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Attempting to Fulfill the Plan MNKh Edition
- Thread starter Blackstar
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- Alt. History Users' Choice!
Voted best in category in the Users' Choice awards.
Aka the workers of the world aren't just going to break their chains with a fancy anthem.
DivineAlM
The Chuuni Guy Who Thinks His A Hadou
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Was rereading stuff and found this. Turkey apparently takes the role of Yugoslavia as the creator of the non-aligned movement. Though I do believe while Turkey is nominally neutral they're more Soviet leaning that American leaning. I'd like to know more about this movement, it might be interesting though it's more or less bound to lose some teeth due to lacking India I believe. Wonder who it's members are.
We know that Sweden, Egypt and Turkey are the big members, but there's also Iran and Afghanistan, probably along with Iraq, SA and other Arabian states, rest of Scandinavia bar Norway, bunch of African states as per OTL, and probably some South American states as observers at least.
Also, Turkey is very much neutral-neutral, it makes them a lot of money to be. Frankly, going back to the discussion about economies higher, it's possible Turkey is among the top 10.
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plotvitalnpc
Once more walking the path of the catgirl.
Well, the thing is, none of the nuclear reactors we've built this plan are producing power yet. Nuclear power autodice give the result during the next plan. Our current nuclear power supply is the plants we built last plan.
I think it semi-depends on Oilshock happening. If Oilshock goes ahead then we can probably turn on the money tap and break out 4 nuclear die next plan, if it doesn't then we are in a weird place because we might want to be cheap again to prevent getting punched n the face by the oil crisis, but that might mean we won't have the money for the 4th nuclear dice so there is no point finishing Atommash 4. That's a lot of ifs though and we might do it anyway.
I mean we're also having these issues because the nuclear production comes into effect next plan I believe. So we'll be getting all that electricity later rather than now. It's the downside of nuclear being far more complex and expensive than coal or gas.
I think we can spare two heavy die over three years - my interest is not simply in boosting our electricity but taking Atomash international going into the late 80s and early 90s. The Atomash projects also suggest that supporting them will increase the amount of experimental reactors made, and thus progress towards the holy grail of a SMR.
plotvitalnpc
Once more walking the path of the catgirl.
Well, the reason Atommash 4 dice this plan would have resulted in more experimental reactors is that the atommash expansion would have flat out started serialized production a year late for the start of the plan if we finished it year 1, meaning our reactor builders needed to do something else for a year or two before coming back to building VVER-1000 based powerplants.
Are we ahead or behind modern day Rosatom?
Black star says we need the oil crisis though for it to destroy unsustainab practices we are doing.
Cannon Omake: Two sides of the same sea: Turkish-Soviet relations from the 20s to the 70s
New
Terminator57
Southern trees bear a strange fruit
Here's a new diplomatic omake named "Two sides of the same sea: Turkish-Soviet relations from the 20s to the 70s", I hope you will like it.
With the implosion of the Ottoman Empire - as a result of the actions of the nationalities making up the empire and the wishes of the victors of the First World War - and the emergence of the Soviet Union from the ashes of the Tsarist Empire, it could be said that relations between today's two historical formations, Turkey and the Soviet Union, were able to start on a new footing, freed - at least in diplomatic relations - from the weight of past conflicts.
While the scale and volume of economic activities are unprecedented today, thanks to Turkey's role as a hub for Eurasian trade and its leading role in circumventing the customs duties and other sanctions implemented by the Ashbrook administration against the Soviet Union, their existence is not entirely new.
Indeed, the two countries maintained important economic relations throughout the last century, even when Turkey went from being an occasional ally of the Soviet Union to an interested neutral country. In fact, the history of Turkey's economic development could not be written without reference to the Soviet loans, the transfer of know-how, the barter agreements and then the exchanges in national currencies that preceded the very important 1964 agreement that the two parties signed in Ankara on September 18 of that year.
