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Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

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Spectre said:
He really doesn't have the authority to close down his own base from sightseers...
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Jrandom said:
A base commander does have the authority to take whatever steps necessary to insure the security of the base and personnel there upon. If he deems that he needs to close the base to sightseers, he is well within his command authority to do so. Any thing less would be construed as dereliction of duty.
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If they flew over the base, then he could. However, the flightplans were typically an orbit. They flew around the perimeter. Which is why the Japanese has such a clear overview of the harbor.
 
Burning Baron said:
If they flew over the base, then he could. However, the flightplans were typically an orbit. They flew around the perimeter. Which is why the Japanese has such a clear overview of the harbor.
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Some things can't be helped. The Japanese could have done the same for San Diego, Subic Bay, or any one of another installations. Heck, you could get a decent geographical layouts of most installations from USGS maps.
 
So you make sure that ship movements leaving the harbor happen from dusk to before dawn, before any sightseeing air tours are operating. There are lots of little things you can play with that messes up aerial observations. What you want to do to mess with spies is to make seemingly random movements or departures. Also, this sort of spycraft takes time to process camera film, get the film to the dropoff/contact, and then it takes awhile for the contact to move the info along the chain to where it can finally be analyzed. Say a week or 10 days to get the info the IJN intelligence (which would be extremely careless for the secrecy of the operative) at the fastest. If movements and maneuvers have a slightly randomized schedule, this lessens the reliability of the intelligence the IJN has to operate off of.
 
MagisterAurelius said:
So you make sure that ship movements leaving the harbor happen from dusk to before dawn, before any sightseeing air tours are operating. There are lots of little things you can play with that messes up aerial observations. What you want to do to mess with spies is to make seemingly random movements or departures. Also, this sort of spycraft takes time to process camera film, get the film to the dropoff/contact, and then it takes awhile for the contact to move the info along the chain to where it can finally be analyzed. Say a week or 10 days to get the info the IJN intelligence (which would be extremely careless for the secrecy of the operative) at the fastest. If movements and maneuvers have a slightly randomized schedule, this lessens the reliability of the intelligence the IJN has to operate off of.
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Also, espionage is another reason why keeping planes in the open is a bad idea, which could help with improving the aircraft situation.
 
Burning Baron said:
Okay, but he's the only one with hindsight. Which means he's basically saying 'you gotta do this. Because I went on a plane.' And the troops won't take kindly to Sundays, the day off, being filled with work.
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A General Quarters drill starting between 0730 and 0745 on Sunday morning won't result in their day being "filled with work." It consists of sounding General Quarters and manning battle stations as if you were going into combat. If there's not been any sign of an attack by, say, 0815, you can then just secure from General Quarters and return to normal operations. It means half an hour to an hour out of the day being spent, not actually working, but being ready to jump into action if something happens. It might be a rude awakening, but it's hardly preventing the crews from having their day off.

Besides, there is, or at least was (I don't know if it's still true) a longstanding tradition in all navies of manning battle stations (sounding general quarters, sounding action stations, beating to quarters, whatever term you want to use for it) just before dawn whenever at sea--because before the advent of radar, sunrise was the earliest time one could get a good view of what's around you, meaning that if an enemy has closed in on you overnight, come the dawn, they could sneak-attack you before you can react. Thus, you put everyone at their battle stations and get ready for a fight just before dawn, so that you won't be taken by surprise. If there's nobody there, then you can just stand down, but if there is, you've mitigated the damage. Having a dawn General Quarters drill on Sundays in Pearl would be an extension of that; if you feel that it actually needs to be justified, you can always share the "war warning" message with your officers and chiefs (who would be able to keep a lid on it, but also assure the enlisted men that yes, there is a reason for this, and no, you're not cleared to hear it).
 
rdfox said:
A General Quarters drill starting between 0730 and 0745 on Sunday morning won't result in their day being "filled with work." It consists of sounding General Quarters and manning battle stations as if you were going into combat. If there's not been any sign of an attack by, say, 0815, you can then just secure from General Quarters and return to normal operations. It means half an hour to an hour out of the day being spent, not actually working, but being ready to jump into action if something happens. It might be a rude awakening, but it's hardly preventing the crews from having their day off.

