As promised, a brief analysis of GDI naval logistical imperatives.
I've lost this thing twice already, so Im putting it up as is without further polishing.
Happy New Year y'all.
SEA CONTROL, SHIPPING,SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND GDI NAVAL STRATEGY
1) Assume all major GDI merchant shipping use nuclear power. We're largely post-fossil fuel at sea except for specialty applications like aircraft and some small ships like the Rapiers, so nuke reactors are going to be standard. This eliminates fuel consumption as a consideration in merchant shipping, leaving only safety and speed.
Google says most containerships are designed to cruise around 25 knots as of the 2000s.
Container ships are taking longer to cross the oceans than the Cutty Sark did as owners adopt 'super-slow steaming' to cut back on fuel consumption
www.theguardian.com
Some 30 knot plus cargo ships like the Algol-class were designed in the 1970s, but they didnt catch on because of rising fuel costs, and are mostly used by the US Navy today as naval supply ships.
Let's be conservative. Assume 25 knots as average for GDI merchant shipping.
2)We know Nod cargo aircraft, and by extension GDI cargo aircraft, have transpacific range, because the Brotherhood flew from China/Siberia to Colorado with full loads of Marked of Kane combat troops and military equipment to steal the Tacitus. For reference, a direct flight from San Francisco to Manila is about 14 hours 40 minutes commercial.
That suggests that a naval patrol variant Carryall or V35 with maritime sensors, extra fuel instead of passengers and ordnance is going to have unrefuelled endurance on the order of 18 or 20 hours.
Think a S-3 Viking with better endurance.
This is important because Nod fighter aircraft do not, as far as I know, have the range and endurance to show up mid-ocean.
And Nod has no carriers.
Yet.
Which means the worst threat GDI maritime patrol aircraft might face is Vertigo bombers with their dinky tailgun.
In which case strapping on a bunch of QAAMs, or a laser gunpod when it becomes available, puts them under threat.
3) Word of God stated that the Rapier-class hydrofoil has a combat radius of 450km, presumably at full combat speed.
This translates to significantly greater range when patrolling at cruising speed, which is much less fuel hungry.
For reference, the Soviets had a 61 knot/>110kmhr military hydrofoil in service through the 1980s, which had a range of 640 nmi at 45 knots, 1250nmi at 36 knots, and 1500 nmi at 8.5 knots.
While carrying 4x 3 ton antiship missiles, a 30mm autocannon and a 20 round shortrange SAM.
4)UNREP or underway replenishment ships are a thing.
The US Navy has the Kaiser-class, and soon, the John Lewis-class, which are roughly 42,000 to 50,000 tons fully loaded and can refuel up to five ships simultaneously.
They are especially critical for carrier heavy fleets, because while the ships run on nuclear power, their fighter aircraft and helicopters still run on jet fuel and lubricants. And use up a horrifying amount of bombs and missiles under combat conditions, to the point where US Navy Nimitz-class carriers were forecasted to run out of ammo in less than a week of full tempo operations.
This means that GDI needs must have a fleet of tens, if not hundreds, of UNREP fast supply ships to keep its carriers and its helicopter carrying escorts fuelled and bombed up during weeks and months of continuous combat.
This is an important capability that has implications for their convoy escort strategy.
5)GDI is likely to maintain scientific and military bases in places where the civilian population has been evacced.
Puerto Rico yes, in order to secure the shipping routes from the Colombia/Venezuela MARV.
But also Mauritius + Seychelles + Reunion all around Madagascar. Socorta Island off Yemen. Newfoundland. Falkland Islands. Azores. Places where mostly Nod's relative inferiority in seapower denies them easy access, and which are too small to hide significan Nod infrastructure.
6)GDI naval availability is 50% by WoG.
That means for every ship on active operations, there is one in maintenance, refit or testing.
That, by the way, is better than RL, where availability is more like 30-33%.
Keep this in mind when thinking about building ships. When you build, say, 90 cruisers, only 45 will be at sea at any time.
BLUE WATER FLEET STRENGTH AND ORGANIZATION
At last WoG, the GDI fleet had 44x supercarriers and either 36x or 46x battleships(Im using the higher number), an indeterminate number of legacy Burke/Zumwalt/??? escorts and an eventual 90x Governor-class cruisers.
