One thing I forgot to mention:
Francophone Africa is an area where France still wields significant foreign influence.
West and Central Africa. Military basing, defense cooperation agreements et cetera.
They even retain control of their currency; the West African CFA franc and Central African CFA franc are guaranteed by the French Treasury and were pegged to the French franc, and now to the euro.
Not an economist, but economists say that has not been economically advantageous to the saidcountries.
Given Russia's intentions vis a vis French power, they arent exactly going to be overly distressed by local arrangements arising in the aftermath of French civil unrest.
Thank you.
Russian arms sales post-Soviet Union have been primarily aimed at economic return on investment, not like the more strategic positioning that the Soviet Union engaged in.
I wouldnt read anything into the Ethiopian arms sales; they tried to buy nuclear missiles from France first.
Sudan has been effectively diplomatically isolated for years.
Picking up a naval base there is as much about Sudan trying to break out of its Gulf State foreign policy box links post-Bashir than any Russian links.
In the post-Collapse Middle East where they have basing from Syria to Yemen, not really the coup it seems.
Russia is the largest LNG producer post-Collapse with the US and Canada gone.
Alexander's primary means of exercising economic pressure post-Collapse, of compelling other countries to move to renewables, is his control of most of the worlds fossil fuel production post-Collapse, both in Russia and the Middle East. Why would he want someone new to start up production?
Blowing up the rig(s) that's prospecting before it starts any production is not a particularly difficult concept for Russian Intelligence to master.
Especially given the expense of investing in petroleum mining, and what probably happened to most oil companies in this TL during the Collapse.
Its worth remembering that many of said resources and raw materials are things that new African production would be competing with domestic Russian production for marketshare.
The consumer base is still developing.
And Russia does not have infinite resources to invest everywhere, something thats been explicitly called out.
Dude brought Japan and India onside for a reason, and its not generosity or appreciation of their culture.
Its not about turning away investment and more needing to find it internally because financers are not exactly falling over themselves to throw money at developing countries in the midst/aftermath of the Collapse.
Thats what happens when people blow up the world financial system.
There's a reason I asked what the desired endstate is, and the conditions.
Russia has always been treated as a European country in geopolitics.
The bulk of its population is in Europe, as is the bulk of its economic activity.
It was one of the European countries involved in Angola and Ethiopia and Somalia.
If I refer to North American countries, that doesnt exclude the United States because Hawaii and Puerto Rico exist.
Whether arms sales are an economic or "strategic" lever does not change the fact that they are a definite lever. Ethiopia shopping around for French nukes does not in any way reduce the amount of influence that these arms sales would offer Russia, especially in an immediately post-collapse scenario when Russia is one of the only games left in town for armaments.
Sudan being diplomatically isolated, again,
does not change the fact that Russia has basing there, and that that basing is another lever that Russia can use to insert itself into African affairs. Basing in Syria and Yemen
is not basing in Africa. Sudan provides this, Russia has reason to retain that basing if not expand it, Sudan has absolutely no reason to refuse them. Sudan having motives of its own to grant the Russians basing does not in any way change the fact that this is still
Russian basing from which it can deploy troops and other assets for assorted fuck-fuck games.
Russia is a major LNG producer, but there is still a US and Canada-sized gap in production, probably more than that given the severe unrest the Middle East and global hydrocarbon supply chains are seeing as a result of US withdrawal and the Collapse. There are fossil fuels, and then there are fossil fuels: crude oil production is not the same for Alexander's climate goals as natural gas production, since LNG is the most logical choice for a stopgap hydrocarbon. Russia has considerable reserves and production of Nat Gas, but surprise surprise, neither massive Russian reserves or massive Middle Eastern reserves mean that there is no market for natural gas production in other countries, since
mankind consumes so much fuel that even Russia's massive reserves cannot currently sate all demand. Even with a broader economic collapse and the decline of global trade, the fact that the US and Canada still require plenty of fuel to meet the various micro-states' needs while their production has been slashed to basically zero, as well as the Tsar's climate agenda hinging upon transitioning away from dirty power generation to cleaner stopgaps like LNG while renewables spool up, mean that demand for LNG isn't going anywhere and is likely to rocket upward. Even Russia's considerable reserves and the reserves of their client states in the Middle East are not going to be enough to sate this demand. Even if the bulk of this LNG is going to fuel domestic African power consumption (which would rise considerably as Sub-Saharan African states dramatically increase the scale and complexity of their electricity grids) that is still something Russia would want to encourage and get in on, especially since Alexei needs a sop or two that he can toss to the major Russian oil companies that are going to take Alexei's shift away from crude oil directly in the shorts. Even without natgas, the sheer hydropower potential of the Congo basin is something Russian energy companies would rush to exploit, helpfully lining the pockets of the struggling East African states in the process.
