Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

[CompassJimbo]

See if you can rustle up any help from the RCN's Pacific forces. They probably have trawlers and other small ships that can lay mines.

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Ahahahahaha. No. The RCN's resources are all being spent trying to secure the Atlantic. They have no reason to divert assets and crews to the Pacific when America has this huge honking fleet to beat up Japan with. Please, stop trying to push these poorly-informed ideas when the people who you're arguing with know better and have access to more than just Wikipedia.

 

[Guardian54]

Ahahahahaha. No. The RCN's resources are all being spent trying to secure the Atlantic. They have no reason to divert assets and crews to the Pacific when America has this huge honking fleet to beat up Japan with. Please, stop trying to push these poorly-informed ideas when the people who you're arguing with know better and have access to more than just Wikipedia.

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I am aware that the RCN is busy keeping Britain fed and has been for years by this point.
"Exaggerated scraping of bottom of barrel" applies here. I've gone back to make it more obvious.

 

[CV12Hornet]

1. Yes, Midway is too small. But you do what you can with what you have, and it at least will allow the lower-endurance ships (escorts) a refuelling stop that isn't underway replenishment.

2. Should have put a disclaimer: "effectiveness not guaranteed"

3. The US only had one minelayer at the time? Wow... thanks for the info.
See if you can rustle up any help from the RCN's Pacific forces. They probably still have at a couple of old training trawlers and other small ships that can lay mines if the USN is somehow (obvious sarcasm) unable to figure out shoving them overboard from the sterns of destroyers or even just motor launches (these are smaller mines than the usual, to prevent friendly fire from killing USN ships but still being enough to stop Japanese landing craft, and to allow mroe mines to be shipped per ton). Of course, this would require that such small naval mines intended for high-density anti-landing minefields be developed in the first place, which is unlikely. But even a few mines (if you only have standard large types) could do a lot of damage to the Japanese approach.

4. As far as I can tell, however it's sliced, if the USN wins Second Wake as decisively as they are likely to (shipgirls + improved doctrines + superior numbers = WIN) then Third Wake will have USN numerical superiority or at absolute least parity (if Sara and Enterprise are both damaged enough to not be at Third Wake)...

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1. Not gonna happen. There are four problems with using Midway as a refueling stop. First, as I mentioned, the harbor is pretty small, and a third to half the enclosed water is unuseable due to shallowness. Second, you have to add all this oil infrastructure, which is going to take time. Third, Midway is 1300 miles from Hawaii. All it means is that the oilers, rather than supplying the fleet directly, are just dropping off the oil at Midway. And they're still not on West Coast to Hawaii duty, which means you're still depleting the stores at Pearl. Fourth, and most damning: I've checked a map. There's literally no space to put that kind of oil storage on Midway.

3. Having done some more research, the mine idea is viable - if they can get the minelayers there in time. The issue is that the ships that can just go to Wake and lay mines without modification don't have the range without oiler support, which runs smack dab back into the oil problem. Oh, and they're vulnerable to the G3Ms that can, y'know, still fly to Wake.

4. The US winning Second Wake decisively is a colossal assumption on your part. As an aside, I can't find your previous analysis post, so if I miss something that's why.

Anyway, here's the thing: none of the advantages you listed for Second Wake are as decisive as you think they are. Ship spirits help, improved doctrine helps, superior numbers... kinda helps, but carrier warfare in this era is still fundamentally a game of rocket tag. Carrier groups simply can't fend off a determined carrier strike. That ability requires late-war fighter direction, radar, and anti-aircraft, none of which is available here. Oh, and far greater numbers organized into large, coordinated groups. That's also not present, particularly the coordination.

Honestly? I think the two fleets are just going to trade a carrier apiece sunk/heavily damaged.

1. The IJN will throw the rest of the Kido Butai at it the next time.
2. US have broken most of the IJN codes, or at least can identify rough movements by radio directions and volume.
3. It's not that hard on the logistics train to deploy large numbers of submarines on station around Wake to triangulate radio signals and be directed onto the 4 remaining KB carriers.
4. With a crushing victory at Second Wake AFTER winning First Wake, the political impetus for the Doolittle Raid will not be so rushed. Thus, Doolittle Raid is more likely to be flown by very-low-bomb-load B-17s with special mods (e.g. rest of bomb load replaced by more fuel tanks to extend range) flown from Wake.
5. Hornet should be worked up by March 1942, the earliest possible time for Third Wake (the IJN will need time to familiarize the huge CAP replacements with their carriers).