Assuming carriers operate in groups of two or more to maximize mutual defense, that current composition would come to:
22× Carrier Strike Group: 2x CVN + 1x BB + 2x CA + naval supply ships + additional escorts
12× Surface Action Group: 2x BB + 1x CA + naval supply ships + additional escorts
34× cruisers + unknown number of remaining escorts
WoG is that the Navy maintains 50% availability, which means at any moment half of that is at sea while the other half is in port undergoing maintenance/resupply/training/RnR.
That comes around to 11x CAGs, 6x SAGs and 17x CAs available for combat at anytime, as well as unknown numbers of Burkskis
Split by ocean size and perceived threat:
Atlantic Ocean: 3x CAGs + 2x SAGs
Indian Ocean: 4x CAGs + 2x SAG
Pacific Ocean: 4x CAGe + 2x SAG
Remaining CAs and escorts distributed at need.
MERCHANT SHIPPING STRATEGY
GDI blue ocean merchant shipping would be organized in convoys of 20-50 ships, and restricted to transit lanes between 500km and 1000km of friendly shores. Given the demonstrated range and endurance of cargo aircraft, this puts them within range of sustained air coverage by marinised V35s and Carryalls of Naval Aviation, both for protection and search and rescue if necessary.
You'd have two to four maritime patrol aircraft orbiting a convoy at a time as it travelled, while carrying everything from torpedoes to sonobuoys and antishipping missiles. Aircraft that can carry 70 ton Predators and combat drops of cyborgs over the Pacific in one jump can carry a shitload of ordnance.
This would be supplemented with close escort of hydrofoil squadrons in one of several possible configurations:
A)Relay legs, handing off from one hydrofoil squadron to another from naval bases and staging points hundreds of kilometers apart. A naval convoy averaging 25 knots an hour would travel 600 nautical miles/690 miles/1111 km in a day. That translates to roughly a new hydrofoil squadron escort every 24 hours, with the new replacements accepting handover and then in turn handing them off in turn to another set of escorts before returning to their bases.
B) 1-2 squadrons of hydrofoils permanently attached to the convoy for the duration of the trip, along with one or two UNREP fast supply ships to play milkcow as necessary until the convoy reaches it's final destination.
It bears noting that a single Kaiser-class oiler masses around 42 kilotons full load and carries around 180,000 barrels of fuel, plus additional dry supplies. More than enough to keep two squadrons of hydrofoils supplied for a 10,000km trip.
C)UNREP fast supply ships rendezvousing with the convoy 300-500km off the coast of a BZ, and the hydrofoils tanking up, before moving on and the supply ship going back to base
The Flower-class convoy escort from WW2 was close to the same size as the Rapier; 63m to the Rapier's 50m-ish
Not that the merchant ships would be completely unarmed.
Something like SeaRAM point defence is essentially automated, and light enough to be bolted anywhere the ship has free space. One forward. One aft.
Add a couple of remote weapon stations on each broadside for heavy machinegun or 25mm autocannon to discourage boarders, and underwater active sonar to kill enemy divers.
You can even fit ASW torpedoes if necessary.
And they'd be able to call on air support from shore or the local carriers.
The big naval taskforces would be dedicated to sanitizing geographic areas of threats instead of escorting particular convoys. And making sure that only leakers got through, if that. The convoys might never see them in a trip, but they'll keep track of them as they pass through their area of responsibility.
TLDR
To couch this in sports terms:
Hydrofoils and aviation do man-marking of convoys.
Naval taskforces do zone defense.
I will give examples of the primary routes by ocean:
ATLANTIC CIRCUIT
NGIUKS: Newfoundland - Greenland - Iceland - United Kingdom - Senegal
The Atlantic is the safest of the three major oceans. The North Atlantic in particular is essentially a GDI lake, ringed with BZs and studded with GDI controlled islands. Major combatants are thus seldom trully necessary here. The Caribbean and South Atlantic are more fraught, and thus demand more attention. Nevertheless most of GDI's security requirements here are met by hydrofoils and landbased MPAs.
Representative voyage: St John,Newfoundland - Nuuk,Greenland - Reykjavik,Iceland - Aberdeen,UK - Lisbon,Portugal - Dakar,Senegal
6675 miles.
