Reds! A Revolutionary Timeline

Voted best in category in the Users' Choice awards.
Got to thinking about how the Cold War might actually end and what the signs of decaying late-stage capitalism might really look like...and what better representative of this than a sort of FN of the Left? Once more, not remotely canon, just was really trying to do some thinking about what shape late-stage capitalist politics might take in this time-line.
____

AbbreviationPPSF
Founded1994
Formed FromLabour Party Dissidents
LeaderPierre Tremblay**
Deputy LeaderBenoit Hamon
IdeologyLeft-wing Nationalism
Left-wing Populism
French Separatism
Rural Advocacy
Moderate Socialism (Left Tendency, Social Nationalists)
Cultural Conservativism (Nationalist Faction)
Anti-Immigration

Factions
  • Social Nationalists
  • Left Tendency
  • Reform Caucus
Motto"A France Free in Brotherhood".
Political PositionCentre-left to Left-Wing (FBU)
ColoursRed, Blue and White

The French Socialist People's Party/Parti Socialiste Populaire Français is a left-wing FBU political party formed in 1994 following the Labor Party's shift to the left. Initially branded as the "Franco-British Socialist People's Movement", it performed dismally in elections for the most ten or so years of its existence, finding particularly little support in Britain, where it was not able to make meaningful inroads into the Labor vote. In 2004, the party was captured by a left-wing nationalist clique led by former ESCI member Pierre Tremblay and the youth activist Benoit Hamon, who rebranded the party as a solely French Party, the "French Socialist People's Party". The most controversial part of its initial platform was its call for the break-up of the FBU and the restoration of "French Independence". This was met with a harsh crackdown from the Franco-British state following a surge in international tensions, with the police attempting to break up the party's 2005 convention. The images of police cracking down on party activists quickly went viral in France, galvanizing support for the party. The first sign of electoral trouble for the Franco-British establishment People's Alliance was the 2006 Marseille mayoral election, which saw the PPSF candidate narrowly qualify for the run-off and then defeat the incumbent PA mayor as much of the left united behind him and a significant portion of the right-wing vote simply stayed home.

The 2007 parliamentary election provided another shock, as it became the first regional party to clear the 5% bar required to qualify for seats in the national parliament. Although garnering only 8% of the vote in the Franco-British Union as a whole, they scored 18% of the vote in metropolitan France, owing largely to a surge of support from rural voters in Southern and Northern France, and in smaller part due to a shift in support from ESCI-Labor voters who worked in traditional extractive industries which might be endangered by environmental policies. Most post-election analysis, however, indicated that the party did not secure most of its support from traditional left-wing demographics: a full 50% of the party's voters switched from the People's Alliance. Another 20% were first-time voters, 10% came from minor right-wing parties, and only 20% from Labor, which despite the PPSF showing actually improved their net vote share in metropolitan France. Demographically, the PPSF performed best amongst rural pensioners, the lower and middle strata of farmers, small shopkeepers, older industrial workers, and the non-unionized proletariat. Support for them was marginal to non-existent amongst students, professionals, businessmen, Parisians and immigrants.

Immediately following the election, the PPSF declared it would stand in the "opposition", and despite some initial concerns that the party might join the new "Popular Front", it quickly became clear that neither Labor nor the ESCI wished to work with the PPSF. The feeling was mutual.

Ideology

The success of the party and its seating in the national parliament forced it to clarify its platform amidst media scrutiny. After the 2008 party convention a much more detailed policy document was devised, "A French Socialism for the 21st Century". The main proposals, procatively termed the "minimum programme", were put forth at the beginning of the document:

1: An independent French state with full sovereignty over foreign, economic, and domestic policy must be restored, as it should have been following the cessation of hostilities in the Second World War and the end of the national emergency.

2. The withdrawal of France from the European integration initiatives, and a return of a bilateral foreign policy befitting France's great power status.

3. Internal reform of the AFS to allow for individual states to have greater military autonomy, and diplomatic reapprochment with the Comintern.

4. The transition to socialist management of enterprises in firms with over one hundred workers.

5. The protection of small and medium businesses from socialization and state interference, and an emergency moratorium on the taxes levied against businesses employing fewer than 20 workers.

6. The reduction of the annual number of foreign visas granted by at least 50%, and the creation of a national commission to investigate the effect of immigration on wages.

7. An increase of at least 25% in the national budget allocated to police, paid for with a reduction in military spending.

8. Designation of agriculture as a vital national industry in the same class as metallurgy and energy, allowing the state to take emergency measures to relieve the plight of smallholders.

9. The implementation of a national tariff of at least 10% on agricultural goods, with any price raises in the cost of food to be made-up through state subsidies funded by a 4% raise in the top tax bracket.

10. Pass a law making it illegal for employers or the government to alter the pension pay-outs of anyone who has already paid into the system for at least five years.

11. End the gax tax and carbon tax, both of which harm ordinary French consumers. End state subsidies for alternative energy industries and redirect the money toward shoring up the struggling French Healthcare system.

The party manifesto of 2008 clarified the party's nature as an alliance of small farmers, petty bourgeoisie, and socially conservative industrial workers. Many in the FBU have commented on the party's seemingly "post-ideological" nature, as it seems to be a mélange of welfarist liberalism, moderate market socialism, agrarian advocacy, and left-wing nationalism with a socially reactionary undercurrent. The clearest ideological precursor of the party is Marcel Deat's "Neo-socialists", through thus far they have shared little of his penchant for authoritarian governance. If anything, something of a Libertarian tendency runs through the party: they have voiced skepticism about nationalization schemes from Labor, and signed onto right-wing measures to weaken some of the planning instruments of the FBU. This distinctive ideological orientation is likely related to their almost non-existent relationship with the Trade Union movement, which on the whole is supportive of taking dirigisme in a significantly more progressive direction, but not weakening it.

Of course, Libertarian economic schemes and skepticism of economic planning are hardly incompatible with authoritarian politics. Many critics, particularly from the left, have pointed out the continuities between the platform and support base of the PPSF and those of interwar Fascism. Amongst the powerful social nationalist faction, one does not have to go particularly far to hear virulent anti-British and anti-immigrant rhetoric. Yet at least rhetorically, the party strives to situate itself in the traditions of French Republicanism, tracing back their own political lineage to the utopian socialists of 1848.

Factions

The party's factions largely correspond to the three official caucuses within the party, the "Social Nationalists", "Left Tendency", and smaller "Reform Caucus".

Social Nationalists: Probably the faction closest to the majority of the party's voters in their basic attitude and orientation, the social nationalists are above all concerned with the restoration of French sovereignty and its return to autonomous great-power status. Unlike the other factions in the party, they advocate for a complete break with Britain, whereas the Left and Reform caucuses merely advocate for the shift to a confederal status. Nonetheless, given the importance of the issue for the social nationalists and their power within the party, they were able to make a commitment to independence one of the key parts of the party's platform.

