Changing Destiny (Kancolle)

Okay, you seem to be laboring under some misconceptions here. First of all, citation needed on the Germans knowing about the KGV's turret problems. Second, those 14" guns? Were just as powerful as British 15" due to the newer design. King George V did just as well shooting up Bismarck as Rodney and her 16" guns did. That Bismarck was still afloat after that pounding had more to do with trajectories and good design than any deficiencies in the British guns.

That said, Bismarck worrying more about Hood is entirely logical. Bigger, faster, and has quite the reputation. But the King George Vs were superior ships in just about every way.
Hmm... Considering every account I have read from Wikipedia to straight Bismarck books, about the sinking of the Bismarck always talks about the damage done by the Rodney. Nothing is said about King George doing any damage, so please show me.

Prince of Wales on the other hand got lucky and hit unarmored sections of Bismarck, in her bow and under her belt.

Then when Ballard found Bismarck wreck they found massive dents in her hull, cause by King George shells failling to penetrate her belt armor.
 
Hmm... Considering every account I have read from Wikipedia to straight Bismarck books, about the sinking of the Bismarck always talks about the damage done by the Rodney. Nothing is said about King George doing any damage, so please show me.

Prince of Wales on the other hand got lucky and hit unarmored sections of Bismarck, in her bow and under her belt.

Then when Ballard found Bismarck wreck they found massive dents in her hull, cause by King George shells failling to penetrate her belt armor.
Sadly, I'm away from most of my sources on this subject, except for the penetration figures, which can be found on Navweaps. I might be wrong. *shrugs*
 
Sadly, I'm away from most of my sources on this subject, except for the penetration figures, which can be found on Navweaps. I might be wrong. *shrugs*
Ah... I see.

Remember to use those as a guideline cause a lot of those figure are figured out by math, very fucking complex math, and not by actual testing. And it generally average out.

So in reality you need to have some give and take until you get hard real world experience and facts.

Remember, when they were built the KVGs were considered under arm as hell, I do believe this is noted in Navweaps too.
 
Also all of the figures noted in navyweaps are noted to be if the shell strikes at exactly 90* IE perfectly angled hit.
 
Especially for all the *non* war related projects they wanted to do.

Which literally cost them the war in Russia. If the Holocaust of Bullets hadn't happened then the Germans would have had a massive amount of new, willing manpower and a much larger workforce.

The only reason Germany lost WW II is because it was being led by the Nazi's.

EDIT: Also, unloading trains carrying much needed fuel and ammunition to the front to instead fill them with Jews destined for death camps.
 
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Not to mention how much Adolf Hitler screwed everything up. Seriously.

Here is a video listing several massive screw ups he did that could have made the war go much worse for the Allies.

 
Not to mention how much Adolf Hitler screwed everything up. Seriously.

*sigh*

I already covered this myth in this very damn thread...

Which would have been military-economic suicide and Hitler knew it. The German economy would have imploded in the early 40s without any of the loot the war brought them and taken the German armament plan with it. Meanwhile, the French, British, and Soviets programs would have already sailed past the Germans and kept going.

Some people assume Hitler didn't know the risks he was taking in declaring war on the West and Russia. The evidence is that he did, he just realized that Germany would never be stronger vis a vis her rivals than she was in the late 30's/early 40's. His decision to wage a genocidal war came at the point where Germany had the greatest chance of winning it, something he identified yet surprisingly few others in the German military establishment did (and of those who did, they drew the opposite conclusion from Hitler - that war should be avoided - since they weren't amoral megalomaniacs). Part of Hitler's disdain for so many around him was due to the fact that very often he was right, when so many others who surrounded him were wrong.

