Overview
I'd like to thank various folks both in the thread and away from it who not only helped me to put the finishing touches on these polities, but helped me with the task of stringing together a common thread for the region.
Alexander's interventions in the Middle East took many steps. First, he made an ally of a faction in Iran that took power and proved willing to work with him. Using a combination of pressure and good deals, he brought Turkey on-side. With these secured, he invaded first Iraq, and then Saudi Arabia, hitting the various Gulf States along the way. After this, he and his allies set up clients and moved on.
There were many effects from this, but one of the most decisive was the discrediting of the pan-Islamism movement in the region. While Russia was the primary actor in bringing down the old order of the Middle East, both Turkey and Iran contributed heavily, and in Iran's case, eagerly. Both have profited handsomely at the rest of the region's expense. There is very little fond feeling left for them based on co-religiosity.
However, what the various Middle Eastern states now under the Russosphere's thumb do have in common is a point of commonality decades discredited, but now breathing new life under the pressures of explicitly nationalist foreigners oppressing them all. Not with the open acknowledgement of any governments who don't with to experience some intervention, but certainly within the general populace, the old idea of pan-Arabism is starting to make a comeback.
For the time being, this is not an active political movement. You're mostly seeing various protesters within various countries making gestures of solidarity with one another. For another thing, nations outside of the Middle Eastern pressure box aren't experiencing this movement. The movement may or may not, actually be going somewhere. But it is apparent by now, and it's very concerning to Alexander and his puppets, and shapes their and others' approach to engaging with the region. Consider it a rough equivalent to the Revivalist sentiment in the former United States; a solidarity and union movement reacting against the artificial paradigm Russian and its allies impose through brute force.
As for the specifics:
Iran
Iran dealt with the collapse of the oil market poorly. Tensions in the country, long-dormant, boiled over, and while there was not outright civil war, there was civil strife. Refugee flows from an imploding Pakistan -- Alexander's work, very delicate, quite a 5D chess move to get the nukes without something going pop -- did not help, as the country was stretched already at the time. Alexander, seeking a good ally to open the way to the Middle East, took the opportunity. He supported one of the factions willing to work with him, and that faction used that support to its advantage in suborning or eliminating other factions. Iran never came to civil war, but the existing regime did fall -- either in a coup or under less violent pressure ultimately doesn't matter. It did through force of foreign-backed politics.
Iran has been Alexander's willing and eager ally -- they are too small to threaten him, naturally balance against several of his other allies, secure a flank, and are well-positioned to project much influence over the Middle East. They made an absolute killing riding the death of oil, and with Alexander's encouragement, used the funding to diversify their economy so they could survive the end of the ride. Despite momentary friction, they are generally pleased with their alliance. Iran in the modern day is a regional hegemon on the Persian Gulf, one of those states that has genuinely and unambiguously benefitted by association with Alexander, and likely one of his most secure allies.
Iran sees pan-Arabism as a threat. It is, after all, one of the movement's favorite targets. As one of the more outgoing of the Russosphere powers in the region, it actively works to counter pan-Arabic sentiment throughout its sphere of influence, largely attempting to discredit its proponents through means political and direct.
Turkey
The Bosporus Strait must remain open.
This has been one of the truisms for Russias throughout the centuries: the Bosporus must remain open. Via the Black Sea, Russia connects to the Mediterranean -- the greatest trade artery in the world. Russian trade must have access to that artery. Russian warships, for a superpower, must be able to contest for control of that Sea.
The Strait must remain open.
When Russia was utterly alone at the top, they ensured that message came through, loud and clear. Turkey became a Russian-aligned state.
But it can't all be stick. Alexander's reconquest of ex-Soviet territories obliterated the Turkic nations that Turkey held sway in; there needed to be some payoff. Thus, Alexander offered Turkey the strategic depth they sought throughout the Middle East, serving as a middleman between Turkey and Levantine states to ensure that relations remained friendly and cooperative. Furthermore, Alexander supported Turkey in resolving the political situation on Cyprus, to Turkey's advantage (I don't care about specifics, they aren't relevant, all that matters is that Turkey got what it wanted at the time).
