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Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

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Part of the reason the US DAMCON was so effective is that the ships themselves were build taking into account all WWI Germany's lessons from before Jutland which had dedicated DAMCON facilities, more subdivisions between bulkheads and redundancies for electricity, internal comms and firefighting pipelines. Also the DAMCON doctrine was superior, considering the responsability of the captain and personnel to take measures for the survival of the ship first instead of trying to keep fighting ability (for example counterflooding was regarded as a last resort despite it could help keep a more stable shooting plataform).

As for Thompson and the Army Air Force? Teach them the Weave, that simple tactic better distributed to the rest of the fighter corps alongside some other advanced tactics against nimble planes will be of use. He doesn't even need to point towards the Zero to keep their interest, just mention the experiences of both the BF-109's vs the Splitfire in Europe and the local authorities will se the wisdom of having a counter against them.
 
BF110C4 said:
As for Thompson and the Army Air Force? Teach them the Weave, that simple tactic better distributed to the rest of the fighter corps alongside some other advanced tactics against nimble planes will be of use. He doesn't even need to point towards the Zero to keep their interest, just mention the experiences of both the BF-109's vs the Splitfire in Europe and the local authorities will se the wisdom of having a counter against them.
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P-40s actually want to fight Zeroes differently from how Wildcats want to fight Zeroes. And P-38s yet another way. So while the Thach Weave will help, it's not as useful for the Warhawk as it is for the Wildcat.
 
BF110C4 said:
Also the DAMCON doctrine was superior, considering the responsability of the captain and personnel to take measures for the survival of the ship first instead of trying to keep fighting ability (for example counterflooding was regarded as a last resort despite it could help keep a more stable shooting plataform).
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And all US Sailors knew basic DAMCON and machine-maintenance. The repair party was more about coordinating people already there and the more specialized equipment/training.
 
PAGDTenno said:
P-40s actually want to fight Zeroes differently from how Wildcats want to fight Zeroes. And P-38s yet another way. So while the Thach Weave will help, it's not as useful for the Warhawk as it is for the Wildcat.
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Richard Bong showed everyone how it was done in the P-38. Lightnings were superb against the Zero because it could do everything the zero could (and better) and could do things the zero *couldn't*
Warhawks want to set up high energy passes, diving preferable since that gives them lots of energy to climb away after the pass.
 
PAGDTenno said:
P-40s actually want to fight Zeroes differently from how Wildcats want to fight Zeroes. And P-38s yet another way. So while the Thach Weave will help, it's not as useful for the Warhawk as it is for the Wildcat.
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Yeah, but the point is to develop successful tactics against nimble fighters because the efforts of the different fighter commands was seriously fragmented and the americans took a long time believing just how good the Zero was even when they had reports of the Flying Tigers that the japanese were far more dangerous that everyone suspected. Having a full squadron of P-40's losing a mock fight against a quartet of Wildcats going at 3/4 speed (that's how Thach proved the worth of his tactics against Butch O'Hare with a Wildcat at full-throtle) will be enough for them to start thinking on their own ways of getting the 100% out of their planes.
 
CompassJimbo said:
The Japanese, even though they built the world's biggest and most badass battlewagon (at the time. Stop looking at me like that, Jersey, and this isn't your time to shine right now), were very relunctant to actually use her. She guzzled their limited fuel stocks (one of the many, many mistakes Japan made during that period), was most likely a bitch and a half to fix if she took a hit, regardless of whether it penetrated or not, and she'd be facing angry American carriers who would be all too eager to sink her.
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But if US battleships survived and were sortied against Japanese ships, the Japanese would be far more likely to deploy the Yamato, especially since the Japanese hold pretty much every advantage in a fight at the start of the war.
 
BF110C4 said:
As for Thompson and the Army Air Force? Teach them the Weave, that simple tactic better distributed to the rest of the fighter corps alongside some other advanced tactics against nimble planes will be of use. He doesn't even need to point towards the Zero to keep their interest, just mention the experiences of both the BF-109's vs the Splitfire in Europe and the local authorities will se the wisdom of having a counter against them.
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Well, Thompson already taught Sara's flyboys the Weave. Yes, even the technique's creator.
 
