First, a disclaimer: I am coming at this assuming that Russia is about as strong as Russia is right now (in 2020), and is just lucky in that the factors weakening and disorganizing the rest of the world effect them much less. In other words, that Russia's apparent power comes from giving already collapsing jenga towers a push, claiming credit and then moving on to the next tower before people question the aura of power. If Russia is somehow powerful enough that it can quickly mount sequential major invasions or invade several places at once that's a bit different.
Iran
Iran dealt with the collapse of the oil market poorly. Tensions in the country, long-dormant, boiled over, and while there was not outright civil was to start, there was civil strife. Refugee flows from an imploding Pakistan -- Alexander's work, very delicate, quite a 5D chess move to get the nukes without something going pop -- did not help, as the country was stretched already at the time. Alexander, seeking a good ally to open the way to the Middle East, took the opportunity. He supported one of the factions willing to work with him, and that faction used that support to its advantage in suborning or eliminating other factions. Iran never came to civil war, but the existing regime did fall -- either in a coup or under less violent pressure ultimately doesn't matter. It did through force of foreign-backed politics.
Iran has been Alexander's willing and eager ally -- they are too small to threaten him, naturally balance against several of his other allies, and are well-positioned to project much influence over the Middle East. They made an absolute killing riding the death of oil, and with Alexander's encouragement, used the funding to diversify their economy so they could survive the end of the ride. Despite momentary friction, they are generally pleased with their alliance. Iran in the modern day will comprise of all of their modern territory, plus any bits of Iraq, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf they felt like taking (open to suggestions). At minimum, I expect that they know own the Strait of Hormuz and some border regions in Iraq.
I am dubious that Iran would be likely to fall into civil war, there is that saying that every place is three meals away from revolution and Iran, much as the rest of the region is vulnerable if food imports either become hard to get or just too expensive. But just who is backing the factions in this civil war? It just seems to me that whoever could command a modicum of legitimacy and the loyalty of the army would come out on top fairly quickly. So bad civil unrest, coups, perhaps a short series of revolutions and counter-revolutions but actual civil war seems less likely to me, requiring either the dedicated focus of Russia or the army to be split on who is the legitimate authority.
So I am doubtful about the civil war part. Otherwise, it seems reasonable to me.
The way you talk about nukes gives me the impression that this Iran doesn't have the bomb, and IMO, it probably would. Especially with Pakistan falling into chaos - Pakistan has a certain ideological interest in making sure some Muslim state has nuclear weapons, is right next to Iran and the pair have had a warm and close relationship since Pakistani independence. But it may be Iran has a strong nuclear industry that
could be weaponized quickly if they needed to, or has nuclear weapons that probably work but hasn't officially become a nuclear power in a similar way that Israel either could quickly become nuclear-capable or already is but doesn't announce they are because of diplomatic considerations.
Given Iran's history with Russia (pretty bad between 1747 and 1979) and the way Alexander treats other states, I imagine even the most friendly Iranian regime would feel better if they could wipe Moscow off the map if they needed to.
I don't have a great sense of the extent to which Afghanistan is capable of addressing its own internal issues, nor of how able it would be to survive absent the international markets. Open to suggestions, although I don't foresee them coming up much.
Well... A great deal of Afghanistan's issues are due to being a warzone for almost 50 years. If they've had relative peace for the last 40-50 years they'd be doing OK. It would still be a landlocked country but it could look alot like Jordan today does - relatively stable and with a good international reputation, but still very poor and struggling with the refugee problems that the disintegration of Pakistan and the Russian invasions of their northern neighbours would cause.
Things could go either way of course, but I would have thought that Afghanistan would actually be a surprisingly peaceful place if likely to be languishing under a government whose most important job is to be a good sycophant for Russia, Iran and India.
Maybe I am just too optimistic.
Turkey
The Bosporus Strait must remain open.
So, does Russia have basing rights on the Dardanelles, or is Turkey fully in control of the straits here?