No, he was frequently very often right on all the issues that those around him challenged him on, at least up until 1943 (and even then he made some good calls), although after that it really didn't matter what calls Hitler made. The issues that he was wrong on dealt with basic strategic goals (such as conquering all of Europe and totally remaking it's politico-social-racial order in an orgy of conquest and genocide), but on these issues he was not challenged on. Once one accepts Hitler's basic premise, that Germany had to wage a massive genocidal war to conquer Europe or die, then the course he followed was the one that offered the most chance of success. In that sense, Hitler was the best strategist Germany had (which is more a damnation of the German military's capacity for rational strategic thinking then it is any praise of Hitler's acumen).

Sure, ultimately Hitler's style of leadership became counterproductive once the Nazis were losing, but the fact that they even got as far as they did was because of him.

I mean, looking at the examples in that video:

10. Attributing the performance of German armies in Barbarossa on a prototype assault rifle? The effectiveness of an army depends on a hell of a lot more then a single weapon system. Oh, and the MP-43/44 wound up seeing service from 1943 onwards anyway... where it had jack-all impact on the operational-strategic situation.
9. Repeat of the Me-262 myth, ignoring that material and technical constraints meant the fighter was never going to enter into mass service anyways.
8. Following the destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad, Hitler gave permission for multiple retreats that allowed the Germans to assemble the forces needed to execute 3rd Kharkov. In fact, on multiple occasions in 1943 he approved of withdrawals, although most of the time grudgingly or after the deed had already been done. And it should not be forgotten that the first time he issued a "no retreat" order (on the outskirts of Moscow), he was correct in doing so.
7. The Germans had all the winter equipment they needed in storehouses along the border. The problem was they had zero capacity to get it all the way out to the frontlines at the edge of Moscow.
6. The V-1 and V-2 were too inaccurate and had too inadequate warheads to have any military value no matter what target they were directed at. Case in point: in 1945 Hitler did have the missiles fired at things like "bridges" and "logistical targets"... and they all bloody missed.
5. A pure product of post-war German general sob stories who sought to put all their military failures on a long-dead man. Modern scholarship on this issue has debunked this myth so thoroughly that I am simply not going to reiterate the arguments here. Read Megargee's "Inside Hitler's High Command" for a good overview.
4. Okay, yeah. This one is entirely his fault.
3. Already covered this up in my quoted posts. The prevailing geopolitical situation in 1941 pretty much left him no choice but to risk a two front war if he wanted to acquire his dreamed of lebensraum. And better 1941 then 1942, when the US will be in the war and the Soviets will have largely finished reforming and re-equipping the Red Army.
2. Addressed this in this post:

Pearl Harbour neatly murdered the Isolationist movement in America and the Germans were very much seen as in cahoots with the Japanese even before Hitler declared war, so an American declaration of war on Germany is extremely probable anyways. Even if that is not enough, the next incident between a German U-Boat in the Atlantic and an American vessel in a convoy to Britain leads to the American public focusing all that anger over Pearl Harbour upon Germany, with a subsequent DoW. Since the US are now allies with Britain against Japan, Roosevelt would have a free hand to ship whatever he wants to Britain, sent on and guarded by whatever ships he wants, and with free reign to shoot any German submarine which refuses to surface and identify themselves on the assumption that they are Japanese (and therefore expose themselves to being sunk by the inevitable Royal Navy vessels which are also hanging around the convoy) that incident would likely come very soon.

Not to mention with lend-lease already extended, the Soviets have everything they need to eventually smash the Germans into the ground once they get their remaining military deficiencies sorted out in the latter part of 1942. From Churchill's perspective, though, that is merely exchanging one nightmare for another.

Hitler didn't declare war on the US for no reason. He saw which way the wind was blowing and decided to get it over with.

1. Happened after Operation Blau had already failed. Yeah, it would have been better for the Germans to ignore the city and just screen it. But that would have just slowed their defeat, not prevented it.
 
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Which literally cost them the war in Russia. If the Holocaust of Bullets hadn't happened then the Germans would have had a massive amount of new, willing manpower and a much larger workforce.

The only reason Germany lost WW II is because it was being led by the Nazi's.