XWingExecuter said:
But if US battleships survived and were sortied against Japanese ships, the Japanese would be far more likely to deploy the Yamato, especially since the Japanese hold pretty much every advantage in a fight at the start of the war.
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Except they wouldn't. Because Yamato used astronomical amounts of fuel and resources. Her deployment near Midway was the furthest she'd ever go from Japan.
 
Burning Baron said:
Except they wouldn't. Because Yamato used astronomical amounts of fuel and resources. Her deployment near Midway was the furthest she'd ever go from Japan.
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You assume the IJN would care about fuel and costs when they are faced with the prospect of a fleet battle between the best of the US and the best of the Japanese. Part of the reason the IJN never deployed the Yamato in any meaningful engagement was because they were waiting for the "critical" battle to use her in. The one where the costs would be worth it. The surviving remnants of the Pacific fleet would be the most likely thing to draw her out, especially early in the war where the Japanese are still confident bordering on overconfidence.
 
XWingExecuter said:
You assume the IJN would care about fuel and costs when they are faced with the prospect of a fleet battle between the best of the US and the best of the Japanese. Part of the reason the IJN never deployed the Yamato in any meaningful engagement was because they were waiting for the "critical" battle to use her in. The one where the costs would be worth it. The surviving remnants of the Pacific fleet would be the most likely thing to draw her out, especially early in the war where the Japanese are still confident bordering on overconfidence.
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Problem is that logistics is not only about costs, is about how much you got and how long to bring more. And the japanese were never good enough in the art of moving goods from Point A to Point B, and even worse actually calculating if they would have enough of the things that did arrrive to where they were needed.
 
XWingExecuter said:
You assume the IJN would care about fuel and costs when they are faced with the prospect of a fleet battle between the best of the US and the best of the Japanese. Part of the reason the IJN never deployed the Yamato in any meaningful engagement was because they were waiting for the "critical" battle to use her in. The one where the costs would be worth it. The surviving remnants of the Pacific fleet would be the most likely thing to draw her out, especially early in the war where the Japanese are still confident bordering on overconfidence.
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It's not just the cost of sailing her. It's the cost of Yamato in general. She took a single torpedo, launched by USS Skate, then needed over a month to repair the damage.


And you're partly right. Yamamoto took her out to Midway to fight a 'decisive battle,' except that after the events of June 3-4, 1942, as predicted by the man himself, Yamamoto's 'running wild' was brought to an abrupt halt after six months. Losing four fleet carriers in just a few minutes tends to do that. Also, the surviving remnants of the Pacific Fleet was seven Dreadnoughts that could be salvaged/repaired,as well as their CarDivs, of which there were four, a lot of Cruiser Divisions, and an awful lot of DesDivs.

All of their battlewagons being laid up meant a radical doctrine change was necessary. While they were in dry dock, except for Pennsylvania who was already there, the US had no choice but to rely on air power, something Yamato was decidedly weak against. Even when they were combat ready again, the seven surviving dreadnoughts were promptly scattered across the world. Some to the Atlantic, some staying in the Pacific. But all of them were spread out amongst carrier groups. Which were spread thin, primarily due to low numbers, until naval construction in the US got really moving. Then, there were so many carriers, which we knew worked really well against the Japanese Navy, that even the USN's finest and newest battleships, the Iowas, were relegated to mobile AA batteries, and weren't needed to fight. Iowas didn't launch until after Midway, which means the Japanese had little chance of even getting close, what with a lack of heavy striking power. Yamato's own sister, the Shinano, was converted from a battleship to a carrier because the IJN was desperate to build carriers. And look how costly fighting against the Pacific Fleet was for the Japanese anyway. They lost Kirishima at Iron Bottom Sound, as well as Hiei, and a lot of others. In exchange for a few cruisers, and several destroyers. The heaviest loss wasn't even a USN vessel. It was a County-class Cruiser. The heaviest USN loss was a New Orleans-class.



