocket can be far, far more capable - one of the things that troubled Soviet interplanetary missions in OTL is that the lack of high-energy upper stages, lower-mass electronics or superheavy rockets meant that for missions to most planets, they couldn't get worthwhile probes to the destination. Space stations are far cheaper and more effective if you can launch the station in bigger chunks. Earth-orbiting observation platforms and communications satellites can be far more capable when launched by larger rockets. More eager young space cadets can actually get to go into space and do useful things with the kinds of efficient space bus that large rockets enable (which helps motivate those eager young space cadets, and those motivated engineers and scientists will be solving other problems in the course of their careers as well).
The downside of going for the moonshot is the time limit. Even with far better electronics and textile manufacturing than the Soviet Union (advanced textiles being needed for good space suits), the US incurred enormous costs in order to land men on the moon in 1969, rather than 1975. Waiting just a few years would have enabled far better technologies to be utilized at far lower prices than the OTL Apollo program. Even the more advanced Soviet Union of the quest would incur significant extra difficulties in pushing for a moon landing by 1970.
IMO, the program we want to pursue in the 1960s would be the same regardless of the goal we picked - we need heavy launchers (of around about Falcon Heavy class or better) lofting increasingly sophisticated satellites, interplanetary probes and manned vehicles. We need high quality, advanced electronics to make those payloads work. We need a space station (preferably several so that the people running experiments the effect of Martian levels of artificial gravity aren't interfering with the experiments done in zero gee and so on), an orbital propellant depot and orbital assembly of things like moonships and eventually we want a permanent moon base (though that last may be beyond the time this quest will cover). The question is the most efficient path to achieving those goals?
In OTL, the NASA of 1960 was planning to take a similar course forwards, but the Kennedy moon goal (plus a string of Soviet space firsts, Kennedy getting martyred and the former senator who forced Eisenhower to create NASA getting made prez piling on pressure to actually MEET that goal) led to the pre-existing NASA infrastructure and most other US space plans being sacrificed on the altar of Apollo. The result was a propaganda victory and an agency that had destroyed itself in the race to achieve that victory. To put it bluntly, we don't need to make the same mistakes as the Americans of OTL.
By contrast, in OTL the Soviet space program was pretty much a military program with some fun spin-offs and the Soviets didn't even take the American moon program seriously until 1964, at which point catching up was an exercise in extreme optimism. While Korolev tried, realistically the Soviets were starting too late, and couldn't have managed a landing until 1975 or 1976. We don't need to make the mistakes of the OTL Soviets either.
With setting a goal of reaching the moon by 1970 now, we'd have 12 years. That is a doable schedule. And if we were able to keep the moon program from cannibalizing the larger space program, we could potentially end up with an efficient and effective program that not only delivered propaganda wins, but also achieved science and telecommunications benefits at rock bottom prices due to economies of scale. And you know, Glushko will be happy.
The issue is, are we willing to spend precious resources on rocketry and spend political capital defending the inevitable hiccups of the program? Historically we've done well on the latter at least...
TL;DR, I am torn between the near-earth focus and the moonshot. IMO the scientific focus is too conservative, and thus can be dispensed with.
