Contest 4: Whitepaper
Towards a New Generation of Armored Warfare
As armored warfare continues to mature, it becomes necessary to critically evaluate current trends in its development and lay out a course for the future. With the Great Pig War now behind us, we can look back with the benefit of hindsight and draw what lessons we can from the performance of our early tanks. Simultaneously, new technologies, new demands, and the steady march of progress require that we examine the course that we are on, and make any corrections needed to arrive at the armored forces we will need in the future, both in technology and doctrine. This report is an initial attempt at such an analysis.
Current trends in the development of armored warfare are largely positive. Recent designs incorporate a number of features and advancements that will significantly improve our capabilities going forward, and the overall design of many recent tanks is starting to converge on a good approach. Recent improvements in suspension are a particularly positive development, and these and other similar innovations should make their way into all future designs to improve terrain handling and mobility. Some recent tanks are beginning to achieve good survivability against weapons they will likely to face, including anti-tank weapons, without adversely impacting mobility to an unacceptable degree. This is a very positive development, and will have to continue as anti-tank weapons also improve, as it means the tank will be more capable of resisting enemy infantry and other weapons.
The inclusion of radios in some current tanks is also an extremely positive development which will greatly increase in importance in coming years, allowing field communication to a much greater degree than without it. Rangefinders, recently included in a tank for what may be the first time with the SkW-2, have the potential to be quite important going forward too, as they allow more efficient and rapid acquisition and targeting of hostile combatants in the battlefield. Of note is the possibility of using this to ease the burden on individual tanks, by using multiple tanks working together rather than being forced to use only one to maintain coordination.
Beyond purely technical improvements, greater presence on the battlefield through larger numbers allows armored support on a tactical, not just strategic, scale. Organic integration and attachment to infantry units allows opportunities to be acted upon before a window may close. Tanks are beginning to become well integrated into the way we fight a war.
Despite the overall positive trends, significant room for improvement remains and there are negative trends which must be corrected.
The increased reliability that has been seen in other motorized vehicles in recent years is not yet becoming particularly apparent in our tanks. More effort should be put into this, even to some extent at the cost of performance in other areas. A vehicle which is not available when it is needed may as well not exist at all. Moreover, current reliability is sufficiently low that it severely impacts mobility on both tactical and strategic levels due to frequent breakdowns. What variation exists within our existing tanks with respect to reliability appears to largely be traceable to size, complexity, and the strength or weakness of particular engineering choices rather than improvements to technology over time or an accumulation of lessons learned. There is no trend towards increasing reliability to match that seen in unarmored vehicles over the past years. This must change.
There seems to be a trend among some manufacturers towards ever-larger, more heavily armed vehicles. This comes at the cost of mobility, fuel usage, compatibility with existing infrastructure and of course price. The goal should not be to build the biggest, most powerful vehicle possible. It should be to build a vehicle as capable as is needed for it's task, in the ways that matter for that task. This may mean a large, heavily armed vehicle, or it may not, depending on the nature of the task. It is, however likely that said landships will not be adequate for many tasks as more specialized and efficient vehicles outperform them at individual tasks, if not all tasks. The use of large tanks for purposes such as oversize weapon mounting is firm, but generalist tanks festooned with every type of gun available will have difficulty besting, for example, a lighter-armed and more mobile or better armored tank capable of resisting or avoiding it's weapon fire long enough to destroy it through armor compromised to mount more weapons.
Going forward, there are several broad trends which will feature prominently in the next several generations of tanks.