What all of this means is that Yamato is too damn expensive to do anything with, and her entire existence was a waste. Of time and material.


OH RIGHT: I forgot to mention. Do you know what Yamato did before she was hit by Skate? She was an enormous troop transport. Yep. She was used to ferry troops to Truk Island, where they would be deployed as needed.
 
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Burning Baron said:
I think the Beaufighter was a one-time thing, right after Dunkirk, because Panzers thoroughly wrecked their shit on the continent. It was probably one or two tests, before they decided they needed fighters for other things, like the Battle of Britain. I know it wasn't the Mosquito, because they have different noses.
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I was under the impression the Beaufighter significantly post-dated the Dunkirk crisis/Battle of Britain, but it seems I was thinking of their actual service career. One Beau was used for trials of two different 40mm anti-tank guns, side-by-side in the fuselage, and the Vickers weapon was then put into service on the Hurricane Mk.IID tank-buster. The RAAF also experimented with mounting a Bofors on a Beaufighter, but I don't think it ever reached service.
TTBOMK, the only 'big gun' modification of a British fighter/bomber that ever flew operationally was the Tsetse version of the de Havilland Mosquito, the aforementioned-version with an autoloading 6-pounder.
 
Sir_Gaea said:
Fuso apparently broke in half after 2 torpedoes,
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<growl>
And her aft section kept underway because the crew in the engine room didn't realize they lost half of their ship, while the fore was still floating until it went turtle. This is one (not the only or the main) of the reasons why some reports of the battle of Surigao Strait are confusing and even conttradictory. Several witnesses reported three Japanese capital ships when it actually was Mogami and the two halves of Fusou still upright.

Shigure's radio messages addressing Yamashiro as if she was Fusou made the brass commanding Yamashiro think that Fusou was still around when she wasn't.

In any case, she was tough, just not tough enough. And leave my waifu out of this.

Now I need to cheer her up and give her an Instant Repair Bucket.
 
Question for all.
Has Sky stated his thoughts on the physical appearance of the Royal Navy shipgirls?
We got a general idea of what the HMS Hood looks like but what about the HMS Belfast or the HMS Ark Royal?
 
Burning Baron said:
-Snip-
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I'm fully aware of just how expensive it would be to deploy her to battle. But in this universe, if multiple battleships do survive the Pearl attack and can be immediately sent into battle, things change. For one, America doesn't become wholly reliant on carriers and battleships would probably still rule the US Navy. Even if they didn't, you once again have the Japanese high on their successful attack and are more willing to put forth an extremely expensive asset. The US Navy will probably be looking for a battleship fight, not a carrier fight, and the Japanese will be more likely to put forth their best battleships to defeat the Americans. Just because the Yamato is expensive doesn't mean that Japan will be smart in how they use her. They may ignore all good sense and deploy her early in the war, or, they may ignore all good sense and never deploy her when she could have turned the tide of battle. If we'd ever see that happen in this fic, it will be as I've said before, very early after the Pearl attack, before the US Navy can rebuild itself and pose an actual threat in the air or on the sea.
 
XWingExecuter said:
if multiple battleships do survive the Pearl attack
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The United States Navy operated an awful lot of battleships. There's the two Wyoming classes, the two New York classes, the Nevada, whose sister ship, the Oklahoma, didn't survive, Pennsylvania, whose sister ship needs no introduction, Arizona, the three New Mexico class, both Tennessee class ships, three Colorados, both North Carolinas, and finally the four South Dakota sisters. Iowas don't count, since they didn't come online until after Midway. That's 20 battleships. I do believe that is a sufficient number to warrant a fight of Mahanian proportions. And yet, the US COMPACFLT decided to use his carriers, instead of requesting more battleships be brought to the Pacific.
XWingExecuter said:
Even if they didn't, you once again have the Japanese high on their successful attack and are more willing to put forth an extremely expensive asset.
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They did. Once. After which Yamato spent the next two years sitting in port after port, doing nothing. Her nickname was Hotel Yamato for a reason.
XWingExecuter said:
They may ignore all good sense and deploy her early in the war, or, they may ignore all good sense and never deploy her when she could have turned the tide of battle.
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She wasn't even launched until December 16th, nine days after Pearl. Then, she would have to embark on her shakedown cruise. Then sail to wherever she is intended to fight. Such as Wake Island in September and October 1943, where she and her battle group waited for six days, after sailing there for almost three weeks, and then had to sail back, which took another three weeks.
 