Let's look at the most probable Third Wake matchup if the Japanese manage to replace ALL their pilots/planes, and the USN does not totally flunk Second Wake (would call Alien Space Bats if they did):

THIRD BATTLE OF WAKE ISLAND: PROBABLE ORDER OF BATTLE
MARCH 1942

IJN: West of Wake
Akagi (66 + 25 reserve)
Soryu (63 + 9 as spare parts)
Shokaku (72 + 12 reserve)
Zuikaku (72 + 12 reserve

USN: Fleet East of Wake + Wake Island forces
Saratoga (78)
Lexington (78)
Yorktown (72)
Enterprise (72)
Hornet (72) (OTL it arrived in California in March after months of training for Doolittle. Once Second Wake is won, modified B-17s flying from Wake will be used for Doolittle instead so it will be hurried to Pacific Fleet for Third Wake)

WAKE ISLAND:
At least 50 fighters (all of Pearl's convoy ability is scrambled to shore it up) and unknown number of dive bombers. Probably at least 70 single-engined aircraft if not 100+ (there is, barely, enough ground to dig airstrips and revetments for about a hundred planes on the main island of Wake... if you are creative, and if the barracks and such are all shoved on the smaller islands that can't hold an airstrip able to put Wildcats into the air.
12+ PT Boats
12+ Submarines on patrol around Wake
"Many" AA and shore guns (some AP ammo reserves for heavier guns for anti-shipping)
circa 5000 Marines (They have over 10km of front line to potentially defend, this isn't that many men by that metric) with tanks.
SHORE RADAR INSTALLATION

The Japanese will be attacking into at least a 2:3 disadvantage in aircraft count for Third Wake, with Wake Island itself soaking the first round of attacks for the American carriers (who will park somewhere east of Wake nearly opposite the IJN to force the IJN recon to come within Wake's radar and radar-directed interception envelope if they want to find them, and to let the IJN air wings attrite for a day--or two if the landing battle is not in any doubt--first against Wake's air forces and ground AA fire).

IJN has two real choices:
a) Operate near max air range from Wake, and suffer more losses of pilots and planes every single time (being intercepted by fighters costs lots of fuel), which means losing half or more of every CAG within three or four strikes without inflicting decisive damage on the USN carriers they expect to be there... the USN carriers need not even intervene beyond the IJN noticing "there are suspiciously many naval-type fighters based out of Wake" until the second or third day when the tables are upended on the IJN landing forces if they made any headway.
b) Operate closer, with all associated dangers.

This can euphemistically be called "throwing good money after bad" for the IJN... which they might be stupid enough to do.

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Okay, let's go over this analysis, shall we? Because there are a great many problems with it, besides the over-decisive results of Second Wake.

First, if the battle is happening in March and Hornet only arrives on the West Coast in March, there's no way in hell she's participating. By the time she transits to Pearl, the rest of the carriers almost have to be operating at Wake already.

Second, here's a picture of Wake with the airfield and barracks:

Spoiler: Wake Island

Please tell me where in the sweet tits you're going to find the space for a garrison ten times the size of the existing one, 70+ aircraft, a dozen PT boats, a submarine depot, more guns, and all the supplies needed for both combat operations and an extended siege.

Third, what radar installation? Answer: there isn't going to be one. For fuck's sake, the Marines didn't put a shore radar station on Guadalcanal, you think there's going to be one available for Wake? In February?

And again: Oil. Oil oil oil. I'm honestly not sure the US has enough oilers to operate more than two carriers off Wake for an extended period of time... for a given value of "extended". There's a reason the US never sent out more than two carriers at a time, operationally, in 1942, unless they were operating near friendly bases. Like during Midway or Guadalcanal.

 

[Guardian54]

1. Not gonna happen. There are four problems with using Midway as a refueling stop. First, as I mentioned, the harbor is pretty small, and a third to half the enclosed water is unuseable due to shallowness. Second, you have to add all this oil infrastructure, which is going to take time. Third, Midway is 1300 miles from Hawaii. All it means is that the oilers, rather than supplying the fleet directly, are just dropping off the oil at Midway. And they're still not on West Coast to Hawaii duty, which means you're still depleting the stores at Pearl. Fourth, and most damning: I've checked a map. There's literally no space to put that kind of oil storage on Midway.

3. Having done some more research, the mine idea is viable - if they can get the minelayers there in time. The issue is that the ships that can just go to Wake and lay mines without modification don't have the range without oiler support, which runs smack dab back into the oil problem. Oh, and they're vulnerable to the G3Ms that can, y'know, still fly to Wake.

4. The US winning Second Wake decisively is a colossal assumption on your part. As an aside, I can't find your previous analysis post, so if I miss something that's why.

Anyway, here's the thing: none of the advantages you listed for Second Wake are as decisive as you think they are. Ship spirits help, improved doctrine helps, superior numbers... kinda helps, but carrier warfare in this era is still fundamentally a game of rocket tag. Carrier groups simply can't fend off a determined carrier strike. That ability requires late-war fighter direction, radar, and anti-aircraft, none of which is available here. Oh, and far greater numbers organized into large, coordinated groups. That's also not present, particularly the coordination.

Honestly? I think the two fleets are just going to trade a carrier apiece sunk/heavily damaged.

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1. That's unfortunate.

3. Yeah, that is a problem.

4. Sub-hivemind coordination and sensor sharing isn't enough for you? And Sara has extra fighters, Marine Corps F2As but still SOMETHING (i.e. the same Buffaloes that could have covered and likely saved PoW/Repulse if Philips hadn't been a moron.)
My Second Wake analysis was on Page 359:

Spoiler: Eyerape quote length

What about pilots? How many spare pilots did the IJN carry? Probably more than enough to man their planes, so that's not a problem. But the planes, with a much nastier furball over Pearl? The fighter wings are maimed at least.

