American Civil War Orders of Battle
US Army Infantry Division
- Division Headquarters
- 2 x Infantry Brigade
- 2 x Infantry Regiments
- 3 x Infantry Battalions
- Machine Gun Company
- Machine Gun Battalion
- Field Artillery Brigade
- 155mm Artillery Regiment
- 2 x 75mm Artillery Regiment
- Mortar battalion
- Engineer Regiment
- Train HQ
- Supply Train
- Munitions Train
- Engineering Train
- Sanitary Train
Authorized Strength: 27,000 men, 1,000 officers. 48 mortars, 72 artillery pieces, 260 machine guns, 17,666 rifles.
The US Army infantry division had changed very little from the Great War. Years of Congressional frugality had frozen the Army's combat units, and blocked most attempts at reorganization and modernization. This is not to say that the officers of the White Army were dunces stuck refighting the Great War. The General Staff had begun studying the problems of the next war as soon as the guns had fallen silent in France.
A 1920 memorandum by Brigadier General Fox Conner, widely circulated within the War Department, had identified the basic strategic questions poised at the US Army. A falling out among the victors of the Great War was identified as the only plausible future conflict within the next decade; all other potential adversaries had been ruined. This would entail military operations, whether on the offense or defense, on the North American continent, liking against the British Empire. The tactics and organization of trench warfare would only be of limited applicability. The terrain would favor a return to maneuver warfare. The existing US Army division was too immobile for operations in depth.
Financial and political restrictions blocked General Pershing's
1 planned reorganization to a triangular division arrangement. Like after the Slaver's War, the political leadership beat swords into ploughshares, and made only limited accommodations to geostrategic needs. The Selective Service system was gutted; the individual states would maintain it for an enlarged National Guard to provide the Army with the reservists it would need to mobilise for the next war.
The US Army itself would be a professional, all-volunteer cadre force. With the limited budget available, it would be impossible to simultaneously reorganize the divisions, and familiarize officers and NCOs with the new organization, as well as establish the new cadre system.
Under the National Defense Act of 1919, the divisions of the US Army were reorganized into three grades of readiness. Class A divisions were to be maintained at between 90 to 100 percent manpower, in full readiness for combat operations. Class B divisions would be fully billeted with all necessary materiel, but would only be kept at 50 percent manpower. In the event of mobilisation, a Class B division would require a week to prepare for operations, and significantly longer to fully mobilise. Class C divisions were purely reserve formations, staffed only by a core cadre of officers, NCOs and senior enlisted, between 10 and 25 percent strength. Class C divisions would require much longer to train and mobilise reservists and new recruits, and would have to acquire rear echelon assets, such as trucks and draft animals transferred from the civilian sector.
The existing divisions of the US Army were divided into the organisational classes based roughly on their history. The 1st through 10th Infantry Divisions were to be organised as Class A divisions. The 11th through 24th Infantry were to be Class B divisions. The 25th through 50th were the designations for National Guard divisions in federal service, and under the ambitious plan established by General Pershing, were expected to be organized at Class B level. The remaining divisions of the National Army, 51st and up were to be demobilised to Class C levels, maintaining a minimal cadre of officers and NCOs to manage equipment in long-term storage. Pershing and the General Staff developed a rubric to make this ambitious plan affordable by slimming down the huge square divisions into smaller triangular divisions of around 13,000 officers and men.
The US Congress would not provide the funds and personnel required for this scheme. The National Defense Act of 1921, along with the year's Selective Service Act, dramatically reduced the manpower of the US Army, and cut the funding available to the bone. With the exception of the 3rd Infantry Division, all of the Class A divisions were downgraded to Class B status by 1924. The planned Class B divisions were reduced to skeleton Class C cadres, and many of the National Guard commands existed only on paper after the National Guard adopted more flexible organisations for the needs of the states. Class C divisions were often just stores of equipment and uniforms barely guarded, especially as Great Depression budget cuts forced economisation.
Limited reorganizations were made under this arrangement. Trench warfare became a special operation, and most of the specialized equipment and units required were transferred from the division to corps or army level commands.
The US Army division of the Civil War was a slightly leaner version of its Great War antecedent. MacArthur had been a champion of military reorganization, one of the strongest advocates Pershing's triangular division plan, but with the pressing need to crush the insurrection in the industrial centres of the United States quickly, the U.S. Army could not be reorganised. MacArthur would fight the war with the tools he had: 2 Class A divisions (3rd Infantry, 1st Cavalry) and 10 Class B Divisions.
On paper, these divisions were robust and wielded immense firepower. But they were organizationally cumbersome, with each level of the chain of command constituted of four organic units plus supplemental units. Officers were burdened with a heavy organizational workload.
