1) There is nothing to indicate our intelligence service is incapable of handling the intelligence of an improved Mississippi network.
No blip about the intelligence service being unable to handle additional intelligence like I would expect if those problems were imminent. Plus, we expand the number of analysts next turn with the sec. department specific AP on Long Tail.
How do you know they didn't? We don't get that level of resolution on information.
Looting Fort Knox in an increasingly collapsed America isn't the scale of operation you think.
If it got stashed at the bottom of a coal mine or something, whoever stashed it has spent thirty years being very quiet about the location. With plenty of people, including the Vicks, taking a more-than-casual interest in where the gold went, and probably questioning anyone they could find in the area.
Yes, but it cuts both ways. Older OWE is going to be dated and worn, but newer OWE (from the NCR, specifically) is likely to make some design compromises because the NCR is under a lot of economic strain. They're operating with only a fraction of the original US industrial base, and their equipment is only as good as the Russians allow it to be, with the understanding that a lot of it is being made for the export market to Russian client states or Russia-approved neutrals. As such, it could cancel out. dunno.
Special forces are needed because you don't send people from boot camp to rescue hostages from suicidal Victorian wannabes that have broadcast that they will kill them...
Ok, the question is twofold. Is the navy sufficient as an instrument of force projection and if not, can our diplomats operate without force projection?
I disagree. Our continent is filled with brush fire wars, plenty of which we want our allies to win. We are the leader of a continent spanning alliance that includes small revivalist polities, plenty of which are going to have brushfire wars far away from us. Let's say a revivalist community in Virginia is trying to secure an old army base against hostile states, would you not find it useful to send them some special forces? Aside from stiffening the military prowess of any ally, anywhere on the continent, sending special forces also cements our status as the revivalist military leader. It gives us goodwill with our allies and thus ensures we can have more revivalist support for our interests, whatever they maybe. Once we formed the revivalist congress, our interests extend to geographically distant communities on North America. So being able to support polities in brushfire wars is useful, since in plenty of wars we will be the distant power trying to effect the outcome of the small conflict.
First off, you seem to be misunderstanding my argument. My argument isn't "Naval landings are likely required and we need the Devils for that", my argument is "The navy alone isn't enough for force projection, due to our lacking ability to land troops". With that out of the way, is it better to have a depth of "good enough troops" instead of a single elite brigade for the purpose of force projection?
I don't disagree that we require a conventional military. But just because we are on the same continent as New Mexico, Virginia or Oregon doesn't mean we aren't distant. If a revivalist state in Northern Mexico gets into a conflict, we are protected by 1800 kms of geography from the impact. Sending special forces capable of travelling lightly and beating any bandit on their way is far easier than intervening with massive numbers of troops on a continent littered with bandits. I'm in no way advocating for a small conventional army, I'm arguing for keeping our scalpel and making good efforts at forging a better sword. We will need both and lack the ability to get another scalpel, if we dissolve the Devils.
The devils have insane combat bonus from pre-collapse equipment and elite status (5/5), if I'm not mistaken. Right now we are getting our troops towards 2/5, with many more steps being in the way of archieving anything close to elite quality. There is no argument in my opinion that the Devils are decisively better in combat than anything we can hope to field in the next decade.
We are very likely to form a standing army in the next five turns or so, which means we will get a basic infantry battalion to send on the way without mobilizing. (This gets easier if we keep the devils as a expeditionary force, with the expeditionary forces being better trained). But avoiding overkill doesn't seem like a pressing concern to me.
Fair assessment. I personally get great enjoyment from the limited information decisions in the quest (and from trying to get more information).
Ok, I have issues with this statement:
That's assuming they know the brigade is 300 miles away from them.
Deterrence depends on the threat being believed. So yes, deterrence with the Brigade absolutely works if they are 300 miles away provided the pirates either a) believe we will commit to a punitive strike in the future or b) are willing to sacrifice the current mission could be abandoned in favor of punishing them or c) doesn't know if the Devils are inside the commonwealth (which will often be the case, some warlord in Greenville won't have extensive information on secret information). Your premise regarding deterrence is flawed. What is important is reputation and the expectation that our threats are credible, not the actual capabilities. The latter can enhance the former, but threats can be seen as credible without being easily realized. Being able to credibly threaten of violence is cheaper and often more effective as a solution than actually using violence.
If it comes to the scenario you outlined, we have failed to secure the Mississippi. Let me explain: Our ultimate goal is to secure shipping trough the river, which is best accomplished by creating an alliance network tied to the revivalist cause. This means a lot of shaking hands with local governments, informal promises and treaties. If we manage that well and eliminate hostile forces, local allies will secure their section of the river, leading to a Mississippi overall safe for shipping stuff. This network of alliances would safeguard their portion of the Mississippi, with us sending limited aid and only intervening with large troops during a crisis. If we have to occupy the river with massive numbers of troops, we will fail to hold during times when our troops are needed at the front against Victoria. The occupation strategy you outline fails to secure the river under war time conditions, which is precisely when we need it the most as a supply line. What we need is an alliance network that only requires to kick the biggest assholes in the teeth and brings in local forces as allies (or at least as willing to protect the Mississippi trade militarily).
This strategical outlook rests on assumptions that aren't there. During the civil war we had two, reasonably centralized states engaged in war. We have hundreds of small polity-level states engaged in independent diplomatic interactions, each with small military forces. The civil war had a limited number of armies with clear allegiances, we have hundreds of small military forces that might intervene in any nearby county for any specific side. The USA during the civil war didn't have the option to negotiate passage, we have. We are not in the american civil war, we are not the US army and modelling our actions on what people 200 years ago did in a different situation is a surefire way to became similar to the Victorians in strategic mindset. Having to rely on the hammer is a fail state, we need the entire hammer for Victoria.
Honestly, the Mississippi is almost the ideal place to use a large mass of adequate troops for force projection, because the river itself makes it very easy to supply those troops. You just land them fifty miles upriver of whoever you intend to fight, march down the bank (resupplied by river barge at regular intervals) and fight your battle along the river.
While I think it's a fair argument to make the specific geography of the Mississippi makes it easier to operate with numbers, I still don't think it's a good option. Mobilizing large numbers brings a substantial financial burden to our state, while also causing diplomatic friction. States generally don't want large numbers of troops passing trough their backyards, with the fear of those troops being used against them being especially high if the diplomatic relationships are fresh and thus have lower trust. The fear and the anxiety about armies raiding for supply causes a lot of friction, which hinders our progress to our ultimate goal (safe shipping trough the Mississippi) by damaging our diplomatic capacities. While using large numbers of troops is militarily effective, it causes friction every time we do it and is thus strategically undesirable. And that is aside from our need to project power in places less good for supply than the Mississippi, namely any place else that isn't connected to the great lakes.
There are two aspects to this.
Accurate, but the friction created is considerably smaller.
They are not necessarily at a glance identifiable, if they have the foresight to disguise their more conspicuous equipment/ insignia. They were able to surprise Aubery in his own territory, so they certainly have the ability to move without being spotted and identified.
The people around the Mississippi don't know details of our military campaigns and "armies scavenge and plunder" is a common assumption born out of experience with five decades of warlordism. It's a deeply ingrained cultural assumption. The counterproof relies on knowledge about our economic power and supply capability the locals simply don't have. Seeing the commonwealth organize supply lines doesn't guarantee those supply lines will be there and sufficient if the army gets in dire straits or the commonwealth has some sort of internal trouble. I wouldn't count on the locals assuming we don't scavenge and plunder.
1) I don't understand what cost you are referring to. Less people with a lower logistical footprint means lower overall cost, not additional costs for lacking people.