XWingExecuter said:
I'm fully aware of just how expensive it would be to deploy her to battle. But in this universe, if multiple battleships do survive the Pearl attack and can be immediately sent into battle, things change. For one, America doesn't become wholly reliant on carriers and battleships would probably still rule the US Navy. Even if they didn't, you once again have the Japanese high on their successful attack and are more willing to put forth an extremely expensive asset. The US Navy will probably be looking for a battleship fight, not a carrier fight, and the Japanese will be more likely to put forth their best battleships to defeat the Americans. Just because the Yamato is expensive doesn't mean that Japan will be smart in how they use her. They may ignore all good sense and deploy her early in the war, or, they may ignore all good sense and never deploy her when she could have turned the tide of battle. If we'd ever see that happen in this fic, it will be as I've said before, very early after the Pearl attack, before the US Navy can rebuild itself and pose an actual threat in the air or on the sea.
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It took all the fleet oilers in japan to get the KB (Kido Butai) to pearl and back.

And you want to throw in an asset that makes their fuel consumption look like a light quaff at the water fountain.

:jackiechan:

Japan isn't that fundamentally retarded, even in full blown Tenno Banzai mode.

The farthest Yamato and Musashi will go is the Philippines, maybe maybe, Rabaul. (That's PNG)
 
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So what Thompson is hoping for at Pearl is:
1. None of the ships are unsalvageable (are all raised and returned to service)
2. The Battle line takes enough damage to force carriers to become the premier capital ship.
3. Minimizing casualties.
4. No Carriers are Present in Pearl Harbour during the attack.

Let me know if I got that right.

On a different note, is Thompson going to try to save Prince of Wales and Repulse? On one hand, they are allied ships, but they show the need for capital ships to have air cover when at sea.

But the Butterflies might lead to different ships taking their place...
 
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Archduke said:
But the Butterflies might lead to different ships taking their place...
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Well Revenge was due to serve in the Indian Ocean sometime after Japan kicked off the war against the US. So another ship will have to take her place, probably another R-class unless PoW and Repulse survive this go round. One of the Brit flat-tops (Hermes I believe) was at Columbo (Ceylon) on the day Repulse and PoW made their sortie...an earlier than OTL Taranto attack, hmm, maybe the Fleet Air Arm will get some action in sending Hermes through the Malacca straights early and giving force Z some top cover.
 
Burning Baron said:
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You are entirely missing my point. Originally the Pearl attack destroyed most of the existing US capital surface fleet. The Carolinas wont see battle until mid 1942 unless somehow their deficiencies are hammered out and fixed before their commissioning. The South Dakotas wont be around until the same time and the Iowas in 43. That means there are only three active battleships, but they cant reasonably be sent to the western Pacific like the carriers can. This is what forced the US Navy to develop and become more reliant on their carriers, the complete lack of a strong surface fleet at the start of the war. Now, if more battleships do survive, your going to have battleship captains and admirals clamoring to fight the Japanese in surface engagements. This surface fleet would pull the Japanese out, or they would both meet in some strategic spot in the Pacific. This early in the war, the Japanese won't be thinking the long term effects of the war since they think its an assured victory. For the same reason they think they could defeat America in 6 months, they will use the Yamato. Also, Yamato finished her shakedown cruise and was commissioned on December 16. She was fit to fight that day. The Japanese spent all of WW2 waiting for the decisive fleet engagement to use Yamato, and it was only as the war went on that they become unable to actually use her. If given the chance so early on, I do think they would use her. The cost of sending her to battle somewhere in the Pacific would be dwarfed by the chance of completely defeating the US Navy in battle.
 
