Attempting to Fulfill the Plan MNKh Edition

Voted best in category in the Users' Choice awards.
I wonder, is there any program, country, or politician that has been particularly unlucky? Like overall rolls in <20th percentile or such.
I did a post detailing internal politics rolls over the last 3 years a while ago, and recently updated since it to 5 years since it came up in the Discord. So you can see it for yourself!

Gulyam's Faction (15,69=84/200 or 42)
Dzhussoev's Faction (67,92=159/200 or 79.5)
Podgorny's Faction (96,94,98,63,78=429/500 or 85.8)
Kosygin's/Semyonov's Faction (36,83,20,37,68=244/500 or 48.8)
Masherov's Faction (60,83,80=223/300 or 74.3)
Abramov's Faction (48,30,18=96/300 or 32)
Romanov's Faction (50,78=128/200 or 64)
Voznesensky's Faction (8,51,46=105/300 or 35)
Ashimov's Faction (17,70,58,29,22=196/500 or 39.2)
Kleshchev's Faction (7,79,88,50,9=233/500 or 46.6)

I did consider Semyonov as a continuation of Kosygin in this post, since his faction mostly carried over, whilst Romanov for example is more of a mixture of Abramov/Voznesensky carryovers mostly and is not a direct continuation of a political lineage.
 
"Increased construction and direction of the hydrosphere", what is being constructed and where is the hydrosphere being directed? I know it's the last dregs of Voz-speak before Klim updated all the descriptions but idk, this one was pretty clear imo

I like to imagine we're so used to trying to figure out Voz-speak that most of us sorta second-guessed ourselves on that meaning.

"Okay, 'constructing and diverting the hydrosphere' sounds like fucking around with rivers. But does it really though?"

I wonder what Voz's 30th anniversary speech would have been like.

Basically, it'd be that Weird Al Yankovic song about corpospeak. Only delivered unironically. And without any singing. Still has the accordion for some reason though.
 
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Wait I'm just wondering how democratized is Soviet Union at this point as I've remember correctly that someone mention it's more democratic than OTL USSR. Also what economic system country is using , is it Dengnist or modify version as many people claim its quite similar to Dengnist (probably called Marxist-Leninsim TTL) .
 
Wait I'm just wondering how democratized is Soviet Union at this point as I've remember correctly that someone mention it's more democratic than OTL USSR. Also what economic system country is using , is it Dengnist or modify version as many people claim its quite similar to Dengnist (probably called Marxist-Leninsim TTL) .
"More than OTL" is genuinely the best description, it's still ultimately a one-party state where the party decides the candidates and non-party members can only say "yes" or "no". It's slightly more democratic because anyone who wants to can join the party if they pay a small tax and turn up to an AGM once a year, unlike OTL. Most people can't be bothered though so only like 10% of the country is involved in decision making, compared to roughly 30% in the modern west or 15ish% in modern China.

I feel like Dengist is a relatively loaded term so it doesn't really apply. Essentially the system is that most essential/big businesses are state owned, private industry exists legally as "cooperatives" & family businesses, but if they get big then they get bought out by the state and the previous boss gets a cushy management job. As you say, the system is called Marxism-Leninism and is viewed by the party as a logical extension of Lenin's opinions.
 
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Also add that would Soviet eventually adopt somekind system similar to China did before ascension XI where they impose a term limit on how long in being General Secretary then a successor would be decided by previous General Secretary or undecided by faction/s with most seat in General Assembly as I feel like most in Communist Party don't want 80-90 something year old controlling entire country so they'll implement a term limit at some point though probably after General Secretary Semyonov term in office come to pass which probably going be long while.
 
Also add that would Soviet eventually adopt somekind system similar to China did before ascension XI where they impose a term limit on how long in being General Secretary then a successor would be decided by previous General Secretary or undecided by faction/s with most seat in General Assembly as I feel like most in Communist Party don't want 80-90 something year old controlling entire country so they'll implement a term limit at some point though probably after General Secretary Semyonov term in office come to pass which probably going be long while.
We already have term and age limits for high-level politicians - at most 15 years in one position and mandatory retirement at 75 years.
 
Yup, that's why Kosygin retired this year, he would have had to retire in 1972 anyway, so he decided to step down now. Its why Smolin retired as well.
 
So to sum up our dam approach:

Klimenko: Comrade can I have two agri dice?
Vasiliev: To build irrigation right?
Klimenko: Y E S
Klimenko: Actually builds power generators in the arctic like a boss.

Don't worry we'll get to it next plan.
 
Mind you this is just the basic measures, no idea what the separate "advanced" measures would have had.

It's frustratingly vague, especially to modern eyes. It is open about having agricultural aims, but mention of 'canals' is the closest it ever comes to saying we'll be diverting rivers. It says it involves direction of the hydrosphere but doesn't say how we're directing it. Looking at it now, it DOES seem almost tailored to mislead our environmentalist neurons. "green belts", "reduction of evaporation", "wind management", all are things we associate with attempts to reduce environmental damage. And when we hear "stabilization" naturally our minds think of the Aral because the giant drying up sea is the most obviously non-stable thing there. Even more so given there is one other declining central asian sea (the Caspian) that the political folk DO want us to literally stabilize. No wonder we screwed that up.

And I get the general idea of "it's the seventies, period-typical High Modernism sees horribly defiling Earth-chan for our gains as a fun family pastime", but unlike say the northern wetlands the Aral Sea has a pretty clear use (providing water and general economic lifeblood to every settlement in the vicinity, plus drying it is a recipe for horrible dust storms, worryingly close to major cities and our cosmodrome). Wanting to save it seems to make sense even without modern environmentalist logic. "High Modernism", I argue, is not enough to explain why all our bureaucrats in universe celebrate its demise like some Captain Planet villains.

Speaking of water use: People have argued that synthetic fibers use several times as much water as growing cottom. But wouldn't water used in industrial processes be returned to the river (admittedly likely polluted)? As apposed to irrigation water which mostly evaporates.

