Turn 75 (January 1st, 1965 - January 1st, 1966): New Era, New Ministry, and the Same Problems Results
August Incident:
The first moves of the Moscow incident did not happen in isolation but through a prolonged increase in tensions as the government was perceived to be moving too slow on corruption. This was combined with a slow passage of wage reform, or at least the perceived slow passage of wage reform by some of the least informed segments of the population. Moscow renovations are unlikely to have helped the general mood as there was at least in the city a general attitude that the government was entirely impartial to the plight of the workers both through policy and through the development of new structures. All of this only combined to cause the later incident where some hopefuls decided to express their grievances to the government directly through a march to red square with posters and general propagandistic accessories.
Everything to an extent was started when some hopeful youth without an understanding of how the public would react leaked a version of the report on corruption in the heavy industrial sector from elements of the party investigation. This was to an extent jumped on by local media that liked to skirt the line on the content, publishing it as if the government was about to decisively move onto the investigation. When predictably the government remained clueless and continued a thorough investigation, some of the hopefuls in leaking it decided to shift to a more demonstrable form of discontent. Foreign agitation did not help and consistently amplified the messaging, calling the government to be both corrupt and useless with effective jamming policies not implemented due to the timescale involved.
American propaganda outlets hammered on the papers as a cause for further "democratic" reform for the government and called for the people to hold the government to account, with an intensification in programming. Amplifying the more cautious messages of the more questionable papers and ensuring that some of the most convinced members of the public actually moved to try something. For reasons unknown to anyone in the party outside of a few youths that thought that this was a chance to change soviet policy for the better, the best idea that was had was a peaceful demonstration that would move to red square, stay there for an hour and then leave. The few party members involved harbored strange ideas on the possible response, believing that the demonstration would not induce any form of crackdown and that the government would sit there as protesters were less than a kilometer from it.
Starting on August 17th, this protest rapidly formed through street to street coordination between activists, party members, and a general gathering of dissidents into one large movement. Starting out in the south of the Cheryomushki District and slowly moving north with the goal of photogenically crossing the bridge into red square proper. Once the movement and march was noticed, almost immediately alarms to the local military district were called as the movement was not planned, not expected, and the mood on the ground was that something massive was underway. Calls for the mobilization of the Moscow military district were immediately approved by the few officials aware of the protest as armed police positions were erected on little Moskvoretsky and the Kremlin bridge.
Mobilization took the form of getting the politburo and the presidium of the council of ministers together as rapidly as possible to determine some form of a response while the Moscow military district moved the 4th and 32nd Guards Armored into positions on the river to resist what was at the time believed at the time to be a possible attack. Police units involved in the actual crisis temporarily took the lead of army units trickling in, advocating for positioning and containing the protest to the other bank of the river, away from important government functions. In a fast meeting of the politburo between Kosygin, Abramov, Vatutin, and Nikolaev a tentative plan of action of containing the protest was formed as that would buy more time to make a decision on the matter. Commands were almost immediately given to the army to focus on containment and to not fire unless fired upon or they managed to somehow get hardened positions over-run by civilians.
As armed assets trickled in and the police force was called up the scale of the protest was both far less than feared and far worse than originally expected. The demonstration itself was mostly contained, peaceful and more a presence interfering with normal activity than an actual governmental threat. Only half-hearted attempts were made to bypass the barricades for the hours they were up, allowing enough assets to easily move in from all directions to entirely contain the unrest. The bridges were effectively entirely closed to contain the demonstration along with army units moving up on the rear to box in the entire movement in Zamoskvorechye and Danilovsky limiting damage. By the end of the day, the protesters did not seem to disperse even if some of the numbers almost certainly shifted away and the movement started shifting towards criminality and banditry as an effective perimeter was set up and police forces were flown in around the clock.
By the start of the next day the movement itself appeared to have lost a large degree of its enthusiasm from sitting in the streets and calls to deal with it to resume normal economic activity predominated the politburo. From quick interrogations from protesters pulled aside by police units, it was fairly quickly determined that this was some impromptu movement of students and various optimists, leaving open the question of how to actually deal with them. The expected voices of Podgorny's little clique in the Supreme Soviet were advocating to allow them more time to loot central Moscow, but those were rapidly countered. Calls for the consolidation of the movement were made, with military forces moving to ensure that protesters could be contained to a few areas, limiting damage and ensuring that in the process the worst of the agitators could be cleanly arrested.
At a point in the second day, the call was made that there would be a tentative amnesty for those participating as they had theoretically done nothing illegal, with an hour provided to disperse as the entire movement shut down traffic and activity across several streets. The vast majority moved to get through planned routes of egress as rapidly as possible, moving even further away from the government and back to their homes. Out of the few radicals left, a few tried to resist the police using petrol bombs, but it was mostly ineffectual as a sufficient number of trained and equipped units were already present. A few thousand arrests were made of this remaining crowd, assuming that the majority would be the agitators responsible, but this proved more questionable than originally expected.
