You continually twist your analogy into a way so that you can ignore the fact that the whole conflict could have been avoided if the Nagoya group had just asked us what we were doing instead of attacking us.
Actually, they
did ask us what we were doing — but only once they were in a position to use the soul gem interrogation in order to be sure that we couldn't lie to them.
Basically, if they came over and asked, "What the hell are you doing?", and we told them, "Oh, don't worry, it's fine. We've got it under control.", do you think they would feel they could trust that? With absolutely no history with us, they could not possibly trust that we'd give them truthful answers (particularly given what they've learned of the groups in Tokyo), so no matter what answer we gave, they'd still have to consider the option of attack in order to shut things down.
It's like... oh, Iraq's nuclear program. Even if Iraq said they weren't building nukes, the paranoid administration wasn't going to believe them until they could go in and look for themselves. And if Iraq wasn't going to allow that inspection, they'd be invaded to "make sure". (Ignore all the other political complexities of the situation; this is just a simplified analogy.)
So basically, Nagoya cut through all the bits that they weren't going to trust anyway and just got the answers directly.
If you want to continue to compare it to Iwata, we never negotiated for the release of Kaori; Taura got her location directly from the kidnappers' minds, and we just went and took care of it.
So I'd say Nagoya's actions in Iwata were very analogous to our own actions in Iwata.
Your assertion that Nagoya 'should' have talked to us is only valid from our own perspective. They knew exactly one thing about us: That we were overhunting territory to dangerous levels. Their history does not allow for any degree of active trust of the unknown. A dozen groups fought and squabbled in their city to the point of causing a class 3 problem, and they were one of the handful of survivors after probably hundreds of deaths.
It is absolutely no surprise that they adopt a policy of putting a stop to any hint of it resurfacing as fast as reasonably possible. Taking a month off to chat with the neighbors when you can't necessarily trust them to tell the truth is just waiting for a class 3 to pop up
right on the border of one of their vassals — the ones they've promised to protect.
From their perspective, you: 1) ensure things are safe; 2) get the truth; 3)
then start talking. Quite similar to how we handled the kidnapping event, actually, except Nagoya didn't kick us out of our territory, as we hadn't actually done anything wrong. If we'd actually managed to get diplomatic contact with areas 13 and 14 a little sooner, I suspect there wouldn't have been any problems at all.
Overall conclusion: Nagoya are definitely hardliners, but they're also someone we can trust, now that we've gotten past the rocky start. And by trust, I mean I believe that, regardless of their own attempts to benefit their self-interests, or hinder what we consider
our self-interests (eg: the natural competition over who gets what in Tokyo), they will not actively work to harm us.
It is not
complete trust, as I would not be surprised at attempts to undermine us somewhat, such as in trying to convince people to join their side instead of ours (such is the nature of competition), but I do not believe it would be done maliciously.
Now, more specific points:
No. My arguments are:
1: Nagoya attacked without prior warning, therefore they do not use diplomacy before resorting to violence.
2: We must be cautious in our relationship with Nagoya not to give them sufficient incentives that make violence attractive, because we will receive no warning before being attacked.
3: Nagoya values pragmatism far above other moral values, thus they cannot be trusted.
4: Nagoya will not hold to any agreements unless it is in their best interest to continue into doing so.
5: Us maintaining a sufficient size to make violence against their best interest is essential
Note: renumbered the last three, to avoid confusion over the numbers.
1 - The conclusion is overly broad. The only thing we can strictly conclude is that Nagoya does not use diplomacy with an unknown entity during a high risk/active threat situation, but instead uses violence to gather what they believe is more reliable information than a diplomatic reply. We do not know how they would react to a known entity in the same situation. Presumably they will not resort to violence without a pending threat, but that's also unknown. And the unreliability of information is predicated on the fact that it's an unknown entity; whether they would resort to violence first with a known entity, known to be unreliable, is unknown, but likely.
2 - True, but implies an overly broad interpretation of "sufficient incentives". Basically, we don't know the entirety of what such incentives might be, so you phrased it in such a way as to invoke fear over what 'might' trigger them. The only actual known value, however, is activity that threatens to create class 3 demons. Anything beyond that is speculative, and potential fearmongering.
3 - Conclusion does not hold, based on my prior definition of 'trust'. Will review your counterargument about that later.
4 - Conclusion implies a binary nature of "best interests", which is not necessarily true. There is no reason to break an agreement which is neither harmful nor helpful, and
any group should be expected to resist continued holding to an agreement which is actively harmful to their best interests. None of those imply that an agreement will necessarily be broken; neither do they imply that a new agreement can't be reached which all parties consider 'better'. Thus the assertion that they will not hold to agreements (ie: they will break, abandon, or fail to adhere to such agreements, without attempting to change them) is not a valid conclusion.
5 - Only holds based on the prior faulty premises. Since the premises are faulty, the validity of the conclusion is 'unknown' (ie: it might be a valid statement, but it's not a valid conclusion).
This is where we disagree. I would put it this way:
1: Nagoya attacked us without provocation based on their previous experience with others instead of the facts.
1.1: SIMP has previously attacked another group for good reason, because they attacked us without provocation.
1.2: We expect people to trust SIMP not to attack people without provocation.
1.3: We should not extend the same trust to Nagoya, because they don't deserve it, because we know that they attack people without provocation.
"Without provocation" is a misrepresentation of Nagoya's action and perspective. From their view, there
was provocation. With that, there is no difference in the assertions regarding Nagoya and SIMP.