In OTL, the fact that the Aral sea occasionally dries out naturally meant that the Soviets basically... Didn't think much of its disappearance until the 80s. Called it "a mistake of nature". And if irrigation upstream ruined the once strong economy of the Aral delta, well, they were making more wealth upstream so it was all good! As for settlements on the shore, those were poor fishing villages and who cares about those?

As for ESA: According to @Vi'Talzin , Discord Lore is that ESA involves very little networking, even less than ASU, mostly just computerizing the existing command centers so E.G. we have mainframes that can automatically pull up and do stataistics on census data instead of having an army of specialized secrataries and human calculators do it by hand. It's not the EASU. I admit I'm skeptical, that's very little for 250 progress and makes "new automated system of governmental" an alarmingly deceptive bussword. Whatever it is, I am willing to trust Klimenko enough to have actually thought through this thing and check if there is enough Erbrus production to pull it off.

Ah well! That sounds very practical and useful. And to be honest, freeing up the masses of skilled labour (probably women as in the US at this time) who are doing all the math of the department is probably a good idea.

Look what happened last time our exports to our satellite were hit, thanks to the bad oil roles. That said, since it apparently happened OTL could you please elaborate on what impact oilshock had on the eastern block? I'm curious what mistakes we should avert.

Soviet peak oil hits in something like 1988 or 1989. So... The answer isn't super clear. Though the peaking of FSU production does play a roll in the collapse and the post-Soviet trajectories of the successor states (for example, approaching the physical limits of production meant the Soviet Union could not keep up with the demand for cheap energy of their satellites, destabilizing those regimes, nor could they pump more oil to make up for the falling price during the 80s, destabilizing their own state finances), it isn't the most important factor driving the collapse. Eastern Europe had already been destabilized by heavy borrowing in the 60s and 70s to try and kick off an export-led growth boom right as the oil crisis led to Western countries importing less, meaning smaller than expected economies had to go into austerity in the late 70s and 80s to repay the debts. The Soviet Union was already destabilized by Gorbachev's mistaken approach to reform leading to out of control agricultural spending (to bribe Gromyko into backing the reforms) and the emergency of the oligarch class robbing the working people blind. Then, in the 90s, the collapse of industrial civilization within former Soviet borders mean that at the same time that production is declining, demand declined by even more, leading to an export boom.

Also add that would Soviet eventually adopt somekind system similar to China did before ascension XI where they impose a term limit on how long in being General Secretary then a successor would be decided by previous General Secretary or undecided by faction/s with most seat in General Assembly as I feel like most in Communist Party don't want 80-90 something year old controlling entire country so they'll implement a term limit at some point though probably after General Secretary Semyonov term in office come to pass which probably going be long while.

To speculate on the theme: I've never been entirely clear on why the USSR in this TL is less of a gerontocracy, but I do suspect it is to do with some combination of the lower casualties in WW2 (which in OTL hit young members of the party especially hard and in this TL, there might be some young men of that generation who have been rising up the ranks and trying to push out their elders) and the more open selection of candidates - since candidates in elections are selected by (if I remember rightly) the local party voting on candidates, instead of the local party secretary just saying who gets to be voted on (gasps! actual democracy inside the party!) there's more opportunity for people who are young and lacking in connections to get involved in politics.

Anyway, vote time!

I am a little worried about voting for two plans with so little infra dice, but armed with new information, the ESA sounds practical and I am very concerned at the political cost - we need mainframes and machine calculators for the department to be able to handle the ever more complex economy and while I would rather get mainframes later, if such a simple practical measure is such a big political issue now, we should probably get on with it.

Hmmmmmm. Actually, has anyone ever asked WHY the ESA is such a political hot topic?

Until we get an answer on that tho, here's my votes. Two votes for other people's plans, and two variants that expand the student cadres to get more infra dice. Based on current information, my two plans aren't super great ideas, but in case it turns out there is a good reason for the ESA being so politically expensive, and since I don't know when I'll be able to post next, I'm putting some plans in the ring.

[X]Plan: Slap That Service Transition Button, student cadre version
-[X]Expand the Student Cadres
-[X]Plan Focus (+6 dice): HI/Services
-[X]Spending: 25+15% GNP (10000R)
-[X]Target: High Technology Industries
-[X]Infrastructure Autodice (-8 Infra/-2 Ag dice, -1020R base but modified by steel prices)

--[X]Housing: 5 Infra dice (-480R)
--[X]Rail Electrification: 1 Infra Dice (-140R)
--[X]Dnieper Reservoir System: 1 Ag Dice (-100R)
--[X]Krasnoyarsk-Irkutsk Hydroelectric Zone: 1 Ag +2 Infra Dice (-300R)
-[X]Power Autodice (-5 HI/-1 CI dice, +451 power, -1840R)
--[X]Nuclear Power: 2 HI dice, +36 power from last FYP's program (-640R)
--[X]Coal Power: 2 HI dice, +240 power (-600R)
--[X]Gas Power: 1 HI + 1 CI dice, +175 power (-600R)
-[X]Services Autodice (-7 Services dice, -900R)
--[X]Healthcare: 3 Services dice (-500R)
--[X]Education: 4 Services dice (-400R)
-[X]Total Discretionary pool: 4 FR/2 IN/11 HI/6 LI/5 CI/4 AG/9 SR +up to 4 Dice with 6240R

[X]Plan All Aboard the 3rd Industrial Revolution, student cadre version
-[X]Expand the Student Cadres
-[X]Plan Focus (+6 dice): HI/CI
-[X]Spending: 25+15% GNP (+10000R)

-[X]Target: High Technology Industries
-[X]Infrastructure Autodice (-7 Infra/-2 Ag dice, -920R base but modified by steel prices)