Interrogation of those involved quickly identified the few ringleaders as lower party members without much connection above, more mobilizing out of a desire to influence the government then a desire for an armed takeover. Somehow, these brilliant people thought the best way of doing so was to intimidate the government into change, and to an extent some change was implemented. Anti Corruption investigations were coordinated with the smaller ministry effort and effectively worked to unseat much of the heavy industrial sector, ensuring that those responsible would be held responsible. This was accompanied by a further reform towards the entire process, with a greater degree of publicity for the success of the investigation along with a drive towards ensuring that far more of the smaller results were reported to the public.
The reintroduction of prison sentences for the most extreme examples of corruption have also been re-implemented and passed as a case of discouragement with maximum sentences of a decade. The investigation itself has also been broken down into subsections to reduce the chance of data leaks and compartmentalize it against internal challenges. Work towards reducing the scale of quasi-legal publication has also been made with a far more explicit codification of acceptable reporting standards towards any paper that wishes to remain legal. Allowances for peaceful protests have technically been passed alongside the change in law, but these have been focused entirely on providing a technical route towards an ideal protest without any property damage. Conversely, any protest that does not follow the terms now has a collective responsibility for damages, with every member of a movement capable of being charged for aiding whatever incidents occur.
Internal Politics:
Movements in internal politics have not slowed despite protests and the scale of necessary re-organization. In an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet in the immediate aftermath of the protests an entire slate of legislation has been passed nearly unanimously. Effective immediately the anti corruption investigation was splintered into self contained segments that would ensure a degree of political redundancy. Further, temporary personnel were shifted into the heavy industrial ministry on a political consensus to get it functioning and to work on clearing the worst of the corruption. Even Masherov was amenable as he was willing to go along with compromise candidates with only a small margin of protest.
Both of the personnel selected for the infrastructural sector have come as a balanced series of compromises with the department head coming in from Saratov with a more experienced deputy from the Kazakh SSR. Both men have had a respectable degree of service and have proven to be adequate at their posts, allowing a degree of stability and nothing new or exciting coming about. Immediate reforms to either sector are not expected with the primary task of the ministry and the personnel remaining being the completion of the current plan over any new political maneuvering. The general investigation is only expected to intensify over the next few years as more experienced personnel are lost, limiting what can be done. Hiring programs have started, but they will take time to build up experienced and educated assets.
The heavy industrial sector is practically expected to become the focus of any and all investigations as it seems like there is a crony under every rock. Total turnover of the entire department is not viable from a production perspective, but with the reintroduction of punishments for the corrupt along with a willingness to pursue them, significant networks are almost certain to be pulled out of it. Voznesensky made it his fiefdom and the anti-corruption effort should clear a wide swath of posts to move new personnel in, assuming that the Supreme Soviet does not get too many ideas on necessary appointments. Severe dysfunction in the sector itself can be overcome through funding new programs and moving in new more qualified personnel, consolidating the most important sector for the ministry and finally attaining some political stability.
[]Maximally Exploit the Openings: The mass of openings in the most important sector has opened a nearly unheard of political opportunity as long as strong investment can be continued. Advancing new personnel that are untainted by either corruption or excesses can serve to improve productivity, reduce labor violations, and consolidate control over the ministry. Taking every opportunity to push personnel will come at a constant political cost and there will be compromises on who is moved in, but the ministry needs to be able to eventually stand on its own.
[]Revive Old Cadre Programs: Voznesensky made many mistakes, but the underutilized massive graduation programs that have been partially subsidized by the Ministry along with the hiring of new personnel has proven invaluable for producing those unclaimed by any other center of power. Taking these same people under the wing of the ministry will involve far more students in politics than is sensible but they can be sent to do the harshest work under moderate supervision, and a capable new crop of politicians can be made. A greater focus will be placed on fighting for lower level posts instead of those above, helping in the next decade but offering no immediate help.
[]Propose Neutral Promotions: The political fire around the heavy industrial ministry is too much to get involved with. Choosing to ignore it and proposing comparatively apolitical promotions will ensure that major amounts of influence are not consumed on useless arguments. A program focused on the consolidation of other sectors will be prioritized, leaving the politicians to fight over heavy industry. The limited political capital the ministry does have can instead be spent on secondary sectors considered to be less important, going far further but having far less monetary access.
Infrastructure Department Head: Viktor Yakovlevich Gerasimov: A Saratov party member that took charge of the development of roads and most notably a housing program that did not create massive displacements or further issues. He is one of the ardent believers that the main purpose of the infrastructural sector is to accelerate economic development as a primary goal, making him uncontroversial if bland. Educated in transportation engineering with experience taking charge of the regional road program he represents one of the best choices for the current drive towards improving infrastructure. Technically aligned towards Masherov, Gerasimov is mild enough to be tolerated, with at least a respect for the ministry itself if not the previous personnel.