It could be said that these new economic relations began as early as the gestation of the new state and nation of Turkey. Indeed, during the Turkish War of Independence, which pitted the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal against the victorious allied powers of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War and the army of the Ottoman Sultan, in the midst of a civil war and a succession of inter-state conflicts, Ataturk's movement and government received considerable support from the Bolsheviks, who were waging their own existential war against the White forces.
Thus, in the terrible conditions of the civil war, the Bolshevik government provided financial support to the struggling Ankara government, which represented an alternative power center in Anatolia more in line with Bolshevik ideology to the Ottoman administration present until then. During the War of Independence, the Bolsheviks also sent gold and weapons to the Ankara government.
Later, following the Moscow Agreement of March 16, 1921, the Soviets pledged 10 million rubles a year to the Turkish government. In May 1922, the first trade agreement between the parties was signed. In 1925, Vnestorgbank opened a branch in Istanbul. With the signing of the Trade and Navigation Agreement in March 1927, the volume of trade doubled, but as the Soviet Union moved towards collectivization policies, the agreement became problematic and some of its articles were amended in 1931. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's long visit to Russia in 1932 resulted in the first substantial cooperation and financing agreement between the two sides. The Soviets granted an interest-free loan of $10 million, to be repaid in twenty years from Turkish exports. This loan was then used to build two textile factories in Nazilli and Kayseri, whose engineers were trained in the Soviet Union. Soviet technicians were involved in building the factories and training the staff on site.
The Turkish delegation, impressed by what they had seen of Soviet industrialization and having launched a policy of statism in their country to meet the challenges of the Great Depression, decided to prepare an industrialization plan. The first five-year plan was drafted with the help of Soviet experts and published in 1934. During the Second World War and its aftermath, there was little activity or improvement in Turkish-Soviet economic relations, with the exception of the Çayırova glass factory, which was set up with Soviet credit.
This situation began to change in the 1950s, when Turkey shifted to a planning-based development model that favored heavy industry, but also as a result of the meteoric rise of its Soviet neighbor and Comecon. In urgent need of financing and technology, Süleyman Demirel's center-right developmentist government turned first to the Soviet Union. In a second phase, this need for financing was partly covered by his geostrategic move to establish Turkey as an intermediary in intra-Comecon trade. Indeed, since India's inclusion in Comecon following the Indian revolution of 1947, the latter has specialized as a supplier of raw materials such as cotton, followed by industrial products from the second half of the 1970s. However, due to the difficulties of overland transport between socialist India and the Soviet Union, trade had to be conducted exclusively by sea, with Indian goods passing through Turkish ports and roads once they had crossed the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal, before being unloaded in Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, to be transformed into finished products (cotton garments, for example) inland. This would gradually generate substantial revenues from its transshipment operations: revenues which would then be reinvested in Turkey's development, complementing bilateral trade with the Soviet Union - but also with other regional players such as Egypt and Iraq.
It was against this backdrop that Oleg Bogomolov, Head of Foreign Trade for the Middle East, visited Turkey in 1966. During this visit, the Soviets undertook to finance and provide technical assistance for Turkish investments in heavy industry and energy. Turkey received a $300 million loan "for the construction of steel plants in İskenderun as well as the Seydişehir aluminum plant, the Aliağa oil refining plant and the Bandırma sulfuric acid plant". Five years later, two further agreements were signed to improve economic relations and advance scientific and technical cooperation.
The soviet Russians will help build the Arpaçay dam, expand the İskenderun steel plant and the Seydişehir aluminum plant. A thermal power plant will be built in Orhaneli. A Black Sea oil refinery project was also discussed. In all these important agreements for Turkey's industrialization, Turkey repaid its loans by exporting goods to the Soviet Union, mainly traditional agricultural products.
In 1972, the parties signed a further agreement to modify the terms of payment, with the result that at least part of the payments were to be made in freely convertible currencies, and deliveries of goods were to be made at the current prices of the main world markets for the corresponding goods, which were to be expressed in freely convertible currencies.