--[X]Housing: 5 Infra dice (-480R)
--[X]Rail Electrification: 1 Infra die (-140R)
--[X]Hydroelectric Power: Krasnoyarsk-Irkutsk, 1 Infra + 2 Ag die (-300R)
-[X]Power Autodice (-6 HI/-1 CI dice, +573 power, -2100R)
--[X]Nuclear Power: 2 HI dice, +38 power from last FYP's program (-640R)
--[X]Coal Power: 3 HI dice, +360 power (-860R)
--[X]Gas Power: 1 HI + 1 CI dice, +175 power (-600R)
-[X]Services Autodice (-7 Services dice, -900R)
--[X]Healthcare: 3 Services dice (-500R)
--[X]Education: 4 Services dice (-400R)
-[X]Total Discretionary pool: 4 FR/3 IN/10 HI/6 LI/11 CI/4 AG/3 SR with 6080R

[X]Plan All Aboard the 3rd Industrial Revolution!
-[X]ESA
-[X]Plan Focus (+6 dice): HI/CI
-[X]Spending: 25+15% GNP (+10000R)

-[X]Target: High Technology Industries
-[X]Infrastructure Autodice (-7 Infra/-2 Ag dice, -920R base but modified by steel prices)

--[X]Housing: 5 Infra dice (-480R)
--[X]Rail Electrification: 1 Infra die (-140R)
--[X]Hydroelectric Power: Krasnoyarsk-Irkutsk, 1 Infra + 2 Ag die (-300R)
-[X]Power Autodice (-6 HI/-1 CI dice, +573 power, -2100R)
--[X]Nuclear Power: 2 HI dice, +38 power from last FYP's program (-640R)
--[X]Coal Power: 3 HI dice, +360 power (-860R)
--[X]Gas Power: 1 HI + 1 CI dice, +175 power (-600R)
-[X]Services Autodice (-7 Services dice, -900R)
--[X]Healthcare: 3 Services dice (-500R)
--[X]Education: 4 Services dice (-400R)
-[X]Total Discretionary pool: 4 FR/3 IN/10 HI/6 LI/11 CI/4 AG/3 SR with 6080R

[X]Plan: Slap That Service Transition Button
-[X]ESA
-[X]Plan Focus (+6 dice): HI/Services
-[X]Spending: 25+15% GNP (10000R)
-[X]Target: High Technology Industries
-[X]Infrastructure Autodice (-8 Infra/-2 Ag dice, -1020R base but modified by steel prices)

--[X]Housing: 5 Infra dice (-480R)
--[X]Rail Electrification: 1 Infra Dice (-140R)
--[X]Dnieper Reservoir System: 1 Ag Dice (-100R)
--[X]Krasnoyarsk-Irkutsk Hydroelectric Zone: 1 Ag +2 Infra Dice (-300R)
-[X]Power Autodice (-5 HI/-1 CI dice, +451 power, -1840R)
--[X]Nuclear Power: 2 HI dice, +36 power from last FYP's program (-640R)
--[X]Coal Power: 2 HI dice, +240 power (-600R)
--[X]Gas Power: 1 HI + 1 CI dice, +175 power (-600R)
-[X]Services Autodice (-7 Services dice, -900R)
--[X]Healthcare: 3 Services dice (-500R)
--[X]Education: 4 Services dice (-400R)
-[X]Total Discretionary pool: 4 FR/2 IN/11 HI/6 LI/5 CI/4 AG/9 SR +up to 4 Dice with 6240R

Regards,

fasquardon
 
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Hmmmmmm. Actually, has anyone ever asked WHY the ESA is such a political hot topic?
It makes hundreds of bureaucrats redundant by automating their work and replacing them with younger candidates with new computer degrees.
Specifically eliminating old and established bureaucrats with political connections but not many modern technical skills, or the nephews and cronies and girlfriends of old established bureaucrats who landed cushy jobs in the lower ranks/calculator pool.
 
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Y'know I was worried about rising labor costs. But between working to automate heavy industry and our other focus being chemical industry (which consumes more educated labor than general labor), they actually might not climb much this plan.
 
Y'know I was worried about rising labor costs. But between working to automate heavy industry and our other focus being chemical industry (which consumes more educated labor than general labor), they actually might not climb much this plan.
Yes, we might need to toss a couple of free dice and use Klim's focus action on Services to keep up. Though we do have some stuff in LI to help soak up labor as well, and we probably will want to reform penal labor since Romanov will likely start a war on drugs which should help too.
 
Y'know I was worried about rising labor costs. But between working to automate heavy industry and our other focus being chemical industry (which consumes more educated labor than general labor), they actually might not climb much this plan.
to be fair there's not much we can do there.

ESA should come with at least a minor labour discount, and we still have immigration helping to keep labour costs down... and of course we WILL work heavily on automation.

But it's only a matter of time. Soon general labor, and possibly educated labor, will actually go up a tier in costs. Nothing much we can do about it except maybe delay it by one more plan.

And all in all, that's fine. Eventually the extra money the people will be payed will in large part go to further improve the economy and quality of life. Our projects will become more expensive, but our budget will also go up.

I imagine we mostly want to complete those projects that require lots of low-cost dice quickly, if we can, but that's not really that different from usual.
 

During one of the first test runs of the ESA system, one of the printers at the Ministry of the National Economy central office spontaneously produced an image with no apparent human input.
The existence of this image was classified and only released in the mid-2020s. No conclusive explanation as to its meaning or origin has yet been found.
 
While the plans with HSR didn't win this plan, no doubt we'll be expanding the passenger rail network in the future. I had the idea of making and updating a map of HSR network as it grows, but figuring out the existing network has been tricky. After compiling all the lines mentioned in the turn results for the West Russian project, there's gaps and uncertainties that I'd like input on resolving. Here's what I have right now. Apologies if the map is too cluttered, I didn't want to spend time looking further for what's a rough draft.

