Attempting to Fulfill the Plan MNKh Edition

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An excellent response, which shows that you're obviously not involved with the kind of centralist position I was critiquing here. It's not at all incoherent, though it's clear your approach to Marxism is more technically minded than my own, which largely proceeds from the humanities. Still I'll try and see what useful comments I could make on the basis of my own understanding of cybernetics.

the improvement of material conditions needs to be an instrumental sphere of any practice of communism as otherwise capitalist competition even in its externally exploitative forms will act as a consistent and active measure of suppression.
This is a classic dispute between state socialists and leftcoms/anarchists, though I don't think it's a question which can be neatly resolved either way, mostly because "material improvement" is already a point of social and political dispute. In a Soviet context, the problem was not just that the Americans could reliably provide its workers with more cars and tv dinners, but that the Soviets themselves had token those amenities to be the measure of Plenty. To some extent, I think it's a trivial observation that no 20th century socialism could outcompete capitalists in the capital accumulation department, since even capitalists are willing to resort to Keynesianism and the welfare state in order to guarantee the social reproduction of an industrializing society.

The only wild card for a socialist society would be to introduce new models of welfare alongside these vulgar material improvements, of the kind that could not be easily replicated by capitalism. Full employment and shopfloor democracy would be clear examples of that, since that degree of safety and power over their own working conditions is exactly what workers tend to lack under capitalism. Such measures even have a degree of precedent in 20th century state socialist history. I'm most familiar with the Chinese context, from which I get the sense that the PRC was more serious about socialism as an experimental alternative than the comparatively technocratic Soviets, but that also led to the constant social campaigning which could easily turn atrocious. Still, the idea that building socialism doesn't carry its own risks, or that you shouldn't aim to present a different kind of society, ultimately only leads you back to social democracy, and the slow death it's died at the hands of secular stagnation in the (over)developed world.

This leads to the argument against communitarian methods of organization as, while not bad in terms of post-global revolution/communism, are not effective for the essential transitory stage of the struggle.
Two points here: my proffered model of socialist transition is only 'communitarian' compared to the historical record of state socialism (and even then, certain aspects of 1920s Soviet life or 1960s Chinese life provide real examples of communitarian life in those contexts). My larger point is not that we should 'decentralize' for its own sake, since that says more about where decisions are made than how they are made, but that different domains of life are already practiced at different levels of organization, and that it's not obvious that each should be maximally central decentral. For instance, the Soviets after Stalin never made any serious attempt to 'abolish the family', which means that the quotidian aspects of social reproduction still took place at a 'local' and 'decentralized' level. Nobody would call that a triumph of Soviet anti-authoritarianism though, since the family is a potential locus of many kinds of patriarchal oppression. That's all I'm saying, really, that both within the economic sphere and without it, differing concerns compel different levels of collective organization.

This could be done through a market system as the marginal value in a system provides an effective series of control signals in the cybernetic sense, allowing a system with a limited degree of local controls and information to function without forming lower-level decision paralysis. The market mechanism is a distribution shorthand that allows for a lack of control and information access on the local level to be compensated for through the use of collective pricing schemes.
You are evidently more of a marginalist than I am when explaining the nature of capitalist pricing. While I'm not a full labor value theorist, I'd hold that most firms still operate by a relatively simple "cost plus" model of pricing, and that cost is primarily driven by the need to socially reproduce labor. Workers need to eat, sleep, and be educated, which is why capitalist would prefer that there be as few of them as possible, especially the skilled ones. This is a big part of why capitalism is such a unique historical epoch. The mere presence of currencies or markets is not a sufficient cause for the mass accumulation of capital to get going, but the capitalist's concern with minimizing socially necessary labor time is. If socialism reproduces that need, it can produce a lot of good and necessary things, but only by specific standards (minimizing necessary labor time) in specific departments (industrial commodity production). Any need more complicated than that, and there are many of them in the broader social domain, are overridden by this central compulsion.

For those unfamiliar, these are the workings of Marx's Law of Value. From the production side of things, it is is the Law of Value which sees the drawbacks of increasing mechanization fall on the shoulders of ordinary wage laborers, who can never be sure that their day's wage represents a day's labor. I've never been too fond of labor tokens as the means of socialist administration, but there is some compelling literature in that field from actual communists. I've yet to acquaint myself with this source, but I've heard good things about it!