Mobility improvements will be key. Tanks of the future will be able to not just keep up with infantry, but outrun them. Future cavalry tanks will be able to travel at genuinely cavalry-like speeds. This will be important not just for relatively mobile fronts in a major war and for conflicts with minor powers, but in every context. A tank which can move relatively quickly can keep up with lighter forces, catch opponents off guard, take advantage of openings and respond effectively to new developments in the course of a battle or campaign. A tank capable of easily negotiating rough or broken terrain is much harder to stop with trenches or barricades, can attack from unexpected angles, and can relocate regardless of road quality, mud or slopes that might seriously impact the operation of other vehicles. The tanks of the future will also have greatly increased reliability over current models. Breakdowns will be relatively infrequent, rather than expected multiple times per hour. This will improve mobility in practice as has been previously discussed, while also simplifying logistics through lower demands for fresh components and repair crews, ensuring that tanks are available when needed, and decreasing the chances of a potentially deadly failure during combat. These improvements to mobility and reliability are expected to be a gradual process enabled by advancing technology and the accumulation of lessons learned, but it is a process which must be emphasized now.
Crew ergonomics, visibility, ventilation and communications will continue to improve. If a tank's crew can't do their jobs, the tank is useless. If they can't reach the controls, see out, breath or talk to each other, they can not do their jobs. Tanks of the future will feature easy to reach controls, weapons and ammo stores, acceptably comfortable seating, good visibility, enough ventilation to reliably avoid choking on fumes or baking alive in the summer heat, and intercoms or speaking tubes whenever they are needed to allow proper communication. This may seem relatively unimportant compared to the more prominent aspects of a tank like "how big is the gun?" Or "how fast does it go?" But a tank can't work without a crew, and the easier it is to operate, the less training is needed in getting a crew capable of operating it to a basic level, either accelerating deployment or allowing more time to be spent improving that basic qualification to a more expert level.
Tanks of the future will incorporate sloped armor and cast rather than welded plate to improve protection without increasing weight. As is increasingly becoming the standard, tanks of the future will generally be built with a single turret for the main armament, no sponsons, and no hull-mounted weaponry beyond perhaps machine guns to minimize crew sizes and allow better protective armor configurations.
Future tanks will also universally incorporate radios, both for coordination with other tanks at short ranges and for longer range communication. To permit this, antenna designs will be developed which do not require complicated setup procedures, enabling radio to be used routinely. As radios become more widely used, improved models allowing more, distinct channels will be necessary. Though modern radios can fairly easily accommodate this in principle in the context of morse code, using much narrower channels than early model spark gap transmitters required, experience has shown that voice is more practical under combat conditions for communication between tanks. Technical advances may be required to increase the number of channels available.
Building upon the successes and failures of armored warfare in the context of the most heavily fortified fronts of the last war, a significant shift in tank doctrine needs to be made.
Current infantry tanks are still largely not up to the task of forcing breakthroughs in the context of trench warfare. They are insufficiently mobile and reliable for the job, and those few with the armor and firepower to counter the heavier fortifications likely to be encountered are even less mobile than the others and too expensive to be available in quantity. The solution is a new approach to armored combat.
The infantry tank of the future will feature good mobility and armor, and will mount armament well suited for engaging infantry, light fortifications and armored vehicles. It will be of relatively modest size compared to some of today's largest. It will feature a radio and a coincidence rangefinder or similar device, as well as good optics of a more conventional sort, which will be its most potent weapons. This is because Infantry tanks of the future will operate in close cooperation with assault support tanks, a new category of armored vehicle.
Assault support tanks will be lightly armored, equipped with a large, long range main gun, and well suited for indirect fire. They may potentially be quite large and might lack a distinct turret in order to fit larger guns, as well as substantial ammunition stores and, as with other tanks, include a radio to communicate with other tanks in the field.