SECOND WAKE INITIAL STATE:
Main Citations:
Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia
Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga - Wikipedia
Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū - Wikipedia
USS Saratoga (CV-3) - Wikipedia
USS Enterprise (CV-6) - Wikipedia

OPTIMISTIC FOR IJN:

KAGA: "This increased the flight deck length to 248.55 meters (815 ft 5 in) and raised aircraft capacity to 90 (72 operational and 18 in storage)." And from google: flight deck width 109' 6"
At absolute most 72 planes out of 72 + 8 + 10-12 parts usable after Pearl with Japanese aircraft durability feats and how willing they are to push write-offs over the side instead of striking them below for parts. And assembling a plane from parts while at sea would eat into maintenance of the ready planes, so they'd scrape maybe 3-4 of them together from the parts. Also, the Japanese were terrible about scavenging for parts from damaged planes to keep others flying, so I doubt they'd take from the parts pool to repair otherwise damaged planes. They'd also tend to push those unflyable planes over the side when the USN could have patched them up.

HIRYU: "The carrier's 216.9-meter (711 ft 7 in) flight deck was 27.0 meters (88 ft 6 in) wide"
Absolute most about 60 planes of 64 + 9 usable. Should have about 10 losses from Pearl operation, for about 63 survivors, and operational attrition accounts for a few more, more significant due to smaller carrier with shorter deck being harder to operate on.

REALISTIC:
This is right after Pearl, before there was time to reinforce planes and with IJN stupidity on CAG transfers (barring sunken ships' orphans landing elsewhere)...

KAGA began Pearl with 27x B5N TB (can serve as level bomber with heavy AP bombs), 27x D3A DB (250kg + 2x60kg), 27x A6M
OTL Losses: 5x B5N, 6x D3A, 2x A6M
TTL loss estimate: 10x B5N, 10x D3A, 8x A6M (Trying to wrest air superiority and protect bombers is costly)

HIRYU began Pearl with 18x B5N TB, 17x D3A, 24x A6M
OTL Losses: 2x D3A, 1x A6M
TTL loss estimate: 3x B5N, 5x D3A, 7x A6M (Trying to wrest air superiority and protect bombers is costly)

So we're down to...
KAGA: 17x B5N, 17x D3A, 19x A6M
HIRYU: 15x B5N, 12x D3A, 17x A6M

TOTAL: 32x B5N, 29x D3A, 36x A6M, for 97 planes, not counting operational attrition.

If we count all the spares and such, we can push against operational attrition to APPROX. 35x B5N, 30x D3A, 40x A6M for 105 planes.

A D3A lacks sufficient bomb load to reliably kill a USN carrier with appropriate improved damage control measures. the B5Ns are the real danger... which even an SBD can act as CAP against.

USN:
SARATOGA: Circa 80 planes, OTL 11 F4F-3 + 14 F2A-3 fighters (Wake reinforcement), 43 SBD, 11 TBD.
TTL likely increase in fighters in exchange for SBDs.
ENTERPRISE: Circa 90 planes (by all sources I could find). OTL unknown, similar to SARA
TTL Realistic: 15 F4F-3, 50 SBD, 15 TBD
TTL Ideal: 35 F4F-3, 40 SBD, 15 TBD
WAKE: Circa 10 Fighters.

TOTAL:
160-170 USN planes + 10 Wake Fighters

Worst Composition: 26 + 14 Fighters, 93 SBD, 26 TBD + 10 Wake Fighters
Best Composition: 46 + 14 Fighters, 83 SBD, 26 TBD + 10 Wake Fighters

FIRST ROUND: AIRSPACE, WAKE ISLAND
Each side loses circa 5 fighters at minimum. Circa 5 IJN bombers probably lost.

SECOND ROUND START CONDITIONS:
Fighters: Numerical Parity, IJN Experience Advantage, USN Tactics Advantage, USN Survivability Advantage. USN AA Support. CONCLUSION: USN Slight Advantage, unless USN has optimal build, in which case USN Crushing Advantage.
DB: USN Crushing Advantage, can serve as CAP and slaughter IJN TBs as needed.
TBs: IJN Crushing Advantage, as their torpedoes actually work.

US has est. 155-165 carrier aircraft remaining, IJN has est. 100 carrier aircraft remaining.

*This is assuming the IJN actually spotted a US carrier instead of an oiler like at Coral Sea.



This is a hilarious assertion. The IJN is at best 60% of the US air strength here.
See above. The Weave is here, the USN has at least fighter parity if not overwhelming advantage.

"Win battles before you start them." Applies.

EDIT: My apologies to @SisterJeanne, my estimated 70% chance of USN roflstomping IJN was an understatement now that I have the numbers plotted. Please raise to 75%, or 80% if the sighted "carrier" was an oiler or something.