Besides, there is, or at least was (I don't know if it's still true) a longstanding tradition in all navies of manning battle stations (sounding general quarters, sounding action stations, beating to quarters, whatever term you want to use for it) just before dawn whenever at sea--because before the advent of radar, sunrise was the earliest time one could get a good view of what's around you, meaning that if an enemy has closed in on you overnight, come the dawn, they could sneak-attack you before you can react. Thus, you put everyone at their battle stations and get ready for a fight just before dawn, so that you won't be taken by surprise. If there's nobody there, then you can just stand down, but if there is, you've mitigated the damage. Having a dawn General Quarters drill on Sundays in Pearl would be an extension of that; if you feel that it actually needs to be justified, you can always share the "war warning" message with your officers and chiefs (who would be able to keep a lid on it, but also assure the enlisted men that yes, there is a reason for this, and no, you're not cleared to hear it).
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That's during wartime.
 
Even during peacetime, General Quarters drills are under the discretion of the commanding officer on board and can be done at anytime. (Depending on said officer's level of hardassness) Captains and XOs have a great deal of power on their ships regarding stuff like this, and for a good reason, they are ultimately responsible for the state and fate of their ships. Even if they are not at fault for an accident they can still be held culpable for it.
 
Yes, but morning/daybreak GQ isn't routine in peacetime. With benefit of hindsight, it's a good idea as we get close to December 7, but hindsight is perfect.

Also, even if an officer may do things at their discretion, that is because they are expected to use that discretion, and to have reasons for what they do.
 
Burning Baron said:
Geographical, yes. But force disposition you need eyes on.
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No you don't.

  1. The IJN has been aware of the development of Pearl as a fleet base since the '20s, so they've been watching all the construction going on
  2. With the USGS maps and the knowledge of what construction has taken place, and a copy of recent Jane's, you can tell who's going to be moored where
  3. When the fleet's in, EVERYONE in Honolulu knows. Can't hide it because you've got some 40,000+ sailors with energy and money to burn.
So you know pretty much know where everyone is moored, and you know when they're in port. So you don't need aerial reconnaissance. It'd be nice to have, but it's not a need to have. That's what you have an Intelligence department for.
 
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Jrandom said:
  1. The IJN has been aware of the development of Pearl as a fleet base since the '20s, so they've been watching all the construction going on
  2. With the USGS maps and the knowledge of what construction has taken place, and a copy of recent Jane's, you can tell who's going to be moored where
  3. When the fleet's in, EVERYONE in Honolulu knows. Can't hide it because you've got some 40,000+ sailors with energy and money to burn.
So you know pretty much know where everyone is moored, and you know when they're in port. So you don't need aerial reconnaissance. It'd be nice to have, but it's not a need to have. That's what you have an Intelligence department for.
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That;s great, but occasionally, ships are moved to elsewhere in the harbor, like the dry-dock, or the fueling pier.
 
Jrandom said:
That's what you have an Intelligence department for.
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Is this an appropriate time to note the average Effective Intelligence level of the Japanese military (taking into account propaganda, ego, being hindered by subordinates, etc.)?

Because I "haff no klu whatt" Japanese department you are speaking of.

If the Japanese wanted a Decisive Battle so badly, they could have left the Americans completely alone until the US declared war first, and then let them move the battle fleet up (not happening given US plans, but the Japanese can predict the US would move up) to Manila harbour... Their failure to do so indicates an inability to employ strategic or tactical intelligence to any significant degree.
 
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Burning Baron said:
That;s great, but occasionally, ships are moved to elsewhere in the harbor, like the dry-dock, or the fueling pier.
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And that's where Naval Intelligence comes in. An knowledgeable observer with a pair of binoculars on Halawa Heights, or in Pearl City, Waipahu, or Ewa can always get a good look into the harbor. Pearl's small enough that when the Navy designates moorings and anchorages, they normally stay set, unless there's a compelling reason for changing them. And Pearl is pretty crowded when the whole fleet's in, especially with all the battleships and carriers are there.

Even if a ship is in dry dock or at the fueling pier instead of their normal mooring, they're still a target. Just look what happened to Pennsylvania, Cassin and Downes.
 
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PAGDTenno said:
Yes, but morning/daybreak GQ isn't routine in peacetime. With benefit of hindsight, it's a good idea as we get close to December 7, but hindsight is perfect.

Also, even if an officer may do things at their discretion, that is because they are expected to use that discretion, and to have reasons for what they do.
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Actually, it was a routine thing in peacetime at least up until long-range radio became a thing. Until it became possible to have effectively instant communications between ship and shore, it was entirely possible to be at war and not know it because word of the war hadn't yet reached your ship. (This is why, though the Treaty of Ghent was signed in 1814, the last battle of the War of 1812, the Battle of New Orleans, took place in 1815; word of the treaty's signature hadn't yet reached General Jackson because it still took three months just to get the news to the US, and then at least another month or two to get it from the East Coast to the Mississippi.) Between that, and the fact that piracy was still a going concern, throughout the Age of Sail and well into the Age of Steam, daybreak GQ was routine--because you never know if sunrise will reveal a ship from another nation that declared war on you three months ago... and they left port after War Were Declared.