The primary task of an assault support tank will be to provide long range fire support for infantry tanks at short notice. Infantry tanks, when faced with a target they are not equipped to deal with such as particularly strong fortifications or the FvC recently fielded by Balkhchivan or when in position to provide spotting on a target of opportunity, will be able to communicate with a nearby group of assault support tanks and arrange an accurate bombardment in a matter of minutes. This is distinct from existing artillery roles in that it focuses more on precise and prompt bombardment of discrete targets rather than artillery's use in large suppressive and general attacks on a large area of land. As secondary tasks, assault support tanks may provide similar support to infantry, cavalry tanks or other forces, supplement artillery in sustained bombardment when not otherwise available in sufficient quantity, or engage targets incapable of effectively retaliating at long range with direct fire. Assault support tanks should not be treated as front-line combatants, as they sacrifice armor and features necessary for close range combat in order to mount large guns and achieve acceptable mobility at a relatively modest cost. Their role is to stay well behind the infantry tanks and operate from stationary positions.
Assault support tanks may be able to provide accurate fire support and then relocate rapidly, essentially negating the effectiveness of counter-battery fire. If this can be made to work in practice, their mobility will protect them from incoming long range fire without the need for earthworks or excessive armor.
This role in tank design is one that has been explored by the designers of such vehicles as the SkZ 1 and 2, as well as the balkh CdvM, and though none are particularly optimal for the task yet (being generally insufficiently mobile, sometimes less well adapted to indirect fire than is ideal and often wildly overbuilt for use as an assault support vehicle) they show examples of the general layout of such a tank.
Current infantry tanks are, unfortunately, not especially well suited for cooperation with assault support tanks. The SkZ-2 is the only tank currently in our arsenal featuring the radio and rangefinding equipment that is required for the task, while it lacks the mobility that will be required, is excessively large, armored and armed for this role and is generally poorly suited to mobile, closser range combat. Moreover, it is too costly to be available in the desired quantities. To put these ideas into practice, a new infantry tank built with them in mind will be required.
The combination of infantry tanks and assault support tanks will lead to an armored force that can reliably force breakthroughs, assault well-protected fortifications effectively, and still maintain adequate mobility and costs.
To properly make use of this new approach, improvements in training, doctrine and coordination will be necessary. The goal is to reach a point where an infantry tank can arrange accurate fire support form an assault support tank in a matter of minutes on any target it can see. Though this is enabled by technological advances, this is as much a shift in training, doctrine and standard practices as it is anything else. It will take practice, and a great deal of work to get there, but the effort will be worthwhile. With tanks of this type and the training and doctrine to support it, tanks will be able to force breakouts along-side infantry and under cover of well aimed indirect fire landing where it is most needed. Fortifications that could otherwise not be defeated by a reasonably armed and armored tank can instead be countered by the superior range and power of our assault support tanks.
When trench warfare has been properly countered, there will likely be a transition to a new, more mobile form of war. In this battlefield of the future, mobility will be key. Though the days of traditional cavalry have passed due in large part to the effectiveness of machine guns, motor vehicles will enable infantry and artillery to achieve similar levels of strategic mobility, and fast armored vehicles will become more common. We will need improved cavalry tanks to meet these challenges.
Future cavalry tanks will continue to improve in mobility and reliability. As technology advances, they are expected to grow somewhat larger and better armed and armored, but the emphasis will remain on mobility over other values. Cavalry tanks will be of increasing importance going forward, given the more mobile type of warfare anticipated to replace trench warfare in the future as infantry tanks and assault support tanks allow our armored forces to force breakthroughs.
Taken together, this course should guide the development of our armored forces in the coming years. With a new generation of increasingly mobile infantry tanks backed up by long range fire from assault support tanks, while improved cavalry tanks build upon the success of the W-5, we will be well positioned for future wars against any foe. We will be able to not just bring an end to trench warfare as a strategy, but end it on our terms: with the destruction of enemy fortifications and insufficiently mobile assets, and a rapid advance into enemy territory. We will be able to force a new, more mobile kind of war, rather than the expensive, bloody stalemates trench warfare often leads to, and we will be able to win this war of the future with the help of an increasingly mobile, flexible and coordinated tank force.
A/N: Special thanks to @TortugaGreen , who helped me turn my plan into a proper white paper.
It still probably needs a few fake citations thrown in, but it's 3:00 AM. Close enough for now.