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First, if the battle is happening in March and Hornet only arrives on the West Coast in March, there's no way in hell she's participating. By the time she transits to Pearl, the rest of the carriers almost have to be operating at Wake already.

Second, here's a picture of Wake with the airfield and barracks:
Please tell me where in the sweet tits you're going to find the space for a garrison ten times the size of the existing one, 70+ aircraft, a dozen PT boats, a submarine depot, more guns, and all the supplies needed for both combat operations and an extended siege.

Third, what radar installation? Answer: there isn't going to be one. For fuck's sake, the Marines didn't put a shore radar station on Guadalcanal, you think there's going to be one available for Wake? In February?

And again: Oil. Oil oil oil. I'm honestly not sure the US has enough oilers to operate more than two carriers off Wake for an extended period of time... for a given value of "extended". There's a reason the US never sent out more than two carriers at a time, operationally, in 1942, unless they were operating near friendly bases. Like during Midway or Guadalcanal.

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I hope this doesn't count as noodling which is against the rules... but he was responding to my separate claims, and numbering would be confusing...

First:
OTL Hornet in January: "TRAIN HARDER FOR DOOLITTLE!" (an activity done on east coast)
TTL Hornet in January after Second Wake: "WEIGH ANCHOR FOR PEARL! WE NEED TO WIN THIRD WAKE SO WE CAN BOMB TOKYO FROM THERE!"

Second:
I'll address this a little later, it will take me a couple hours to throw something adequate together AFTER getting home. I hope you don't mind too much.

Third:
USN can't put a radar installation onshore in 2 months of "highest priority"?
Guadalcanal had no sea denial capability available to it, and could be artillery-bombarded from land too. Wake... would have to expose enemy to your defences.

Fourth (OIL):
This is an actual serious problem... Can you lease civilian tankers for the California-Pearl run and free up fleet oilers?

 

[CV12Hornet]

4. Sub-hivemind coordination and sensor sharing isn't enough for you? And Sara has extra fighters, Marine Corps F2As but still SOMETHING (i.e. the same Buffaloes that could have covered and likely saved PoW/Repulse if Philips hadn't been a moron.)

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Yes, actually. That coordination still needs to be transmitted down to the squadron level, which shipgirl communication doesn't actually help with.

And I'd forgotten about the F2As. With how bad those things are, and the fact they're likely to be flown off to Wake before the battle, that tilts the aircraft numbers back towards Japan, to a degree.

First:
OTL Hornet in January: "TRAIN HARDER FOR DOOLITTLE!" (an activity done on east coast)
TTL Hornet in January after Second Wake: "WEIGH ANCHOR FOR PEARL! WE NEED TO WIN THIRD WAKE SO WE CAN BOMB TOKYO FROM THERE!"

Second:
I'll address this a little later, it will take me a couple hours to throw something adequate together AFTER getting home. I hope you don't mind too much.

Third:
USN can't put a radar installation onshore in 2 months of "highest priority"?
Guadalcanal had no sea denial capability available to it, and could be artillery-bombarded from land too. Wake... would have to expose enemy to your defences.

Fourth (OIL):
This is an actual serious problem... Can you lease civilian tankers for the California-Pearl run and free up fleet oilers?

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1. Uh, you do know the Doolittle training was actually conducted in March, right? And didn't even need the carrier? February was spent training for combat in general, and it took her two and a half weeks just to transit to Alameda.

3. I doubt it. And actually, Guadalcanal was an enormous sea denial asset. Why do you think the Japanese only operated around the island at night, and had to transport men and supplies via destroyer? It certainly wasn't because they wanted to do either of those things, considering the inefficiency of Rat Transportation.

The reason the Japanese had to do both those things was because the Marine SBDs on Guadalcanal were very good at smashing up slow, vulnerable transports during the day, and by operating at night on destroyers, the Japanese could sprint down the Slot, deliver the goods, and get back to Rabaul without the dive bombers coming out to play, as they weren't night-capable.

4. This probably depends on how bad Sky lets Drumbeat get.

 

[PAGDTenno]

The only thing Hornet was needed for WRT the Doolittle Raid OTL was an experiment conducted in February to see if a B-25 could actually take off from her decks. That could just as easily be conducted on the West Coast.

 

[Guardian54]

Yes, actually. That coordination still needs to be transmitted down to the squadron level, which shipgirl communication doesn't actually help with.
And I'd forgotten about the F2As. With how bad those things are, and the fact they're likely to be flown off to Wake before the battle, that tilts the aircraft numbers back towards Japan, to a degree.

1. Uh, you do know the Doolittle training was actually conducted in March, right? And didn't even need the carrier? February was spent training for combat in general, and it took her two and a half weeks just to transit to Alameda.

3. I doubt it. And actually, Guadalcanal was an enormous sea denial asset. Why do you think the Japanese only operated around the island at night, and had to transport men and supplies via destroyer? It certainly wasn't because they wanted to do either of those things, considering the inefficiency of Rat Transportation.