In short, Alexander resolved Turkey's longstanding issues with diplomacy in its immediate neighborhood by offering it free entry to the Russosphere on favorable terms -- with the stick of the Russian military ever hoisted overhead. In the modern day, Turkey attempts to secure its own interests independent of Russia, in an attempt to find plausible escape routes from Russia's shadow, should it need them. In this context, pan-Arabism is a massive threat to Turkey; where Turkey attempts to secure its interests in its neighborhood, this movement casts Turkey as one of the negative legitimizing forces. Turkey works in focus regions to actively suppress pan-Arabic movements.
Saudi Arabia
Dead and gone. Alexander sponsors a client in the Hijaz in order to exercise control over the Red Sea and avoid the global clusterfuck that would be the Muslim pilgrimage sites being threatened. The client is not what we conventionally understand to be viable, absent outside support. That's deliberate.
Iran sponsors a client centered around the city of Dammam, to solidify its control over the Persian Gulf.
The interior of the nation, a desert quite deliberately deprived of water imports, is a marginal and powerless state if it is one at all. Neither Alexander nor Iran bother with it. (This may be a mistake; pan-Arabism has to start regaining traction somewhere, and this is a fine place for that. A nation with no hard power can still provide a pressure chamber for ideologies to ferment, and then spread.)
Iraq
Dead and gone. Iraq fell to a joint Russian-Iranian intervention to secure staging grounds for Alexander's invasion of Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath, the region fell into competing zones of control. Iran organized a Shi'ite client in the southern portions of the region. Turkey claimed influence over the western, Sunni portions of the country. Alexander, always interested in checking and limiting his allies' success, demanded a Kurdish state in the north. The Kurds seized the opportunity of the invasion to declare for Alexander and rise against the Iraqi government, offering their support -- and their ability to guarantee control of the country's mountainous regions -- in exchange for recognition of a state of their own. Alexander agreed, on the condition that the resultant state foreswore any claims on Russian allies.
Thus, the status of Iraq today is a Shi'ite Iranian client, a Turkish Sunni client, and a Kurdistan despised by absolutely every one of its neighbors trying to manage an unending flood of Kurds from Syria, Turkey, and Iran (some voluntarily, some as refugees, and still others as part of programs of deliberate ethnic cleansing). Thus, this -- along with the nations bordering it -- serves as the border of the various Russosphere states' zones of influence in the Middle East. Pan-Arabic sentiment likely gets some pushback from the Kurds -- or, at least, they specifically disclaim any common feeling with it. It likely sees far greater traction in the Turkish and Iranian clients, although those would see fierce contest from their overlords.
Persian Gulf States
The various small states along the Persian Gulf have largely fallen into Iran's sphere. With a general tendency of having oil- or trade-dependent economies reliant on massive exploited foreign labor classes, they did not long survive the Collapse, falling to revolution or civil collapse. The Russian intervention in Saudi Arabia swept them up as well, ensuring that nothing remained to restart the oil trade. In the aftermath, Iran had a relatively free hand to spread its influence into the Gulf, and reached out to the communities remaining in the region to organize their reorganization. These states are shadows of their former selves; the underclasses typically fled the nation en masse when the scale of the disaster and their uncertain place within became clear, where they were not outright expelled by nervous national leadership.
Iran has also established the formerly UAE peninsula projecting into the Strait of Hormuz, from Ras-al-Khaimah and northwards, as a separate and firmly controlled puppet state to solidify its control of that strait.
Pan-Arabism would have somewhat conflicting success, here. The region would be far more ethnically mixed than any other, and with Iran industriously working to delegitimize the ideals of the movement, it would have a harder time taking root in the general population.
Oman
Much-reduced. While not an outright puppet of Iran, Oman is firmly within their sphere, having signed variously favorable agreements with their Persian neighbors intended to solidify Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz. Oman leases military bases to Iran, gives favorable terms to their commerce, and largely lives under their watchful eye. A part of the Russosphere, by association.