The social nationalists tend to be culturally conservative and socially centrist, favoring the restriction of immigration, an increase in police powers, and the continuation of the status quo on gay marriage and abortion law. On the question of economic policy, they range the gamut of the PPSF, including everyone from Libertarian welfare liberals to traditional social democrats to genuine democratic socialists to even a few "national communists".

Left Tendency/Left-Nationalists: The "Left-Nationalist" caucus, or "Left Tendency", represents many of the party's elite, including both Pierre Tremblay and Benoit Hamon, as well as a good portion of the party's urban, younger and first-time voters. Though they share the Social Nationalists desire for increased French sovereignty, they usually frame this demand in terms of their desire to achieve a greater degree of control over domestic economic policy. The recent infusion of rural voters into the party has led to a growing interest in schemes for land redistribution and voluntary, incentive-driven socialization.

The left-nationalists are almost exclusively democratic socialists of the Austro-Marxist variety, though many forswear any explicit commitment to Marxism, instead preferring to describe themselves as socialists or simply French patriots. They have expressed an interest in seeking a rapprochement with their old rival, the Labor Party, which also has a large Austro-Marxist wing, as well as a pink, Old-left wing which shares many of the PPSF's anxieties about social change and environmentalism.

The left-nationalists tend to be mostly supportive of the expansion of social freedoms and nondiscrimination protections, while also advocating for a reduction in the amount of immigration into Metropolitan France. Notably, unlike the Social Nationalists, they believe that Visa holders who have lived in France for over five years should have an easier route to naturalization.

Reform Caucus: The smallest grouping in the party, the Reform Caucus is composed primarily of the party establishment which existed previously to the Tremblay-Hamon seizure of the party in 2004. Older and more moderate, the reform caucus is also the one part of the party that retains any real link to the trade union movement. They tend to support the social nationalists on most domestic policy issues, but are much more skeptical than even the left tendency about their desire for a drastic break with Europe and Britain.

Leaders of the French Socialist People's Party

Laurent Fabius (1994-1998) (Reform Caucus)
Claude Cheysson (1998-2004) (Reform Caucus)
Pierre-Juquin (2004-2008) (Left-Nationalist)
 
Last edited:
As a note, nuclear disarmament or at least arms limitations are a perennial voter issue across both blocs as the superpowers have quite frankly, absurdly apocalyptic arsenals built up from fast-breeder reactors meant to both provide power and cheaply mass produce nuclear warheads. The FBU, UASR, USSR, GIC, Brazilian Empire, Oceania (Australasia), and SWRZ all maintain arsenals in the four to five digits warheads which is enough to cause an instantaneous and catastrophic mass extinction if a general nuclear exchange were to ever result. At the absolute peak of arsenal counts, the global total surpassed one million (though these warhead counts include all manner of pretty small tactical nuclear missiles and shells which made up the majority) before being brought down after the war scares of the late 80s and 90s as well as the usage of tactical nuclear weapons made a lot of people very afraid of what would happen if the great powers actually went to war for real.

Plus, while producing them is relatively cheap, maintaining them is less so.
 
Last edited:
The general rule of the Comintern is, following the example set by Iran which repeatedly insisted on ceasing to use "Persia" to refer to it, moving away from exonyms which are not at least vaguely similar to the endonym. Hence modern material always calling Germany Deutschland, Japan Nippon/Nihon, Korea Chosun/Choson, Finland Suomi, West South Africa Azania, the revolutionary part of Indonesia Nusantara, Greece Hellas, and China Zhonghua/Zhongguo.

Rossiya, Turkiye, and Italia are close enough to Russia, Turkey, and Italy however.

Sometimes the way you refer to a country can tell an observer where you're from due to differing political realities. Like in Britain they still mostly call it "Greece" whereas in America its nearly always rendered as "Hellas". This is particularly exacerbated by the fact that Heraklion's relationship with the mainland is extremely acerbic and is one of the biggest cold war tension points in Europe and quite possibly the biggest in the modern era because whereas the UASR can mostly just dismiss Cuba as brigands on an illegally conquered island that was never part of the American patrimony, Crete is literally the origin point of Hellenic culture.

There's also the fact that the defeat of the Greek royalists in the civil war sparked extremely normal reactions due to Greece's over-representation in European noble families as well as long-standing Hellenophilia in western Europe. Not to mention allowing the USSR that much more unrestricted access to the Mediterranean than they already had with control of the Bosporus by pushing the distance at which Soviet naval activity could be monitored from the Greek coast a day's march away from the straits all the way to the aegean islands. To the point where some blame Labour-SFIO's defeat at the hands of Anthony Eden and Charles De Gaulle's Conservative Alliance at the fact that Eden raked Hugh Gaitskell and Guy Mollet over the coals for not doing more to support the royalists throughout the campaign along with succumbing to the uprising that lost Berlin along with the debacle at Indochina and the Zionist and Royalist defeat at Palestine.

This is something of an oversimplification of course, and the Right of Labour-SFIO in charge after beating Anthony Bevan and Robert Longuet's Labour-SFIO left in a nasty and bitter leadership struggle after Leon Blum's sudden death tried to wave around their anticommunist credentials with the defeat of Bose's post war uprising in India and the crushing of the Malaysian Communists, the Egyptian Free Officers, and Kenyan Mau Mau.

Though with Germany in particular, Deutschland was also pushed in small part to move away from Germanicism which was seen as a key component of Nazi ideology. Deutschland is the country of the Deutsch, not the Germanics.
 
Last edited:
Sometimes the way you refer to a country can tell an observer where you're from due to differing political realities. Like in Britain they still mostly call it "Greece" whereas in America its nearly always rendered as "Hellas".

Imagining now in the UK movies from America containing a "TL Note: Hellas is Greece in Communist English" for these situations

In all seriousness, is there any confusion when it comes to these differences between blocs. I would imagine that it wouldnt be that important or that there would be people who are aware of the differing names, but I can see maybe on the Blue Bloc from older Generations confusion when hearing these Native endonyms
 
While I'm sure we'll hear more about it, I'm definitely curious about Palestine in the timeline. I know that the Zionist project failed, that there's now a socialist/communist state in the Levant instead, but it does seem like a lot of Jewish people ended up there (and we know Shin Bet, in some form, exists, though it seems primarily focused on hunting down Nazis).
 
In all seriousness, is there any confusion when it comes to these differences between blocs. I would imagine that it wouldnt be that important or that there would be people who are aware of the differing names, but I can see maybe on the Blue Bloc from older Generations confusion when hearing these Native endonyms

Given that cross-bloc cultural exchange and communication aren't going to be as restricted as in our Cold War, it's likely to not be a recurring problem, save for some politically-charged instances (eg, anti-communist Koreans in Oceania/Australasia calling their homeland Daehan, whereas the communist government calls it Chosun).

I see the situation more like how a good portion of Americans IOTL refer to Germany as Germany but are aware of the term Deutschland.
 