This changes the nature of the internal loop but does not fundamentally change the external influences of the cybernetic control system or the proverbial control inputs.
Which is why Bordiga says that "the hell of capitalism is the firm, not the fact that the firm has a boss." (Can't believe I'd agree with him, lol) Even a market socialist economy of pure cooperatives would be beholden to the laws of capitalist inter-firm competition, with all the great and terrifying effects that would have. Hell, I'd argue that seizing the means on the level of the firm is the low-hanging fruit of socialist transition!

My fundamental dividing line between a centralized and decentralized system is less a single regional office vs an office in Moscow but more about what control signals are sent externally and how they act on the internal decision loop. In theory, it is possible to have an economy that is entirely contained within a single-division loop as all factors are contained as one point of analysis but that reduces external control signals to nothing.
Decentralization of an economic model in the sense of cybernetics is to reduce the influence of price or command factors on the internal cybernetic loop, reducing its controls in favor of internal valuations. These can still be viable and even predictive but this places a far greater emphasis on the role of local decision-making as the primary means of directing economic growth leading to a lack of responsiveness to other aims.
This is part of what I was trying to get at with my explanation of Ashby's Law, as it is the principle which in organizational terms demands a division of managerial labor. Only a very complex processor could unilaterally respond to an equally complex input signal. This is also why I take a great interest in Stafford Beer's Viable System Model, as it attempts to lay out the division of labor which all effective organizations implicitly follow. It's a useful diagnostic tool for seeing why and where certain organizations fall apart, and also points to the fact that decentralized decisions are not necesarily democratic ones, and vice-versa. Just as importantly, it points to the fact that many decisions within firms are not as top-down as they appear, and that the autonomy of lower organs is often necessary to keep the whole enterprise coherent.

Here's a short primer on the VSM for those interested.

While pretty from an economic perspective, this would only lead to the same crisis of overproduction or underproduction that has been posed as a problem in capitalist economics, as there would be few signals and explicitly no connection between society and economy.
The "anarchy of production" argument is a potent explanation of the cyclical crises in capitalism, but I don't think it's as good at explaining the chronic tendency towards faltering interest and profit rates as something based in ecological factors or the Law of Value. I would recommend this blog for those interested in orienting themselves on Marxist Crisis Theory, even if I have my own quibbles with the latter.

By introducing those controls the debate becomes one of how influential should they be outside the economic unit and how rigidly should they impact its performance. If the control itself is the worker's demands, it becomes a question of communication and information. How do you predict the demands of the workers six months in advance, how do you adjust production in response to failures of prediction, and how do you prevent the measure from succumbing to forgery and excess influence?
Here we come to the heart of the matter, and something which I fear neither of us will be able to solve for absolutely. If we did so, we could start the revolution tomorrow! In the context of this quest, whatever model emerges, it would have to derive from concerns that are outside of the part-state apparatus, since it does not suffer the downsides of non-social production. It would take autonomous working-class organization to bring such issues to the fore. Such formations are not entirely absent in real state socialist history; from my Chinese experience, I can point to certain marginal groupings in the Cultural Revolution, the Democracy Wall, or the worker components of the Tiananmen protests. The Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring also contained such elements, though again they were secondary to more cleanly political and civil concerns.

Importantly though, and something which I think the quest should reckon with as it moves forward, is that the Soviet state's concern with accumulation is still self-destructive even without a defined worker-based counterpower. The paradoxical duality of ecological catastrophe and productive abundance, both outgrowths of a profit-driven developmental model, will inevitably lead to a state of secular stagnation. In recent history, I would argue that the capitalist crisis of the 1970s represented a showdown between the public and private demands on the management of production. For those who can't tell, the private concerns won, partly because of their class power, partly because their concerns are easier to organize (if not easier to realize). That kind of divergence of class interests (profit versus people in a vulgar sense) will become more and more apparent in this version of the USSR, especially once the low-hanging fruits of social welfare are taken care of.

This is where I'll leave it for now, other than to say that I'll always be happy to give my two cents on how this quest could unfold. For those who want to read into some of the ideas I've raised here, I've actually come across some great contemporary communist writings on the problems of socially managed production. Here are two of those sources.
 