EDIT: Also, unloading trains carrying much needed fuel and ammunition to the front to instead fill them with Jews destined for death camps.

.... i thought the reason the Germans lost was because they picked a fight witha bunch of countries that collectively dwarfed them in industrial capacity, population, and economy, and were noxious enough that aforementioned countries commited to stamping them out entirely, which is actually pretty rare for wars.
 
*sigh*

I already covered this myth in this very damn thread...





I mean, looking at the examples in that video:

1. Attributing the performance of German armies in Barbarossa on a prototype assault rifle? The effectiveness of an army depends on a hell of a lot more then a single weapon system.
2. Repeat of the Me-262 myth, ignoring that material and technical constraints meant the fighter was never going to enter into mass service anyways.
3. Following the destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad, Hitler gave permission for multiple retreats that allowed the Germans to assemble the forces needed to execute 3rd Kharkov. In fact, on multiple occasions in 1943 he approved of withdrawals, although most of the time grudgingly or after the deed had already been done.
4. The Germans had all the winter equipment they needed in storehouses along the border. The problem was they had zero capacity to get it all the way out to the frontlines at the edge of Moscow.

Yup. The fall mud in Russia made it nearly impossible to get supplies where they were needed, until winter set in (by which point everyone was freezing to death). Even so, the two big mistakes Hitler made were:

Ordering the bombing of London, rather then continuing the fight against the RAF. Churchill actually said that the RAF was within months of becoming a combat ineffective force, due to the constant damage their installations were taking.

And two was invading Russia at all. Stalin was sending massive quantities of goods and materials across the boarder to aid the German war effort, which promptly stopped when the invasion was launched.

The sheer amount of manpower devoted to the war in Russia probably could have stopped the allies cold (counting just German units, and not including the Russians that would have aided them), or forced the U.S. to drop a-bombs in Germany.

.... i thought the reason the Germans lost was because they picked a fight witha bunch of countries that collectively dwarfed them in industrial capacity, population, and economy, and were noxious enough that aforementioned countries commited to stamping them out entirely, which is actually pretty rare for wars.

Not really. Strategy, logistics, and tech is far more important. They were kicking the crap out of the allies at the beginning of the war, and only when Hitler ordered a halt on R&D for the Luftwaffe did the RAF start to claw its way back.

The French, pre-WW II, were actually regarded as one of the best militaries in the world...until Germany absolutely destroyed them.

And to be fair about declaring war on the U.S., it would have happened anyway. The whole convoy thing, plus (at the time) the U.S. had one of the smallest militaries of all the 'world powers' and were still (mostly) in the Great Depression.
 
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Ordering the bombing of London, rather then continuing the fight against the RAF. Churchill actually said that the RAF was within months of becoming a combat ineffective force, due to the constant damage their installations were taking.

Myth. To quote the almighty IXJac over on SB:

Unfortunately the argument that the British were losing due to a shortage of experienced pilots doesn't work. It's been the common wisdom of the Battle for decades, so there's plenty of sources to reference, but more recent scholarship by Overy and Bungay pokes the idea full of holes. By September of 1940 Fighter Command had plenty of planes and pilots - 200 more than it had had at the start of the Battle in fact (the "deficit" Deighton mentions is for Fighter Command's full establishment strength, which it had been 400 pilots short of when the Battle began) - what it lacked was experienced pilots, who had been suffering continual attrition for the past two months. Yes, that's bad, but what about the other side?