Infrastructure Deputy: Nikolay Ivanovich Pauzin: Graduate in mechanical engineering from the Gorky institute that went to work on the development of the central Aisian republic transport systems. Pauzin has proven that he can function under a ridgid budget and has moved up through consistently accepting the harshest work. Practically unexceptional otherwise as a mechanical engineer and one that is convinced that the infrastructure problem facing the union can be solved through additional finesse. Likely not the best long term choice, but one that can fill the seat and function well as the deputy without causing exciting new problems.
Heavy Industrial Department Head: Georgy Mikhailovich Denisov: A reliable worker from the Kuzbas deposits that took charge of construction in remote areas, rising rapidly after an army career. He represents someone that is at least capable of following directions and a transportation engineer without strange conceptions on development or excessive production. His experience in the development of new coals will be critical towards meeting the Unions power needs. Denisov has also proven comparatively incorruptible with an acceptable adherence to discipline, ensuring that anything approaching the excesses of the old sector can be avoided.
Rocketry:
With the cutback of the five core variation the seeming massive progress of enthusiasm into the more general RLA program has slowed, as engineers have been consolidated on simpler projects. The aerodynamically simpler three core variation has been prioritized over anything else, as its massive capability is more then enough for any reasonable mission. Still, progress has slowed after the first RLA failure due to minor valve issues in the engine. The problem has effectively been solved, but the time taken to review cores and the demand for more of them has slowed testing. Despite this, a prototypical hardened central core is designed and only needs to be built and paired with its outer stages.
In a technical sense both probes headed to Venus failed, but not due to issues with known design factors but a systematic uinder-estimation of the Venusian atmosphere. After re-entry was passed by the primary vehicle pressures on the landing capsule rapidly increased along with temperatures well beyond the original thirty atmosphere design specification, crushing the probe. An altered maneuver was attempted for the backup craft, with a shallower re-entry to provide data on a wider slice of the atmosphere, but the probe itself was crushed before any form of land contact with parachute deployment only working to slightly increase the amount of information retrieved. Working within these constraints work on a next generation of landers has started to increase the tonnage sent and provide considerably greater capabilities with a 1967 launch date planned.
Continued victories in the Mars program have proceeded with the launch and flyby of the new generation heavy probe and its twin spacecraft. The former has managed to take photographs and produced a partial mapping of the equatorial zones along with some information on atmospheric composition. The polar overflight did similar for the poles, noticing slight differences in atmospheric activity and proper high resolution images of the red planet that were sent back through a slow data-connection. Future programs have already proposed the construction of a new series of spacecraft with specialty designs as the original ideas for a universal bus have been canceled due to information on the Venusian atmosphere. One of the spacecraft is to be built for a landing, the other as an aerobrake orbiter, providing constant contact and a far more consistent series of readings.
The remnants of the moon space suit program have effectively been consolidated towards a new generation of vacuum suits, as many of the qualities necessary are similar across designs. Limited packing space and the necessity of quickly donning the suits have favored the rear entry mechanism, as hardware has already been partially designed around them. In the more expedient generation of suits, an example that can hold up to short duration external walks is likely to be ready and flying next year with the first FGB-VA launches. Actual missions will only happen by the end of the year with the more advanced second generation suit still needing considerable effort for longer duration spacewalks but the technical problems involved are entirely solvable.
Through the budget cuts the FGB-VA program has continued through a rationalization in several systems and the acceptance of more common components. Developments for the moon mission and the tight mass budgets involved in it have been rejected in favor of technical simplification followed by later optimization. The VA capsule has already performed two successful re-entrys without its supporting bus, proving that it can sustain short orbital flights. Crewed flights themselves are not expected to start until sometime by the middle of 1966, but they will be conducted with several duration records expected to be set along with a wealth of experiences. As a general platform for testing the FGB bus with a lightened propellant load is expected to be sufficient for almost any reasonably foreseeable missions to low earth orbit.
The Luna program has taken advantage of the higher energy RLA third stage and achieved what was never achieved before. Using a bulky four ton landing stage with an automated ranging system to the moon along with a radar altimeter a massive system has been put onto the surface of the moon with a communications line groundside and a set of television cameras on the probe, both for broadcasting purposes and for the analysis of soils. Important compositional information about the regolith has been broadcast to earth along with the first images of another world. It may be an eerie gray landscape with very little on it and a view of the earth as a fuzzy blue marble, but the broadcast has been watched by tens of millions of Soviet workers and even more across the globe. Subsequent landings are expected to provide more information on sampling, with a plan that is beyond current funding constraints of building a communications network for operations around the moon.