Additionally, the divisions relied heavily on draft animals for logistical backbone. Motor transport played a minor role in the moving of troops, equipment and supplies. While field commanders did requisition civilian motor vehicles during the drive northward, it played a comparatively limited role in the first phase of the war. Artillery is the king of the battlefield, and their carriages were not suited for motor transport. During the winter and spring of 1933, the White Army did not control a sufficient industrial base to refit artillery carriages with pneumatic tires and suspensions. What industrial base they did control was plagued by strikes, absenteeism, sabotage and outright insurrection.
Where they did excel was in prepared defense. With a large number of redundant sub-units, the division could absorb casualties and remain in combat for an extended period of time. Each of the brigades of a US Army division had nearly as many men, rifles, and machine guns as a Red Army division. The engineer regiment, a hold over from the Great War days, allowed the rapid employment of defensive works.
While this table of organisation and equipment by statute applied to the regular, reserve and National Guard divisions of the US Army, the practical necessities of mobilisation required the stripping of the available reserve cadres in the Southern United States of men and materiel to mobilise the regular army divisions. National Guard divisions serving in the White Army typically lacked organic support assets and were at significantly reduced manpower.
Red Army Rifle Division (March Plan)
- Division Headquarters
- 3 x Infantry Regiment
- 3 x Infantry Battalion
- 3 x Infantry Company
- 3 x Infantry Platoon
- Weapons Platoon
- Weapons Company
- Cannon Company
- Artillery Regiment
- 3 x 75 mm artillery battalion
- 155 mm artillery battalion
- Engineer Battalion
- Reconnaissance Company
- Medical Company
- Signal Company
- Service Company
- Political Commissariat
Authorized Strength: ~15,000 men, 700 officers. 84 mortars, 36 infantry support guns, 48 artillery pieces, 190 machine guns, 9,200 rifles.
On 7 February 1933, the Revolutionary Military Committee of the All-American Congress of Soviets promulgated the then secret General Order 17. This directive ordered the establishment of a Red Army outside the control and oversight of the all-antifascist coalition in the Provisional Government.
Under General Order 17, the soviets were directed to take control of the Selective Service draft boards, and begin the process of conscripting men for the Red Army. Training camps would be established by the Spartacus League.
By the time this inflammatory move became known in the broader Provisional Government, it was too late and desperate to stop. In mid March, the RMC finalised its general mobilisation plans. The "March Plan" would utilise the personnel and assets of the Class C cadre formations as the seed for new divisions, stiffened by a core of union "old shirts" and Great War veterans from the party.
The divisions of the March Plan would be organised as triangular divisions comprised of three rifle maneuver regiments. Each regiment would have three rifle battalions, supported by an organic cannon company. These light pack howitzers and support guns would greatly augment the firepower available to the regiment on maneuver.
The infantry battalion in turn would have three rifle companies, and a weapons company kitted with machine guns and mortars. And each rifle company in turn would have three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon similarly arranged.
Divisions of the March Plan were organised to maximise the flexibility and mobility of the division. Organic support assets enabled unit commanders utilise initiative in combat operations and greatly shorten preparation times in offensives and assaults.
These divisions had their organisation heavily inspired by the Experimental Brigade, active between 1925 and 1928 under the command of Brigadier General Leslie McNair. The Experimental Brigade had been promoted by ambitious junior officers with the patronage of Pershing to develop new techniques for operational scale warfare, manoeuvre and mechanisation. As part of the hard-sell to a budget conscious Congress, the division-equivalent unit was pitched as a mere brigade, and a number of other techniques were utilised to hide the total program cost in other programs.
The Brigade was organised into three motorised infantry regiments, each with organic support assets. This basic structure of three maneuver elements with organic support was repeated down to the platoon level. In manoeuvres in the midwest, the Experimental Brigade pioneered the application of radio, mechanised infantry carriage, artillery support doctrine, and even the employment of tanks for exploitation. Most of the Army's best and brightest would pass through it during its three year life, including Harry Haywood, Martin Abern, George Marshall, David Eisenhower, and Terry Allen. Junior officers and NCOs competed for a billet with the Brigade, and during its brief existence it was the Army's most prestigious posting.
The Experimental Brigade would be shuttered during the scandals of 1928. With many of its alumni drummed out of service for being Reds or Pinks, the Congress defunded the experiment over the objections of then-Army Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur.
With most of the nation's industrial base under Red control, and the working class enthusiastically involved in the war effort, the Reds were able to rapidly shift to a war footing, and begin supplementing the materiel taken from government arsenals. Heavy water-cooled machine guns were converted to air-cooled models. Artillery pieces were retrofitted to truck carriages. A wide assortment of cars, trucks and motorcycles were requisitioned for military use. The production lines in Detroit began churning hastily militarised models alongside new tanks and armored cars. Everything from boots, uniforms and web gear to rifles, machine pistols and cannons were being churned out in the great industrial cities.
To ease organisation and foster morale, the Red Army adopted the heraldry and names of Great War National Army divisions. The first division mobilised under this plan was the 19th Infantry Division, mobilised from the loyalist cadre at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, and Great War veterans hastily retrained for service.
