Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

Might have, or they could have been dropped from the plan because they were not ready/available. There is really no telling there, especially since Thompson and the rest of Pacific Fleet have bigger problems at hand, such as the war starting.

That said, if one was sunk in a salvageable state, the USN could do worse than raise the wreck since having an example of a Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo would save them a lot of grief in 1942-43.
Type 95 torpedo, actually. And while this would give important details on the Type 93, being based on that torpedo, it's also a 21" torpedo, which means the US is likely to still underestimate Japanese surface torpedoes.
 
Might have, or they could have been dropped from the plan because they were not ready/available. There is really no telling there, especially since Thompson and the rest of Pacific Fleet have bigger problems at hand, such as the war starting.

That said, if one was sunk in a salvageable state, the USN could do worse than raise the wreck since having an example of a Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo would save them a lot of grief in 1942-43.
well in OTL Japan was losing a sub a month in the area between Hawaii and the US at the start of the war if Thompson has introduced any changes to CAP and reconnaissance that numbers very likely to go up.
 
Type 95 torpedo, actually. And while this would give important details on the Type 93, being based on that torpedo, it's also a 21" torpedo, which means the US is likely to still underestimate Japanese surface torpedoes.

True, but at least it might ring some alarm bells that 'hey, these are really good torpedoes'.

well in OTL Japan was losing a sub a month in the area between Hawaii and the US at the start of the war if Thompson has introduced any changes to CAP and reconnaissance that numbers very likely to go up.

True, but a fair number of those were lost in deep water. If you sink one in relatively shallow water near or in Pearl, you have a decent chance to recover equipment and intelligence from the wreck. I suspect that Japan will lose subs at least at the historical rate, since Thompson would have stressed ASW patrolling off Sara since Japanese subs were a serious threat to USN carriers (see Sara and Wasp in 1942).
 
True, but at least it might ring some alarm bells that 'hey, these are really good torpedoes'.
That's more like 'hey, literally anyone's torpedo is better than ours.'

And the US did historically study German torpedoes to make their own versions. Which still didn't work right... Just ask USS Tang. Let's face it, the US was terrible with torpedoes, examples to work with or not, and it'll take longer than the war to actually fix all of their problems.
 
Once BuOrd handed the Mark 13 to Caltech, it became the premier aerial torpedo of the war, mostly because they gave it a ridiculously large drop envelope. Similarly, by the end of the war the Mark 14 and Mark 15 were both at least reliable.
 
And the US did historically study German torpedoes to make their own versions. Which still didn't work right... Just ask USS Tang. Let's face it, the US was terrible with torpedoes, examples to work with or not, and it'll take longer than the war to actually fix all of their problems.

I'm thinking less 'the US reverse engineers the Long Lance' and more 'the USN realizes that their data on Japanese torpedoes range and speed are way WAY off and starts warning destroyer and cruiser captains before Guadacanal'. We are still going to lose ships in the Pacific, but with some warning disasters like Tassafronga could potentially be avoided.

Thompson would have stressed ASW patrolling off Sara since Japanese subs were a serious threat to USN carriers (see Sara and Wasp in 1942).
Actually to expand on this, IJN subs were responsible for 1/3 of USN carrier losses* in the war (Yorktown and Wasp), plus they put Sara in drydock. So, yes, ASW would have been a special point of emphasis for Sara and Thompson along with CAP.

*Lex was lost to air attack, Hornet scuttled after air attack, Princeton scuttled after air attack, and Gambier Bay was sunk by surface gunfire
 
I'm thinking less 'the US reverse engineers the Long Lance' and more 'the USN realizes that their data on Japanese torpedoes range and speed are way WAY off and starts warning destroyer and cruiser captains before Guadacanal'. We are still going to lose ships in the Pacific, but with some warning disasters like Tassafronga could potentially be avoided.


Actually to expand on this, IJN subs were responsible for 1/3 of USN carrier losses* in the war (Yorktown and Wasp), plus they put Sara in drydock. So, yes, ASW would have been a special point of emphasis for Sara and Thompson along with CAP.

*Lex was lost to air attack, Hornet scuttled after air attack, Princeton scuttled after air attack, and Gambier Bay was sunk by surface gunfire
honestly having Captains and Admirals better understanding and trusting their radar and adopting Burkes "shoot first, IFF later" rule would probably do more than even knowing about the IJN torpedoes. For all the hubbub about the type 93's range, 90% of their kills came from 10,000 yards or less.
 
The true strength of the Type 93 was its speed, not its range. Even the 15% figure the IJN believed to be reasonable is, at best, fantastical and at worst utterly divorced from reality.

Even in short range engagements, the best achieved with any significant number of torpedos launched was 13.5% (I exclude Ormoc bay because four torpedos were launched, of which one hit), for an overall accuracy in the scenarios the IJN envisioned a 15% hit rate of 6.71%. (That is to say, less than half of the accuracy the IJN believed they would achieve)

This is not to minimize the power and danger of the weapon, but rather to put it into proper perspective. It is only with short-range salvos that the IJN was able to properly leverage the strengths of their weapon.
 
The true strength of the Type 93 was its speed, not its range. Even the 15% figure the IJN believed to be reasonable is, at best, fantastical and at worst utterly divorced from reality.

Even in short range engagements, the best achieved with any significant number of torpedos launched was 13.5% (I exclude Ormoc bay because four torpedos were launched, of which one hit), for an overall accuracy in the scenarios the IJN envisioned a 15% hit rate of 6.71%. (That is to say, less than half of the accuracy the IJN believed they would achieve)

This is not to minimize the power and danger of the weapon, but rather to put it into proper perspective. It is only with short-range salvos that the IJN was able to properly leverage the strengths of their weapon.
to further make this point clear when the IJN tried a 20,000 yard launch at Java Sea (which was as close to ideal conditions as you'd get) they only scored a single hit out of over 70 torpedoes and their overall score including short range attacks was 1.8% (3 for 164).
 
to further make this point clear when the IJN tried a 20,000 yard launch at Java Sea (which was as close to ideal conditions as you'd get) they only scored a single hit out of over 70 torpedoes and their overall score including short range attacks was 1.8% (3 for 164).