Infrastructure
Western USSR Regional Roads: The Western USSR has some of the best roads when compared to the rest of the nation, but even those are considered internationally poor. Constructing a massive series of two lane roads to act as regional feeders and linking them with previously built high capacity systems will be more of an exercise of paving the few yet to be paved major roadways, ensuring that every area has acceptably poor access. Further efforts are expected to get more expensive, but they are relatively deprioritized compared to the development of similar systems in regions where no tentative efforts have even started. (105 Resources per Dice 112/300)
Work has gone slowly on the expansion of critical regional roads between the high capacity ones. The state of the roads themselves, despite being generally listed as constructed and maintained have consistently been found in poorer condition than reported. Voznesensky effectively ignored the sector and it showed across the Union with transportation effectively limited to incomplete systems that were thrown together in a rush, with many of the road networks practically constructed in the Mikoyan era or before. Paving programs have effectively needed to be conducted in a manner closer to rail construction rather than road development, with single core points of paving rather than several smaller nucleation sites. Work is still being conducted, and with continuous funding even roads in the West will eventually be adequate for the majority of commercial and personal transit.
Ural Region High Capacity Roads: The least ignored secondary region compared to the Western areas of the USSR has not made the ural region any less ignored. Core transit corridors represent a viable first step in development, linking major urban concentrations and allowing for a viable flow of goods through the region. Tentative interlinks down into Central Asia have been planned to allow for easier movement, but the larger priority after the completion of the high capacity road system will be bringing it into utilization through a massive paving program to claw back obsolescence in road development. (105 Resources per Dice 316/400)
Development of the Ural high capacity system has gone better in a relative sense in that no one had any false expectations of the quality of roads available nor their conditions. Tiny central routes that were last paved as an afterthought a decade ago have received a surge of funding to expand them into proper high capacity roads. Integration with the Western network has come as a logical extension with two main lines built deep into the interior to link general traffic. Offlinks towards the Central Asian republics have been taken into account with the design, ensuring a smooth transition towards further road construction. Once this program is finalized though, the monumental task of constructing regional and local road networks will start, involving bringing gravel and dirt roads up to something resembling a modern standard.
Unified Canal System(Step 2 of 3): The demand for more cheap coal is massive and almost desperate with the lack of domestic transportability and the issues involved in moving the coal. Work on a far larger canal system has effectively already started with the stabilization of the rivers involved, but more funding and more development is desperately needed to ensure significant gains are made. Minor electricity gains are expected from the completion of the cascade, ensuring a steady increase in power supplies and providing the people with viable over-water transportation. Once the system itself is finalized, localized lignite semi-coke can be transported economically, massively reducing coal prices and ensuring that steel can remain a cheap commodity for construction. (90 Resources per Dice 273/350) (Significant Cost Changes) (Finished in 1968)
Construction programs toward stabilizing the river systems involved have been fully funded with construction almost complete on the necessary hydro complexes and development of the short canal itself started. The almost twenty kilometer channel is practically an afterthought of the project, as by instead raising the level of rivers it is possible to significantly save on funding and reduce the number of locks required for transportation. Several optimistic goals of the network being able to fit any size of barge the Western Deep Water System can are optimistic in the scale available for its opening, but will be achieved later on through a comparatively minimal cost of development.
ASU: Voznesensky has made a little assembled system for programers and enterprises, and while it is not necessary for overall planning, it has gained popularity amongst the enterprises. At this point the project can be finalized in distribution with orders and instructions finalized for those working on the overall program. Further funding will expand the training programs for new programmers and those capable of using the system, computerizing a significant portion of large and mid sized enterprises. A unification in systems bases is expected to make some minor improvements in reporting and readability, but as the same operators are using the machinery to make the reports significant changes are not expected. (240 Resources per Dice 132/150)
Training programs and the development of a new unified system of programming has effectively been finalized and mass issuance of systems has started. Limitations on original production models have been endemic to the program, but with the upgrade lines already starting up the choice has been made to run them parallel for a time until proper integrated circuits can be made in quantity. Improved production methodologies are expected to effectively get the program to cross over into something functional, unifying report formatting at the cost of forcing most to standardize on a new standard. A bit more funding will ensure that purchase programs are finalized and the environment created with accelerating enterprise adoption should do the rest of the work.
Heavy Industry
Bryansk Truck Plant: Lighter end trucks that are built in the conventional scheme are still necessary for some of the worst roads in the Union. Building a dedicated facility for the mass production of heavier duty trucks without a detachable trailer and for lighter loadings can help to serve more remote communities. Technical work with these trucks is effectively deriving from previous work towards army systems, allowing some collaboration in design and a growth in mobilization capacity while building out civilian fleets. A unified six wheel chassis will allow for improvements to be made and the absolute oldest examples still in service to be finally retired from all roles. (160 Resources per Dice 89/150)
Initial funding towards the establishment of the Bryansk plant has been partial as the increased technical sophistication of new production methods has slowed development. The main assembly hall has been constructed along with the residences for the workers themselves, but the automated and touchy machinery has only started being commissioned as large portions of it have been directed towards incentive fund expansions in the economy. Work on the development of further productive capacity can still be undertaken but it will have to work around the current political clusterfuck in the heavy industrial sector.