The reason the Japanese had to do both those things was because the Marine SBDs on Guadalcanal were very good at smashing up slow, vulnerable transports during the day, and by operating at night on destroyers, the Japanese could sprint down the Slot, deliver the goods, and get back to Rabaul without the dive bombers coming out to play, as they weren't night-capable.

4. This probably depends on how bad Sky lets Drumbeat get.

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0. Still better fighter direction that otherwise exists at this point.
And the F2As I'd think are at least better CAP than SBDs, and can at least harry a torpedo bomber attack and distract Japanese fighters from the actual killers i.e. Wildcats, kind of like the Hastati being fodder in front of the Principes and Triarii. Besides, the USN didn't have enough Wildcats or carrier fighter doctrine to embark much larger fighter complements. They'd have gone for more SBDs instead. So the Buffalos actually represent a net gain of fighters for the USN, not just in the form of bodies to throw at the enemy airframes. "Buffalos or nothing" is not a hard choice.

1. The guy I quoted below notes an important experiment where the Hornet was still on the east coast. It could in theory hustle down to Panama and across to Pearl quickly enough to join Second Wake, as it commissioned in October (and with Thompson around I wouldn't be surprised if there was a bit more pressure to finish her fast to see how soon in the course of construction capital shipgiirls might manifest)

3. And you can't make Wake a similar sea denial asset, but without any ability of the Japanese to make a presence on-shore and thus be a serious nuisance?

4. God Damn The King!

The only thing Hornet was needed for WRT the Doolittle Raid OTL was an experiment conducted in February to see if a B-25 could actually take off from her decks. That could just as easily be conducted on the West Coast.

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...So the Hornet was delayed at least briefly in February when it could have been transiting Panama instead and doing an active work-up en route from Norfolk, Virginia to San Diego...

 

[CV12Hornet]

0. Still better fighter direction that otherwise exists at this point.
And the F2As I'd think are at least better CAP than SBDs, and can at least harry a torpedo bomber attack and distract Japanese fighters from the actual killers i.e. Wildcats, kind of like the Hastati being fodder in front of the Principes and Triarii. Besides, the USN didn't have enough Wildcats or carrier fighter doctrine to embark much larger fighter complements. They'd have gone for more SBDs instead. So the Buffalos actually represent a net gain of fighters for the USN, not just in the form of bodies to throw at the enemy airframes. "Buffalos or nothing" is not a hard choice.

1. The guy I quoted below notes an important experiment where the Hornet was still on the east coast. It could in theory hustle down to Panama and across to Pearl quickly enough to join Second Wake, as it commissioned in October (and with Thompson around I wouldn't be surprised if there was a bit more pressure to finish her fast to see how soon in the course of construction capital shipgiirls might manifest)

3. And you can't make Wake a similar sea denial asset, but without any ability of the Japanese to make a presence on-shore and thus be a serious nuisance?

4. God Damn The King!



...So the Hornet was delayed at least briefly in February when it could have been transiting Panama instead and doing an active work-up en route from Norfolk, Virginia to San Diego...

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By "important experiment" and "brief delay", you mean "when Hornet was done working up they loaded a couple of B-25s onto the deck and flew them off". That's, like, a twelve-hour operation. And the workup stuff the ship was doing in February was combat training, which is kind of hard to do while in transit. Look at Prince of Wales against Bismarck as an example of what happens when you skip that. Hornet is still on schedule to arrive in Alameda on the twentieth of March, too late to participate in a hypothetical Third Wake.

Re: F2As
The point being, none of this is going to be enough to stop the Japanese from punching through and hitting the carrier if they really want to. It doesn't change the rocket tag dynamic of 1942 carrier combat. Which means no clean sweep of the Japanese carriers.

And finally, no, I actually don't think you could make Wake a sea denial asset on par with Henderson Field. Once again, look at that satellite image of Wake. See how small it is. And more to the point, even Henderson would've gotten plastered if the Japanese threw their carrier force at it, a carrier force considerably weaker than what the Japanese would have at Third Wake.

 

[PAGDTenno]

...So the Hornet was delayed at least briefly in February when it could have been transiting Panama instead and doing an active work-up en route from Norfolk, Virginia to San Diego...

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At most the experiment delayed completion of her shakedown cruise and working-up by one day. At absolute most. It is unlikely in the extreme that this amounted to a delay of such significance at all, since she met up with Enterprise for the Doolittle Raid on 13 April. The absolute soonest you're getting Hornet to Pearl (Unless you want her crew to be even greener than they were OTL, which is not a recipe for success, to be nice about it) is therefore somewhere around the twelfth of April, assuming the Doolittle Raid is still on and you manage to accelerate the modifications to the B-25s taking part in the raid. You might, if you cancel the Doolittle Raid, get her there around 3-4 April, since she was sitting in Alameda from 20 March to 1 April waiting for the bombers to meet her. So instead of sitting in Alameda for 10 days, say she sits there for two to three days to resupply, and then it's going to take her around eleven days to get to Pearl at 15 knots.

 

[Guardian54]

@CV12Hornet and @PAGDTenno would you please inform me why the bloody hell Doolittle would still be flying tactical bombers from carriers if Second Wake isn't a catastrophic USN defeat leading to the loss of Wake?