These existing economic links, payment models and modes of cooperation laid the foundations for the decisive agreement signed in September 1973. The Soviet Union was to sell natural gas to Turkey from 1976, via Romania and Bulgaria. The term of the agreement, which provided for automatic renewal every five years, was 25 years. The price of the initial quantity of 5.5 million cubic meters was to be determined by BOTAŞ and SOYUSGAZ. Payments, as in previous agreements, were to be made through exports of goods and commodities.
The gas agreement paved the way for the construction of gas pipelines, which and prompted the Turkish elite to try to make their country a transit route for gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia, or even an energy hub, even if the latter ambition is not yet realistic. More importantly, the fact that on the Turkish side, private enterprises, under the coordination of the Council for Foreign Economic Relations (DEİK), have spearheaded the improvement of economic relations, many leading companies, particularly in the construction sector, have established themselves as leading enterprises, first in the Soviet Union have contributed to the expansion of bilateral trade relations.
Nevertheless, these mutually beneficial economic relations will have more than just economic, or even geo-economic, consequences, since Turkey's gradual emergence as the Soviet Union's main trading partner in the Middle East will have one major consequence for the region: the moderation of the USSR's multifaceted influence. Indeed, in order not to displease the Anatolian nation, Moscow will always take care to consult its trading partner before undertaking any initiative that could harm Turkish interests and thus, in the worst-case scenario, lead to Turkey's departure from its benevolent neutrality towards the Soviet Union.
This state of affairs is particularly evident in the restraint of the Soviet reaction to the US-organized coup d'état against the Iraqi government and the Kurdish question. In the first case, Moscow confined itself to a formal diplomatic protest and to stepping up aid to its Syrian ally, while in the second case, the Soviet Union refrained from providing any assistance whatsoever to Kurdish fighters - in this case those present in and around Turkey - working on a national liberation struggle with a view to establishing a Kurdish state.
Thus, in view of this brief overview of the evolution of Soviet-Turkish relations, we can say that the extent of economic exchanges between these two nations was inversely proportional to their political convergence, as we move from strong political convergence and limited exchanges in the early 20s to much greater economic exchanges in the 1970s, with Turkey taking an equidistant position between the two blocs.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this position will remain tenable for Turkey in the future, given that the american government is likely to impose secondary sanctions on neutral states, enabling the Soviet Union to circumvent protectionist measures against it, or at least use diplomatic pressure to do so.
Excerpts from "Soviet-Turkish relations from the First World War to the present day" (1978) by international relations historian Irvan Macher
While the scale and volume of economic activities are unprecedented today, thanks to Turkey's role as a hub for Eurasian trade and its leading role in circumventing the customs duties and other sanctions implemented by the Ashbrook administration against the Soviet Union, their existence is not entirely new.
Indeed, the two countries maintained important economic relations throughout the last century, even when Turkey went from being an occasional ally of the Soviet Union to an interested neutral country. In fact, the history of Turkey's economic development could not be written without reference to the Soviet loans, the transfer of know-how, the barter agreements and then the exchanges in national currencies that preceded the very important 1964 agreement that the two parties signed in Ankara on September 18 of that year.
It could be said that these new economic relations began as early as the gestation of the new state and nation of Turkey. Indeed, during the Turkish War of Independence, which pitted the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal against the victorious allied powers of the Ottoman Empire following the First World War and the army of the Ottoman Sultan, in the midst of a civil war and a succession of inter-state conflicts, Ataturk's movement and government received considerable support from the Bolsheviks, who were waging their own existential war against the White forces.
Thus, in the terrible conditions of the civil war, the Bolshevik government provided financial support to the struggling Ankara government, which represented an alternative power center in Anatolia more in line with Bolshevik ideology to the Ottoman administration present until then. During the War of Independence, the Bolsheviks also sent gold and weapons to the Ankara government.