As armored warfare continues to mature, it becomes necessary to critically evaluate current trends in its development and lay out a course for the future. With the Great Pig War now behind us, we can look back with the benefit of hindsight and draw what lessons we can from the performance of our early tanks. Simultaneously, new technologies, new demands, and the steady march of progress require that we examine the course that we are on, and make any corrections needed to arrive at the armored forces we will need in the future, both in technology and doctrine. This report is an initial attempt at such an analysis.
Current trends in the development of armored warfare are largely positive. Recent designs incorporate a number of features and advancements that will significantly improve our capabilities going forward, and the overall design of many recent tanks is starting to converge on a good approach. Recent improvements in suspension are a particularly positive development, and these and other similar innovations should make their way into all future designs to improve terrain handling and mobility. Some recent tanks are beginning to achieve good survivability against weapons they will likely to face, including anti-tank weapons, without adversely impacting mobility to an unacceptable degree. This is a very positive development, and will have to continue as anti-tank weapons also improve, as it means the tank will be more capable of resisting enemy infantry and other weapons.
The inclusion of radios in some current tanks is also an extremely positive development which will greatly increase in importance in coming years, allowing field communication to a much greater degree than without it. Rangefinders, recently included in a tank for what may be the first time with the SkW-2, have the potential to be quite important going forward too, as they allow more efficient and rapid acquisition and targeting of hostile combatants in the battlefield. Of note is the possibility of using this to ease the burden on individual tanks, by using multiple tanks working together rather than being forced to use only one to maintain coordination.
Beyond purely technical improvements, greater presence on the battlefield through larger numbers allows armored support on a tactical, not just strategic, scale. Organic integration and attachment to infantry units allows opportunities to be acted upon before a window may close. Tanks are beginning to become well integrated into the way we fight a war.
Despite the overall positive trends, significant room for improvement remains and there are negative trends which must be corrected.
The increased reliability that has been seen in other motorized vehicles in recent years is not yet becoming particularly apparent in our tanks. More effort should be put into this, even to some extent at the cost of performance in other areas. A vehicle which is not available when it is needed may as well not exist at all. Moreover, current reliability is sufficiently low that it severely impacts mobility on both tactical and strategic levels due to frequent breakdowns. What variation exists within our existing tanks with respect to reliability appears to largely be traceable to size, complexity, and the strength or weakness of particular engineering choices rather than improvements to technology over time or an accumulation of lessons learned. There is no trend towards increasing reliability to match that seen in unarmored vehicles over the past years. This must change.
There seems to be a trend among some manufacturers towards ever-larger, more heavily armed vehicles. This comes at the cost of mobility, fuel usage, compatibility with existing infrastructure and of course price. The goal should not be to build the biggest, most powerful vehicle possible. It should be to build a vehicle as capable as is needed for it's task, in the ways that matter for that task. This may mean a large, heavily armed vehicle, or it may not, depending on the nature of the task. It is, however likely that said landships will not be adequate for many tasks as more specialized and efficient vehicles outperform them at individual tasks, if not all tasks. The use of large tanks for purposes such as oversize weapon mounting is firm, but generalist tanks festooned with every type of gun available will have difficulty besting, for example, a lighter-armed and more mobile or better armored tank capable of resisting or avoiding it's weapon fire long enough to destroy it through armor compromised to mount more weapons.
Going forward, there are several broad trends which will feature prominently in the next several generations of tanks.