Question for all.
Has anyone thought of how Churchill would react to the existence of shipgirls?
I think he would be excited due to this long career in the Royal Navy.
 
XWingExecuter said:
You are entirely missing my point. Originally the Pearl attack destroyed most of the existing US capital surface fleet. The Carolinas wont see battle until mid 1942 unless somehow their deficiencies are hammered out and fixed before their commissioning. The South Dakotas wont be around until the same time and the Iowas in 43. That means there are only three active battleships, but they cant reasonably be sent to the western Pacific like the carriers can. This is what forced the US Navy to develop and become more reliant on their carriers, the complete lack of a strong surface fleet at the start of the war. Now, if more battleships do survive, your going to have battleship captains and admirals clamoring to fight the Japanese in surface engagements. This surface fleet would pull the Japanese out, or they would both meet in some strategic spot in the Pacific. This early in the war, the Japanese won't be thinking the long term effects of the war since they think its an assured victory. For the same reason they think they could defeat America in 6 months, they will use the Yamato. Also, Yamato finished her shakedown cruise and was commissioned on December 16. She was fit to fight that day. The Japanese spent all of WW2 waiting for the decisive fleet engagement to use Yamato, and it was only as the war went on that they become unable to actually use her. If given the chance so early on, I do think they would use her. The cost of sending her to battle somewhere in the Pacific would be dwarfed by the chance of completely defeating the US Navy in battle.
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And what you're missing is that Japan isn't going to be sending out Yamato on a deployment that far out. Yes, Japanese doctrine emphasized a decisive battleship engagement - after luring the US Navy as far west as they could and steadily attriting it with aircraft, torpedo-armed surface ships, and submarines. Midway was very much an exception in this regard, and the Japanese paid mightily for it.

More importantly, the US Navy isn't going to be clamoring for an immediate battleship engagement. They weren't idiots, they knew getting lured into the West Pacific was a bad idea, and the entire war plan was to wait, build up their fleet and logistical train, and then go west with overwhelming force. The only concern was politics, namely Washington ordering them to actually do something like, say, relieve the Philippines, or them not being given the time to build up. And with Thompson around, they have a much better chance fending off the first, and with a strike against Pearl they can avoid the second.

So the Japanese don't want to go East, the Americans don't want to go West, and circumstances aren't likely to pull either of them in those directions anytime soon, at least, not in serious strength.
 
CV12Hornet said:
And what you're missing is that Japan isn't going to be sending out Yamato on a deployment that far out. Yes, Japanese doctrine emphasized a decisive battleship engagement - after luring the US Navy as far west as they could and steadily attriting it with aircraft, torpedo-armed surface ships, and submarines. Midway was very much an exception in this regard, and the Japanese paid mightily for it.

More importantly, the US Navy isn't going to be clamoring for an immediate battleship engagement. They weren't idiots, they knew getting lured into the West Pacific was a bad idea, and the entire war plan was to wait, build up their fleet and logistical train, and then go west with overwhelming force. The only concern was politics, namely Washington ordering them to actually do something like, say, relieve the Philippines, or them not being given the time to build up. And with Thompson around, they have a much better chance fending off the first, and with a strike against Pearl they can avoid the second.

So the Japanese don't want to go East, the Americans don't want to go West, and circumstances aren't likely to pull either of them in those directions anytime soon, at least, not in serious strength.
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Circumstances did pull the Americans west during WW2. Essentially the point I'm making is that the survival of American battleships will keep battleships firmly in the center of US naval doctrine and keep the carriers in their pre war sidelines. This would mean that eventually it would be American battleships sailing west to meet the Japanese, not American carriers. Depending on when it happens, there may be SoDak or NorCal and those would probably pull the Yamato out, if they end up getting close enough to where ever she ends up being stationed. Battleships survived mean battleships keep the limelight and that means they will go to battle in the place of the carriers and loose because of it. Be it the Yamato and any other Japanese battleship or Japanese carriers.
 
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