Rocketry (3) 2 Dice
Start International Programs: If crewed launches are going to happen at a significant scale, it may be prudent to let anyone in CMEA that wants to fly on them fly. It would cost a practically negligible quantity of funds to allow flights from members of CMEA and provide a significant diplomatic opportunity. Even scientific missions can be carried out together as there isn't that major of a difference between a scientist from Bulgaria as one from the Union. Launching foreign cosmonauts will involve greater diplomatic costs of accidents, but the first flights can be conducted with local crews to ensure that there isn't even more blowback on the space program. (88)
General integration with CMEA and offering up scientific slots for both cooperation and their scientific payloads has been authorized and approved. Any nation in CMEA can now pay for the launch of their own payload or crew to space at a tiny markup above the cost of the launcher as additional launch capacity is being built out anyways. The program towards the construction of more RLA's is nowhere near paying for itself with development funding, but as local industries are ramped up some of the cost burdens of production can be transferred abroad. Increasing production rates can serve to further lower costs as line integration improves, with mass production serving to improve efficiency.
Outreach Programs: Broadcasting every orbital victory has already been done to improve the products of the Space program, but nothing stops entire flights from being televised to encourage children to go into the sciences and convince politicians that there is some value in funding exploration. At best the program will result in a dedicated television channel showing clips and a few commentators on the experiments undertaken, but publicity is publicity. Televising the program will further offer the chance to explain the dynamics of orbit and the cosmos to the next generation. (66)
Televising simple orbital operations has proven to have a significant audience despite being both routine and unexceptional. Flying up a camera on most flights takes little tonnage anyways, and broadcasting it down can serve to create a significant amount of footage, both of the world and of cosmonauts performing routine activities. Having reliable recordings of science performed is also expected to improve replicability and the degree of groundside analysis, ensuring that experiments can be gone over for slight variations in results. Effectively, it is expected that most crewed flights will be conducted with a lighter end color video camera on board to provide footage for both television and scientific discovery.
Patent Transfer Systems: The space program has delivered a massive gain in technologies but those are currently in a confused morass of quasi-military use even for ostensibly harmless systems. The old transfer system was primarily developed so Voznesensky could maintain a solid hold on technology, but there is little reason to. If an enterprise or business wants technology that is at worst dual use and is run by reliable personnel there is little reason to avoid distribution. Adding the achievements of the orbital program to the general scientific base can encourage further development and reduce the rate of parallel effort. (22)
The broad developments of the space program have been opened to all enterprises but outside of some criticism from the army few have taken the opportunity. Larger enterprises have crowded the sector with many of the innovations already transferred over well ahead of time. Formalizing a pathway to transfer patents that are outside of military use is still expected to eventually help, but it will not help to induce competition in a sector that was deliberately parceled out in the years prior. Future technical programs will involve more information transfer but that does not help for the current situation.
Light and Chemical Industry
Ukrainian Oilfield Development: The technical development of oil in the Ukrainian SSR has been generally underestimated, but with recent discoveries there are a number of smaller deposits that can be brought under utilization. These small fields can serve to improve localized oil production with a relatively light mix of gas comparative to fuel oils. Localized refineries can be built as a part of the general effort rather than shipping oil far off, ensuring that fuel prices can remain low and that transportation costs can be reduced. (110/100) (Completed) (-15 CI4 Electricity -4 Petroleum Fuels +1 General Labor) (+30 RpY) (1 Gas Project)
Secondary oil fields in the Ukrainian SSR represent some of the few viable fields in the West and are still economic for extraction. Actual assessed quantities of oil are fairly mild and depletion is likely over the next decade but current utilization will provide more energy resources to the Union. Future programs for expanding petrochemical production will likely involve deposits that are more remote if less technically involved. Localized refinery infrastructure has also been built alongside the wells, keeping the industry contained and far less reliant on transportation resources.
Agriculture
Domestic Meat Programs(Stage 1): The meat program has been allowed to develop on its own in a strange drive for the atomization of production and massive reductions in grain prices. Accepting that grain prices can only be pushed down so far and that the cost of a loaf of bread is not the most important indicator of agricultural performance, sector policy can significantly be diversified. Starting a new meat program focused on increasing pork production massively can serve to provide the soviet people with cheaper meat while reducing the negative impacts of tariffs. Unified facilities can be combined with integrated production systems, allowing for the smooth processing of animals on site. (258/125 Stage 1 Complete) (133/150 Stage 2) (-12 CI1 Electricity +2 General Labor) (+30 RpY)
Expansions of meat production have proceeded at first with increasing the supply of pork with a massive expansion to integrated industrial facilities. Bringing pigs tightly together has served to reduce thermal control systems to simple fans while allowing for tight packing. Integration of processing facilities directly to industrial production lines has allowed for a compact system of production. Most of the production happens on site to minimize logistical burdens, with grain going to centralized facilities before packaging and processing the meat goods for transport in refer cars. The massive quantities of funding allocated have practically allowed several dozen facilities to be set up to increase meat throughput and lower overall meat prices. A good amount of transportation simplification is expected, as local grain can be consolidated before being shipped in a more compact format.