Red lines are lines detailed in the text of updates (including links to CMEA from turn 68), blue lines are Moscow-whatever spoke lines that are said to exist, but I had to guess their exact course. Purple lines are tracks not mentioned in the text at all, but I inferred existed because without them there seemed to be large holes in the network. The Minsk-Lviv-Odessa link is the most doubtful one, it's unsubstantiated in the text but there's general mentions of a Ukrainian network and without it the entire Ukrainian SSR west of Kyiv is without HSR. I considered a link to Kaliningrad also, but I figured with Leningrad and Riga as Baltic ports there was no need to extend a passenger line there. Meanwhile I added Odessa because I thought a Black Sea port made sense to include.

The red triangle around Leningrad is the "Kingisepp-Luga-Novgorod-Kirishi-Volkhov" line mentioned on turn 52. I figured there might also be a smaller ring around Moscow, but didn't both with figuring an exact route (for now). The three southern spokes seem excessively dense, but there's direct confirmation of a Moscow-Stalingrad line (turn 53) and a Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov line (turn 55), along with turn 54 mentioning a line (presumably from moscow) to Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk. The north and north-east of European Russia are entirely unconnected by HSR on this map, I don't know if the population there is enough to make connections to towns like Yaroslavl and Vologda make sense.

Thoughts?
 
While the plans with HSR didn't win this plan, no doubt we'll be expanding the passenger rail network in the future. I had the idea of making and updating a map of HSR network as it grows, but figuring out the existing network has been tricky. After compiling all the lines mentioned in the turn results for the West Russian project, there's gaps and uncertainties that I'd like input on resolving. Here's what I have right now. Apologies if the map is too cluttered, I didn't want to spend time looking further for what's a rough draft.

Red lines are lines detailed in the text of updates (including links to CMEA from turn 68), blue lines are Moscow-whatever spoke lines that are said to exist, but I had to guess their exact course. Purple lines are tracks not mentioned in the text at all, but I inferred existed because without them there seemed to be large holes in the network. The Minsk-Lviv-Odessa link is the most doubtful one, it's unsubstantiated in the text but there's general mentions of a Ukrainian network and without it the entire Ukrainian SSR west of Kyiv is without HSR. I considered a link to Kaliningrad also, but I figured with Leningrad and Riga as Baltic ports there was no need to extend a passenger line there. Meanwhile I added Odessa because I thought a Black Sea port made sense to include.

The red triangle around Leningrad is the "Kingisepp-Luga-Novgorod-Kirishi-Volkhov" line mentioned on turn 52. I figured there might also be a smaller ring around Moscow, but didn't both with figuring an exact route (for now). The three southern spokes seem excessively dense, but there's direct confirmation of a Moscow-Stalingrad line (turn 53) and a Moscow-Voronezh-Rostov line (turn 55), along with turn 54 mentioning a line (presumably from moscow) to Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk. The north and north-east of European Russia are entirely unconnected by HSR on this map, I don't know if the population there is enough to make connections to towns like Yaroslavl and Vologda make sense.

Thoughts?
Going from North to South.

The Moscow-Leningrad-Riga line goes through Tallin before reaching Riga, this then forms the Northern segment by linking into Minsk through Kaunas then Vilnius rather then the two lines shown on the map. This then splits off into the Northern European Interlink going through Kaunas-Kaliningrad-Gdanks and runs along the Northern coast.

The "central" line/next line reverse clockwise runs both east and West from Moscow with a similar path to the one displayed with the exception that it goes through Brest rather then through the North.

Going one line more Southern from Moscow and splinting at Moscow rather then at Smolensk as depicted cuts through Bryansk-Chernigov-Kiev and pushes across down to Odessa.

The next line reverse clockwise cuts through Kursk about as depicted then goes to Kharkov then to Dneiprovetsk where it joins elements of the outer ring which then goes through Nikolayev and into Odessa.

Next line reverse clockwise folows as depicted but continues south a bit after cutting through Donetsk, reaching Sochi through Rostov. This is linked into the outer ring through a linkage between Dneiprovetsk and Stalingrad through Rostov.

Next Line Reverse Clockwise runs to Stalingrad on about the same route depicted and would have continued out to Astrakhan if you did Caucuses rail. There is a split in it at Tambov that then runs all the way to Kuybyshev.

From there the Outer ring is all linked up as previously described with a route going from Kazan to Kuybyshev to Saratov, merging with the rest of the outer ring in Stalingrad and continuing to Odessa along the previously described route. From Odessa the southern CMEA branch line is connected.

The not really a ring in any sense middle ring is Kharkov-Kiev and out to Brest, running through the small coridoor of both flat and non-swampy terrain.

The inner so to say ring runs effectivly as depicted with the only change being that it runs into the baltics differently as described in the first few lines.

Thank you for the map, it helps to visualize the situation and the updates being just text doesn't really help with mapping out the full extent of the network.
 
Going from North to South.

The Moscow-Leningrad-Riga line goes through Tallin before reaching Riga, this then forms the Northern segment by linking into Minsk through Kaunas then Vilnius rather then the two lines shown on the map. This then splits off into the Northern European Interlink going through Kaunas-Kaliningrad-Gdanks and runs along the Northern coast.

The "central" line/next line reverse clockwise runs both east and West from Moscow with a similar path to the one displayed with the exception that it goes through Brest rather then through the North.

Going one line more Southern from Moscow and splinting at Moscow rather then at Smolensk as depicted cuts through Bryansk-Chernigov-Kiev and pushes across down to Odessa.

The next line reverse clockwise cuts through Kursk about as depicted then goes to Kharkov then to Dneiprovetsk where it joins elements of the outer ring which then goes through Nikolayev and into Odessa.

Next line reverse clockwise folows as depicted but continues south a bit after cutting through Donetsk, reaching Sochi through Rostov. This is linked into the outer ring through a linkage between Dneiprovetsk and Stalingrad through Rostov.