You can rig up the bomb bay with extra fuel tanks and use B-17s flying out of Wake easily enough and do it in January. Then you can either abandon Wake or leave it as "BAIT (TM)" (submarines--Roosevelt knows of shipgirls and the subs are sure to howl about their torpedoes, getting permission or at least tolerance for field mods isn't impossibru, mines, and aircraft, perhaps even a carrier force ready to close over the second night to strike at the Japanese after they're worn down somewhat and located over the course of attacking Wake) and "LOL IJN CANNOT INTO OPPOSED LANDINGS".

I'm going to go work at the facilities expansion idea...

 

[PAGDTenno]

... We just explained that even without the Doolittle Raid Hornet's arrival in theater cannot be meaningfully accelerated. She's not getting to Pearl before April, unless you want to deploy her with a crew so undertrained she's liable to fuck up horrifically badly. Examining the effects of removing the Doolittle Raid from the equation requires examining how it affected Hornet's movement schedule, which requires, in turn, a detailed examination of her part in the Doolittle Raid.

 

[CV12Hornet]

@CV12Hornet and @PAGDTenno would you please inform me why the bloody hell Doolittle would still be flying tactical bombers from carriers if Second Wake isn't a catastrophic USN defeat leading to the loss of Wake?

You can rig up the bomb bay with extra fuel tanks and use B-17s flying out of Wake easily enough and do it in January. Then you can either abandon Wake or leave it as "BAIT (TM)" (submarines--Roosevelt knows of shipgirls and the subs are sure to howl about their torpedoes, getting permission or at least tolerance for field mods isn't impossibru, mines, and aircraft, perhaps even a carrier force ready to close over the second night to strike at the Japanese after they're worn down somewhat and located over the course of attacking Wake) and "LOL IJN CANNOT INTO OPPOSED LANDINGS".

I'm going to go work at the facilities expansion idea...

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Please point out, specifically, where Tenno and I said Doolittle would still be flying B-25s off Hornet's deck.

 

[Burning Baron]

would you please inform me why the bloody hell Doolittle would still be flying tactical bombers from carriers if Second Wake isn't a catastrophic USN defeat leading to the loss of Wake

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I can.

Because, apart from the morale victory of hitting the enemy back, the fact it pulled troops back from the front to defend against further air attacks.

Less front line enemies=much good

You can rig up the bomb bay with extra fuel tanks

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You kind of need that space for, you know, bombs! Otherwise, what's the point of a raid if you have nothing to drop?

I'm going to go work at the facilities expansion idea...

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WHY?! WHERE?! There's no place to add any more facilities. This is an Atoll that is 3.5 miles east to west, and less than two north to south. It's smaller than my hometown.

And all that space is already in use. And is broken up by WATER.

 

[Guardian54]

WHY?! WHERE?! There's no place to add any more facilities. This is an Atoll that is 3.5 miles east to west, and less than two north to south. It's smaller than my hometown.

And all that space is already in use. And is broken up by WATER.

Click to shrink...

Ya know what?

Screw it.

Not going to bother trying (EDIT: for those curious why, it's because the responses have been too negative on boosting the exploitation of Wake more).

But I do spot at least one major copse of trees you can hide planes under like at Henderson. The green south of the airstrip?

And you can lay another gigantic airstrip running NNW to SSE.

EDIT: I realized something VERY INTERESTING

Gibraltar - Wikipedia Area 6.7 square kilometers land
Wake Island - Wikipedia 7.1 square kilometers land (presume that about 50% is usable due to the shape)
Midway Atoll - Wikipedia 6.2 square kilometers land (presume that 70% is usable based on the satellite map)

Gibraltar has INTERESTING usable land proportion:

Spoiler: SO USABLE!

Net result? Usable land areas for Wake, Gibraltar and Midway are within (by my best eyeball estimate) about half a square kilometer of each other. Yes, there's the typhoon issue for Wake, but the areas involved are very comparable...

In land area for facilities, if Gibraltar could support a major anchorage and air presence, then Midway can support a modest anchorage at least and Wake can support a significant air presence. And the deep central area of Midway lagoon should be enough for destroyers to refuel in reasonably safely.

 

[Wolf of the Sea]

Ya know what?

Screw it.

Not going to bother trying.

But I do spot at least one major copse of trees you can hide planes under like at Henderson.

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You could probably use Wake Island as a base for Catalinas (also known as the Skywhale thanks War Thunder) they got a nice long range and would be perfect for scouting out Guam, Saipan, Truk, etc.

 

[Sandy River DL]

I personally like the idea of beating back the attack, evac'ing, and mining the ever living fuck out of the atoll. Add some decoys, and Third Wake would just be the invasion force getting blown up every other step.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Pulling a Kiska on the Japanese certainly has merit as a plan, yes.

 

[Guardian54]

I personally like the idea of beating back the attack, evac'ing, and mining the ever living fuck out of the atoll. Add some decoys, and Third Wake would just be the invasion force getting blown up every other step.