State Storage Enterprises: Developing a large series of granaries to store grain and provide central repositories to deal with the current overproduction is a step that is politically necessary, if unlikely to actually improve production. These large silo's will ensure that there is a massive reserve of grain that is safely being stored and provide a degree of political confidence for approving reforms in the sector as long as the current state of overproduction is continued. (169/150) (Completed) (-3 CI1 Electricity)
Massive and centralized storage facilities have been built up on a regional level with a program goal of increasing storage capacity enough that any reasonable bad harvest can internally be compensated for. The construction itself will last into most of the next year as the massive silo's are put up, but given the scale of the project that is to be expected. Storage amounts have already improved with further gains expected in the next harvest as more facilities are built. The increased storage has effectively proofed the Union against any possible or imagined hunger, ensuring that even a series of bad years or failing reforms cannot actually jeopardize anything. Dumping practices are effectively expected to resume at the same rate in a few years once the storages are filled, but outside of policy changes that is unlikely to be solved.
Services
Expanded Childcare(Stage 2): Childcare has been either intensely funded or significantly underfunded depending on the time period of planning, but it needs far more funding now. Birth rates have decreased with some of the decrease caused by issues of working and raising a child. By instead offering childcare to mothers for free children can be a far lesser burden, allowing for a general increase in workforce participation. Furthermore, raising kids and educating them in the context of a daycare can be done far better, allowing them to enter the education system with a better foundation. (235/150 Stage 2 Completed) (85/200 Stage 3) (-4CI2 Electricity +1 General Labor) (-1 General Labor per Year)
Surging funding into childcare has served to significantly improve the state of the state child care system. Expansions have started to cover a wider age bracket while the system itself has been mostly fixed from the inadequate capacity from before. Now most urban populations can have a number of available childcare slots to use for a minimal cost, allowing families to be far less burdened by their children. Work towards improving educational outcomes and general education in the pre-primary educational years has already started as a project, with a more enrichment focused curriculum conducted to improve educational outcomes regardless of home environments.
State Consumer Food Champions(Stage 1): The previous state champions of making food directly for the workers' consumption have all performed exceedingly well, but there are many local food goods that have failed to be utilized. Spreading efforts towards including regional foods and bringing them to national distribution will take work on menus and a more complicated logistical chain but it can improve variety in diet and secure a decent portion of profits. These enterprises will effectively be formed as loose conglomerates of smaller businesses, with centralized coordinating bodies driving much of the production and taking a share while lower echelons are organized in a semi-cooperative manner. (609/200 Stage 1 Complete) (409/200 Stage 2 Complete) (209/200 Stage 3 Complete) (-42CI3 Electricity +7 General Labor) (+90 RpY)
Analysis of profitability metrics concluded that one of the best and cheapest ways to mobilize the population and create a demand base for the agricultural sector was the modernization of the canteen system and a considerable degree of funding was committed. Building on the traditional canteen system along with bringing on several dozen consultants from private business, several discrete projects towards expanding the food system have been initiated. Effectively creating an unlimited ability for small cooperatives or businesses to receive funds and franchise was created. Formalizing a scheme of partial state ownership depending on the degree of equipment investment necessary. Republic specific chains have also been organized with a free ability for localized enterprises run in a semi cooperative manner to join into the general branding and menu scheme. Effective local ownership has been a core aspect, as tens of thousands of locations have been unified in menu items and preparation methods allowing for a standardization of supply lines. In the most radical programs, several cross republic items have been directly tested with consumers, evaluating new menus for a new generation of mixed cuisine. Limitations in outreach are expected to limit utilization but the program has already demonstrated a solid profit and decent popularity, if for nothing else than by offering fast consistent food at central locations.
New canteens opened with exciting new menus, serving every variation on plov with white breast chicken, grilled lamb, or even in a new exciting variation pork. Spicy versions are available regionally, with distribution points coming to every major city! Low prices, premium quality meat, and a warm meal for all. -Izvestia
Bureaucracy
Bread Program Cancelation: The bread program has failed in the broadest sense of either solving nutritional challenges or fixing Soviet agriculture as it was originally envisaged. It has offered piles and piles of free bread but effective administrative fees have rendered it too challenging to operate at any scale and a failure in most cities where it was tried. Free bread has been a long term dream but in its current policy implementation it has proven considerably lacking, requiring more funding and creating inefficiencies compared to more conventional social spending. (34)
The results of the bread program have been generally poor, while offering free bread in cities was considered to improve productivity and food security, it has not been effective for either. Excessive licensing requirements and proof of address along with administration of who eats the bread has ended up costing more than the program has distributed. Costs have been made worse by the small kiosks that were set up requiring a further commitment of funding making the program generally inefficient compared to other more worker centric aid. Over the next year it is expected that worker canteen funding will be increased to compensate and offer a more varied diet then just grain based foods while simultaneously a further food program is to be evaluated in order to better address the issue without a massive buildup of new infrastructure.
