2) Re: Turbo electric
I thought these things were all turbine powered? Wouldn't that mean it doesn't really thump? (Or is this more MSSB)
(I mean, artificial turbine hearts are a thing, if still experimental)
All the ships are turbine-powered except for
Arkansas, Utah, New York, Texas, and
Oklahoma. Turbo-electric merely means that instead of having the turbines directly drive the propellers, either by a simple shaft arrangement (as in early turbine-powered ships) or by a more-efficient gear reduction system (as in pretty much every steam turbine powered ship built since about 1910
other than pre-Washington Treaty US capital ships, including nuclear-powered ships), the turbines are used to spin generators, which provide electricity to drive large electric motors that turn the propellers. Adopted because it had some operational advantages (no need for backing stages on the turbines, being able to run the engines in reverse at any power level, etc.) and because it allowed for much greater compartmentization of the machinery spaces, it was dropped from US designs after the Washington Treaty because, frankly, it was just too damn heavy for the power levels it put out, compared to a two-stage gear reduction arrangement. (Two attempts were made to revive it on US nuclear submarines in the 60s and 70s; both eventually foundered on the increased size required combined with poor reliability. Reputedly, the new Ford-class CVNs use it to get past the power bottleneck that is the strength of the reduction gears, since that's held US carrier power output steady for the last 60 years and as the ships get bigger, they're having more and more trouble making 30 knots.)
In the sea the problem was actually the opposite, with the japanese naval commanders being unwilling to risk their heavier units in combat to the point that some american defeats such as Savo Island or Samar were reduced or even turn back because the japanese had the impulse to retire upon perceived but unconfirmed threats. In fact the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal might have saved Hiei and turned into a japanese victory if the damaged fleet pushed itself towards the island and bombarded Henderson Field instead of trying to retire.
That was pretty much true in all navies of the time. One of the biggest effects of the Washington Treaty is that it, at a stroke of a pen, wiped out the large reserve fleets of older battleships that could be risked in hazardous duties. (An example of doing so would be the Royal Navy throwing its obsolete pre-dreadnoughts at the Gallipoli operation in World War One, knowing that they'd lose several of them; the ships were no longer of any real front-line use, and thus could be expended that way rather than keeping them in reserve and eventually scrapping them.) The US disposed of over 20 battleships to comply with the Treaty, for example, including not only pre-dreads, but its first two dreadnoughts,
South Carolina and
Michigan. Between the mass scrappings that resulted and the fifteen-year moratorium on battleship construction, battleships of
any ilk were now more precious than diamonds and, effectively, too valuable to risk. (The only reason the Kongous saw use in the Solomons, for example, was that they were the least-capable battleships Japan had, and it was felt that their speed would be enough to let them escape pretty much any serious danger.)
The result was that all commanders were loathe to risk their capital ships. It was already seen as poor form to put them at unnecessary risk (the term "capital ship" actually comes from
accounting, where battleships and battlecruisers were so big and expensive that they were categorized as capital assets that needed to be maintained as long as possible, whereas cruisers and destroyers were expendable assets that could be used up, disposed of, and replaced), so it was already expected that one would withdraw if he took serious damage rather than fight to the death (if possible); the fact that capital ships were now so few in number meant that commanders were now loathe to even risk them taking any significant damage, and thus would hold them back from most risky duties. Indeed, in the Solomons, this meant that, on both sides, cruisers operated in what would have been traditionally considered battleship roles, simply because the battleships Could Not Be Risked in such dangerous roles, while the more numerous cruisers could.
As for Samar, Kurita made the right call in retiring. Sure, he could have stuck around and finished off Taffy 3, but what then? He's already taken serious damage with several cruisers crippled (and
Maya getting ready to sink), his fleet is scattered because of his switch to a "general attack" because conditions quickly meant that he could no longer really control his forces, his most powerful unit (
Yamato) is badly out of position relative to the rest because she had to run directly
away from the fight for half an hour while combing very real and very confirmed torpedo wakes, he was unaware that TF33 had gone running off after Ozawa's decoy force and, as far as he knew, they could be just over the horizon, about to pounce on him, and while his ships now had enough fuel to get to the anchorage at Leyte, they would have to fight their way in... and then, as soon as they got in, they'd have to turn around and head back because their fuel supplies were critically low. Had the operation happened a couple of days before,
prior to the Marine landings, he probably would have gone ahead, because then he could have sunk the invasion force and if he had to scuttle some of his ships on the way home because there wasn't enough fuel to get them home, so be it. However, with the landings completed, all he was going to be able to do was provide shore bombardment... and that requires being able to stay on station for a long time. And he didn't have the gas to do that.
So yeah, fleet scattered, significant losses taken, the possibility of the Entire Fucking US Navy just over the horizon, and not enough fuel to do anything of real value had he pushed through? Time to cut your losses and withdraw. Based on the information he had at the time, preserving what he had left for future operations was more important than anything he could accomplish by continuing the attack.