Last edited:
The History of Palestine Part 1

Excerpts from "Here or There: The Dialectic of Zion, Bund and later - Palestine" (1978; Laurence J. Silberstein, University of Philadelphia)


…Zionism achieved support only within a minority of Jewry. Outside of the assimilationists, the rest were captivated and enthralled by a fast-growing phenomenon: the Bund. Founded in 1897 – its full name the General Jewish Labor Bund of Lithuania, Poland and Russia. Deeply Marxist and secular – going as far to call Yeshiva students choosing to study the Torah and subsist off donations "parasites" – one of its most important ideas would be "Doikayt".

Doikayt, literally 'hereness' in Yiddish, meant fight instead of flight. To stand your ground as a Jew, and to solve all the problems you face here, in your country. The Bund saw Herzl as a reactionary figure – barely better than the religious Zionists, and fundamentally a coward at that. Surely you cannot turn the hand of history back, what was done is done. To survive meant modern adaptations, for a modern environment. Bundism was thus an anti-Zionist movement from its beginning. It would only continue to innovate new traits – like Yiddishism – the promotion of Yiddish as a Jewish all-cultural language over Hebrew, in its evolution and struggle against Zionism. The Bund used to be interested in it for no more than the purpose that the masses could understand it: this would later evolve as a weapon itself: it was the language of the Ashkenazi prole, not the gaudy bourgeois Hebrew of the educated intellectual.

For them the establishment of a homeland for Jews was unnecessary and distracting from the key matter: the full emancipation of all Jews, throughout the Diaspora – wherever you were in the world, and especially in Eastern Europe.

Bundists were apt innovators and politicians. The Bund was in fact one of the first co-founding organizations of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, whose conferences its members would disappointedly storm out from after the overwhelming majority of the party had rejected their attempt to gain autonomy within the party, and defeated their proposals to federalize the structure of the party. Vladimir Lenin believed that the nationalism of the Bund was a dangerous creature. That it would be an obstacle to the ideal of proletarian internationalism. Both Lenin and Martov – even that "Yuliy Osipovich Tsederbaum" Julius Martov, believed that Bundism was no more than a waste of time. Assimilationism was thus the stance picked by the RSDLP, the path they believed would be the only one that focused on what needed to be done in the Revolution.

Even without any support, on its own path alone Bundism would take off as an international mass movement, spawning many other new organizations in other countries. Its rise to dominance would be challenged in 1905 by the establishment of the organization, Poalei Zion ("Workers of Zion"). In only 2 years the "World Federation of Poalei Zion" would be founded. Its movement would mix Zionism with socialism, shedding its exclusive bourgeois-limited orientation. Poalei Zion also proved that Zionism definitely could be a secular, progressive movement, so it claimed. The key theorist of Poalei Zion was Ber Borochov, a self proclaimed 'Marxist-Zionist': his aims as written in "Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish workers in Palestine" was the creation of a socialist and Jewish state in Palestine. However, he assumed that the indigenous Arab population would simply assimilate once the superior "Avoda 'Ivrit" – hebrew labor, had proved itself in Palestine and established a state. Palestinian Arab, or any other kind of labor, could never be a part of the promised state in Palestine. Borochov and many of the other leading Zionist theoreticians were under the colonialist spell, possessing vague, fantastical and racist notions that the Palestinian Arabs had demonstrated to be natural assimilationists. That they were no more than nomads who cared nothing about the land they lived on, nomads by blood through and through, simply filling a desert as a gas does.

The second idea that answered the question of "Why Palestine" would be found in "Class Struggle and the Jewish Nation: Selected Essays in Marxist Zionism", where Borochov proceeded to make numerous theoretical conflations and mistakes, allowing him to build a contrived justification for the exclusionary and nationalist Marxist Zionist ideology. Two ideas were key to this. First was the idea of "territorial concentration" – that due to their global scattering in the Diaspora, Jews were barred from - or could never be effectively - participating in foreign national economies as a whole. For they stood outside of the framework of each respective nationality. Therefore, it was necessary for them to 'territorially concentrate' - to establish their own national economy where proletarian class struggle could finally begin in a Jewish capitalism.

Never mind the fact that they adored Moses Hess, an early collaborator of Marx and Engels - but only an early one. Hess and the duo had many in common, but when it came to their theory of history - they diverged radically. Instead of a history of class struggle, Hess espoused a history of racial-national struggle. It would be unsurprising to say that this kind of notion underlies many movements like fascism and especially 'National Socialism'. With the first and the second idea - a double pronged, and – deadly, ideological cocktail, Marxist Zionism held the promise to finally conquer the proletarian jewry, and turn them to the movement once and for all.
[...]
For its meteoric rise Poalei Zion was by no means a long lived movement. It would not survive its first test: the Russian Civil War. The organization itself was too rife with contradictions to stand up to the ideological tumult that the Russian Civil War sparked in the Zionist movement. After all, the Bolshevik-led Red Army markedly proved to be much less pogromist than the White Army, and would itself face antisemitic propaganda by the Whites. Jewish-born intellectuals were also a significant part of the movement like Leon Trotsky, who attracted more Jews to communism.

Zionism would fracture with the civil war: socialist Jews and bourgeois Jews would make their oppositions all ever more apparent. The situation would grow more untenable as leading Marxists, following the example of the Bolsheviks, renounce Zionism as socially chauvinist and reactionary. In this atmosphere, the Poalei Zion organization – which covered anyone anywhere left of center, would finally fracture apart between Social Democrats and socialists proper. Yisrael Shochat, one of the early founders of Poalei Zion, would be the nucleus of this right wing in Palestine, and a particularly foxy individual himself, would go as far to forge a conspiracy with the young David ben Gurion to undermine the "Rostovians" a group of Russian Jewish emigres, who desired an united Jewish-Arab proletariat…

Excerpts from "A Party History of the Tahlah; formerly, the Palestinian Communist Party" (2000 ed; Musa Budeiri, University of Haifa)


...Poalei Zion "Right" became the basis for the later organization "Ahdut HaAvoda" (Unity of Labor) by David ben Gurion. Ben Gurion would accede to control of the entire Palestinian Yishuv. This marked the beginning of a long dominance of social democracy in Yishuv politics. At the end of 1921, David ben Gurion was elected as the general secretary of the "Histadrut", an unified trade federation for all Jewish workers in Palestine: it was under the Ahdut and their youth organization, HaPoel HaTzair, that ben Gurion cemented his grasp. The Histadrut was an interesting creature: partly built out of genuine conviction on the part of the leftist Labor Zionists, yet also a weapon to suppress the left in Palestine – which it did so successfully for nineteen long years. After cementing their influence, the Labor Zionists began shedding all notions, all pretenses of being Marxist, adopting a fully social democratic character – liberally acceptable, and perfectly diplomatic for working with the bourgeoisie.
[...]
Indeed, one would be surprised to find that the People's Movement for the Continued Liberation of Palestine, were in their very roots, Zionist. Their first secretary, Gershon "Admoni" Dua-Bogen, was an early activist for Poalei Zion in Poland, and headed efforts by Poalei Zion "Left" to establish a communist party in Palestine. Yes, it was Zionists who founded the core and the bulk of the early Palestinian Communist Party, at that time called the "Socialist Workers Party" (MPS). Founded roughly at the same time as the Ahdut HaAvoda, although slightly later in September 29, 1919 – instead of March for the 'Right', in true leftist fashion. The Socialist Workers' Party held their founding congress in Jaffa on October 17-19. At the congress they proclaimed their support for the establishment of a Jewish communist state in Palestine and expressed their desire to join the Communist International, beginning a flurry of negotiations on comrade Admoni's part with the TCI executive.