Next Line Reverse Clockwise runs to Stalingrad on about the same route depicted and would have continued out to Astrakhan if you did Caucuses rail. There is a split in it at Tambov that then runs all the way to Kuybyshev.

From there the Outer ring is all linked up as previously described with a route going from Kazan to Kuybyshev to Saratov, merging with the rest of the outer ring in Stalingrad and continuing to Odessa along the previously described route. From Odessa the southern CMEA branch line is connected.

The not really a ring in any sense middle ring is Kharkov-Kiev and out to Brest, running through the small coridoor of both flat and non-swampy terrain.

The inner so to say ring runs effectivly as depicted with the only change being that it runs into the baltics differently as described in the first few lines.

Thank you for the map, it helps to visualize the situation and the updates being just text doesn't really help with mapping out the full extent of the network.
its why i made a railway map for my planquest.
 
Turn 80.5 Socialist Democratic Process
[X]Plan All Aboard the 3rd Industrial Revolution!

-[X]ESA

-[X]Plan Focus (+6 dice): HI/CI

-[X]Spending: 25+15% GNP (+10000R)

-[X]Target: High Technology Industries

-[X]Infrastructure Autodice (-7 Infra/-2 Ag dice, -920R base but modified by steel prices)


--[X]Housing: 5 Infra dice (-480R)

--[X]Rail Electrification: 1 Infra die (-140R)

--[X]Hydroelectric Power: Krasnoyarsk-Irkutsk, 1 Infra + 2 Ag die (-300R)

-[X]Power Autodice (-6 HI/-1 CI dice, +573 power, -2100R)

--[X]Nuclear Power: 2 HI dice, +38 power from last FYP's program (-640R)

--[X]Coal Power: 3 HI dice, +360 power (-860R)

--[X]Gas Power: 1 HI + 1 CI dice, +175 power (-600R)

-[X]Services Autodice (-7 Services dice, -900R)

--[X]Healthcare: 3 Services dice (-500R)

--[X]Education: 4 Services dice (-400R)

-[X]Total Discretionary pool: 4 FR/3 IN/10 HI/6 LI/11 CI/4 AG/3 SR with 6080R


Turn 80.5 Socialist Democratic Process

Electoral Results



The electoral campaign in 1969 moved practically in the shadow of the largest change to the political landscape since Mikoyan's reforms. The planned and well-announced retirement of Kosygin and his formal endorsement of Semyonov has proceeded with a few issues, leading the man out of power and Semyonov to assume the position of general secretary. Some form of backroom compromise did happen in advance as there was little resistance from either Romanov or Podgorny, with both agreeing to the move. The party central committee for its part held the procedural vote without issues delivering a unanimous verdict supporting the new general secretary.

The electoral season itself has seen some of the widest participation in Socialist democracy than ever before with party members appearing in droves to vote on initial candidates. Turnout of actual party members has been near total with almost half of the voters being new party members that recently joined through the opening process. Something close to ten percent of the population has voted in the recent elections with campaigns all but declaring for factional alignments. Tracking by recommendation has been far more common as the ostensible block leaders have pushed forward lists of candidates that have been endorsed and local party organs listing them by endorsement.

From those who took part in the initial struggle for anti-corruption and the utter mess of the last plan, a good number still did manage to reach re-election in non-competitive seats. Klechev had to fight hard for his seat, but otherwise, no one notable was unseated in party selections. Further popular elections managed to push out almost two dozen party-selected candidates with one seat in the Far East requiring a fourth replacement to be selected in secondary popular elections. This has to a large extent demonstrated a strong degree of democratic robustness of the system even if some vestiges of discontent remain from those unwilling to work to join the party.

A resurgent right wing after the various reforms and the oil crisis to an extent was expected as for some inexplicable reason they have been tied to improved economic performance rather than any other specific cause. Some of the social issues championed by both Podgorny and Dzhussoev have been partially popular but that does not explain why so many in the party were moved to their position. Romanov for his part has blamed the standards and social issues of the younger generation for the shift rather than economic anxieties. The current economy is still growing strong and despite the past crisis youth employment has massively improved in recent years. To that end, he has in closed-door meetings justified a degree of social liberalization as an electoral platform, attempting to attract the younger generations.


Ashimov's Faction: Even with the leadup to elections Ashimov has continued to take a radical and excessive line on bureaucracy and workers power. He has all but denigrated the CPSU as some organ of disorganization and has advocated for youths to push for radical reforms towards some imagined goal of communism rather than the practical one being constructed. Predictably a radical and harsh line has attracted few who are willing to be associated with him but he has carried a concerning and notable number of new youth voters seduced by the antimaterialist sentiment. They will hopefully learn with time that the construction of communism takes work and committed development rather than some immediate leap out of socialism.

Kleshchev's Faction: Coming from a degree of splendid isolation and a complete inability to consider that Stalinism's time may have passed, Kleschev has continued on the line. He broadly advocates for a conservative return to old policies, preserving some economic elements while tightening the control of the center, and a consolidation of power to the party central committee. This approach has not proved effective in getting delegates to support limitations in their power outside of a few positions across Central Asia and the Caucasus, limiting the reach of a partially revived moribund Stalinism to political irrelevancy.

Romanov's Faction: Romanov's decisive moves to consolidate party power and maintain the strength of core social institutions have enabled a strong electoral performance. Taking charge after the fall of both Abramov and Masherov he has threaded the needle on managing the Union coming from the previous crisis. Romanov's current platform has favored a measured implementation of the rest of Kosygin's reforms, a more aggressive containment of capitalist influence, and stabilization of internal measures. His largest electoral promise has been entirely focused on enforcing the laws already made on labor and work to make labor fairer and protect the workers.