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And take all the Wake Island Rails you can catch with you to prevent the Japanese from genociding the birds.

 

[Burning Baron]

In land area for facilities, if Gibraltar could support a major anchorage and air presence, then Midway can support a modest anchorage at least and Wake can support a significant air presence. And the deep central area of Midway lagoon should be enough for destroyers to refuel in reasonably safely.

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Gibraltar, spoiler alert, is not a lagoon formed by a ring of coral. It's called the Rock of Gibraltar for a reason. And, as has been already stated, the water is shallow. Maybe destroyers, but they'd have to sail like they were in a minefield. Because of all the sandbars and hazards.

presume that 70% is usable based on the satellite map

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Maybe check an actual photo. Because maps have a general area. Not exact. And that doesn't include what's there. For example. The Eastern Island of Midway, for example, is dominated nearly entirely by three airstrips.


In the future, if you drop a topic, it should probably stay dropped. Don't edit it hours later.

 

[Guardian54]

Gibraltar, spoiler alert, is not a lagoon formed by a ring of coral. It's called the Rock of Gibraltar for a reason. And, as has been already stated, the water is shallow. Maybe destroyers, but they'd have to sail like they were in a minefield. Because of all the sandbars and hazards.

Maybe check an actual photo. Because maps have a general area. Not exact. And that doesn't include what's there. For example. The Eastern Island of Midway, for example, is dominated nearly entirely by three airstrips.

In the future, if you drop a topic, it should probably stay dropped. Don't edit it hours later.

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Hours later I remembered Gibraltar with the vague impression that it was pretty damned small in land area and much of it was unusable (hence that bunker observation post idea in WWII).
Then I looked it up and it turned out to be comparable usable land area in all three cases.

The deep blue stretch in the lagoon in satellite images of Midway seems like it might be deep enough for destroyers, subs, and tenders for both? I mean sure Wake's lagoon isn't good for anything, but Midway doesn't give that impression with that big blue splash...

And I didn't want to double-post, so...

 

[Burning Baron]

I'm going to work my way backwards, because THIS!

And I didn't want to double-post, so...

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IS THE MOST FOOLISH THING I HAVE SEEN IN MY LIFE! YOU DROPPED THE MATTER! YOU COULD HAVE LET IT DROP!

The deep blue stretch in the lagoon in satellite images of Midway seems like it might be deep enough for destroyers, subs, and tenders for both? I mean sure Wake's lagoon isn't good for anything, but Midway doesn't give that impression with that big blue splash...

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According to depth charts, that water is about 10 to 20 feet deep at most. Use other sources man. You have the entire Internet at your fingertips.

Then I looked it up and it turned out to be comparable usable land area in all three cases

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Comparable how? In area? Sure. In viable land? No. Because Gibraltar isn't spits of land with lots of water in the way. There's a little more solid, not sandy area to build with.

 

[Guardian54]

According to depth charts, that water is about 10 to 20 feet deep at most. Use other sources man. You have the entire Internet at your fingertips.

Comparable how? In area? Sure. In viable land? No. Because Gibraltar isn't spits of land with lots of water in the way. There's a little more solid, not sandy area to build with.

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1. Just looked it up, "well shit" applies.

2. Yeah, building on actual beaches is kind of difficult. So... Wake and Midway each have something like half the usable land of Gib, so... not enough for much.

However, Wake is still the longest strategic airstrip the US have in the western pacific. A B-17 with 1-2 tons of bombs and the rest of the load replaced with more fuel tanks can hit Tokyo from Wake for TTL Doolittle Raid (you can probably do this as early as January 1942 as Second Wake is about December 20, 1941 and Third Wake isn't going to happen until at earliest March 1942 if the USN doesn't withdraw), and then everyone can pull out of Wake along with as many of the Wake Island Rail as they can catch alive, to let the Japanese shut themselves on their own POW camp.

 

[Burning Baron]

However, Wake is still the longest strategic airstrip the US have in the western pacific.

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It, much like the Philippines, is also on the ass end of nowhere, Pacifica. On the furthest side of the supply chain.

A B-17 with 1-2 tons of bombs and the rest of the load replaced with more fuel tanks

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You mean the 512 B-17Es that are being built? Or the preceding, even less produced designs?

Also, bomb bay tanks for the -17 do exist. Bt why? You would need so many the bomb bay is rendered meaningless.

Third Wake isn't going to happen until at earliest March 1942

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What Third Wake? Seriously. Why does Wake need to be held for a third time? It's got no value right now. Except as a point of 'haha Japan look what we did here.'

as many of the Wake Island Rail as they can catch alive

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Conservationism is great, but right now? Who actually cares? There's kind of A WAR ON! THE LARGEST WAR IN HUMAN HISTORY! AND YOU WANT TO SAVE A FLIGHTLESS BIRD?!

 

[CV12Hornet]

1. Just looked it up, "well shit" applies.

2. Yeah, building on actual beaches is kind of difficult. So... Wake and Midway each have something like half the usable land of Gib, so... not enough for much.