11.1 days at 25 knots
INDIAN OCEAN CIRCUIT
SMA: South Africa - Madagascar - Oman
The left half of the western Indian Ocean boasts a heavy GDI air and hydrofoil presence. The right half is much less secure, growing ever more perilous the closer you approach the Indian coastline. GDI merchant shipping is strongly recommended to avoid the eastern Indian Ocean until the security situation improves.
Representative voyage: Durban,South Africa - Antsiranana,Madagascar - Muscat,Oman
3806 miles. 6.3 days at 25 knots
PACIFIC CIRCUIT
Canada - Alaska/America - Siberia - Korea
The northern Pacific is almost as safe as the northern Atlantic.
Nevertheless, an abundance of caution would have merchant shipping following much the same procedures as elsewhere, in order to deny Brotherhood raiders easy shots
South of Korea in the west is no-go for civilian shipping. In the east Pacific, south of Baja California, in between upsurges of centrally-mandated violence, vigorous patrolling as well as the difficulties of staging out of Red Zones and a certain caution by Stahl would keep losses to naval raiding out of Stahl's Pacific coast down. Mostly.
Representative voyage: Vancouver,Canada - Anchorage,Alaska - Vladivostok,Russia - Busan,South Korea
5190 miles. 8.6 days at 25 knots
HERE BE DRAGONS: SECTORS OF CONCERN
These are those areas of ocean where GDI naval aviation and hydrofoils have only sporadic presence, if at all.
Either because they have limited endurance in the case of the hydrofoils, because of the absence of GDI naval bases, or because of the real possibility of running into powerful Nod raiding forces in ambush while out of the range of support.
These routes would only be covered by naval strike groups, and are characterized by at least some YZ coastline.
SOUTH ATLANTIC: West Africa to South Africa. Takoradi,Ghana to Cape Town,South Africa. 2593 miles. 4.3 days at 25 knots
SOUTH ATLANTIC: South America to South Africa. Comodoro Rivadavia,Argentina to Cape Town,South Africa. 4010 miles. 6.7 days at 25 knots
SOUTH ATLANTIC: Puerto Rico to South America BZ. San Juan,Puerto Rico to Comodoro Rivadavia,Argentina. 5408 miles. 9 days at 25 knots
SOUTH PACIFIC: New Zealand to South America. Auckland,New Zealand to Valparaiso,Chile. 5257 miles. 8.8 days at 25 knots.
EAST PACIFIC: Baja California to Chile. Ensenada,Mexico to Valparaiso,Chile.4691 miles. 7.8 days at 25 knots.
DEATHS GROUND: FORBIDDEN SECTORS
The Eastern Indian Ocean.
Nod has the entire coastline of India and western Australia from which to launch air and sea strikes on any convoys, and the Straits of Malacca roll right through Bintang territory. Any significant naval movements in the area are at risk of everything from surprise Vertigo strike to Gana boarding attack to sea mines in the Straits of Malacca.
There is no GDI merchant shipping here. Only naval strike forces and patrol groups.
Any shipping to Australia and NZ would go via South America; much better than the alternative.
IMPLICATIONS
1)Wingman Drones are critical to both the Air Force and Navy.
Giving each maritime patrol aircraft a wingman or two thickens aerial convoy escorts significantly, and raises the requirements for successful Nod naval raids even further.
2)The primary Nod naval threat to GDI cargo traffic in most parts of the oceans is either air or submarine.
The principal transit lanes for GDI merchant traffic are covered by patrol aircraft, and are well within range of landbased fighters.
Which helps justify Bintang's passivity, for instance.
3)Finding ships at sea is a non-trivial exercise.
Nod undoubtedly has spies in GDI ports to tell them when convoys leave, but their options at sea are much more limited.
Those warlords with accessible coastlines undoubtedly have some passive sonar arrays listening and attempting to track ships at long range in order to have a direction to send bombers or subs.
But.
They have no satellites, and even with stealth hiding them, search aircraft are limited by both the Tiberiumverse limitations on radar range, and the risk of suddenly GDI carrier fighter aircraft or naval SAM homing in on their emissions.
Security by obscurity is a very real thing here.
4)Even CVEs need escorts in order to avoid getting shanked by some sneaky or lucky bastard.
The GDI Navy is explicitly short of bluewater escorts. Where to find the escorts for a new batch of 30 to 60 escort carriers without building frigates is a question that I dont think anyone has considered fully.
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