Fact is the Germans were also running out of experienced pilots, but on TOP of that, they were also running out of planes as well, and the trickle of recruits WASN'T replacing losses. New pilots were showing up at fighter squadrons with only 10 landings on the 109, and no live practice with the cannon. EGr 210 was receiving raw replacements out of flight school, which Goering's second, Erhard Milch, considered "particularly aberrant" given 210s elite role. The Bf 109 Gruppes with a paper strength of 35-40 planes were actually running 18 planes on average, with a serviceability rate of 75% due to shortages of spares. Worse, while Park was able to rotate out his squadrons the whole of the Jagdwaffe was continually engaged, and had been from the start. Its experienced pilots were running six or seven sorties a day, fighting an enemy who could appear at any time, usually from a position of advantage, and were faced with the continual danger of capture. The stress was literally starting to kill them. [Bungay, Chapter 24 "The Pilots]

The Battle of Britain was an attritional fight, and you can't judge an attrition war without looking at both sides. On one side you had an air force that was losing experienced pilots, but had plenty of replacement fighters and pilots. On the OTHER you have an air force that was ALSO losing experienced pilots (and at an even greater rate) and ALSO lacked replacement planes and new pilots. By early September the Luftwaffe was very close to breaking. Kesselring was reaching the point where he could no longer escort multiple raids against defended airfields. In raw numbers, he had gone from a modest numerical edge in 109s in July, to having fewer serviceable fighters than Fighter Command in September! This bears repeating. By September of 1940 Dowding had 950 Spitfire and Hurricane pilots available, up from the 750 he had in July when the Battle started. Kesselring had 735 Bf 109 pilots operational by September, down from the 906 he had had in July. The Germans were clearly losing the war of attrition. Attacking London seemed to present both the chance of a strategic Hail Mary play, as well as making the job of Kesselring's overstretched fighter pilots much easier. They would now have just one big raid to cover, rather than lots of little ones.

The ever prescient Keith Park summed the situation up perfectly in a talk with the chief fighter controller of 11 Group. "I know you and the other controllers must be getting worried about our losses. Well, I've been looking at these casualty figures, and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we can hang on as we're going I'm sure we'll win in the end." [Most Dangerous Enemy, p.301] Park repeated this optimism several times to his beleaguered squadron leaders, and at no time is there any indication he felt he was losing.

He was right.

And two was invading Russia at all. Stalin was sending massive quantities of goods and materials across the boarder to aid the German war effort, which promptly stopped when the invasion was launched.

The entire point of the war was the eventual conquest of the Soviet Union as the German lebensraum that Hitler believed he needed to make Germany a world-conquering superpower. Given the pace of Soviet rearmament, reform, and fortification construction it was either 1941 or never.

EDIT: Just saw this:

Which literally cost them the war in Russia. If the Holocaust of Bullets hadn't happened then the Germans would have had a massive amount of new, willing manpower and a much larger workforce.

The only reason Germany lost WW II is because it was being led by the Nazi's.

EDIT: Also, unloading trains carrying much needed fuel and ammunition to the front to instead fill them with Jews destined for death camps.

Once again, IXJac says it better then I ever could:

Adam Tooze disagrees, stating; "Once we bear in mind the constraints under which it operated it is, therefore, hard to escape the conclusion that the Third Reich was an extremely effective mobilizing regime." ["Wages of Destruction," p.660]. He spends many chapters of "The Wages of Destruction" debunking various claims of German industrial and economic incompetence, and arguing that many criticisms have failed to account for the reality of the Reich's situation. For example, the German nuclear program - even if it had the intellectual capital of the Jewish scientists - would never have had the resources to succeed. In 1942 Heisenberg and his colleagues briefed Speer and other senior war manages on the potential of their atomic program, but also had to admit that completing the program would entail an astronomical cost and best case would take two to three years. Speer acknowledged that the weapon had impressive potential - and then cut the program off. Germany had neither the funds nor the time to see it to fruition. Heisenberg's scientists spent the rest of the war working from scraps, and even with vastly greater intellectual capital, they would never have been able to succeed. Tooze argues that the Nazis made the right decision - looking at how phenomenally expensive the American nuclear program was, and how even it missed the end of the war in Europe. In the end Tooze feels that while the Germans could have better optimized in some areas, overall they squeezed most of what was possible out of the Reich's economy. . .

