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Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

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CompassJimbo said:
Now do tell, how would one go about creating this using 1940s technology?
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First off: There's nothing stopping you from using public-key encryption by hand. You'd have to reduce the complexity, of course, but there's a commensurate decrease in codebreaking ability.

Rather more on point, though: I'm not talking just about public key. I'm talking about every single advancement the US has made in codemaking.
 
Wobulator said:
First off: There's nothing stopping you from using public-key encryption by hand. You'd have to reduce the complexity, of course, but there's a commensurate decrease in codebreaking ability.

Rather more on point, though: I'm not talking just about public key. I'm talking about every single advancement the US has made in codemaking.
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Shouldn't Thompson leave all this code creation and code breaking to Joe Rochefort and his merry band?
 
Wobulator said:
First off: There's nothing stopping you from using public-key encryption by hand. You'd have to reduce the complexity, of course, but there's a commensurate decrease in codebreaking ability.
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In other words, it is not really worth the time or money to develop public-key encryption. You are aware of how long it would take to do public-key encryption by hand? there is a reason why it is done by computers.

Wobulator said:
Rather more on point, though: I'm not talking just about public key. I'm talking about every single advancement the US has made in codemaking.
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Don't tell me you actually believe that Thompson, a mere Up-timer US Rear Admiral, would actually be capable of giving the United States every single advancement in codemaking? He is a US Rear Admiral. Not a military code historian.
 
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Jrandom said:
Shouldn't Thompson leave all this code creation and code breaking to Joe Rochefort and his merry band?
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Of course, but he can say "hey, this was what worked in the future and the Nazis already broke Combined Naval Cipher No. 1"
newwriter said:
Don't tell me you actually believe that Thompson, a mere Up-timer US Rear Admiral, would actually be capable of giving the United States every single advancement in codemaking? He is a US Rear Admiral. Not a military code historian.
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First off: He undoubtedly knows far more about naval history than your average officer by dint of his job.
Second: He doesn't need to know the exact codes- all he needs is a rough overview of the principles
 


Wobulator, you've made your point. Sky will incorporate this or he won't, and at this point all you're doing is annoying the other posters. Everyone else, quit dogpiling the guy. This is at least more on-topic and realistic than the kind of shit Guardian or Vianca will post.
 
I'm really quite sorry about having helped kick this off...

Anyways, on a different topic, I think it would be kind of interesting to see an interlude where we get to see how non-time traveling officers/admirals outside of the USN or Kriegsmarine are reacting to the discovery of shipgirls, ie. how is the British Admiralty handling this?
 
Wobulator said:
Of course, but he can say "hey, this was what worked in the future and the Nazis already broke Combined Naval Cipher No. 1"
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Rochefort and his team have got their hands full on what's happening in the Pacific Theatre. This is WAY outside their area of operations, and should be in the hands of a different team for Naval Intelligence concentrating on the Atlantic Theatre.
 
Jrandom said:
Rochefort and his team have got their hands full on what's happening in the Pacific Theatre. This is WAY outside their area of operations, and should be in the hands of a different team for Naval Intelligence concentrating on the Atlantic Theatre.
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See above: Me dropping this.
 
Wobulator said:
Sure, but he can probably say "the IJN is going to try and bait our carriers out into open battle- they did it last at Midway in early summer of 1942". That alone is incredibly valuable.
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Considering by this point, 1941-1942, the US has cracked codes for the government and some of the military branches, why does he need to bother? We know what they're saying, but we don't speak the language, so it needs to be translated after interception and decryption.

Plus, the whole IJN doctrine is built around a full fleet on fleet engagement. Their entire fleet and tactical mindset was built around the idea of the now-meme Kantai Kessen. Destroyers and light cruisers undertake suicidal torpedo runs to soften the vanguard of the enemy fleet, then the heavier hulls move in to engage the battle line. Which they wouldn't have a prayer of winning in the first place. Because the US, and the Navy especially, hate playing by someone else's rules. The IJN was also smaller. Much smaller. With an emphasis on close range gunnery. Belt and hull penetration. Whereas the USN planned to arc shots into the deck at range.

And finally, PACCOM is no fool. He knows the Japanese want a fight. But that doesn't mean he's going to give them one. Fair fights are for suckers. CINCPAC doesn't need a time traveller to tell him his business. Because, just like why Ike was chosen over De Gaulle, he's got decades of experience over the other.
 
Ash19256 said:
Anyways, on a different topic, I think it would be kind of interesting to see an interlude where we get to see how non-time traveling officers/admirals outside of the USN or Kriegsmarine are reacting to the discovery of shipgirls, ie. how is the British Admiralty handling this?
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In regard to the British Admiralty, it seems that they are handling the existence of shipgirls really well based on what we have seen so far.
Burning Baron said:
Because, just like why Ike was chosen over De Gaulle, he's got decades of experience over the other.
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What are you referring to when you say Ike was chosen over De Gaulle?
 
newwriter said:
What are you referring to when you say Ike was chosen over De Gaulle?
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For Allied Operations in France, although the landing was to be in France, Ike was to be overall commander instead of De Gaulle. Even though they would be relying on French resistance to soften the Germans up somewhat, and generally being in France, clearly, Ike had seniority over every other commanding officer of the Allies. De Gaulle, I believe, had the least amount of generalship under his belt, being promoted to général de brigade after the war had started. Although he also won one of the relatively few engagements against Germany once the Battle of France began.