Perhaps a radical reorientation of the economy and politics on the confines of the quest is possible, but it requires the kind of seismic shifts on the system (that very much works to perpetuate itself, both on the part of the CPSU which as the bureaucratic and political class generally fight to maintain their status, or us the MNKh who do so as well) that are either external (an apocalyptic oil crisis well into our period of peak oil) or generally us failing to do our jobs as economic planner (which would probably lead to a lot of a salt) dealing a critical blow to the institution of the MNKh, reverberating through society.
I don't expect the CPSU itself to suddenly embrace my favored forms of Marxism, I was speaking moreso to the priors which inform the narrative as a whole. A system can be defective even if its operators don't think it is, and I do actually think that this version of the USSR is likely to face more crises of the kind that both sides of the Iron Curtain faced in this period. The capitalist world's dilemma in the 1970s was a choice between uncertain advancements of socially managed production or incipient neoliberalism, and without overturning the class structure, the latter was almost inevitable. The USSR will face similar dilemmas shortly, since the need to 'grow the productive forces' and the question of what to do with all that potential abundance are to some extent in conflict with one another, and that will only be more true as the drive to accumulate necessitated the liquidation or commodification of the social sphere.
 
So what are relations with Japan like? Are they capitalist or more communist.
What Han said, but the really spicy part of Japan's national conscience is that the Chinese and Koreans cribbed our notes on what we did to Nazis (work them to death in hazardous environments) and turned the (much larger than OTL numbers of) Japanese POWs and settlers into Japanese shock labor. Those that haven't been naturalized into the soil are nominally naturalized citizens composing a de-facto underclass.*

Country-dependent*
 
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We're pretty close to Pong being invented right?

Will we have to worry about a new element of the cold war with the cyber gaming front heats up?

edit: Guys will we have to worry about wreckers who play to much mine sweeper, solitaire, or s.t.a.l.k.e.r. instead of working! We are the ministry most susceptible!@!
 
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I don't expect the CPSU itself to suddenly embrace my favored forms of Marxism, I was speaking moreso to the priors which inform the narrative as a whole. A system can be defective even if its operators don't think it is, and I do actually think that this version of the USSR is likely to face more crises of the kind that both sides of the Iron Curtain faced in this period. The capitalist world's dilemma in the 1970s was a choice between uncertain advancements of socially managed production or incipient neoliberalism, and without overturning the class structure, the latter was almost inevitable. The USSR will face similar dilemmas shortly, since the need to 'grow the productive forces' and the question of what to do with all that potential abundance are to some extent in conflict with one another, and that will only be more true as the drive to accumulate necessitated the liquidation or commodification of the social sphere.
That's fair, though I think the challenges we will be facing soon, are less a question of dealing with abundance, because assuming the General Secretary does not fumble his consolidation in the next few turns, well:

General Secretary: Vladimir Semyonovich Semyonov(1969): With the retirement of Kosygin Semyonov is the only logical and rational man to take the post with an immediate shift in the prioritization of politics. Going up as someone with experience in party work rather than more conventional technical fields Semyonov represents something of a change in party cadres. The man has a negligible degree of experience working with institutions and even considers that the workers having a primary say in some operations ahead of more reliable state powers as preferable. Most of these programs are almost certain to fall short of failing but the man is at least positioning himself as a champion of the workers and a credible alternative to significant deviations in politics.
  • Factional Leader
  • Trade Unionist
  • Focused on Fighting Inequality
  • Foreign Policy Dove
  • Social Liberal
  • Economically Inexperienced

He is probably the man most willing to push the envelope on redistribution and workplace democracy that we could have asked for. If he can fullfil his political programme, the Soviet safety net and worker's rights will be improved upon, not degraded. And its already a pretty good deal due to the compromises made in the last decade in response to increased unrest and lagging wage growth.

Our biggest challenge in the next decade imo is likely be one that the Soviets faced as well, the growth of productive forces as you said. Suddenly, oil its about to get a lot more expensive due to external factors, and the cheap easy growth of the 60s and early 70s is no longer as viable. As a major oil producer, obviously we are dealt a much better hand than say, the West Europeans, but it will become a challenge with the depletion of deposits, especially when paired with that of of coal, iron ore and the impacts of rising costs of labor in manufacturing making the oh so favored intensive growth the Soviets depended on historically much harder to achieve. I honestly think this is surmountable enough that the dilemmas the state will face will not be system breaking, but well, that's not accounting for bad luck and mismanagement.
 
