So, lots of fun thoughts here about retribution, crime, and punishment. Bai Lao Keung has an interesting view on the place of retribution and punishment, certainly, it seems to be vastly different than the Bai rulers. Extremely so.
The first thing I will point out is that, for all of Lao Keung's talk of cost and value, we aren't moving the discussion away to a view of crime/punishment as restitution model, AKA the model that seeks to compensate for the wrongs inflicted in some manner through punishment and levy of fines/work requirements. We are still firmly in the retribution model, the view that punishment should deter repeat behaviors as well as deter others from committing that same behavior. Which is the same model that the Bai seem to hold firmly to.
A couple of notes about Lao Keung's beliefs though, in the cost and value of pursuing the retribution. Firstly, it presumes that the retribution can be achieved, even if the cost is exorbitant. There is no discussion on what should be done when the retribution for the crime can not happen, for whatever reason. A peculiar, but likely wise, absence given Sun Shao being a large topic of discussion in the upcoming future. Lao Keung mainly focused on, at least as it appeared to me, the idea that if retribution is too costly for the value of the deterrence it would produce, then such retribution shouldn't be pursued. Along with, of course, having the retribution target the appropriate wrong-doer and not punishing those who had no part in the original crime.
The issue, of course, comes along with something that wasn't discussed at all. Not the value of the deterrence but rather the consistency of the punishment. And this is not that punishment is appropriate or equivalent to the wrong-doing, rather that punishment is consistently meted out when the wrong-doing occurs. It is in that consistency where most deterrence lies, although the Bai seem to take the other approach of having draconian punishments as well, and which was not really discussed. Since deterrence comes from consistently punishing wrong-doing, failing to do so because the cost outweighs the immediate deterrence gained then not only is the deterrence not gained for the wrong-doing, but also future efforts at deterrence are undermined as well.
Which puts the Bai in a peculiar spot. They get the most out of current efforts of deterrence and future efforts of deterrence by being consistently retributive. However, the immediate cost of that retribution may outweigh the current value of deterrence. But by not being consistent in their retribution, they weaken their own policy of retribution down the line. This really is only a major problem if the Bai's whole system of rulership and relations with others relies on retribution. Unfortunately, it seems to be.