By the time major fighting began in April, the Provisional Government was able to constitute five divisions under this arrangement to supplement Red Guard and paramilitary forces. All of them were significantly under strength, and would be committed to battle immediately.
In the savage fighting of April, they clashed with the regular divisions of the US Army in Chicago, Toledo and Pittsburgh and bore the brunt of the casualties. The flexibility and manoeuvre made possible by their organisation and motorisation allowed for daring counterattack and exploit operations, absolutely crucial to the decisive encirclements that turned the tide of the Civil War.
By the beginning of the June offensives, the Red Army had mobilised sixteen of the new model divisions. Grueling logistical work had ensured that while none were full strength, they were adequately equipped for offensive operations.
3rd Cavalry Regiment (Mechanised)
- Regimental Headquarters
- 2 x Mechanised Cavalry battalions
- 2 x Cavalry Squadrons
- 3 x Cavalry Troops
- Weapons Platoon
- Mechanised Infantry Company
- 3 x Infantry Platoons
- Weapons Platoon
- Weapons Squadron
- Tank battalion
- 3 x Tank company
- 3 x Tank Platoon
- Service Platoon
- Service Company
- Reconnaissance Platoon
- Antitank platoon
- 4 x M1921 12.7 x 99 mm heavy machine guns.
- Assault gun Platoon
- 4 x M1928 75mm assault gun
- Artillery battalion
- 2 x Towed 75mm batteries
- 1 Assault gun battery
- 2 x assault gun platoon
- Mortar platoon
- Service Battalion
- Engineer Company
- Reconnaissance Squadron
Authorized strength: 3,641 men, 120 officers. 45 tanks, 16 artillery pieces, 12 assault guns, 20 mortars. 700 riding horses, 2,140 rifles/carbines, 20 machine gun teams.
The 3rd Cavalry Regiment was formed from the bones of the Experimental Brigade. Over the objections of the old guard of the Cavalry Branch, who did not see the temperamental new weapons and motorised systems as sufficiently mature to replace horse cavalry, the two Cavalry divisions began mechanisation in mid-1928.
The 3rd Cavalry Regiment, a component of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade in the 2nd Cavalry Division, was detached to begin mechanisation. One of its three cavalry battalions
2 was converted into a tank battalion, with equipment, officers and NCOs transferred from the now defunct Tank Branch.
In each of the two remaining battalions, one of the cavalry squadrons was converted into a mechanised infantry company. These companies were equipped with twelve M1928 light armored half-tracks, manufactured by Packard based off the Franco-Russian Kégresse design. Infantry would be carried into battle protected from shell splinters and gun-fire, and eventually many of these half-tracks would be outfitted with M1917 Browning machine guns. Each company was stiffened with a weapons platoon equipped with a 57mm mortar section and a Browning machine gun section.
Following preliminary organisation, the cavalry squadrons were augmented by a motorised weapons platoon, and the M1919 Christie prototypes were replaced with more reliable M1927 Christie tanks.
The main punch of the new regiment came from its battalion of 45 fast tanks. The light three-man tanks carried a turret mounted 37mm gun and a coaxial Browning machine gun. Additional firepower came from organic assault guns armed with 75mm pack howitzers, and two support batteries of 75 mm guns.
The cavalry regiment was organized towards the role of exploit operations in the enemy rear areas, with artillery and tanks to be screened by cavalry and mobile infantry. During manoeuvres in 1929 and 1930, the regiment performed quite well, and the Cavalry Board looked to acquire funding from Congress to finish the conversion.
The 1st Cavalry Division was part-way through reorganisation when the Depression hit, and the Army budget tightened. Plans to reorganise both divisions under the new plan were shelved indefinitely, with 1st Division only partially mechanised. 2nd Cavalry Division was downgraded to a Class B division.
Under US Army doctrine, the 3rd Cavalry Regiment was an independent manoeuvre unit, and should have been redesignated a brigade. But leaders in both the Cavalry and Tank Branches fought this proposal to prevent the outright cancellation of the mechanisation of the cavalry.
- His full rank is General of the Armies of the United States. It was intended to be equivalent to a British Field Marshal, but since only Pershing held it during the Great War and the years after, in practice it has the kind of symbolic weight that the position Marshal of France has in the French Army.
- This will probably only concern militaria enthusiasts, but naming conventions in the Cavalry Branch were reformed during the Great War ITTL to avoid possible confusion with British and French forces. IOTL, during the 19th century cavalry battalions existed only in garrison; when on maneuver the field force of the battalion was known as a squadron, and these squadrons were divided into troops that were the equivalent of infantry companies. At some point, this organisational difference was abolished, and cavalry battalions became squadrons. But in the British and French armies, the company equivalent unit is known as a squadron, and the platoon equivalent is a troop. The US Army grudgingly adopted this nomenclature during the Great War.