True, but the overall thinking is, "A torpedo in the launch tube during a battle is a waste. A torpedo in the water is a chance to get lucky."
 
honestly having Captains and Admirals better understanding and trusting their radar and adopting Burkes "shoot first, IFF later" rule would probably do more than even knowing about the IJN torpedoes. For all the hubbub about the type 93's range, 90% of their kills came from 10,000 yards or less.


And that worked spectacularly well for Task Force 67 during Tassafarnoga.
 
The torpedos should have been retained for a shorter range launch, where hits would have been more likely and the strengths of the torpedo could have been better leveraged. Had this been done, the torpedos would have been better utilized, and likely more hits generated, resulting in more ships likely sunk or damaged.
 
mind you by the IJN own testimony (several sailors on the destroyers reported the torpedoes sailing underneath their vessels), had the mk 15's been working Tanaka's own force would have been slaughtered on the spot.

In spite of that, Wright's force of 4 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruiser caught Tanaka by surprise when they opened fire and set Takanami on fire, at a range of less than 8,000 yards. Task Force 67 should have shot the rest of Tanaka's squadron into scrap, even without the Mk 15s working.
 
Fire control radar wasn't quite universally equipped on the ships of the fleet. Search radar was, but it didn't give precise enough bearings for gunnery. The USN's night battle training of the time wasn't quite up to late-war standards, either.
 
Fire control radar wasn't quite universally equipped on the ships of the fleet. Search radar was, but it didn't give precise enough bearings for gunnery. The USN's night battle training of the time wasn't quite up to late-war standards, either.

They didn't need to use their fire control radars, they illuminated the scene with star shells, when they set Takanami on fire. Tanaka's force was clearly visible to Task Force 67 at the opening of the engagement.
 
They didn't need to use their fire control radars, they illuminated the scene with star shells, when they set Takanami on fire. Tanaka's force was clearly visible to Task Force 67 at the opening of the engagement.

Fire control radar is great because radar beats good optics, as the latter part of the war would prove. It also doesn't get obscured by the large amounts of smoke a flashless/reduced flash charge produces, allowing maximum rate fire .

That all said, this is getting rather off-topic. Thompson's influence on surface combat is much more limited than his influence on carriers.
 
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That all said, this is getting rather off-topic. Thompson's influence on surface combat is much more limited than his influence on carriers.

True, and the butterflies will be flapping their wings especially hard now that we have someone ruthless and competent enough to do serious anti-Nazi plotting in 1942, not to mention that the USN is much better prepared for war with Japan this time around.

Certainly the Japanese margin of superiority is much smaller this time around with the Kido Butai's airwings more damaged, and USN carrier doctrine further along toward where it was in 1943-44 than it was historically. Now, still the IJN will have to be broken and broken decisively for the war to come to an end, but hopefully the death toll will not be quite as high.
 
With the weakened Japanese carrier force there may be no Japanese's second attempt made on Wake after the failure of the first attempted landings. Also if weakend enough it my allow a successful relief and reinforcement of Wake.
 
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The problem with Wake is that it is pretty isolated and close enough to be bombed daily by Nells from Kwajealin (i know i fucked the spelling up)

It's also tiny and hard to keep supplied because there's no where to put it all.
 
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But also means that if are bombers stationed at Wake they can bomb them back. Also if the preparations that went on at Peral that improved its defenses extended out to places like wake they may be better defended to start off with. If Wake already has some or all of the things Commander Cunningham requested in OTL after the first assault, Wake might be hold out against all but the heaviest assaults.
 
If.

Pearl's commander burned a lot of his influence and soft power getting Pearl upgraded. I doubt he could do much more than that.
 
Even if they don't have beefed up defenses and only have what they did OTL they would still repulse the first attack and with a weakened Japanese carrier force that increases the chance that the resupply fleet will not be withdrawn allowing the resupply of the island with thousands of 5 and 3 inch shells, millions of rounds of .50, and large amounts of mortars and other small arms. On top of that is the 4th Marine Defense Battalion and VMF-221. All of this combined with the pre-existing garrison would make the island a very tough nut to crack and it may turn a battle of Wake into a version of OTL's battle of midway.
 
Even if they don't have beefed up defenses and only have what they did OTL they would still repulse the first attack and with a weakened Japanese carrier force that increases the chance that the resupply fleet will not be withdrawn allowing the resupply of the island with thousands of 5 and 3 inch shells, millions of rounds of .50, and large amounts of mortars and other small arms. On top of that is the 4th Marine Defense Battalion and VMF-221. All of this combined with the pre-existing garrison would make the island a very tough nut to crack and it may turn a battle of Wake into a version of OTL's battle of midway.
and you're missing what i'm saying.

it has like...a company of Marines and a small coastal defense gun battalion manning some old 5" guns. If the IJN really, really wants it, they'll have it. Plus the KB still has more than enough Zeroes to swat down a squadron of Mildcats.
 
and you're missing what i'm saying.

it has like...a company of Marines and a small coastal defense gun battalion manning some old 5" guns. If the IJN really, really wants it, they'll have it. Plus the KB still has more than enough Zeroes to swat down a squadron of Mildcats.

Do they? Maybe. But it's going to cost them more this time around. Especially if the squadron tactics that Wildcats need to take on Zeros in a furball have started to work their way through Fleet and Marine fighter squadrons.
 
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