. . .A key factor of which was utterly evil policies towards the conquered people that were very much rooted in Nazi racism. Slave labour allowed the Nazis to go well beyond what they would otherwise have been capable of through the ruthless expenditure of human life. This conclusion is unsettling to us, since we like to have what is evil also be what is ineffective, but the unfortunate fact is that foreign slave labour allowed significant increases in Nazi productivity at a time what the Germans simply had no other viable labour source. Their women were out farming, and their men were off fighting. Although foreign labour was never as efficient as German workers, the Nazis literally worked them to death for nothing.

Similarly, the death camps served a disturbingly practical purpose. The Reich faced very real food crisis after 1942, which could have crippled it had it not settled on the solution of killing large numbers of conquered peoples. The extermination of the Polish Jewry for example was not just an ideological insanity - it also had the practical effect of freeing up large amounts of food for the German war machine, which would have otherwise been faced with famine. The brutality of the Nazi policies often hides the threadbare shoestring Germany waged WWII on. Germany was in terrible economic shape at the start of the war, and carried it through only by exporting much of the hardships onto its victims. Had Germany ACTUALLY tried to feed all its conquered citizens, it would have collapsed years earlier.

Regarding the concentration camps, we need to remember that Germany was an invader forcibly occupying large swathes of conquered territory. It was always going to require significant forces to oppress the conquered peoples, and there would be few if any real savings if those occupiers operated more humanely - and many economic losses compared to what the Nazis were historically able to wring out of those populations. Regarding that mobilization, Tooze writes:

"From the spring of 1942 onwards, the new leaders of the German war economy combined an expansive effort at industrial mobilization with some of the most destructive components of Nazi ideology, to fashion a radical new synthesis of total war. This was not a strategy that promised Nazi Germany any real chance of victory. In this sense, the turning point in December 1941 was final and decisive. But it did allow the regime to survive for a remarkable three and a half years, despite the overwhelming materiel superiority of its enemies. . . It ensured that the Third Reich, unlike the Wilhelmine Empire, Fascist Italy, or Imperial Japan, went down fighting, taking with it millions of its enemies. The key to this awful resilience of the Third Reich lay precisely in the alliance formed in the aftermath of Moscow between some of the most brutal exponents of Nazi ideology and the key powerholders of the German economy. [emphasis mine]"
-Tooze, "The Wages of Destruction," pp.550-551

That isn't to say there weren't several areas the Nazis could have improved on - Tooze lambastes their long range economic and industrial planning, as well as their general myopia even when faced with the truths of Allied industrial superiority - but he doesn't leave a lot of room for the old wargamer's fantasy of massive increases in German productivity, if only the Nazis had been nice.

And more specifically:

The only reason Germany lost WW II is because it was being led by the Nazi's.

That it (A) started World War II and (B) got as far as it did in World War II was because it was being led by the Nazis in general and Hitler in particular.

Strategy, logistics, and tech is far more important.

On all of these, Germany did the best it could given what it was trying to accomplish. The only way to really get Germany to do better in World War II is to have the WAllies or Soviets screw-up worse.
 
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Myth. To quote the almighty IXJac over on SB:





The entire point of the war was the eventual conquest of the Soviet Union as the German lebensraum that Hitler believed he needed to make Germany a world-conquering superpower. Given the pace of Soviet rearmament, reform, and fortification construction it was either 1941 or never.

EDIT: Just saw this:



Once again, IXJac says it better then I ever could:



And more specifically:



That it (A) started World War II and (B) got as far as it did in World War II was because it was being led by the Nazis in general and Hitler in particular.

It wasn't experienced pilots that was the issue, it was raw materials. The whole island nation thing. Yes, the British were making better uses of manpower (radar made up for a lot) but they still were unable to maintain the constant repairs of air bases and radar installations long term.