This spurred an intense debate in the summer of 1920, when the Second World Congress of the TCI was being held. Finally the Congress decided to reject the MPS's application, on the basis of their Zionism: they could and not were willing to accept any communist who so openly flaunted a colonialist nationalist desire. Indeed as early as this was, the Moscow-controlled TCI recognized the lie of Zionism and correctly deduced that the Zionist project would lead to future stronger conflicts between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine. Individual applications were, however, acceptable. That is, as long the person applying had broken away with Zionism in all of its forms. Still, the TCI continued to see value in the MPS and would later denounce the British's anticommunist crackdown and treatment of the 1921 May Day riot
[...]
After Meiersohn's departure and despite their rightward ideological shift, for their part the "Mopsiim" continued to advocate for opening Histadrut membership to Arab workers and an united struggle for the Jewish-Arab proletariat in the congress. Many of the members at the congress were also bitter with their poor performance in the elections: they had gotten only 6.8% of the total vote. The dominant parties in the Histadrut were accused of manipulating the elections for their benefit. After all they had noticed there were irregularities throughout the election season. The party began to split over the actions of Dua-Bogen and Revutzky who had vigorously complained at length to the entire Congress, and the entire affair only served to deepen a rift between Communism and the Histadrut.

A year later, just before May Day the MPSI held another party congress … The congress exhibited a tense atmosphere as Zionism and Anti-Zionism became an apparent division among the delegates. The party drifted in the Anti-Zionists' favor when they succeeded in voting to change the name from their previously exclusivist "Hebrew Socialist Workers' Party - Poalei Zion", to "Jewish Communist Party — Poalei Zion, section of the Palestine Communist Party" … For all that it was purely symbolic. There was no Palestine Communist Party yet. There was not even a single Arab member or a lick of Arabic being spoken in the meetings and the congresses. All it expressed was a claim to bicommunalism.
[...]
A week later Labor Day finally arrived and as had been decided on in the Congress, the Party sent a small congregation of demonstrators to the border between the Arab-dominated Jaffa and the Jewish colony of Tel Aviv. A member had created a huge banner to be held by two people, declaring in Yiddish ""TSUZAMEN LOMIR BOYEN A SOVETISHE PALESTINE!" - 'Together Let's Build a Soviet Palestine!'. Initially peaceful, things turned for the worse once the demonstration had met the larger, actually authorized, Histadrut-held rally. It is unknown what exactly happened, but according to PKP reports, the origin was a loud argument between a Histadrut demonstrator and a JKP-PKP demonstrator, which turned violent and the two began punching each other. This then spread among the other rallyists, resulting in widespread fistfighting. The British police arrived on the scene, firing rifles into the air, which were heard throughout Jaffa and Tel Aviv. In the afternoon, a rumor had erupted among the Jaffa Arab community that several of their own had been killed by the 'Zionist Jews'. Enraged, the Arabs began mass riots in the city, seeking to enact bloody retribution and reprisal on the Jews for allegedly killing their brethren: the rioting would not subsist for several days and at the end, the city coroner counted a dozen deaths, some of whom were from the JKP-PKP[...]
As the idea of fostering Jewish-Arab unity was trampled on, Gershon Dua-Bogen was finally deported from Palestine later in the year back to Poland. The party was now left without its secretary, while the British only continued their deportations and cracking down on the party's activities, moreover banning the party – blaming them for the riots. The party was also left politically isolated not just from the Arab community but also the Jewish community as prominent leaders and figures joined on the criticism bandwagon, including that of Ze'ev Jabotinsky. The famous far-right Revisionist Zionist, who accused them of unforgivable treachery. The Jewish Communist Party made overtures towards the Arab community and more explicit denunciations of Zionism, these were, in the end, lackluster, primarily as a result of the internal strife happening within the Party
[...]
While the 450 members of the "Palestine Communist Party", working illegally and were rebuilding, in 1922 a former Zionist and now a firebrand radical would convince a large section of the Jewish Communist Party to split with him. That man was Joseph Berger. Born in 1904 in Krakow, he would emigrate to Palestine at the age of only 15. Now he was just seventeen and had become a participant in the founding of the Communist Party of Palestine; he was elected its secretary. Berger had denounced the Zionists within the former Jewish Communist Party, pointing out that the failures of the Party came down to far too much hemming and hawing among the executive, and its failure to actually agitate among the Arab workers.
[...]
In February of 1923 both the "Palestine Communist Party" and "Communist Party of Palestine" were finally expelled from the Histadrut – which is a surprise with how long it took them – given the complete mess that were the years 1921 and 1922. The expulsion and complete illegalization would come as something of a period for soul-searching within the two parties. In June of 1923 the PCP finally accepted the radical stance of Berger, seeing his organizational successes in setting up a front party in Lebanon, and recruiting Arab workers to the party; the newly formented sense of camaraderie, post-expulsion, led to the two parties finally reconciling that June and the splitters joining the PCP. The June congress would also see them deciding to appeal to the language of the Diaspora - Yiddish, and start calling themselves the party's name in Yiddish, acronymed PKP. The party was finally accepted by the Comintern on 8 March 1924.



On the eve of the Buraq revolts, the Party issued leaflets to the marchers, pleading in Hebrew: "Al teshane et haKotel haMa'aravi lekotel shel sin'a bein'chem!" – "Do not change the Western Wall into a wall of hatred between you!"

The initial resolution of the Palestinishe Komunistishe Partei on the revolts of the Wailing Wall - the Buraq uprising, was one of decrying Anglo-Zionist colonialism's economic pressures as behind the turmoil; that mere religious agitation does not simply occur in a vacuum. [...]

The PKP also observed (according to Joseph Berger's "The class character of the Palestine Rising") that the economic background behind the revolts came fourfold:
  1. The poor peasantry and fellahin had their lands expropriated and underwent a process of proletarianization by an unholy trinity of European-American Jewish bourgeoisie, British barons and rich Arab capitalists.

  2. Crushing taxes by the Mandatory government, which were nominally lower than in Ottoman times, could not be paid in kind (i.e. that it could not be payable in agricultural goods, grown by the farmer) but only in money. Money that the fellahin did not have. Meanwhile, prices only continued to inflate: they were 2 to 2.5 times higher than in other neighboring countries, while wages were only 50 to 75 percent higher.