However, Wake is still the longest strategic airstrip the US have in the western pacific. A B-17 with 1-2 tons of bombs and the rest of the load replaced with more fuel tanks can hit Tokyo from Wake for TTL Doolittle Raid (you can probably do this as early as January 1942 as Second Wake is about December 20, 1941 and Third Wake isn't going to happen until at earliest March 1942 if the USN doesn't withdraw), and then everyone can pull out of Wake along with as many of the Wake Island Rail as they can catch alive, to let the Japanese shut themselves on their own POW camp.

Click to shrink...

Wake is the longest strategic airstrip we have today. I'm fairly certain it was lengthened postwar, and was much shorter in 1942.

More to the point, after sleeping on things, why on Earth would the US even want to conduct that raid ITTL? Instead of a near-unbroken string of defeats as in OTL, the US is about to fight a battle that, even if it doesn't win outright, it can easily spin as a victory, especially if they successfully evacuate the Marines. The political impetus isn't nearly as strong.

 

[Guardian54]

It, much like the Philippines, is also on the ass end of nowhere, Pacifica. On the furthest side of the supply chain.

You mean the 512 B-17Es that are being built? Or the preceding, even less produced designs?

Also, bomb bay tanks for the -17 do exist. Bt why? You would need so many the bomb bay is rendered meaningless.

What Third Wake? Seriously. Why does Wake need to be held for a third time? It's got no value right now. Except as a point of 'haha Japan look what we did here.'

Conservationism is great, but right now? Who actually cares? There's kind of A WAR ON! THE LARGEST WAR IN HUMAN HISTORY! AND YOU WANT TO SAVE A FLIGHTLESS BIRD?!

Click to shrink...

1. Turns out (just went trawling more instead of listening to another poster's claim of 1 ton bombs and rest fuel doable at 2000 miles, he probably mistook range for radius...) B-17s can't fly that far.
But if Wake was held for long enough, well, you can fly B-29s off it without having to assault any Japanese-held islands (though that would give you time to build up the fleet train) and it doesn't take much to make it a sucking chest wound for the IJN to attack over and over and OVER again... in fac thte OTL reinforcement convoy was such that it was clearly THE PLAN... and picketing around it might as well be training for sub skippers.

2-3. Yeah, turns out they don't have the range.

4. If Third Wake was to be launched the IJN can't do it before March 1942 at earliest. The Pearl losses were too great, the air wing replenishment cycle needs familiarization, and the tankers and other fleet train units need to resupply. The rest of the Kido Butai is needed for the Battle of Rabaul (January 23 to early February) which is more necessary for the southern perimeter than a random atoll in the middle of nowhere.
Alternatively, they get so mad about Second Wake they throw the rest of the KB at Wake right away, in which case they still fail to take the island in an opposed landing, or suffer huge casualties doing it, attrite their airwings further, and, very importantly, give the Allies time to build up Rabaul.
"haha Japan look what we did here"... with how close Wake is to their SLOCs, ain't nobody in Japan going to notice "that's bait", especially with their fixation on "enemy will do exactly what we want him to". And wasn't that the whole point of OTL Doolittle, to spit in Japan's eye (and force them to pull forces back to guard the Home Islands)?

It seems Doolittle is still on for this timeline for the latter strategic purpose.

5. Spitting in Japan's eye, that's what it's good for.
"they want this island. What does it have that's unique? Oh, a flightless bird they'd probably eat to extinction like dodos... AHAHAHA No, we are AMERICANS. Our bird species are OURS, and Japan will not wipe any of our birds out... Besides, it's basically just hauling a couple chicken coops to Hawaii as the cost thumbing our noses at the Japanese..."
After the heroic defence of second Wake I wouldn't find it too SoD-breaking if the Marine unit in question chose the Wake Island Rail as their mascot and took a number of breeding pairs with them for the Honolulu Zoo.

Wake is the longest strategic airstrip we have today. I'm fairly certain it was lengthened postwar, and was much shorter in 1942.

More to the point, after sleeping on things, why on Earth would the US even want to conduct that raid ITTL? Instead of a near-unbroken string of defeats as in OTL, the US is about to fight a battle that, even if it doesn't win outright, it can easily spin as a victory, especially if they successfully evacuate the Marines. The political impetus isn't nearly as strong.

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1. ...Which means there is enough room to quickly expand the airstrip length. But I just found new documents that show 2000 miles is too long a range for B-17s, so scratch that.

2. Doolittle did a lot in making Japan keep more forces for defence of the Home Islands, forces they're not throwing into the perimeter (making for easier battles, but more battles because the Japanese merchant marine is less overstretched than it would be if they'd thrown everything out there).
Wikipedia is very reasonable about this in Doolittle Raid - Wikipedia "High command withdrew substantial air force resources from supporting offensive operations in order to defend the home islands, and also for use in the Midway operations. Thus, the raid's most significant strategic accomplishment was that it compelled the Japanese high command into ordering a very inefficient disposition of their forces, and poor decision-making due to fear of attack, for the rest of the war."
In other words, a sharp knock to the head of Imperial Japanese strategy... which was never very mentally sound in the first place.