It is a fairly poor example, I admit. But it's hopefully a good enough simile.
 
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newwriter said:
Honestly, it is a very poor example and a poor simile. There was no dispute that General Eisenhower would be the overall commander. Not to mention, it is really unlikely that FDR or Churchill would even consider DeGaulle over Eisenhower.
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After thinking it over, it's a lot simpler than I immediately realized.

The subordinate won't be around long if he's telling the CO how to run the war.
 
Burning Baron said:
Considering by this point, 1941-1942, the US has cracked codes for the government and some of the military branches, why does he need to bother? We know what they're saying, but we don't speak the language, so it needs to be translated after interception and decryption.

Plus, the whole IJN doctrine is built around a full fleet on fleet engagement. Their entire fleet and tactical mindset was built around the idea of the now-meme Kantai Kessen. Destroyers and light cruisers undertake suicidal torpedo runs to soften the vanguard of the enemy fleet, then the heavier hulls move in to engage the battle line. Which they wouldn't have a prayer of winning in the first place. Because the US, and the Navy especially, hate playing by someone else's rules. The IJN was also smaller. Much smaller. With an emphasis on close range gunnery. Belt and hull penetration. Whereas the USN planned to arc shots into the deck at range.

And finally, PACCOM is no fool. He knows the Japanese want a fight. But that doesn't mean he's going to give them one. Fair fights are for suckers. CINCPAC doesn't need a time traveller to tell him his business. Because, just like why Ike was chosen over De Gaulle, he's got decades of experience over the other.
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Actually, that gunnery strategy isn't accurate. Japan did not want to close during the battleship gunnery phase of Kantai Kessen. They wanted to stay at long range (defined as 21,000 yards to 27,000 yards) and developed a great many means to fight at that range. It's why they crammed so much extra deck armor on their ships, why they went to 43-degree turret elevation, and sunk money into diving shells, world-best optical systems, and aerial spotting - the latter in particular drove a lot of their carrier development.

As for the US Navy, while they certainly intended to arc shots into the deck at range, that was only during the initial phase of the battleship gunnery phase. The US Navy knew that Japan had a (relative) advantage in the long-range band, while the extreme-range band (27,000+ yards) was deemed unlikely to be decisive with onboard shell stocks. Opening fire at extreme range carried a chance of something decisive, but the more important gain would be the firing solution, which with the Navy's predictive fire control they would be unlikely to lose. They would then press through the long-range band as fast as possible before settling in the medium-range band (17,000-21,000 yards) for the decisive gunnery.
 
Burning Baron said:
Considering by this point, 1941-1942, the US has cracked codes for the government and some of the military branches, why does he need to bother? We know what they're saying, but we don't speak the language, so it needs to be translated after interception and decryption.

Plus, the whole IJN doctrine is built around a full fleet on fleet engagement. Their entire fleet and tactical mindset was built around the idea of the now-meme Kantai Kessen. Destroyers and light cruisers undertake suicidal torpedo runs to soften the vanguard of the enemy fleet, then the heavier hulls move in to engage the battle line. Which they wouldn't have a prayer of winning in the first place. Because the US, and the Navy especially, hate playing by someone else's rules. The IJN was also smaller. Much smaller. With an emphasis on close range gunnery. Belt and hull penetration. Whereas the USN planned to arc shots into the deck at range.

And finally, PACCOM is no fool. He knows the Japanese want a fight. But that doesn't mean he's going to give them one. Fair fights are for suckers. CINCPAC doesn't need a time traveller to tell him his business. Because, just like why Ike was chosen over De Gaulle, he's got decades of experience over the other.
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See above: me dropping this.
Please stop trying to drag me back in.
 
I appoligize if this has been brought up before, but has the author ever indicated how/if Shipgirls work on land? Because if they do, then the US OTL strategy in the Pacific becomes significantly more difficult to pull off. If any island can suddenly spawn a task force from nowhere with (comparatively) little indication that the force is THERE, then they really can't afford to simply isolate and ignore large concentrations of Japanese forces. Let alone the prospective nightmare of having shipgirls defending on shore installations.

Frankly, even beyond potential tech questions I'd think the first two questions that Thompson gets asked are 1. How are shipgirls born/created/made/etc? and 2. How do we fight them effectively (beyond 'throw our shipgirls at them')?

EDIT: If this has been discussed, could somebody point me to about where I should look to find what's been said?
 
legiodamnatus said:
I appoligize if this has been brought up before, but has the author ever indicated how/if Shipgirls work on land? Because if they do, then the US OTL strategy in the Pacific becomes significantly more difficult to pull off. If any island can suddenly spawn a task force from nowhere with (comparatively) little indication that the force is THERE, then they really can't afford to simply isolate and ignore large concentrations of Japanese forces. Let alone the prospective nightmare of having shipgirls defending on shore installations.

Frankly, even beyond potential tech questions I'd think the first two questions that Thompson gets asked are 1. How are shipgirls born/created/made/etc? and 2. How do we fight them effectively (beyond 'throw our shipgirls at them')?

EDIT: If this has been discussed, could somebody point me to about where I should look to find what's been said?
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We've already seen one in action with the German resistance.
 
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