[]Determine the Next Launcher: The R7M is a perfectly functional launcher, but it is one that has been superseded by a number of current technologies and even in its quad core configuration it has been found to be lacking. The new engines under development by Glusko and Korolev both have promise for different stages, and the construction of a dedicated plant for the new rocket will enable a radical redesign of the old formula, with several improvements in metallurgy and design theory. (1 Dice) (Subvote)
[]R7M Interplanetary Boost Stage: The construction of a dedicated third stage on a small sustainer engine should be capable of launching a number of interplanetary payloads without too much difficulty. This wouldn't allow for at all sizable payloads to be used, but it will be more than capable of achieving a number of prestigious firsts. (1 Dice) (Expected Project Cost 5RpT)
[]Start Luna-Probes: Sputnik-type probes are more than mature enough for their utilization for single-way missions around the moon. By stripping out the re-entry equipment and launching with a quad-core R7M configuration with an extended second stage, basic impactors and flybys will be available on a rushed time frame. (1 Dice) (Subvote)
[]Adapt Sputnik Capsules: While not suited for manned utilization in the slightest, a small cosmonaut can be placed into a remodeled compartment and theoretically sent into orbit with a recovery. This would be one of the least comfortable rides possible and practically require an independent parachute landing to maintain any degree of safety, but it is theoretically possible, and, most importantly fast. (1 Dice) (Expected Project Cost 10RpT)
[]Manned Capsule Program: The R7M, in its maximal configuration, can launch a heavier proper capsule into orbit with a far greater degree of safety than using the same system for a man as for a dog. This will involve a stricter testing regime for the R7 system itself, but it will also enable it to easily reach a number of targets previously thought to be non-viable. (1 Dice) (Expected Project Cost 20RpT)
[]R7M-PKA Program: The PKA program is far further along than anything new, and is capable of a controlled orbital descent in theory. By doing a radical restructuring of the R7M launcher and adding the PKA in line as a third stage, it should be possible to do an orbital excursion without anything new being created. The risks involved are also more studied, and there are already experienced pilots willing to make the flight. (1 Dice) (Expected Project Cost 20RpT)
IMO we definitely DEFINITELY want the R7M interplanetary boost stage. The science benefits and engineering experience we could gain from such a project makes it absolutely worthwhile, and even if we start developing a new rocket now, we'll still be using the R7M as our main LV for some time yet... And even once we move on to other rockets, the interplanetary boost stage may still be useful for missions launched by them as well.
The Luna probes also sound like a good investment. Propaganda glory, encouragement to improve the electronics industry and science all in one neat package!
I am unsure about the choice between a manned capsule program and the R7M-PKA... The reports on the PKA have consistently sounded a little too good to be true to me. But if the engineers just rolled well behind the scenes, it could be an extremely valuable foundation to build on.
I am also unsure if we should start developing a new LV right now...
Definitely the former, OTL the USSR had basically 20% of its GDP tied up in military spending. For reference, the US with its bloated budget is only around 3%. The military also has first dibs on technological innovations and will frequently classify it, making the rest of the economy lag behind. OTL they also consumed 90% of the ICs produced in the USSR, and practically all yhe high quality ones. The military is an enormous drain on the economy and decisively contributed to stagnation.
There's a couple things to note here: during the Cold War the USA was certainly not spending 3% of its GDP on the military! The actual spend was between a high of 17.4% (in 1953) and a low of 5.47% (in 1979) of GDP,
see here. Second is that both the USA and the Soviet Union had reasons to exaggerate the Soviet military budget (for the USA, because it justified more resources for the American military and intelligence services, for the Soviets because it allowed them to blame the USA for problems that were actually of their own making). So... Research any claims about Soviet military spending with a few hills of salt (for example a common mistake that was made both accidentally and on purpose was to calculate the Soviet military spend by figuring out what all those men an equipment would cost the American economy to field, then comparing the size of that number to the size of the overall Soviet economy that had been calculated according to what manpower and materials costed the
Soviet economy - but things like the hourly wage, the cost of steel and so on
weren't the same in the Soviet and American economies, so a comparison like that was very much an apples-to-melons comparison). Realistically, the Soviet military may have been consuming over 50% of Soviet GDP during Stalin's last years, 20-25% during the 60s (when the US was spending over 10% of its GDP on the military) and 10-15% in the 80s.
Also, it isn't fair to blame the Soviet military-industrial complex for making technological innovations secret - that wasn't behavior restricted to the military industrial enterprises, but rather a scourge that infected the entire Soviet bureaucracy. All information was made secret if some bureaucrat could get away with it, even if he were running a yarn factory using Tsarist-era machinery, because information was above all a weapon in the constant bureaucratic turf war that was Soviet politics.
And while it is correct to say that the military was an enormous drain on the economy of the Soviet Union, it was an enormous drain on the US economy too. The Cold War was enormously wasteful by nature. However, in neither case was the military industrial complex the WORST drain on their respective economies and for the most part, the military was generally a declining burden, in relative terms (or in other words, not a problem that tended to get worse over time). Unlike for example the Soviet problems with over-investment in expensive infrastructure products and the out-of-control agriculture subsidies of the Gorbachev era.
It MAY be useful for Voz to mount an attack on the Army's budget and the military-industrial complex, but don't expect some vast trove of treasure to be locked behind their bureaucratic defenses.
fasquardon