We're pretty close to Pong being invented right?

Will we have to worry about a new element of the cold war with the cyber gaming front heats up?

edit: Guys will we have to worry about wreckers who play to much mine sweeper, solitaire, or s.t.a.l.k.e.r. instead of working! We are the ministry most susceptible!@!
A new rivalry opens up between the capitalists and communists who can make the best video games.
 
Would actually be an interesting thing to develop. Especially if some kind of International Videogame Expo happens and E-Sports also become a thing.
Imagine Rocky but instead of boxing they are playing League of Legends.

But yeah would be interesting, personally I see a bit of a stigma against American games and vice versa between the two. Of course such a thing would get complicated when MMOs like WoW and others start coming out.
 
We win the video game contest year one with Tetris tbh

On future economic developments, I really hope our next guy isn't another marketeer, would really like to centralize a lot more, work with the left for sure instead of beating on them constantly, the current crop seem neat
 
We win the video game contest year one with Tetris tbh

On future economic developments, I really hope our next guy isn't another marketeer, would really like to centralize a lot more, work with the left for sure instead of beating on them constantly, the current crop seem neat
If it's the deputy don't so much reason why he would be biased for either side much?
 
This doesn't reflect reality.
We are here because of the long-term screw up of the doves, which was QM confirmed.

And now you think that somehow, with the backing from previous observations pointing to the exact opposite, the doves are going to be good long-term?
Both the hawks and the doves are, in separate ways, screw-ups in this context.

The doves screwed up by not deploying as aggressively in colonial Africa as they could have, thus enabling the French to consolidate their position and entrench.

The hawks screwed up by taking that situation, and then deciding it'd be a good idea to push the Union into a round of nuclear brinksmanship that could have started World War III.

Ultimately, the French getting to keep their African colonial empire is bad, but not a threat to the survival of the USSR. World War III is such a threat.

Even if the doves are driving badly, that doesn't mean it was right for the hawks to grab the steering wheel and nearly get us all killed, nor does it mean the hawks will drive better than the doves and should replace them in the driver's seat now that we've pulled the car out of the ditch.

Because they are more likely to learn from their errors than the doves in this case, while at the same time being the most likely to try to remediate to them instead of just accepting that they are there.
I don't think that's true, and even if it's true then I'm not sure it matters. First, as noted above, if the hawks fuck up we get a nuclear war, whereas if the doves fuck up then some "dominoes" in the Third World fall the wrong way. Second, if the hawks still are hawks, they by definition have not learned the core lesson "courting nuclear war is very, very bad." The doves aren't doves because they're structurally incapable of understanding the idea of opposing Western interests, or because they're actually pacifists- I doubt there are any pacifists in the Politburo.

They're doves because they have a lower estimate of the urgency of doing so, or a higher estimate of the value of cooperation. That's a stance that can adapt to circumstances, and we can see circumstances changing.

Something that can manifest with Nato actually expanding in our friendly countries.
What, precisely, are you referring to with "NATO actually expanding in our friendly countries?" That's a bit vague.

...requires the localization of total production controls on the decision loop level rather than on the external control level...
Could you expand on what this phrase means? I understood most of what you said, but this is using some fairly specialized jargon.
 
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The French will not be able to keep it forever, since they will fuck up eventually and not be able to do anything about the multiple knifes going for there organs.
 
I mean, I think the doves are structurally incapable of understand the need to oppose western interests yes, their likely compromised by marketeering forces who seek peace to promote the economic power of our private sector and capitalist class. Alternatively, their just incompetent


The lesson I've taken from this crisis is that we should have given Libya the missiles instead of sending ships ourselves. We need more aggression, more escalation, and more deniability by having our allies and puppets be the ones to actually start shit
 
I don't think that the Doves are against opposing the Capitalists, just does not want the world to end in nuclear flame. With the ascension of a Hawk in the halls of the White House, even if they want to try for a detente it wouldn't happen because the Hawk in question is basically the spirit of the Cold War American Right. And I wouldn't say they are incompetent either, their stance has been vindicated for a long time and vindicated by the Algerian Incident.