  3. Mass deregulation and wage slavery among the Arab proletariat.

  4. A denial of the right to organize: only Jewish labourers were able to organize under the Histadrut. In 1927, the Arab-Jewish general trade union "Ichud" (Union) was closed by British authorities, right at its moment of becoming popular and spreading…

Excerpt from "The class character of the Palestine Rising" (1930; Joseph Berger, Jerusalem)

...These, then, are the class-factors of the August rebellion and the subsequent revolutionary struggles in Palestine. On the one hand, the masses -- fellahin, Bedouins, workers -- radicalized through and through, seething with revolution, ready for a war of liberation against those who have so long oppressed them. On the other, treacherous feudal-bourgeois leaders bent on strengthening their alliance with imperialism by compromise and petty political gains, who, after diverting the spontaneous movement of the masses into the channel of a Nationalist struggle and deceiving their followers, finally deliver them over to the guns and bombs of the imperialists.

Excerpts from "A Party History of the Tahlah", continued


…However, the analyses and rhetoric of the PKP would amount to nothing later that year, as directives from Moscow forced the PKP to change its tune. A tune wholeheartedly supporting the riots - preferring to ignore the pogromist and religious nature of the uprising and to focus on its anti colonial and anti-imperialist heart. That, "so despite … despite the fact that in its initial stage it was under reactionary leadership, it was a national liberation movement, an anti-imperialist, all-Arab movement, and in its social composition—a peasant movement", as according to the TCI executive. At the same time, the TCI executive correctly criticized the PKP for being unable to Arabize effectively and to win the support of the Arab community. At least, finally, this would get the PKP to listen, and in 1931 a historic moment occurred: the PKP elected an Arab general secretary – Nadjati Sidqi. Sidqi would eventually give up his position as secretary, passing the torch on to a man called Radwan al-Hilu in 1934. Born in the year 1909 in Palestine, he was raised in a poor, proletarian and Orthodox Christian family in Jaffa. Al-Hilu's first taste of revolutionary politics came at the age of 16, when he attempted to join a party of Arabs going to Syria to try and support the 1925 Syrian revolution. He was rejected. Afterwards, he joined the Muslim Youth Association -- still a very religious man, and learned the basics of reading and writing. He was expelled for unknown reasons, which we should be thankful for, because al-Hilu joined the Youth League after being found by a PKP spokesman at a construction yard. He stayed in the League and later became a member of the Party. In 1930, he was selected among a few to go to Moscow, and stayed in Russia to receive the honor of studying at the Communist University for the Toilers of the East. After four years of study, al-Hilu returned to Palestine an impressively (for the time) educated man and was successfully selected as the secretary.

The accession of al-Hilu would mark the beginning of greater Arabization within the party, and its developing ties with Arab organizations. Arab leaders in the PKP would no doubt be an invaluable source of connections: as we learned, Sidqi was part of the early work in organizing Arab labor with Sami Taha[...]

The beginning of the thirties had brought with it unfortunate challenges for the PKP, and especially its Jewish leadership. British persecution of the party and anticommunist crackdowns would intensify following the Buraq Uprising, deporting a record number of several hundred Communist Party members. The PKP was painted by the authorities as one of the instigators of the uprising, ironic considering the actual history. Of these several hundred deported, Joseph Berger and Wolf Averboch were also part of them; Averboch would change his name to Daniel Ribkind, and the two went to the Soviet Union…

Excerpt from "I Dreamed Of Being Lenin of the Arabian Peninsula" (1971, posthumous; Wolf Ze'ev Averbuch, Jerusalem)

...They told me I was to be manager of agriculture in the town of Krasnohorivka in Ukraine. I don't know any agriculture, let alone farming in Ukraine! How the hell did they expect me to succeed? That was when I realized – they didn't. They wanted me to fail. They wanted to see me burn and crash, in a podunk dead-end town in the middle of nowhere, a political and moral failure. Later, I learned that comrade Berger had been expelled from the Russian Communist Party. He didn't know why.

[...]

You know, there's a joke among us of those that were in Russia. "Who was more relieved to see the Red May Revolution, Stalin, or Wolf?" Because, you see, I knew! America was hope. All these months I wondered why they were doing this to me. I wondered why Russia had not been the paradise of socialism we hoped for. They said it was because of the failure of the world revolution in Germany. Well, America's got our back! The moment I made contact with them, I made sure to get the hell out of there, along with my friends[…]

The Leningrad Treaty was how. I think it might have been the fortune of the bureaucracy, they didn't notice my going to Leningrad when I applied for a vacation. I was overjoyed to see my comrades from the Palestine Communist Party: I hadn't seen them in nearly two years. I met comrade Musa (Radwan al Hilu), the new General Secretary – never met him before, but I was pleased to see a man of his character in leadership. He helped me, you know, he said he could get me in touch with an American who could pull some strings for me to be there at the Treaty conventions. [...]

It was three after midnight when we finally first noticed that things were getting late… me, our comrades from the Party, and our newfound friends in the "Jewish American Labor Bund"! Who ever heard of such a thing! Some of them were real youngsters. I joked that I got in fights with their grandfathers back when I was a Poel LeZion… We kept our Palestinian charm, which they warmed up to quickly even when we were supposed to be in suits in official meetings. I could tell they longed for the canteens back then. So here we were, our food trays long empty, and we were still laughing, singing songs, and even showing them how we dance, and they showed us, the Russians joined in too! That's what Palestinism is. That's where Palestinism started! …

Excerpts from "Here or There", continued


...The Moscow Consensus's death was in sight - and a new wave of reflection and ideological diversification had already begun to wash over the TCI. With the signing of the Leningrad Treaty, anti-assimilationism was adopted as the official doctrine of the TCI. This is celebrated as a victory by the members of the Jewish American Labor Bund, who had been fighting a long time to see this happen. The Leningrad Treaty however would ironically spell the death for a large part of the JALB -- the Marxist-Zionists, as a new, powerful idea emerged...

It was among the many congresses and conventions that occurred simultaneously with the eventful Leningrad Treaty Convention, that the Palestine Communist Party (PKP) and the Jewish American Labor Bund hold unofficial meetings. These meetings between fellow Jews across the world would begin a new dialogue between the American Jewish community and the Palestinian Jews - and in turn, causing divides and fractures to open within both parties. The Palestinians had shown the JALB what being an anti-Zionist Jew was like in Palestine with first-hand testimony. And they showed them that perhaps Bundism and Zionism was not all there was to the Jewish question of survival.

[...]

Soon after the Leningrad Treaty, the Jewish American Labor Bund had divided into several camps:

  1. the Hard Bundist line - and by far the biggest camp, comprising over 70% of JALB members:

    Lamenting on the failure of the original Bund in Russia, they nevertheless, and enthusiastically espouse that the victory of anti-assimilationism, American socialism and other positions in the Leningrad Treaty - as well as the affirmative policies and political representation they've earned following the Second American Revolution - all serve to confirm that the Jewish American Labor Bund has been thoroughly successful at their goals.