Mobility improvements will be key. Tanks of the future will be able to not just keep up with infantry, but outrun them. Future cavalry tanks will be able to travel at genuinely cavalry-like speeds. This will be important not just for relatively mobile fronts in a major war and for conflicts with minor powers, but in every context. A tank which can move relatively quickly can keep up with lighter forces, catch opponents off guard, take advantage of openings and respond effectively to new developments in the course of a battle or campaign. A tank capable of easily negotiating rough or broken terrain is much harder to stop with trenches or barricades, can attack from unexpected angles, and can relocate regardless of road quality, mud or slopes that might seriously impact the operation of other vehicles. The tanks of the future will also have greatly increased reliability over current models. Breakdowns will be relatively infrequent, rather than expected multiple times per hour. This will improve mobility in practice as has been previously discussed, while also simplifying logistics through lower demands for fresh components and repair crews, ensuring that tanks are available when needed, and decreasing the chances of a potentially deadly failure during combat. These improvements to mobility and reliability are expected to be a gradual process enabled by advancing technology and the accumulation of lessons learned, but it is a process which must be emphasized now.
Crew ergonomics, visibility, ventilation and communications will continue to improve. If a tank's crew can't do their jobs, the tank is useless. If they can't reach the controls, see out, breath or talk to each other, they can not do their jobs. Tanks of the future will feature easy to reach controls, weapons and ammo stores, acceptably comfortable seating, good visibility, enough ventilation to reliably avoid choking on fumes or baking alive in the summer heat, and intercoms or speaking tubes whenever they are needed to allow proper communication. This may seem relatively unimportant compared to the more prominent aspects of a tank like "how big is the gun?" Or "how fast does it go?" But a tank can't work without a crew, and the easier it is to operate, the less training is needed in getting a crew capable of operating it to a basic level, either accelerating deployment or allowing more time to be spent improving that basic qualification to a more expert level.
Tanks of the future will incorporate sloped armor and cast rather than welded plate to improve protection without increasing weight. As is increasingly becoming the standard, tanks of the future will generally be built with a single turret for the main armament, no sponsons, and no hull-mounted weaponry beyond perhaps machine guns to minimize crew sizes and allow better protective armor configurations.
Future tanks will also universally incorporate radios, both for coordination with other tanks at short ranges and for longer range communication. To permit this, antenna designs will be developed which do not require complicated setup procedures, enabling radio to be used routinely. As radios become more widely used, improved models allowing more, distinct channels will be necessary. Though modern radios can fairly easily accommodate this in principle in the context of morse code, using much narrower channels than early model spark gap transmitters required, experience has shown that voice is more practical under combat conditions for communication between tanks. Technical advances may be required to increase the number of channels available.
Building upon the successes and failures of armored warfare in the context of the most heavily fortified fronts of the last war, a significant shift in tank doctrine needs to be made.
Current infantry tanks are still largely not up to the task of forcing breakthroughs in the context of trench warfare. They are insufficiently mobile and reliable for the job, and those few with the armor and firepower to counter the heavier fortifications likely to be encountered are even less mobile than the others and too expensive to be available in quantity. The solution is a new approach to armored combat.
The infantry tank of the future will feature good mobility and armor, and will mount armament well suited for engaging infantry, light fortifications and armored vehicles. It will be of relatively modest size compared to some of today's largest. It will feature a radio and a coincidence rangefinder or similar device, as well as good optics of a more conventional sort, which will be its most potent weapons. This is because Infantry tanks of the future will operate in close cooperation with assault support tanks, a new category of armored vehicle.
Assault support tanks will be lightly armored, equipped with a large, long range main gun, and well suited for indirect fire. They may potentially be quite large and might lack a distinct turret in order to fit larger guns, as well as substantial ammunition stores and, as with other tanks, include a radio to communicate with other tanks in the field.
The primary task of an assault support tank will be to provide long range fire support for infantry tanks at short notice. Infantry tanks, when faced with a target they are not equipped to deal with such as particularly strong fortifications or the FvC recently fielded by Balkhchivan or when in position to provide spotting on a target of opportunity, will be able to communicate with a nearby group of assault support tanks and arrange an accurate bombardment in a matter of minutes. This is distinct from existing artillery roles in that it focuses more on precise and prompt bombardment of discrete targets rather than artillery's use in large suppressive and general attacks on a large area of land. As secondary tasks, assault support tanks may provide similar support to infantry, cavalry tanks or other forces, supplement artillery in sustained bombardment when not otherwise available in sufficient quantity, or engage targets incapable of effectively retaliating at long range with direct fire. Assault support tanks should not be treated as front-line combatants, as they sacrifice armor and features necessary for close range combat in order to mount large guns and achieve acceptable mobility at a relatively modest cost. Their role is to stay well behind the infantry tanks and operate from stationary positions.