Cooperatives Reform: The new definition of a cooperative as defined by Kosygin is a relatively popular policy to pass, with the ministry called on to make the correct recommendations. Broad policy implementation has called for a minimum worker representation on the general board to the point of majority plus ten percent, at least sixty percent capital ownership by workers, and a split of profitability towards the workers on the same percentage as their ownership. With businesses reorganized on such a scheme, a permissive tax bracket is to be instituted, allowing practically unlimited scaling with a reasonable rate of taxation, and effectively minimal taxes on the average cooperative with less than twenty workers. (71)
The passage of the full cooperative reforms as a core piece of legislation by Kosygin has been expected by practically everyone in the Supreme Soviet and party the second Voznesensky could be pushed aside. Changes to the old artel law have effectively been codified for all sectors of the economy along with provisions for mixed state enterprises included to ensure that combined state and worker systems can be created. Taxation requirements for all but the largest cooperatives have also been reformatted to ensure a fair degree of gain rather than policies towards a reduction in the number of workers. Tax brackets are now determined by an income system, with each lower bin of income applying only to that money. Work on applying a similar if higher taxed system towards businesses has also proven popular, serving to streamline the system and encourage the employment of more workers with size of turnover determining taxation over numbers of workers.
Undo the Wage Freezes: Freezes in general wages were unpopular as they were implemented and have only grown worse in public perception. Rather than dithering on the issue and proving indecisive the new government has moved to re-organize minimal wages with an immediate ten percent increase following a direct peg to common commodities. This is expected to slightly beat the general inflation rate, ensuring that even at the minimum wages continue to grow with the value of goods and the economy can become far fairer. The left wing of the party has pushed for a normalization of wages across the USSR, but it is unlikely that that element will pass, as the necessities of developing the poorer republics are still massive. (45)
Despite being implemented by the same exact people the Supreme Soviet has called the policy regressive and harmful to worker development. Anti-inflation effects were proven to be minimal as some of those not obsessed with seeing the workers as a perfect input-output machine insisted in the first place. Effective immediately and especially after the significant unrest in Moscow, the Supreme Soviet has provided an immediate ten percent increase to minimum wages with the wages themselves set to be updated on an annual scheme to match inflation rates. Some inflationary risk can be assumed from the policy but less then a percent of effective inflation change is far less harmful then the societal impact of creating an exploited lower class.
Never before has the average worker been better paid. In a rapid session of the Supreme Soviet an immediate 10% wage increase for minimum wages has been passed along with a permanent inflationary peg! Further political work is only expected to improve conditions for other workers, especially now that minimum wages are rising. All wages can start rising rapidly and comprehensively across every sector. Continued development work will ensure that every gain in productivity is directly given back to the worker, improving the distribution of enterprise gains and ensuring that common prosperity is universal for every laborer no matter their post. -Pravda
Intervene on LCI Department Reorganization: Both of the idiots appointed by Voznesensky have been hilariously guilty of some of the worst abuses of the workers since fucking Stalin. They have both effectively been forced to retire, pushed out of the party, and their posts expected to be handed out to anyone promising to fix the current mess. Rather than letting the Supreme Soviet stick someone into the post, work can be done to make sure that the lead minister is at least moderately palatable and possibly appointing a more agreeable deputy that can be worked with. (43)
The general disunity of the troika along with the prolonged instability in it, has allowed for a degree of political opportunity. Abramov and Masherov are both busy fighting each other while Kosygin has become relatively legislatively satisfied, leaving some room for movement. Abramov's immediate move to consolidate the ministry has led to criticisms of enabling a new Voznesesnky, but that was dismissed fairly easily. Instead, a general compromise candidate has been pushed forward as the new department head, offering a good history of service, if with a relatively unexceptional performance. Movement around the deputy is far more flexible, with the strong possibility of one outside the realm of the Supreme Soviet being promoted due to the current upper level conflicts.
New LCI Department Head: Alexey Sergeevich Biryukov: Head of chemical development that has come to prominence with the further expansion of the Saratov complex and the subsequent oil fields. He is conventional and focused on the struggle with increasing fuel and energy demands across several sectors with a graduate degree in chemical engineering. After working in the development of new oils he has a solid basis of experience for the position and has few issues in the further development of the consumer sector. Less experienced in primary development of high return manufacturing, but otherwise capable and experienced. He is expected to work to solve the current rise in petrochemical use along with stabilizing the general Union wide energy demand.