    Since the Jews were not under any foreseeable threat, and the Bund had won in America, they saw it as unnecessary to create a Jewish state, let alone settling their former homeland in Palestine with all the problems that would bring. Many of the Bundists also even go as far to claim that the very idea of a return to Eretz Yisrael is wholly reactionary.
    This translated into a promotion of seeing the TCI as the "New Jerusalem" for Jews, a place where they could be safe for and ever. The JALB regularly set up donation drives to get people to fund immigration agitation groups, they lobbied politically, and just about everything to get the rest of the Diaspora to congregate in the UASR and other TCI member states.
  2. the "Tsurikkerist" line - The camp taking up the remaining 30%, Tsurikkerists comprise the minority. Tsurikkerism, taken from the Yiddish word "tsurikker" - to return someone or something and optionally to someplace, revolves around the establishment of a state for the protection of Jews, a 'dictatorship of oppressed Jews.' Tsurikkerists are ideologically diverse, spanning from the deviationist Zionists, the Palestinists and other factions. Rife with contradictions, Tsurikkerists are nevertheless significant due to the accession of Haim Kantorovitch; a de facto Tsurikkerist - to the Presidium.
  • Marxist-Zionists: The old guard of Poalei Zion plus some converts from the social democratic and right-leaning Labor Zionists. The ideology of Marxist-Zionism was already expounded on, at length - earlier in the book. Marxist-Zionists are a dying faction, as the ideology proves too contradictory to stand up in the JALB. They are generally seen as a remnant of an older stage in the evolution of the Tsurikkerist ideology. Although they ideologically are not the direct ancestors of Palestinism, many Marxist-Zionists would make the conversion [...]

  • Palestinism: Likewise seeing Palestine as a land where the Jewish people as a whole may escape all forms of oppression, these, however, have resolved their contradictions with the antinationalist, internationalist and anti-assimilationist American communist movement by abandoning the idea of an "Eretz Yisrael." Accepting the reality on the ground, they acknowledge Israel is not an empty land waiting to be settled. Indeed, Israel no longer meaningfully exists.

    Palestinists seek to bring the Jewish and Arab proletariats together, and for them to cooperate and unite into a multinational, anti-assimilatory federation. They claim that they have successfully appropriated and transformed Jewish nationalism into the proletariat's own ends. Moreover, Palestinists believe that creating a JDPON that can serve as a homeland for the Jews is the only truly secure option as long as nationalism and antisemitism still exist; the scattered, cosmopolitan nature of the Jewish people means that they are quite vulnerable to persecution.

    They point to growing mass antisemitism in Nazi Germany. Many Palestinists see the need to return to Palestine as a necessary transition to communism, just as the dictatorship of the proletariat is. Once world communism has been achieved, they say, then the safe refuge of Palestine will no longer be needed.

    Palestinism has demonstrated itself to be a fast-growing movement, having been founded only in the wake of the Treaty. To establish the legitimacy of the Palestinist movement, action groups within the JALB sought out Palestinian-Arab Americans to participate. By August 1934, the movement's first and oldest magazine Voice of Tomorrow, an English-Yiddish-Arabic periodical, had already entered publication. The periodical would eventually incorporate more languages, such as Esperanto, and even Hebrew. Alongside Jews such as, they and Muhammad Askhar[1] – a Palestinian Arab living abroad, had co-founded the magazine.

    VoT's "worker-brother stories" were instrumental to establishing a dream in which Jewish-Arab cooperation was possible. The periodical didn't just cover the PKP's present work, they also wrote about early stories about the indigenous community helping to teach Jewish settlers, of whom they had thought had desired to live together. Moreover today, the Voice of Tomorrow is considered the first 'true Palestinian' piece of media, and it continues to be[...]

The changing winds of geopolitics, as well as the WCPA's covert support for Tsurikkerism through the establishment of the ACLP and the promotion of Tsurikkerism, leads to a slight decline within Hard Bundist politics. Palestinism takes off among the Tsurikkerists, with the Marxist-Zionists being almost wiped out. [2]

In America, the Palestinist movement is subjected to an increasingly relentless barrage of polemics and criticism on the Bundists' part - as the old guard continues to decline in the face of Palestinism's growth. But the ideology is not vulnerable to their attacks – and dialectically, the movement gains a new desperation for further legitimacy. In order to recontextualize themselves as truly a Palestinian movement, rather than a 'covert Zionist infiltration' as Bundists claim – the movement intensifies their efforts to attract Arabs.

"How can we call for unification if the party is composed entirely of arrogant Yiddishers, who know only the winters and streets of Europe? Only so few of us has actually set foot in Palestine. Do not be surprised when the Jew from the lofty shtetl finds himself a stranger in a strange land – the Arabs around him being basically aliens, when he has never seen an Arab himself in the first place.

We cannot just be a solely Jewish movement calling for unification with the Arabs only in name. We have to realize unification in fact within the movement, first. It is the party that is the origin, the birthplace and the womb of cultural change and transformation; our work starts here and now. We must adopt a dual character, a Jewish and an Arab character - we cannot be merely Jewish in outlook, we must also be Arab in outlook at the same time."​

Concurrent with the discourse in the movement, agitation from Voice of Tomorrow, and directives from the PKP, the American Commission for the Levantine Proletariat had begun to channel Palestinian Arab politicians, workers and especially youths - to receive education in the United Republics. A portion went directly to the Institute of Scientific Socialism, to become either one of the very few voices for the Palestinian Arab population in the UASR, or to return and further the struggle of the PKP in Palestine. The rest would receive education at normal universities and institutions, where it was hoped that they would eventually become communists through immersion and osmosis – perhaps, even committed fighters in time.

Of the situation in the UASR, Muhammed Ashkar wrote:
"The road ahead of us is long and difficult, especially considering the great irony of the Palestinist movement. Here, 99%, maybe even more than that, of all Palestinists are Jewish. The situation is however not hopeless, since with each passing week we are catching the interest of the greater Arab world in general."​

Ashkar's vague gestures towards the 'broader Arab community' showed the early Pan-Arabist roots of the Arab ideological contribution to Palestinism. [3]

But why were overtures to Arab unificationism happening in Palestinism? Simple necessity. As Ashkar alluded to, in order to Arabize the movement they had to incorporate more voices, and for them that meant broadening their criteria for who could join – after all, there were perhaps no more than 2,000 Palestinian Christians and Muslims in the United Republics at that time! Outside of a few outliers, Palestinism remained close to its roots in who it attracted - primarily Arabs of Levantine and near-Levantine extraction (Syria was in addition, one of the biggest centers of Pan-Arabism at this time.)
[...]
The congress on 15 March 1935, would see a move to earn greater political support by the "New Tsurikkerists" (the Palestinists) within the JALB. Not only were they the first to lodge the proposal, they voted together with the Hard Bundists to expel the Marxist-Zionists from the Bund: they won with an overwhelming majority.