Although the lesson in using proxies to do Cold War Intrigue Operations is definitely one that the people in charge of that sort-of thing would definitely take note.
 
I don't think this vindicated them at all? This whole crisis still seems to me like a moderate win for the hawks

We have word of QM it very much was not. We humiliated the French, but in the process we came across as unstable warmongerers to the rest of the world and made concessions on arms sales that will hamper the Algerians and make their genocide much more likely to continue. For the trade of a few French warships, it was not at all worth it.
 
Do you think the Hawks would be popular politically speaking after nearly causing a Nuclear War? Or that politicians wouldn't use said unpopularity to make political maneuvers?

And the result was a loss. admittedly one with silver linings, but still a loss considering that the Algerians are going to be completely screwed over.
 
We have word of QM it very much was not. We humiliated the French, but in the process we came across as unstable warmongerers to the rest of the world and made concessions on arms sales that will hamper the Algerians and make their genocide much more likely to continue. For the trade of a few French warships, it was not at all worth it.

We even had to pay to replace these warships so didnt decrease the french capabilities in any true fashion.
 
The trade unionist ending up in power with the backing of the army sounds like a good outcome to me! We got our wiki box AND a gs that just had the chance to put people who aren't completely allergic to power centers outside the party
 
This is a classic dispute between state socialists and leftcoms/anarchists, though I don't think it's a question which can be neatly resolved either way, mostly because "material improvement" is already a point of social and political dispute. In a Soviet context, the problem was not just that the Americans could reliably provide its workers with more cars and tv dinners, but that the Soviets themselves had token those amenities to be the measure of Plenty.
The problem is that it's very hard in the long term to sell people on the message that physical, material deprivation isn't important as long as they have abstract freedom. You can get people to tighten their belts in the short term. But in the long run, it becomes apparent to them that they live in communal barracks housing and live on a diet of potato soup. If this is true, and they know that their counterparts in the West live in detached single-family homes bigger than a pre-revolutionary village headman's, complete with yards and gardens and pets, and that they eat meat with every meal, they're going to ask some inconvenient questions, and these questions will not grow more convenient over time.

This is especially problematic if your socialist state is actually democratic, including both the workplaces and the political system. Because the workers will almost certainly very sincerely want to vote for material prosperity. They will likely not accept or believe the explanation that they "need" to forego material prosperity (of the cars and TV-dinners kind) in order to maintain the philosophical purity of the mode of production.

That the workers will vote for greater material prosperity is predictable. Then the question becomes "okay, the workers have voted to have greater material prosperity. What form will the attempt to implement their wishes take?"

I mean, I think the doves are structurally incapable of understand the need to oppose western interests yes, their likely compromised by marketeering forces who seek peace to promote the economic power of our private sector and capitalist class.
I think you are greatly overestimating the ability of the "capitalist class" to coordinate subversion attempts. Being aware of the influence of the capitalist class on governments is not the same as "all conspiracy-theories are true."

(To be clear, the capitalist class collectively controls governments and so on, yes, but that doesn't mean that capitalists in one country can just pick up a phone and issue orders to capitalists in another country who will duly rein in the government of that other country. Capitalist countries piss in each other's Cheerios all the time)

Of course, you seem to define "competent" in a way that ultimately gets everyone killed in nuclear fire sooner or later.

The lesson I've taken from this crisis is that we should have given Libya the missiles instead of sending ships ourselves. We need more aggression, more escalation, and more deniability by having our allies and puppets be the ones to actually start shit
In the context of this specific crisis, Gaddafi firing antiship missiles at anything too close to his coast might have worked out better for us. On the other hand, it might very easily have touched off the French-Libyan War, and then we'd have to figure out what to do because that would almost certainly have turned into the US under Ashford in a few months deploying in the Mediterranean to help the French curtail the "rogue state" that was tossing missiles at neutral shipping headed for Suez. We'd just be stuck in crisis longer, because the question of "to confront the French or to let them pound on our proxies" wouldn't go away.

In the context of the next crisis, it might get even weirder and more difficult for us.
 
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