To celebrate the recent update and chase away my problems, here is a new omake named "Stalin's sledgehammer: the 280mm super-heavy self-propelled howitzer". I hope you will like it.
Among the plethora of calibers used by the Red Army against its enemies during the Second World War, one became famous for the damage it inflicted on Axis positions during the war, to such an extent that this new piece earned the nickname "Stalin's sledgehammer" for the destructive power of its 205 kg shell.
The piece's origins lie in the positional fighting that marked the early years of the German-Soviet conflict. Indeed, the need for a very large-calibre howitzer was made apparent by the dense network of fortifications and trenches built by the Germans from the end of 1941 onwards, following their initial territorial conquests at the beginning of that year, particularly in the Baltics front.
Indeed, this combat zone represents a radicalized version of the type of fighting seen in the first two years of the Great Patriotic War: from the outset of Operation Barbarossa, the offensive towards Leningrad quickly came up against several Soviet armies, which were solidly supported on the ground by numerous urban or field fortifications - for example, the buildings in the city of Riga were converted into solid fortified points.
Faced with the lack of a breakthrough in the Soviet lines, and with Soviet counter-attacks on the whole front, particularly on the Baltic front, due to the violence of the assaults observed, German troops followed the Soviet example and dug in until they had amassed sufficient forces to break through the Soviet lines and exploit the breakthroughs thus achieved.
This unprecedented situation for a Soviet army originally designed for offensive operations based on rapid-fire field artillery, and whose only heavy guns capable of providing the firepower needed to demolish German works and fortified lines were the naval guns on their few battleships operating in the Baltic Sea, led Soviet engineers to think about adapting these large-calibre guns for use on land.
To this end, in November 1942, an Artillery Committee (known in short as the Artkom) was appointed. It was headed by military engineer R.A. Durlyakhov. This committee decided to set up an artillery design bureau in February 1943, with Frantz Lender as its leader. This design bureau was entrusted with work on "a 280mm self-propelled howitzer with long range" in September 1943, with the Artkom issuing a resolution of June 11, 1943 to "entrust the Artkom design bureau with designing a 203mm howitzer of long range within 8 months".
Given the importance of such a gun for an arsenal lacking in heavy artillery, this project was immediately marked for prioritization by the military high command. Given the need to motorize this heavy artillery piece and the development of a new high-weight heavy tank chassis, a new proposal was made to design a slightly lighter, far more mobile self-propelled gun system that should still fulfill the range requirement.
The development team for the gun has requested specifications for the new heavy tank's chassis and has designed a new gun platform around that. Based on a limited stock of 280mm shells already fitted to its tsarist predecessor and taken from Soviet arsenal stocks, this shell has been updated and adapted to a longer barreled howitzer system, featuring some loading assistance and considerable weight saving elements for easier transportation and mounting to a heavy tank IS hull. This tank chassis and associated engine will enable the self-propelled piece to cover 6km off-road and 8km on-road. To maneuver it and maintain its firing rate of one shot every five minutes, the gun crew will consist of five men, with a further five men in support to supply the 280mm gun with shells from the rear of the battlefield.
Moreover, some rudimentary protection for the crew and hull has also been designed out, featuring around 25mm of armor around the crew to protect from fragments and light weapon fire while loading the gun. The entire platform is still open-topped, slower than the tank prototype it is based on, and less reliable, but it can move fairly quickly on its own power and be used as a heavy support platform near the front, with some limited direct fire capability.
With the heavy tank being rushed into production, the gun has also been set to be moved into production, with the first examples to be produced by April 1944. From this date until Japan's surrender, 103 pieces were produced by the Leningrad arsenals and made available to the Stavka's strategic reserve.
Although the B-4 howitzer would be of no use in breaking through German lines, contrary to the intentions of its designers, given the unblocking of the military situation, the howitzer would nonetheless have its baptism of fire on the Western stage, since in preparation for the offensive on Berlin, all parts produced up to that point would be mobilized for artillery preparation. Subsequently, once urban fighting had begun in Berlin, the self-propelled howitzer was used to fire directly at German fortified points, demolishing a building after each shot due to its powerful blast. Another of the piece's feats of arms was to be used to destroy the huge anti-aircraft flak tower in Berlin, whose ten or so 128 mm anti-aircraft guns were a thorn in the side of the Soviet forces in Berlin, as their firepower slowed down their movements. Equally, on German territory, the gun was instrumental in reducing the various festungs (the transformation ordered by Hitler of several towns and ports in both the West and the East into so many fortress islands designed to resist to the last man with no spirit of retreat or surrender) such as Breslau and Frankfurt, set up to halt the Soviet advance.