In response, the Marxist-Zionists established the Jewish-American Communist Federation six months later. The JACF never takes off and remains a minor political party. They would not make it to see the end of the World Revolutionary War…

Excerpts from "A Party History of the Tahlah", continued


...The Palestine Communist Party would get its big break when they heard that an American Commission for the Levantine Proletariat (ACLP) was being set up to help them. They didn't know who was responsible, but in the following years we eventually learned: it was Haim Kantorovitch. This was no surprise, seeing as the unmistakably Jewish Secretary-General was once a member of Poalei Zion - yes, once! Then he briefly spent some time in the Jewish American Labor Bund after its founding by the SLP, however he eventually decided that his talents were better spent working for the American country; he put aside his Jewish activism, and put his excellent theoreticism to use in a stellar rise after joining the Socialist Labor Party itself…
Some compare him to Leon Trotsky. The two couldn't be more different indeed, since Kantorovitch never abandoned his Jewish heritage and did not assimilate like his "Russian counterpart". The Tsurikkerists in the JALB sent many letters to Kantorovitch, where he first became aware of the pressing dilemma of the Palestine Communist Party[...] Aside from Kantorovitch, the rest of the WCPA of the United Republics also had a major interest in Tsurikkerism as a means of exporting the revolution to the Middle East and establishing a foothold there.

The Commission couldn't be more helpful for the PKP. For the first time, it facilitated and funnelled support, on a non-meager scale, such as firearms, equipment, money and men for the Party. The PKP now had the backing of a peerless country, a vast power across the shining ocean. They were also instrumental in the reunion of our comrades in Russia, moving them and smuggling the disappeared Berger and Averboch back to Palestine. The PKP's new influx of support enabled them to begin a renovation of the party's structure, including that of the "Boyivka", the old PKP guard[...]
Moshe Kuperman was joined by a skilled fighter and Arab of sharp wit -- Kemal Ouda, and they together created the PKP's first proper paramilitary – the "Palestinian Freedom-Fighters League". It would be composed of a few dozen, primarily from the Boyivka but with the influx of funding, they now had much more resources to support and expand the PKP, growing by many hundreds, some of which joined the PFFL…



[1] OTL, Muhammed Ashkar was the Palestinian delegate for the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern in 1935.

[2] TCI events only. These political changes do not apply within the AFS or the non-communist world.

[3] Historically, the question of Pan-Arabism over emphasis on Palestinian identity is a complex one. From the start of the movement, Syrian unionism and Arab unificationism were popular, but with the establishment of the Mandate – and Syria's falling to an entirely different nation's administration, the practical reality was that such unionism was no longer feasible. The Syrian-Unionist Party of old was essentially annihilated. This led to a kind of soul-searching for most Palestinian Arab nationalists, resulting in the creation of a current which emphasized Palestinian nationality over any Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamist notion. Nevertheless, pan currents remained to influence the movement primarily due to political notables who moved into and out of the country. Indeed, one way the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement showed resistance to British colonization was by hosting the General Islamic Congress - a pan-islamic congress in December 1931. Also, the creation of New Afrika and consequently the recognition of African-American identity, as well as other developments in the world such as the "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Commune", led to a resurgence in national unity and liberation movements.
But to put a long story short, this footnote doesn't matter very much - because Pan-Arabism is functionally a bell and whistle. Fundamentally it isn't that critical to the arab nationalist movement. The central goal is independence and self-determination away from colonial interests: people change their opinions quickly on matters like this question, depending on the successes of the political movements with their auxiliary opinions on mere auxiliary questions.
 
Last edited:
Might also want to expand on what one might call the Zionist spectrum, because IOTL it's not actually synonymous with hardline ethnonationalism and Jewish people tend to get rather justifiably annoyed when you assume it is.
 
Might also want to expand on what one might call the Zionist spectrum, because IOTL it's not actually synonymous with hardline ethnonationalism and Jewish people tend to get rather justifiably annoyed when you assume it is.
Jewish zionists, that is.

A similar spectrum probably exists in the Reds! present among modern AFS Jews with their later revisions and contemporary perceptions, but with the establishment of the Palestinian TCI-aligned country Zionism rapidly becomes rather marginal and expresses more of a desire among the AFS Jews, especially post-revolutionary exiles, to see the communist country crumble.

However with the exiles, and this is also for Zionism in Palestine, it takes on a more rightward direction since they have to be in actual contact with the Arab population, and I can tell you from personal experience that settlers and Israelis living in close proximity to Arabs are the most likely to be militant and far-right. (It's a similar tale in many other settler states and herrenvolk democracies, like the Confederates) Not to mention as they start losing the war to take control of Palestine, they're going to get increasingly extreme...
 
Last edited:
So the Lehi and Stern Gang have some sort of equivalent but it loses the war? I'm guessing part of that is the communists don't support Israel like the Soviet Union did OTL?
 
Might also want to expand on what one might call the Zionist spectrum, because IOTL it's not actually synonymous with hardline ethnonationalism and Jewish people tend to get rather justifiably annoyed when you assume it is.

Very much not a historian of the period, but my impression is that though there were forms of soft "cultural" Zionism that existed throughout the 10s and 20s, they were never the dominant strain and were increasingly marginalized by hardline revisionists in the 30s and 40s. @Qalqulserut's post strikes me as a fairly balanced treatment of the state of play in Zionism, as well as an interesting portrayal of an alternate historical trajectory.

So the Lehi and Stern Gang have some sort of equivalent but it loses the war? I'm guessing part of that is the communists don't support Israel like the Soviet Union did OTL?

I was also having some trouble seeing how the Communists would actually win the war, but this post helps make some more sense of for me. With substantial Jewish support for the Communists, factions like the Irgun and Lehi are going to be a much larger portion of the Zionist coalition than the Haganah, meaning both that it will be substantially weaker and much more liable to engage in terrorism against both FBU colonial authorities and Arabs. So I can't really imagine the FBU backing them. It makes a bit more sense for them to get behind the Arabs, especially because one of their only sources of oil in a Cold War Situation is a Pan-Arab client state (Red Iran means no British Petroleum extraction in Khuzestan). But that will come with substantial political risks if there is any Zionist lobby within the FBU itself. And insofar as the arab movement, like OTL, has broader anti-colonial aims, the FBU would be pretty hesitant to provide them with substantial funding, I think.

I wouldn't be surprised to see them sit out the war entirely, allowing lots of Comintern guns, pilots, and money to flow to the hands of the Palestinists. Rather than backing any particular faction, the most plausible intervention I think happen is a FBU-supported United Kingdom of Arabia land-grab for the West Bank and Jordan, resulting in a hardening of the anti-imperial attitudes of the Arab communists and the easier formation of a national, palestinist identity in the following years.
 