It wouldn't be
hard to blow up the rigs, it would just be a terrible fucking idea that would do far more environmental damage than it would prevent. Russia and Africa
want the LNG, Russia has the means to exploit the LNG, blowing up the rigs would create an environmental disaster for negligible benefit. It would make far more sense for Alexei to engage with Tanzania and co. to get influence over East African LNG production, because again, Russia and the Middle East having considerable LNG reserves does not inherently make African LNG reserves useless, if only because domestic African power generation through LNGs is guaranteed to be a considerable market which Russian energy companies would want a piece of.
The rigs aren't prospecting, they are in production. These are proven reserves that Tanzania is accessing right now, albeit not to the full potential of the reserves in question. The mere existence of the rigs proves my point, which is that this is ongoing natgas production with existing infrastructure that Russia would want to take over, not destroy, because natgas demand far outstrips Russia or the Middle East's production even today. This is a world where Canadian and US production, as well as a great deal of European production, has gone the way of the dodo, while demand has not declined and has in all likelihood spiked considerably (wars to fight, disruptions to the existing supply chain since the Texas refineries and shipping terminals are offline, etc.).
A huge chunk of Alexei's deal with the Russian people involves a massive improvement in Russia's economic and political stature and ordinary Russians' standard of living. Russia even today is not an autarchy, despite its considerable resources: a far more affluent Russia in a world where several major centers of production have either collapsed (see several of the Southeast Asian states) or similarly become better-educated and more affluent (India and China) cannot hope to sustain enough manufacturing to sate the demands of Russian consumers or the global market. Manufacturing is already increasingly moving to Africa, and a Russian economic and political ascendancy and Asian collapse would would only increase the speed of this. Russian production is a drop in the bucket of global consumer goods production
even today, let alone when Russia has become vastly more affluent and other current centers of consumer goods production have either become affluent enough to transition to a Post-Fordist economy or faced societal collapse. Africa is the logical next choice for where this production ought to go. Russian companies wanting to sate the demands of Russian consumers for cheap goods will want to set up manufacturing taking advantage of African cheap labor and raw materials, as well as the stability guaranteed by Russian involvement.
Speaking of which, Russian intervention can come in more ways than purely military: economic assistance is a potent enough arrow in Russia's quiver here, and one that has potential to make Russia far more money than it initially invests. The idea that Russia, in its efforts to become a world hegemon, would for some reason expend resources on Asia, which it has already given to its allies Japan and India, but completely neglect Africa, which has a wealth of manpower, raw materials and, in the case of East Africa, vital positioning astride global sea lanes and massive water reserves, is absurd to the point of ridicule. Africa is too great a prize for Russia to ignore, and as I previously pointed out, Russia is in prime position to re-enter the region first, given that it is making its big play for power at the same time as China is melting down completely and India is coping with the total collapse of its main rival and biggest nuclear threat. Even if Russia
were to intervene militarily, the amount of resources that such an intervention would require would be paltry compared to what the European or Central Asian conquests to require. Even today, Russia is able to leverage not-insignificant influence on the continent in the face of American, French and Chinese competition with a small number of advisors and mercenaries on a shoestring budget. Africa is too important for Alexei to ignore. He will
make time and he will
find resources, because the amount of bang he can get for his buck in Africa is considerable compared to Russian commitments elsewhere and the rewards of such intervention are great.
Again,
this does not mean that Russia will stay in control for ever, or even secure total control initially. A position of economic and military influence in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 2020s and 2030s is unlikely to hold in the face of China and India offering alternatives to Russian suzerainty, especially since the African states will all be maneuvering for their own advantage. It is entirely reasonable for Sub-Saharan Africa in the 2070s to have shrugged off Russian influence through playing games with its various sponsors and investors. But a scenario where Russia meekly declines to re-engage with Africa, or
simply ignores a continent's worth of people and resources, is absurd and defies all credulity. If we are going to chart out the course Sub-Saharan Africa takes, it is only sensible to factor in Russian involvement, because Russia will not ignore close to a sixth of the globe however much we might wish for them to.