Later, following the Moscow Agreement of March 16, 1921, the Soviets pledged 10 million rubles a year to the Turkish government. In May 1922, the first trade agreement between the parties was signed. In 1925, Vnestorgbank opened a branch in Istanbul. With the signing of the Trade and Navigation Agreement in March 1927, the volume of trade doubled, but as the Soviet Union moved towards collectivization policies, the agreement became problematic and some of its articles were amended in 1931. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's long visit to Russia in 1932 resulted in the first substantial cooperation and financing agreement between the two sides. The Soviets granted an interest-free loan of $10 million, to be repaid in twenty years from Turkish exports. This loan was then used to build two textile factories in Nazilli and Kayseri, whose engineers were trained in the Soviet Union. Soviet technicians were involved in building the factories and training the staff on site.
The Turkish delegation, impressed by what they had seen of Soviet industrialization and having launched a policy of statism in their country to meet the challenges of the Great Depression, decided to prepare an industrialization plan. The first five-year plan was drafted with the help of Soviet experts and published in 1934. During the Second World War and its aftermath, there was little activity or improvement in Turkish-Soviet economic relations, with the exception of the Çayırova glass factory, which was set up with Soviet credit.
This situation began to change in the 1950s, when Turkey shifted to a planning-based development model that favored heavy industry, but also as a result of the meteoric rise of its Soviet neighbor and Comecon. In urgent need of financing and technology, Süleyman Demirel's center-right developmentist government turned first to the Soviet Union. In a second phase, this need for financing was partly covered by his geostrategic move to establish Turkey as an intermediary in intra-Comecon trade. Indeed, since India's inclusion in Comecon following the Indian revolution of 1947, the latter has specialized as a supplier of raw materials such as cotton, followed by industrial products from the second half of the 1970s. However, due to the difficulties of overland transport between socialist India and the Soviet Union, trade had to be conducted exclusively by sea, with Indian goods passing through Turkish ports and roads once they had crossed the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal, before being unloaded in Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, to be transformed into finished products (cotton garments, for example) inland. This would gradually generate substantial revenues from its transshipment operations: revenues which would then be reinvested in Turkey's development, complementing bilateral trade with the Soviet Union - but also with other regional players such as Egypt and Iraq.
It was against this backdrop that Oleg Bogomolov, Head of Foreign Trade for the Middle East, visited Turkey in 1966. During this visit, the Soviets undertook to finance and provide technical assistance for Turkish investments in heavy industry and energy. Turkey received a $300 million loan "for the construction of steel plants in İskenderun as well as the Seydişehir aluminum plant, the Aliağa oil refining plant and the Bandırma sulfuric acid plant". Five years later, two further agreements were signed to improve economic relations and advance scientific and technical cooperation.
The soviet Russians will help build the Arpaçay dam, expand the İskenderun steel plant and the Seydişehir aluminum plant. A thermal power plant will be built in Orhaneli. A Black Sea oil refinery project was also discussed. In all these important agreements for Turkey's industrialization, Turkey repaid its loans by exporting goods to the Soviet Union, mainly traditional agricultural products.
In 1972, the parties signed a further agreement to modify the terms of payment, with the result that at least part of the payments were to be made in freely convertible currencies, and deliveries of goods were to be made at the current prices of the main world markets for the corresponding goods, which were to be expressed in freely convertible currencies.
These existing economic links, payment models and modes of cooperation laid the foundations for the decisive agreement signed in September 1973. The Soviet Union was to sell natural gas to Turkey from 1976, via Romania and Bulgaria. The term of the agreement, which provided for automatic renewal every five years, was 25 years. The price of the initial quantity of 5.5 million cubic meters was to be determined by BOTAŞ and SOYUSGAZ. Payments, as in previous agreements, were to be made through exports of goods and commodities.
The gas agreement paved the way for the construction of gas pipelines, which and prompted the Turkish elite to try to make their country a transit route for gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia, or even an energy hub, even if the latter ambition is not yet realistic. More importantly, the fact that on the Turkish side, private enterprises, under the coordination of the Council for Foreign Economic Relations (DEİK), have spearheaded the improvement of economic relations, many leading companies, particularly in the construction sector, have established themselves as leading enterprises, first in the Soviet Union have contributed to the expansion of bilateral trade relations.