Deputy Department Head Selection:
[]Go With Abramov's Man: Ilya Pavlovich Shulyakov: An industrial engineer that has taken charge over the consumer industry across South Moscow and is both boring and unexceptional. Shulyakov has delivered acceptable and consistent performance along with having a nonexistent history of labor abuses. He is practically Abramov's seat on the regional development committee and has served to improve local production and accelerate the development of the technical industries around Moscow. Shulyakov is also experienced in management on the same level and would represent the most experienced deputy choice, providing a solid basis for later consolidation. (Gets A Favor)
[]Compromise with Kosygin: Alexander Evgenievich Mikhailov: A conventional chemical engineer that has served to develop the petrochemical industry around Tyumen and served to improve local production. He is both unrelated to the old Malenkov era corruption ring and the more modern Voznesesnky one. Far more of Koysgin's political ally than anyone else he has served to boost local delegates to the Supreme Soviet and improved regional development in excess of expectations heading local plastics production and associated commercial industry. His ascension would drive a large-scale focus towards improving the plastics and general petrochemical industry, adapting oil into higher value goods. (Gets A Favor)
[]Promote the Smolensk Minister: Lidia Pavlovna Lykova: Bringing an experienced party career along with a graduate degree in Social Sciences Lykova can help to minimize the previous excesses. Consumer production involves a comprehension of consumers and the need to liaise with a massive number of mixed sector interests, favoring social skills over technical skills. While this makes her under qualified as a primary minister, she is more than adequate as a deputy and can serve to assist the sector in not repeating any of the previous mistakes. She is also a dependable ally from the Smolensk regional committee and while taking charge of managing development has served more than adequately.
Call a General Meeting: The ministry is a mess, the general management is convinced that they are next on the chopping block and that has encouraged a drive for radical action. Some of those involved may be corrupt fuckers, but at least getting everyone in front of a table with a degree of organization and a plan can assuage some fears. It's almost certain that the majority of the rank and file at worst, are facing a fine along with a stern talking to along with getting passed up for promotions for a few years rather than whatever imagined fate they have in store. Ensuring that they actually believe that is a different story, but an attempt now can considerably reduce bureaucratic resistance. (14)
Getting the ministry together should have been an easy task along with making sure that everyone involved could respectfully sit in a room without creating a major departmental incident. Unfortunately, due to the panic over the situation in Moscow and the general situation this has proven to be far more challenging. Tarasov was busy explaining how clearly he was not guilty for demolishing large tracts of Moscow or the implementation of the transit system that caused them. Dollezhal was convinced that he would be next on the chopping block, and Smolin and Petrovsky too clueless to even comprehend what was going on or the gravity of the situation. Effectively nothing came of the meeting outside of everyone declaring that either they were not guilty or arguing for funding, achieving absolutely nothing. It was not even possible to have a favorable impression on the various upper administrative personnel as all of the ministers were either so far into denial or having a veritable paranoid episode over nothing.
Personally Asses Department(HI): Party anti-corruption investigations can say one thing, but a personal perspective is far more important than a high minded one marred in politics. Working to gather a small team of auditors as an attachment to the ministry can be a relatively uncontroversial way to discover evidence and ensure a more accurate perspective, along with one that is not limited in the amount of information passed on. (52)
It was blatantly obvious to everyone with a significant oxygen consumption that Smelyakov was a corrupt little shit, but the extent was surprising even with a cursory investigation. Forming a small anonymous group with the goal of forming political contacts with the leadership generated results faster than ever expected with offers handed over to what were ostensibly low ranked party members. Gorky has practically been setting prices for whatever goods it has, specialized tooling going to friends first and enemies never. Secondary plants have effectively forced similar policies limiting growth in the sector. Automotive industries have been built up for these party friends, constructing a near total empire under the noses of everyone, arguably including Voznesensky. Internal opposition inside the steel industry prevented a larger penetration, but the entire department was a near integrated den of favor trading and cadre moving.
While the information was being compiled, the Moscow incident happened leading to a rapid movement in every political body. Doing the only reasonable and logical thing with a moment to warn Abramov, those papers were presented to the Supreme Soviet as the results of an independent investigation to tackle corruption. offering a clear route out of the situation. The fact that both of the high level posts were deeply guilty was an added benefit as the image of a great crusade against corruption, no matter how factual, is practically ideal in the current environment. Abramov has gone so far as to praise radical action by the ministry in crushing the corrupt ring of ministers that were determined to undermine everything from within, starting backdoor work to appoint personnel that would serve to continue the drive to the lower levels while party level investigations continue. Abramov himself has asked for more than a few days of warning next time, and that if playing with fire, be cautious as the Moscow situation was far too close for comfort even if it did bring in massive results.
12 Hour Moratorium(Will update status page tomorrow)