Assault support tanks may be able to provide accurate fire support and then relocate rapidly, essentially negating the effectiveness of counter-battery fire. If this can be made to work in practice, their mobility will protect them from incoming long range fire without the need for earthworks or excessive armor.
This role in tank design is one that has been explored by the designers of such vehicles as the SkZ 1 and 2, as well as the balkh CdvM, and though none are particularly optimal for the task yet (being generally insufficiently mobile, sometimes less well adapted to indirect fire than is ideal and often wildly overbuilt for use as an assault support vehicle) they show examples of the general layout of such a tank.
Current infantry tanks are, unfortunately, not especially well suited for cooperation with assault support tanks. The SkZ-2 is the only tank currently in our arsenal featuring the radio and rangefinding equipment that is required for the task, while it lacks the mobility that will be required, is excessively large, armored and armed for this role and is generally poorly suited to mobile, closser range combat. Moreover, it is too costly to be available in the desired quantities. To put these ideas into practice, a new infantry tank built with them in mind will be required.
The combination of infantry tanks and assault support tanks will lead to an armored force that can reliably force breakthroughs, assault well-protected fortifications effectively, and still maintain adequate mobility and costs.
To properly make use of this new approach, improvements in training, doctrine and coordination will be necessary. The goal is to reach a point where an infantry tank can arrange accurate fire support form an assault support tank in a matter of minutes on any target it can see. Though this is enabled by technological advances, this is as much a shift in training, doctrine and standard practices as it is anything else. It will take practice, and a great deal of work to get there, but the effort will be worthwhile. With tanks of this type and the training and doctrine to support it, tanks will be able to force breakouts along-side infantry and under cover of well aimed indirect fire landing where it is most needed. Fortifications that could otherwise not be defeated by a reasonably armed and armored tank can instead be countered by the superior range and power of our assault support tanks.
When trench warfare has been properly countered, there will likely be a transition to a new, more mobile form of war. In this battlefield of the future, mobility will be key. Though the days of traditional cavalry have passed due in large part to the effectiveness of machine guns, motor vehicles will enable infantry and artillery to achieve similar levels of strategic mobility, and fast armored vehicles will become more common. We will need improved cavalry tanks to meet these challenges.
Future cavalry tanks will continue to improve in mobility and reliability. As technology advances, they are expected to grow somewhat larger and better armed and armored, but the emphasis will remain on mobility over other values. Cavalry tanks will be of increasing importance going forward, given the more mobile type of warfare anticipated to replace trench warfare in the future as infantry tanks and assault support tanks allow our armored forces to force breakthroughs.
Taken together, this course should guide the development of our armored forces in the coming years. With a new generation of increasingly mobile infantry tanks backed up by long range fire from assault support tanks, while improved cavalry tanks build upon the success of the W-5, we will be well positioned for future wars against any foe. We will be able to not just bring an end to trench warfare as a strategy, but end it on our terms: with the destruction of enemy fortifications and insufficiently mobile assets, and a rapid advance into enemy territory. We will be able to force a new, more mobile kind of war, rather than the expensive, bloody stalemates trench warfare often leads to, and we will be able to win this war of the future with the help of an increasingly mobile, flexible and coordinated tank force.
A/N: Special thanks to @TortugaGreen , who helped me turn my plan into a proper white paper.
It still probably needs a few fake citations thrown in, but it's 3:00 AM. Close enough for now.
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