Might also want to expand on what one might call the Zionist spectrum, because IOTL it's not actually synonymous with hardline ethnonationalism and Jewish people tend to get rather justifiably annoyed when you assume it is.
This is incredibly arguable. Zionism is inherently intertwined with the State of Israel which was founded on hardline ethnonationalism (hence its continual pattern of ethnic cleansing, colonialism, and mass violence that continues into the present day). Frankly the position that Zionism isn't hardline ethnonationalist is one that flies in the face of historical and contemporary evidence, whether some Jewish people believe otherwise doesn't really invalidate that proof.

Also since we're on the topic let's not erase the diversity of thought within Jewish communities. Many are sympathetic to Zionism yes however they are by no means the only group within it and erasing the Jews who are anti-Zionist due to political or religious motivations is... not the best.
 
Last edited:
A lot of the Zionists end up fleeing to the legally uncertain Island of Rhodes as the island was never transferred from Italian to German control; thus preserving its about 1/3rds Jewish community. The collapse of the royalist greek government in the 40s in the face of the civil war and the fact that Rhodes was never under the Kingdom of Greece's control at any point means that the isle was left in legal limbo. Technically Crete claims it and the British never formally ended their provisional mandate over it, but the failed Zionists also claim their own government rooted there. Not helping is the fact that Hellas/the Balkan Federation and Turkiye both have claims to the island that drift in and out of political relevance over the decades.

With no answers to its actual legal status forthcoming, its greatest use is as an OTL Malta style place to hide assets on.
 
Last edited:
So the Lehi and Stern Gang have some sort of equivalent but it loses the war? I'm guessing part of that is the communists don't support Israel like the Soviet Union did OTL?
Soong Qingling's Chinese government comes out swinging with an outright Veto of the proposed plan for the mandate of Palestine at the United Nations in retaliation for the FBU's veto of their own proposal for mandatory decolonisation without lingering ties that bind to be governed by the UN itself as well as principled opposition. Within the Comintern, while many of the new eastern European governments are in favour, the New World and East Asian governments are pretty solidly opposed. Molotov is ultimately convinced to align against the proposal on the basis that an Israeli state would most likely be an Angevin puppet and supporting them would damage the arab communist movement and ultimately doesn't feel strongly enough on this issue to upset Soong and Flynn over it. Especially as a Soviet influence in the middle east is basically guaranteed through Turkiye and Iran.

Within the Allies, personal sympathies from much of the political class do translate to support from the well connected, but the FBU itself is convinced into not doing it to better protect the Suez with a friendly Egypt and Hashemite Federation rather than risk inflaming Arab Republicanism. Openly disavowing Zionism would be politically unpopular so they ultimately abstain from any direct involvement.
 
Last edited:
This is incredibly arguable. Zionism is inherently intertwined with the State of Israel which was founded on hardline ethnonationalism (hence its continual pattern of ethnic cleansing, colonialism, and mass violence that continues into the present day). Frankly the position that Zionism isn't hardline ethnonationalist is one that flies in the face of historical and contemporary evidence, whether some Jewish people believe otherwise doesn't really invalidate that proof.

Also since we're on the topic let's not erase the diversity of thought within Jewish communities. Many are sympathetic to Zionism yes however they are by no means the only group within it and erasing the Jews who are anti-Zionist due to political or religious motivations is... not the best.

While I'm not and never have been a Zionist myself (definitely more of the "Doikayt" school), I think there's a level of teleological thinking in the assumption that the ideology of "Zionism" as it developed over the first half of the twentieth century is inherently intertwined with or can be plausibly defined by the actions of the post-1948 Israeli state. There's a similarity here to the thinking we see amongst a good number of reactionary to liberal types, who treat Stalinism as a simple outgrowth of Marxism, or Marxist-Leninism, rather than the product of a specific historical-developmental trajectory, the joint choices of many thousands of Soviet elites, and the particular circumstances in Post-Tsarist Russia. This isn't to say that Marxism-Leninism has nothing to do with Stalinism, but avoiding teleological thinking does lead to a significantly more complex assessment of the relationship between ideology and state formation.

There were significant (though never majority) factions of Zionists who were not necessarily interested simply in an ethno-state of ethnic Jews. The initial slogan of Zionism was a "Jewish Home-land" - what that meant in practice was a question open to contestation for some time. In fact, I think it's quite possible that, rather than a formal repudiation of Zionism in toto, as we see depicted by @Qalqulserut, the word just might come to mean something quite different from what it means today. But I think the story @Qalqulserut told was also very plausible, where a de facto split within Zionism leads a significant number of Jews who came to Palestine as Zionists simply ceasing to identify as such.

I do have trouble seeing a Jewish Palestinian Palestine as plausible. It ignores why Jewish immigrants went there before WW2. It was to establish a state

Interestingly, I think this post makes a similar mistake, albeit from a somewhat different perspective.

1. Insofar as one equates European Jewish immigration to Palestine with "Zionist Immigration", and conceives of "Zionism" as a project uniformly committed to the building of an ethno-nationalist state, this conclusion might seem unavoidable.
2. But in fact, it's not: people who were once Zionists might cease to be Zionists. Perhaps they went looking for a state, then found a better alternative.
3. More importantly, the second assumption in 1) is faulty. There were certainly those looking to build an ethno-nationalist state. It's not clear everyone was. It's not clear it's part of some historical essence of Zionism to seek to build an ethno-nationalist state. Given the brutality of the current Israeli state and the crimes perpetrated over the past 75 years in the name of Zionism, this conclusion might seem unavoidable. But I think it's yet another example of reading the future back into the past.

So Anglo-Israelism fizzles out?

Britain supported the Zionists primarily for geo-political reasons and secondarily for ideological-civilizational ones. Insofar as the Brits cared about the Jews, it was as an outpost against "Arab Barbarism". With geopolitics militating against support for Zionism, the Arabs actually on the Brits' side, and Zionism as a whole getting more ideologically hostile to Britain as it is captured by OTL's fringe, I can't really see significant British support for the ethno-nationalists here.
 
Last edited:
So Anglo-Israelism fizzles out?
The failure of the Free Officer coups against the United Kingdom of Egypt et al and in the Hashemite Federation as its reorganised into the United Arab Kingdoms ultimately cinches the London politicos losing interest in zionism as they have two powerful regional entities to contain the Soviets from reaching any further southwards in west Asia and ensure that the Suez is safely in their hands. While it becomes the perennial bugbear of some people, they fade into the fringes of the overton window.

Without a Nasserist UAR to threaten the Suez and with a mega Hashemite Fed to be a wall against the Iranians, the strategic need for an Israel or even the basic value of one largely vanishes.

Greece is meanwhile, as mentioned before, severely overrepresented in European nobility and also losing the Aegean means that the net they have to cast to hem the Soviet fleet in to prevent them from spilling into the western med is much wider and so the Greek Revolution is a much bigger political bugbear in London's circles.
 
Last edited:
Back
Top