Insofar as Oman would engage with pan-Arabism, it would likely be with a fair amount of caution, but much more openness, than any other state in the region. The hand of the Russosphere lays lightest here, and so Oman can openly entertain dangerous ideas as long as it doesn't act on them...but at the same time, they have fewer grievances to give the movement fertile ground.
Yemen
Stabilized into a Russian client ideal for control over the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, with a proven and excellent trade harbor. Very Russian loyalist. Economy entirely dependent on servicing Russosphere trade. Along with the various states in and around what remains of Iraq, this is the second front for where Russian, Turkish, and Iranian interests tend to all compete with one another. Russia is preeminent, with Iran tending to contribute a fair amount, and substantial Turkish investments coming in last place.
Pan-Arabism would actually have a difficult time taking root in Yemen, since it has generally prospered by its alignment to Russia. There would need to be something to discredit Russia's position in the region.
Syria
Long a Russian client, and that has not changed. The insurgencies, absent foreign aid, are long-dead. There's a fair amount of Turkish presence in their nation as well, as the Turkish government attempts to find ways to ameliorate Alexander's chokehold on their neighborhood. Pan-Arabism would be in a similar position to Iraq -- always on the mind, but never with much traction.
Lebanon
Russian-aligned, albeit meaningfully independent. Interested in diversifying foreign interests in their nation, and thus on more than speaking terms with Turkey and the EU. Pan-Arabism would have ample room to spread here, given its relative lack of strategic importance and their specific focus on getting out from the foreigners' thumbs.
Israel
Russia kept them alive out of fear of them touching off a nuclear spitestorm in Russia's backyard. The extent of this, "support," is telling Alexander's clients not to fucking start shit if they want to keep their arms subsidies. Alexander is tracking down the nukes so that he can address Israel more permanently.
That said, with the rising tide of pan-Arabic sentiment in the Middle East, Alexander also has a reason to keep Israel around. Israel presents a religious opponent to draw off some of the ire of his allies and clients, and helps him to keep them in line with his vision for the world. There is also the fact that Israeli intelligence is legitimately a fearsome opponent -- even if Israel didn't give Alexander a good counterweight to keep his clients in line, there's the fact that he simply hasn't found the nukes yet. The fact that he'd like to kill them, but can't for multiple reasons, is a significant source of stress for him. If Alexander found the nukes tomorrow, he'd have a hard question to answer regarding whether or not Israel's time had come.
Jordan
Arguments in the thread and elsewhere have convinced me to spare Jordan. Phosphate exports and the fact that constant refugee flows from across the Middle East will help to keep the nation locked down mean that Russia doesn't particularly come gunning for them. He makes sure to dominate the market -- the money keeps them alive and dependent, and gives him leverage to make sure they never even think of trying to crack for shale oil, even if they were to have the cash for it. Jordan's economy turns inwards as the food sector goes to soaking the refugees, and the phosphates get dominated by Russia. It is alive -- more than many others could say.
Pan-Arabism enjoys both fertile ground and the only barely tacit support of the government, here. They have suffered by foreign domination, but retained state and government continuity. That, plus the massive flows of Arabic refugees from all over the region, seething over their victimization at the hands of Russosphere nations, makes for a potent ideological brew. If pan-Arabism did not start up in the middle of former Saudi Arabia, it did so here -- and whichever was not the birthplace has certainly found it an attractive notion.
Egypt
To be covered fully in the African debate, as our point of entry, but suffice it to say that Egypt remains a thing. Thousands of years of existence as a coherent state broken only by foreign occupation. The Suez Canal. The Nile. So much food. The support of the African Union -- and my canonical stance that Alexander simply did not have the resources to do what it took to really square up with the African Union. In some way, shape, or form, Egypt is still there. We will determine the finer details when we cover Africa.
Given my revised treatment of Jordan, it occurs that a friendly Egypt would complete a Russian encirclement of Israel -- in addition to a friendly Egypt simply being strategically vital to Russian interests. Egypt would certainly be a high priority. The specifics, however, will have to wait.
All right, folks, there we go. This mostly won't be directly relevant to play, but it's good to have it all nailed down. Next up, since it's about to be relevant to the quest proper: South America! Stay tuned.
