No, Hitler was very often wrong, and his direct interference often fucked things up.
No, he was frequently very often right on all the issues that those around him challenged him on, at least up until 1943 (and even then he made some good calls), although after that it really didn't matter what calls Hitler made. The issues that he was wrong on dealt with basic strategic goals (such as conquering all of Europe and totally remaking it's politico-social-racial order in an orgy of conquest and genocide), but on these issues he was not challenged on. Once one accepts Hitler's basic premise, that Germany had to wage a massive genocidal war to conquer Europe or die, then the course he followed was the one that offered the most chance of success. In that sense, Hitler was the best strategist Germany had (which is more a damnation of the German military's capacity for rational strategic thinking then it is any praise of Hitler's acumen).
Sure, ultimately Hitler's style of leadership became counterproductive once the Nazis were losing, but the fact that they even got as far as they did was because of him.
As it turns out, invading almost all of Europe in rapid succession (not counting Italy) stretches one's military quite thin and has no long-term outcome in your favor. Who knew?
This pretends that a more measured pace would have brought Germany more dividends. Nothing is further from the truth: time was on the side of Germany's enemies, not Germany, as Hitler was well aware. A more measured German leadership would have achieved less before being crushed. Germany either had to win quickly (which necessitated all those rushes, improvisations, and shoe-stringings you spent all your post deriding) or she was doomed to defeat. I mean, to address some individual points you make:
but he made no effort to avoid war with Britain
Of course Hitler made no effort to avoid war with Britain. That was impossible given what he was trying to do. His
basic strategic goal of conquering all of continental Europe pretty much obviates any attempt at avoiding war with Britain since it flew in the face of Britain's own basic strategic policy of the last 500-so years of preventing any continental power from dominating all of continental Europe. And since Britain could always count on growing support and eventual entry into the war of the United States before the Germans could build the necessary naval-air power to defeat her, fighting the necessary prolonged naval-air war to actually defeat Britain is not a winning prospect.
and he never gave sufficient consideration to the massive undertaking of an ideological throwdown with fucking Russia that he could see being around the corner the whole time.
Because Germany did not have the time to accrue those resources. It's 1941 or bust. In 1940 or earlier, Germany is too weak. In 1942 or later, Russia is too strong. Hitler gambled on a short, victorious war with Russia because the time and resource constraints upon Germany obviated any other option.
The alternative of not starting the war and abandoning rearmament is there too, but from the perspective of Hitler's cosmology of racial struggle this is an even worse fate then the historical bloodbath of a defeat Germany suffered in 1944-45 as it dooms the "master race" to eventual racial subversion and extermination by the Jews (in a very real sense, the Nazis believed they were doing unto the Jews what the Jews would do unto them). For the Wehrmacht, though, abandoning rearmament is unacceptable because it undermines their domestic political power, position, and sense of prestige and self-esteem.
The rest of your post is spot-on, though.
Thanks.