I specifically said that if it was felt that a reason needed to exist for starting to do such things, then the famous "War Warning" message sent out by the Navy Department to all Pacific stations in on 27 November 1941 (or 2 December, depending on your source) is more than adequate. "Why did I start daybreak GQ as a matter of routine? Because, Admiral King, Admiral Wilkinson sent me a message warning that war was imminent, and I didn't want to get caught with my pants down."

"This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected in the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent out by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa take appropriate measures against sabotage."
 
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Guardian54 said:
Is this an appropriate time to note the average Effective Intelligence level of the Japanese military (taking into account propaganda, ego, being hindered by subordinates, etc.)?

Because I "haff no klu whatt" Japanese department you are speaking of.

If the Japanese wanted a Decisive Battle so badly, they could have left the Americans completely alone until the US declared war first, and then let them move the battle fleet up (not happening given US plans, but the Japanese can predict the US would move up) to Manila harbour... Their failure to do so indicates an inability to employ strategic or tactical intelligence to any significant degree.
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We can say what the IJN should have done and criticize what they did do, but that's filtered by over 70 years of hindsight and historical analysis.
 
rdfox said:
Actually, it was a routine thing in peacetime at least up until long-range radio became a thing. Until it became possible to have effectively instant communications between ship and shore, it was entirely possible to be at war and not know it because word of the war hadn't yet reached your ship. (This is why, though the Treaty of Ghent was signed in 1814, the last battle of the War of 1812, the Battle of New Orleans, took place in 1815; word of the treaty's signature hadn't yet reached General Jackson because it still took three months just to get the news to the US, and then at least another month or two to get it from the East Coast to the Mississippi.) Between that, and the fact that piracy was still a going concern, throughout the Age of Sail and well into the Age of Steam, daybreak GQ was routine--because you never know if sunrise will reveal a ship from another nation that declared war on you three months ago... and they left port after War Were Declared.

I specifically said that if it was felt that a reason needed to exist for starting to do such things, then the famous "War Warning" message sent out by the Navy Department to all Pacific stations in late November 1941 is more than adequate. "Why did I start daybreak GQ as a matter of routine? Because, Admiral King, you sent me a message warning that war was imminent, and I didn't want to get caught with my pants down."
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Reminds me of when the USS Charleston sent to capture Guam during the Spanish-American war, but when she fired on the defending fortifications, the spaniards (not knowing they were at war) thought they were being saluted rowed at to Charleston to apologize for not returning the salute due to the lack of gunpowder.
 
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Guardian54 said:
Is this an appropriate time to note the average Effective Intelligence level of the Japanese military (taking into account propaganda, ego, being hindered by subordinates, etc.)?

Because I "haff no klu whatt" Japanese department you are speaking of.

If the Japanese wanted a Decisive Battle so badly, they could have left the Americans completely alone until the US declared war first, and then let them move the battle fleet up (not happening given US plans, but the Japanese can predict the US would move up) to Manila harbour... Their failure to do so indicates an inability to employ strategic or tactical intelligence to any significant degree.
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That was actually the Japanese strategic plan until Yamamoto went off the script and made the US angry while also providing a ready-made excuse to hold off on charging to the Philippines.

Great job, Yamamoto.
 
And now that I've managed to get annoyed (a little bit angry too, honestly)...I'm going to start using this thread for more general KC stuff along with the story itself. The idea threads (here and SB) just piss me off now. For one, blindingly obvious, reason.

So! With that said:

Richardson and Pearl: There is a reason I put 'consider it under advisement' with him. He knows there is only so much he can do, though he'll keep trying it anyway. Though its worth remembering that he can connect all the dots he wants, he still won't know how or when the attack will happen.

Schreiber: Yeah, I was hinting at Barbarossa and the Soviets there. Hence red Elephant. Only one more chapter with him before Pearl, but I can't not touch on Barbarossa.
 
I can't help but wonder if not just Admirals time-travelled, but also Generals, too.
 
Skywalker_T-65 said:
And now that I've managed to get annoyed (a little bit angry too, honestly)...I'm going to start using this thread for more general KC stuff along with the story itself. The idea threads (here and SB) just piss me off now. For one, blindingly obvious, reason.
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I have too many watched threads to pay attention to the generic idea threads. To me it seems that way lies madness. Hopefully we aren't the ones that have pissed you off.
 
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