Furthermore, Alexander supported Turkey in resolving the political situation on Cyprus, to Turkey's advantage
This implies that Cyprus is no longer a major offshore banking destination for Russia (since I can't see Alexander giving Turkey the ability to manipulate his oligarch class). It further implies that Alexander was not a friend to the oligarchs who had offshored their money here. Together with Britain being imploded (and likely London property prices along with that), maybe Alexander rose to power in Russia by selling himself as Alexander, crusher of oligarchs. (At least until he'd installed his own cronies as a new oligarch class.)
What's the status of Greece again? In civil war currently? Does one of the factions allow Russian bases?
No suggestions for this part, I just think it has real interesting implications for the Commonwealth's foreign policy down the road...
Kurdistan?
I am wavering towards an independent Kurdistan under very specific conditions. My imagination is that the Kurds would have proactively reached out to Alexander once he aligned Iran (possessed of foresight or opportunism; which isn't relevant). They pledged support in Alexander's invasion of Iraq in support for his support for their own state. He agreed, but only on the condition that they agree to very strict terms regarding territorial claims in Russia's allies with Kurdish populations, i.e., the Kurdish state would completely renounce said claims. Alexander would be willing to support the Kurdish state as a homeland for the Kurds, and to present it as a release valve for restive populations in his allies, but would not abandon Kurdistan if it caused problems for him. A heavily-restricted state being better than none, the Kurds accepted.
Still not sure about this, but seems the only possible way for this to happen without deeply alarming Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Given Turkey and Syria's recent issues, they might even find the idea of a release valve committed to not wanting their land appealing. Still, not completely certain, and open to final workshopping. Alternative is that they just don't have a state and hoo boy are they not doing well.
Soooo. The Kurds get support for having a state in Iraqi Kurdisatan, in return for staying shtum as Syria and Turkey ethnically cleanse their parts of Kurdistan and drive refugees into what was Iraq?
...
Sounds depressingly plausible to me.
So, there's a few places that are covered under this. I am guessing most of them outside of Russia's Hedjaz protectorate are Iranian protectorates. But what about Pakistan? I can imagine Baluchistan being some sort of Iranian conquest or protectorate. I can see the North West frontier being made part of Afghanistan in order to give some Russophile Pashtun nationalists to secure some sort of legitimacy to rule Afghanistan. But what about the most populated parts? I can't see Iran or Afghanistan trying to claim any part of the Indus valley itself. And while maybe you could get really dystopian by making it a zone of Indian occupation, it would be kinda crazy for an Indian government to try treating over 200 million people like they do the Kashmiris...
I suspect that Pakistan would exist in some rump form. Probably a rump that has close but low-key relations with Iran.
Entirely absent any other political concerns, the primary issue facing any Iranian territorial desires in Iraq is that there's
no good natural boundary as your border until you hit the Mediterranean. This was the bane of basically every Persian Empire in history, because while the Iranian heartlands are basically impossible for anyone to take and hold (except, wait for it-- the Mongols), holding anything westwards is a continual invitation to overstretching what their heartlands can support control over. The fact that both Egypt
and Turkey are at the other end of the Fertile Crescent, with each one inevitably having territorial ambitions of their own in the region, just guarantees an inevitable clusterfuck.
Taking into account the Sunni-Shia religious divide, about the only way that I see Iran holding much of anything outside of, well,
Iran, is with extensive ethnic cleansing of some sort or another.
Furthermore, the Fertile Crescent is the region which has already shown the most sensitivity to the already-existent levels of climate change, with the revolution in Syria being driven in no small part by complete crop failures due to drought and heat. It's entirely possible that during the bad days of the 2030s to 2050s (before the carbon-capture counterattack really got going in its impact) that there were times where the
wet-bulb temperature could exceed the levels where humans can survive.
Iraq used to
be the Persian heartland for 2000 years - from the conquest of Babylonia until the Ottomans took the region. (Though its importance did decline after the Arab conquests, most of the dynasties that held the Iranian plateau also held Iraq and it was still the wealthiest part of the empire every time they held it.) And judging from where the Persian border usually ended up, I'd say the natural border was the Euphrates. On the East bank, the economic pull is towards the Persian Gulf, on the West bank, the economic pull its towards the Mediterranean.
I think if the new Iranian regime is smart, it will have a friendly Iraqi client it supports. But if they are dumb, I don't think it would be as bad as you are thinking.And
@PoptartProdigy hopefully this feedback helps.
fasquardon