Nevertheless, these mutually beneficial economic relations will have more than just economic, or even geo-economic, consequences, since Turkey's gradual emergence as the Soviet Union's main trading partner in the Middle East will have one major consequence for the region: the moderation of the USSR's multifaceted influence. Indeed, in order not to displease the Anatolian nation, Moscow will always take care to consult its trading partner before undertaking any initiative that could harm Turkish interests and thus, in the worst-case scenario, lead to Turkey's departure from its benevolent neutrality towards the Soviet Union.
This state of affairs is particularly evident in the restraint of the Soviet reaction to the US-organized coup d'état against the Iraqi government and the Kurdish question. In the first case, Moscow confined itself to a formal diplomatic protest and to stepping up aid to its Syrian ally, while in the second case, the Soviet Union refrained from providing any assistance whatsoever to Kurdish fighters - in this case those present in and around Turkey - working on a national liberation struggle with a view to establishing a Kurdish state.
Thus, in view of this brief overview of the evolution of Soviet-Turkish relations, we can say that the extent of economic exchanges between these two nations was inversely proportional to their political convergence, as we move from strong political convergence and limited exchanges in the early 20s to much greater economic exchanges in the 1970s, with Turkey taking an equidistant position between the two blocs.
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether this position will remain tenable for Turkey in the future, given that the american government is likely to impose secondary sanctions on neutral states, enabling the Soviet Union to circumvent protectionist measures against it, or at least use diplomatic pressure to do so.
Excerpts from "Soviet-Turkish relations from the First World War to the present day" (1978) by international relations historian Irvan Macher
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- Location
- The great frozen north
I thought Ashbrook lost his reelection in 1976? Or was that confirmed on Discord to have been a misconception?
Terminator57
Southern trees bear a strange fruit
I don't think so, because I read somewhere that Ashbrook scored a 90 on the dice.
Moreover, my text was validated by Blackstar without raising this point.
But if need be, I'll change this passage if I have confirmation of the change, don't worry.
Thanks for your feedback.
Moreover, my text was validated by Blackstar without raising this point.
But if need be, I'll change this passage if I have confirmation of the change, don't worry.
Thanks for your feedback.
USA rolled 33, unless there is a roll I missed? I never read anything about any 90.
That was him winning the primaries, the actual election was won by Democrats, I believe.
DivineAlM
The Chuuni Guy Who Thinks His A Hadou
- Pronouns
- Him
Great Omake. It really puts into perspective how being generally dovish and diplomatic has helped up build some really durable relation with other nations. Continuing on with our relatively dovish foreign policies is most likely going to make the USSR look like an appealing alternative to the USA.
@Blackstar - I am curious how far TTL's Virgin Land scheme went, and how it compared to the OTL scheme. Did we manage to thread the eye of the needle and establish new farms that have prospered, or did the scheme fail, and the ministry just didn't notice?
Regards,
fasquardon
Regards,
fasquardon
I hope we are growing corn in Siberia. 100% of communist countries fail before they grow ENOUGH corn in an uninhabitable environment.
- Location
- The United States
- Pronouns
- She/Her
It was never done at the same scale as OTL, also it was done more gradually in somewhat mixed areas instead of going all in on growing wheat in Khazakstan. Most of the gains came from improved vegetable crops alongside the radical improvements in cultivars that came from drought and season resistant dwarf wheat strains in the 60s more so then increased land area under till. The Volga and Altai have recieved far more attention with the hydroprojects on the main central aisian rivers somewhat organically driving it there once they were complete from strongly increased water access and creating a fairly sizable green belt. Current virgin lands are also more so focused on optimizing water acess and increasing areas in already somewhat developed ag regions without any true well "virgin lands."
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- Lost in the internet
So we can say the Cornumism as failed XD
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- He/Him
"Socialism is when you do experimental agronomy, and the more experimental the agronomy, the more socialister it is. And when the agronomy primarily revolves around corn, baby, that's Communism!"
--Nick Khrushchev
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- Europe
So in those areas we don't build roads through our cultivated fields, but cultivated fields sprout from around our roads or "roads"?
Interesting.
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