Semyonov's Faction: Taking a more open and reformist line than Kosygin ever did for social matters Semyonov is arguably closer to Podgorny than Kosygin ever got. His largest contrast exists in economic policy as he advocates for a strengthening of economic planning compared to market mechanisms and ensuring that enterprises stay properly controlled through state means. Further, he has partially capitalized on campaigns to enforce the laws as they are but he has furthered several partially unpopular general concepts out of several reformist beliefs. The man is effectively a moderate variation on Kosygin with slightly different priorities and is unlikely to last.

Podgorny's Faction: Through time and time again Podgorny has continued to stay in politics as the nearest thing to a reasonable right opposition. He has moderated his point on economics, advocating for a limited opening of the planned system with some small-scale speculation but few other changes. Socially he is almost an unflinching liberal, advocating for the opening of party cadres to anyone that can pass a single exam. Further, he has championed several causes for providing Western-style rights to workers that are neither useful nor wanted. Podgorny himself can be worked with and out of all of the right wing opposition he is at least one that can be talked and compromised with.

Dzhussoev's Faction: Dzhussoev has continued his radical and nearly anti-socialist agitation of pushing for the total opening of both the party and the enterprises. The commanding heights of the economy in his mind will be delegated out to uninformed and incapable workers, practically selling off the enterprises for a pittance to maintain some illusory worker power. Further, he advocates for a larger extent of the market system by changing planning indices and breaking significant aspects of ministry power in favor of what is the private sector. These promises have attracted some workers by promising them illusory rewards but that alone should not have influenced so many party members.

Gulyam's Faction: In several ways acting as a direct continuation of Voznesensky with a focus on increasing enterprise initiative all while simultaneously moderately expanding the party. Gulyam is a strong advocate for increasing the marketization of enterprises in a far more moderate way than Dzussoev, advocating for partial investment options while maintaining strong national control. In his view, the initial reforms of Mikoyan and Kosygin are a good basis for further development rather than a logical stopping point. In his eyes, as long as the parties guiding role over the economy is maintained, introducing further market mechanisms can only assist in improving material conditions. Being the candidate advocating for the enterprises has been a significant negative this cycle but the threat of a more right-wing course remains.


Politics and Politicians:

With the passage of a new series of social bills through the closed-door protests of several conservative voices in exchange for ministry positions a new government organized along a Semyonov-Romanov axis has been formed. This has come as something of an expectation as despite Podgorny's strong performance it is insufficient to appoint new ministers without compromising with the far right, limiting it as a government despite the alignments of the center. The largest agenda of both toward the economy has come in the form of modifying the current system and ensuring that laws towards labor are enforced.

The social reform bill itself contains a broad slew of cultural reforms through weakening the authority of the Ministry of Culture away from a direct evaluation role to an intervening position. From this, the ministry is ostensibly responsible for screening published media but only in the sense of finding works outside the standards rather than as an initial screening tool. Further, the new social reforms have shifted further funding towards a wider variety of social programs with state backing provided for several more exploratory films and books towards previous politics. More notably new musical styles have reached mass adoption with the formalization of funding towards "rock" productions over more conventional classism.

The largest upset has come in the updated law from several compromise liberalizations conducted to keep pace with the West and to some on the right wing to undo the mistakes of Stalinism. Sodomy has been broadly decriminalized due to the pressure of several doctors towards treating it as a disease rather than as a criminal social act. Further agitation has continued towards reviving some aspects of the 1922 criminal code over the modern one, ascribing a degree of excesses to the current series of laws. This has brought up questions ranging from changes in standards of allowed social expression to questions involving the 1926 drug law that has stood practically unchanged.

Further advocacy of economic reform has become a far more contentious topic with strong advocacy for ensuring that laws towards labor are entirely enforced and inspected. Alternatively, several outside the current government have instead agitated for radical reforms to the system with the left advocating for an increase in planning while the right wants to further the distribution of capital in response to slight decreases in economic growth. Practically speaking the Voznesesnky era cannot be recreated in that there is no massive reserve of labor to mobilize now. Any economic growth will have to fundamentally come from improving productivity rather than constant efforts to mobilize yet more workers out of agriculture.

[]Agitate for a Conservative Course: Romanov is possibly correct that the vast majority of general party members prefer a more socially progressive course but that still leaves a wide swath of discontent. Working to pick up the conservative flank of the general conservative block will allow a far greater degree of political maneuver. Romanov for his part to an extent expects this and has all but admitted that he expects to lose supporters in the short term from changing social opinions.

[]Keep to Romanov's Line: Romanov has a point even if the point is a sign of the party escaping from the guidance of the older generations in favor of something new. Staying with him and broadly upholding his campaign promises will avoid splitting the current conservative block between personalities and allow a degree of unity in the face of resurgent liberal pressure. Staying in tight association without securing an independent party base can cause a massive problem but that is unlikely to be an issue through the course of this plan.

[]Compromise: Semyonov has a point in that the youths want social changes to social organization and several further reforms. Instead of working with the conservatives, tentative outreach can be made to the right to form a new alliance by being far more useful than Romanov to them. Assuming Semyonov can hold onto power a rapid consolidation of the conservatives can follow in the aftermath of the 74 election, securing a political career and directly undermining Romanov.


Presidium of the Council of Ministers:

MNKh: Ivan Efimovich Klimenko:
With new changes in government and the massive electoral upsets inherent to it, the ministry is practically back to its old political influence. A politburo candidacy has rapidly turned into a full voting position on the politburo consolidating the party and state executives. Further work is still going to be needed on the economy and restoring the ministry away from all of the losses induced by Voznesensky. The post itself is secured for the current cycle with few viable contenders assuming the political environment is preserved and no accidental economic crisis happens.

MD: Pyotr Alekseevich Belik: With the retirement of Kosygin the retirement of Vatutin was almost expected as politics have moved on from the last generation of party members. Replacing the minister of defense has forced harsh compromises between Romanov and Semyonov leading to the appointment of an acceptable officer from the Western Forces. His command experience stemmed from an accelerated course in the academy and rapid promotion to commanding a reconstituted armored brigade fighting on the Minsk-Smolensk axis. During the counter-offensive he rapidly advanced to the leadership of a full tank army, taking charge in the 2nd Ukrainian front combined encirclement and destruction of Army Group South. From his wartime performance, a promotion to the command of forces in Germany was a logical next step, leading to sufficient experience in exercises for further promotion.