Also, it wasn't so much the slave labor as it was executing the entire native population who, at the time, saw the Germans as liberators. Stalin, a few years earlier, had deliberately cut much needed supplies leading to the starvation of thousands. I'm also going to contest the whole 'made good use of slave labor'. They didn't.

While it certainly helped, the Nazi's were explicitly working them to death, which is in no way sustainable and would have (and did) hurt them in the long run. Using slaves to make goods only works as long as the slaves are alive, and the Germans made no effort to keep them so. This constant turnover resulted in needed more slaves to keep the industry running, taking manpower and transports that could have been better used elsewhere tied up in maintaining the slave population.

And while yes, the invasion happening sooner rather then later was necessecary, your forgetting that much of the Soviet build up was a direct result of the Germans moving hundreds of tons of supplies and thousands of men to the border, but again that's not exactly what cost them the war.

The Russians the Germans first 'liberated' saw them as such. They would have willingly contributed to the German war effort, had the Nazi's not slaughtered or enslaved them all.

This actually made Stalin's regime look kind by comparison, and also led directly to the many thousands of resistance fighters that plagued German troops from then on, and led directly to many divisions being bogged down. Suddenly every town they came across was fighting, and supplies were constantly being attacked.

I do agree with the last point, though.
 
It wasn't experienced pilots that was the issue, it was raw materials. The whole island nation thing. Yes, the British were making better uses of manpower (radar made up for a lot) but they still were unable to maintain the constant repairs of air bases and radar installations long term.

Again, incorrect. German raids generally only knocked out air bases for a few hours on average and their repair mainly consisted of filling in the bomb craters. The raids against the radars were even more drastic failures, although this was because the Germans simply didn't actually pay them any mind.

Also, it wasn't so much the slave labor as it was executing the entire native population who, at the time, saw the Germans as liberators. Stalin, a few years earlier, had deliberately cut much needed supplies leading to the starvation of thousands. I'm also going to contest the whole 'made good use of slave labor'. They didn't.

While it certainly helped, the Nazi's were explicitly working them to death, which is in no way sustainable and would have (and did) hurt them in the long run. Using slaves to make goods only works as long as the slaves are alive, and the Germans made no effort to keep them so. This constant turnover resulted in needed more slaves to keep the industry running, taking manpower and transports that could have been better used elsewhere tied up in maintaining the slave population.

And it was always going to be so, given how Nazi ideology worked. There was no alternative source of labor available and to actually feed those people meant taking food away from German citizens, which was unacceptable. The Nazis just applied capitalism to slave labour, with races as the brand names.

The Russians the Germans first 'liberated' saw them as such. They would have willingly contributed to the German war effort, had the Nazi's not slaughtered or enslaved them all.

The only places which welcomed the Germans on a large-scale were not any parts of Russia proper, but rather those parts which had recently been annexed into the USSR since 1939. Further east, the Germans were met with apathy at best.

Not to mention that once again this misses what the entire point of Barbarossa was. Hitler's goal was to secure industry and raw resources for the Reich, but before the invasion the Wehrmacht's economics section pointed out that even if conquered, the Soviet Union would actually be a net drain on German resources for years to come, particularly after the ravages of war. Simply feeding the conquered Soviet population would be a huge draw on Nazi stocks and transport. Hitler's solution was as simple as it was immoral. Kill the Soviet population. In terms of logistical support and such, the Germans probably saved a lot more doing this then it cost them (in fact, they definitely saved a lot more: they didn't have to ship any foodstuffs to the soldiers since the troops just took from the Soviet population).

The atrocities perpetrated on the Soviet citizenry were not some regrettable unpleasantness the invasion could have done without. They were a key factor in making the whole venture worthwhile to Nazi Germany. Without them, the invasion loses any economic legitimacy. And it will also give a morale hit to the German soldiers. Fact is that racism, and race-based exploitation, are very effective vehicles for conquest. If you try to treat everyone fairly and equally, then you're gonna run into a LOT of problems trying to build your empire. It gets worse if one of the chief reasons for your expansion is to steal resources from others, as was the case with Nazi Germany. Then you need a very good reason why your people deserve other people's stuff more than they do themselves, and racism is very good at providing that reason.