Nevertheless, the the Soviet artillery piece would nevertheless have the opportunity to fulfill its initial mission of destroying fortified lines, by subsequently taking part in the "August Storm" operation in Manchuria, which mobilized a large proportion of the 280mm guns then endowed in the Soviet army in a high-profile offensive. The result was a Soviet victory between August 9, 1944 and September 9, 1945, with the destruction of the Japanese army in Guandong and the liberation of Manchukuo, Mengjiang and Korea, as well as the consequent expansion of territorial control by the Chinese Communist Party and its armed forces over a decaying Nationalist army.
Indeed, from the battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939 (a border incident in Mongolia which degenerated into two battles between the Soviet Union and the Japanese Empire from May 11 to September 16, 1939, both of which were defeats for the Japanese Empire) to the breaking of the Japanese-Soviet non-aggression treaty, Japanese forces on the eastern border of the Soviet Union had ample time to fortify their positions with numerous shelters and concrete defensive positions, culminating in 4,500 permanent works in seventeen fortified regions. This mission was entrusted to the B-4 howitzer, which brilliantly disemboweled the Japanese lines by mobilizing all the 280mm guns available. In this theater of operations, as in Germany, the super-heavy howitzer played a role in urban combat, supporting assault groups with its devastating fire, demolishing resistance points set up in Chinese and Korean cities by retreating Japanese forces.
Unfortunately for him, the end of the Second World War led to the gradual end of production and use of this weapon by the Soviet army in the years that followed, due to changes in the post-war strategic and technological context.
Indeed, although the presence of the Soviet army opposite the Maginot Line until the end of the military occupation of defeated Germany might at first sight suggest that the 280mm howitzer would have found a second lease of life as a demolisher of works on the French defensive line. However, the reinforcement and modernization of this line following its reoccupation by the French army (until the atomic weapon was obtained, guaranteeing the definitive sanctuarization of the national territory) rendered such a weapon obsolete in view of the much larger calibres required to hope for the destruction of fortified works. What's more, in view of Germany's performance in Belgium in seizing Belgian forts by airborne assault, the Soviet army doctrinally favored this type of assault in the early post-war years for the capture of French fortified works, as it guaranteed efficiency and rapidity of action.
Speed of action was also a factor in the decision to abandon such guns, as Soviet war plans during this period were based on the speed of execution of the maneuver, in order to seize French ports as quickly as possible, to prevent any American or British reinforcements from reaching them, and also to interdict any Anglo-Saxon maritime movements by bringing Soviet forces closer to the coasts overlooking the English Channel or the Atlantic. However, this would be incompatible with a logistical burden slowed down by the presence of such high-calibre weapons in the Soviet arsenal. To this we can also add vulnerability to aircraft in the event of unassured air superiority.
This geopolitical argument can also be applied to the Asian theater. With China, Korea, Indonesia and India now on the Communist side, the theaters of operation for a hypothetical third world conflict between the Communist and capitalist blocs are shifting to the high seas, with the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean as likely areas of conflict: areas of conflict that will undoubtedly give pride of place to the air-sea components of both blocs, rather than land-based ones. What's more, a battleship could easily fill the B-4's role as a breaker of fortified positions, with the many large-calibre guns normally found on a battleship worthy of the name. The B-4 howitzer thus loses its usefulness in such a conflict.
The technological breakthrough represented by the misille is also a factor in the abandonment of this artillery, since the misille offers a cheaper, more accurate alternative to the artillery shells of this piece, with similar or even superior tactical effects as the misille branch develops.
Another technological factor in the gun's retreat can be found in the conceptualization of the recently-developed atomic weapon as a multi-tasking super-artillery tasked with destroying troop concentrations at the front or rear of the front, enemy hardpoints (fortified positions or trench lines) or logistical networks, with the aim of dislocating its apparatus and nullifying its ability to respond to the actions of the Soviet military.
In conclusion, the B-4 super-heavy howitzer did the Soviet army proud during the hard fighting of the Second World War on the European and Asian fronts, helping to reduce the braking zones set up by the enemy, before being relegated to the museum following the geostrategic evolution of the Soviet Union and post-war technological developments.
Excerpts from "The arsenal of socialism: the Soviet military-industrial complex during the Second World War" by historian Jack Mauer (1964)