MFA: Igor Vasilyevich Babkov: Continuing in his post as a part of the continued focus on Africa and the Middle East previous programs have effectively been continued. He was originally appointed through the influence of Masherov but with a continuation of current policies and the Algerian situation Babkov has been maintained. His likely political priority will be a drive towards stiffening anti-imperialist forces against external aggression and ensuring that they have the arms needed for resistance. Conventional outreach to CMEA will continue in the previous guide, as the adoption of the Euro is necessary for providing economic stability for Comecon.

MF: Nikolai Viktorovich Garetovsky: Promoted after a career in the Ministry of Finance as the direct assistant to Garbuzov, Garetovsky is to a large extent a direct continuation. He is effectively one of the largest advocates for increasing the extent of financial mechanisms in the planned economy along with strengthening Gosbank. Continued work in the department is expected as debt balances expand to increase the rate of modernization of the enterprises. Further, he is a close ally of Semyonov and his advancement has led to the push of several of Romanov's suggestions elsewhere in the council of ministers.

MVD: Konstantin Mikhailovich Obukhov: With the near forced retirement of Barsukov in light of current labor problems and the essential compromises needed for Romanov to affirm the selection of Garetovsky, Obukhov has been moved in. He is a veteran of the SMERSH campaigns against espionage. After the war and with the Mikoyan reforms he took charge of movements against religious dissent and earned his name for the successful management of the anti-sect department of the MGB. He is inherently a more conservative voice than Baskurov advocating a stronger response to criminality and failures of socialist discipline. Further, his selection is almost certain to accompany a new series of social reforms to both improve discipline and eliminate several tendencies towards criminality.

MGB: Anatoly Nikolaevich Nikolaev: With the victories of the Algerian struggle and broader anti-imperial efforts spearheaded through strong armament commitment the maintenance of Nikolaev was practically guaranteed. The networks cultivated in the previous decade along with the strong fight against imperialism have more than earned him the post. An increase in funding is expected to further reinforce Soviet positions across SEA and ensure that our regional allies can prevent the encroachment of capitalist influence. Further work towards Europe has largely been discounted as the more mobile frontiers of the revolution demand more funding compared to the stable zones of influence across Europe.


Political Maneuvers(Pick As Many As Desired, You have One Favor from Romanov, Choosing one you do not have will have major political costs):

[]Expansionary Financial Policies:
Pushing Gosbank to further accelerate economic growth through increasing monetary supplies has already been proposed as essential. The necessity of currency in the economy is only growing with several limitations brought in from effectively holding to the gold standard for external commerce. Revaluations of the currency along with the tentative steps to float the external ruble can be started now instead of waiting for a more synchronous application of the Euro. (Costs a Favor from Romanov)

[]Reforms of the Social Sphere: Social reforms may be necessary for the Youths but there is no reason to be as radical as Romanov. Applying several breaks to the system and encouraging more measured and studied reforms can allow the party to determine what is appropriate. Enhanced bills on criminality are unlikely to backfire in a significant way but the acceptance of Western degeneracy can undermine the socialist experiment. Sending both to several committees for analysis and policy guidance can allow them to be fairly judged before being implemented. (Costs a Favor from Seymonov)

[]Education Expansions: Radically increasing the education system is going to be necessary at a time when there is an ever-increasing drive towards skilled labor. Something is going to have to be done about the middling students and those who fail in the technical track as both cannot sustain the demands placed upon them. The general track is mostly adequate for university admissions but starting programs towards improving it to the standards of the gymnasium track can start now. Further work at increasing the rigor of the Gymnasium students will have to be studied but with more comprehensive instruction they can become a far more capable generation of scientists. (Costs a Favor from Seymonov)

[]Updates to Wage Policy: Part-maximum is not working in any way that it was envisaged as while the maximum ratio of wages is still upheld the lack of competitive wages for technical experts has caused delays in advancement and continued loss of intellectuals. Removing the distinctions between technical and administrative work will be essential to maintain domestic technical experts and continue their rapid import. Some will agitate that this undermines socialism, but higher pay is needed to keep technical experts and encourage them to pursue a rigorous education. (Costs a Favor from Romanov)

[]Accelerate Euro Adoption: Current tepid questions on the Euro are due to the resignation of Kosygin and some agitation for local currency. The enterprises that have massively pushed for further trade integration have to an extent been discredited but the cause itself is still justified. Ensuring that the previously made plan for a universal currency across European CMEA is adopted in full and not politically fought can provide significant long-term dividends. Forcing the vote before 1975 and in what is likely to be an economic upturn will only further improve the odds of universal passage. (Costs a Favor from Romanov)

[]Immigration Reforms: Allowing anyone who can prove they can maintain a job for five years and with a willingness to work in the Union for jobs that local workers are unwilling to take will be critical for securing talent. Any position that cannot be staffed for the equivalent price of domestic labor will be effectively opened to foreign laborers with fully allowed citizenship for their family as long as one member continues working for every three adults who arrive. This will mostly go towards reinforcing the agricultural sector but other industrial sectors need a steady supply of cheap labor that CMEA is more than willing to supply. (Costs a Favor from Romanov)

[]Increase IP Acquisitions: More technology is critical to the success of the Union and expanding the work of acquisitions for it is politically fraught. External-facing positions have always been questionable and problematic but standards need to be put in place for easy licensing practices along with minimal modifications for domestic replication. This is not to say that local enterprises will be restricted from direct copying, but a minimal amount of work will be expected to avoid diplomatic incidents. (Costs a Favor from Seymonov)


Commitment Towards Balakirev:

[]His Own Merits:
If Balakirev can prove himself through good administrative work and a five-year scramble for power that would make the eight plan look easy he can make a good minister. The next five years will be hard on the man but he has already taken to the ministry well and can certainly make it through without too much assistance. He's going to learn some hard lessons and require some holding to take the seat, but if a more capable candidate comes along he can easily be replaced. (-0 Bureaucracy Dice)

[]Mild Assistance: Balakirev at least deserves some guidance on how to operate the ministry and to sit in on critical operational meetings. It will be his duty to make a name for himself and consolidate enough political support externally but he will be able to at least be well known on the inside of the ministry. Involving a student in a lot of the decision-making will require a rudimentary confirmation of his work for the first few years but formally teaching a successor is as good a way to go as any. (-1 Bureaucracy Dice)

[]Support Him: Retirement from the ministry is around the corner. Ensuring that someone with a clue of what they are doing and a modest capacity for politics takes control afterward will be crucial. Balakirev for all of his problems is a known actor and one that is both young and capable with few bad ideas that cannot be worked through. Directly taking him on as a protege is outside the picture but ensuring that he has important administrative work directly under his control and allowing the deputy a wild extent of operational freedom can produce massive results. (-3 Bureaucracy Dice) (1 Bureaucracy Dice Controlled by Balakirev)


24 Hour Moratorium(Vote By Plan, will be updating the info-post in a bit)
 
[]Immigration Reforms: Allowing anyone who can prove they can maintain a job for five years and with a willingness to work in the Union for jobs that local workers are unwilling to take will be critical for securing talent. Any position that cannot be staffed for the equivalent price of domestic labor will be effectively opened to foreign laborers with fully allowed citizenship for their family as long as one member continues working for every three adults who arrive. This will mostly go towards reinforcing the agricultural sector but other industrial sectors need a steady supply of cheap labor that CMEA is more than willing to supply. (Costs a Favor from Romanov)
This is an easy choice.

EDIT:
Actually, doing the Euro Adoption will naturally lead to open immigration down the line.
[]Accelerate Euro Adoption: Current tepid questions on the Euro are due to the resignation of Kosygin and some agitation for local currency. The enterprises that have massively pushed for further trade integration have to an extent been discredited but the cause itself is still justified. Ensuring that the previously made plan for a universal currency across European CMEA is adopted in full and not politically fought can provide significant long-term dividends. Forcing the vote before 1975 and in what is likely to be an economic upturn will only further improve the odds of universal passage. (Costs a Favor from Romanov)
 
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During one of the first test runs of the ESA system, one of the printers at the Ministry of the National Economy central office spontaneously produced an image with no apparent human input.
The existence of this image was classified and only released in the mid-2020s. No conclusive explanation as to its meaning or origin has yet been found.
Malenkov isn't even included. Sadge. Nice meme, otherwise.

Going from North to South.

The Moscow-Leningrad-Riga line goes through Tallin before reaching Riga, this then forms the Northern segment by linking into Minsk through Kaunas then Vilnius rather then the two lines shown on the map. This then splits off into the Northern European Interlink going through Kaunas-Kaliningrad-Gdanks and runs along the Northern coast.

The "central" line/next line reverse clockwise runs both east and West from Moscow with a similar path to the one displayed with the exception that it goes through Brest rather then through the North.

Going one line more Southern from Moscow and splinting at Moscow rather then at Smolensk as depicted cuts through Bryansk-Chernigov-Kiev and pushes across down to Odessa.

The next line reverse clockwise cuts through Kursk about as depicted then goes to Kharkov then to Dneiprovetsk where it joins elements of the outer ring which then goes through Nikolayev and into Odessa.

Next line reverse clockwise folows as depicted but continues south a bit after cutting through Donetsk, reaching Sochi through Rostov. This is linked into the outer ring through a linkage between Dneiprovetsk and Stalingrad through Rostov.

Next Line Reverse Clockwise runs to Stalingrad on about the same route depicted and would have continued out to Astrakhan if you did Caucuses rail. There is a split in it at Tambov that then runs all the way to Kuybyshev.

From there the Outer ring is all linked up as previously described with a route going from Kazan to Kuybyshev to Saratov, merging with the rest of the outer ring in Stalingrad and continuing to Odessa along the previously described route. From Odessa the southern CMEA branch line is connected.

The not really a ring in any sense middle ring is Kharkov-Kiev and out to Brest, running through the small coridoor of both flat and non-swampy terrain.

The inner so to say ring runs effectivly as depicted with the only change being that it runs into the baltics differently as described in the first few lines.

Thank you for the map, it helps to visualize the situation and the updates being just text doesn't really help with mapping out the full extent of the network.
Thank you so much for this summary! It does make the layout seem more rational, and I have a clearer idea of what the individual "Rings" are now. I've updated the rough map. The northern European interlink caught me off guard since it wasn't mentioned in the text.Anything I've missed? Should I keep that weird triangle around Leningrad or is the Kingisepp-Luga-Novgorod-Kirishi-Volkhov just regular rail?

Would the Rostov line continue on to Sochi already? I thought the latter was part of the Caucasus network which we're not voting to start yet, so I haven't included it for now. I notice there's no HSR line to Sevastopol. I suspect one will be built in the coming decade, if plans to make it the Silicon Peninsula work out. Hope we can also extend it to Western Ukraine some day.

I threw this one together quick, I'll clean it up for a more 'official' post over the coming days. You said the map helps you visualize things- how did you as the author plan the routes? My first instinct usually is to draw lines on a map.

EDIT: Quite the ninja. Whoops!
 
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[] Plan Pragmatic Integration
-[]Keep to Romanov's Line
-[]Expansionary Financial Policies
-[]Accelerate Euro Adoption
-[]Mild Assistance


Calling in two favors from Romanov might be a tad risky, but I figure sticking by him on social reforms might calm the backlash.
 
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