This isn't just talk. People need a reason to lay down their lives for their country, and states that are unable to provide sufficient reason often fold under pressure. Fascist Italy is a good counter example. Although Italy certainly had some of the same racist dogma, it wasn't as pervasive or as popular. Once the going got tough, the Italians asked themselves just what the hell they were dying for, then threw in the towel. A country doesn't fight to the bitter end for nebulous reasons. The Germans fought incredibly hard in WWII because they had a pervasive ideology that made sense to them. That ideology told them they were better than everyone else, deserved to be on top, and were justified in killing anyone else until that became a reality. It was incredibly racist, but it worked.

What is going to happen is that you have somewhat less motivated soldiers ("Why are we invading these people?"), little change to the opposition of the occupied people ("You launched an unprovoked attack and conquered us!"), and a much weaker war economy ("We can't take those inhumane emergency measures! Poles/Jews/Ukrainians/Russians/Belorussians/Roma/jesusyouaretryingtomurderalotofpeople are people too!") In all probability, it costs the Germans the war faster.
 
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um.....

are you sure we're still in the right topic?

this is getting, IMO, out of topic in related to the story.....
 
I don't typically mind the historical discussions myself. The story is set in WW2, it's only natural to talk about it. Especially in this case, since the last bit was in Germany.

That said, probably a good idea to make sure it doesn't go too far down the rabbit hole, at least until the land war gets actual focus in the story (which it will, but that's a ways off in the future).
 
Alright then, I'll lay off for now.

That said, probably a good idea to make sure it doesn't go too far down the rabbit hole, at least until the land war gets actual focus in the story (which it will, but that's a ways off in the future).

I am curious how you will take it. I just hope you give the Soviets their due. I'm quite tired of alternate histories which treat them as the Nazis punching bag when in reality they were actually likely the more formidable military-industrial power...

I suppose the easy way out would be to make the "Soviets join the Axis" idea happen combined with Britain overreacting to suck them into the war on the Nazis side. That way it's democracies versus militant totalitarian powers. Although that ones going to get rrrrreeeeeeaaaaaallly bloody for everyone involved.
 
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I'm currently studying to be a history teacher. One doesn't do that, well hopefully doesn't, by looking at biased views. No different than when I do a crossover, I always make sure to look at every side and see they get their due.

Unless they just really don't deserve it for some reason, but that's not the case here. The Sovs were bullrushed and knocked around, but to look at it as 'LOLZ NAZI CURBSTOMP' is insulting to the veterans of the war.
 
I am enjoying the discussion as well, but we're probably at the point it needs its own thread.
 
Fair enough. @obssesednuker, I actually enjoyed this debate though I think we're referencing different sources, or coming at this from radically different views.

Either way I enjoyed it, and I certainly respect your opinion (even if I think your wrong :p). Thanks for debating in good faith.
 
Unless they just really don't deserve it for some reason, but that's not the case here. The Sovs were bullrushed and knocked around, but to look at it as 'LOLZ NAZI CURBSTOMP' is insulting to the veterans of the war.
It's because the masses like easy and simple things to identify. For example,

Nazi=stronk
Soviets=punching bag

Not that I agree with the thinking. It's just how many people prefer to.

Curse you for resisting simplicity, Truth!
 
And the Gestapo, and the NSDAP morale officers, and the SD, and the Abwehr, and...

Look, Nazi Germany had a lot of security services, okay? So many in fact they sometimes wound up tripping over each other.
Well, good news about the Abwehr, they were even more at cross-purposes with the rest of the security services.
In that the people in charge seemed to send a lot of mail to London.
And while cleverer decisions could have made the War in the USSR easier for the Nazis, I really see no way they could actually take out the USSR.
 
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