I am glad you like it, I am honestly not quite satisfied with this update. I wanted to include some bits about how the UAR Jewish communities and OTL ones are reacting to one another, and some extra words to further elaborate just how damaging this whole thing has been to progressive liberals and leftists but the update was long enough as is and decided the former could use its own separate update instead.
NeoIsrael is non-territorial for now but there are tentative plans to start a new zionist project in the Pacific or in Mongolia.
The media oscillated between spreading such claims and quietly retracting them after the damage was done, and it didn't help matters much when the UAR ignored calls from Germany and the US to hold a referendum on establishing a Zionist state in the holy land.
I'm sure there's at least one cheeky response from the UAR suggesting that Germany and the US hold similar referendums (carving Roma and Sorb states out of Germany, indigenous American states out of the US, etc).
The UAR's policy of allowing a right of return to the entire Palestinian diaspora and their descendants while explicitly prohibiting any immigration into its borders by former Israeli citizens (save Palestinian citizens) unless would-be immigrants agreed to an extensive background check and questioning along with 10 years of disarmament were mere icing on the cake and no amount of international condemnation, denouncement or comparisons to the Nuremberg laws were going to make Cairo or Alexandria budge; their world had seen the horrors of Tkuma, the aftermath of its collapse and the chaos wrought by its former settlers, and they would make sure such a thing would not happen again, never again.
Unfortunate, but unsurprising. The standard many Israelis expect are (mostly) farms where the government pays for all your expenses and gives a you military-grade weapons to boot. Someone who's feeling especially vindictive could make a comparison between the TNO timeline having the SS's Wehrbauer program get significantly more money, turned into an even bigger drain on the party and state's money when the soldiers in concrete bunkers weren't able to agriculturally sustain themselves, and just proved to be another tool of genocide post-Reich states would try to keep using.
Israel is pretty thorough on background checks for people coming in, that's been long established. But a 'ten year disarmament' is not something that has alot of... precedent, either domestically or internationally. The right to own guns s is either pretty heavily restricted to paperwork approval processes, uses limited to either range or sporting, or just not allowed at all. A time-limited prohibition has negative connotations even before considering the target audience's existing fears.
I am glad you like it, I am honestly not quite satisfied with this update. I wanted to include some bits about how the UAR Jewish communities and OTL ones are reacting to one another, and some extra words to further elaborate just how damaging this whole thing has been to progressive liberals and leftists but the update was long enough as is and decided the former could use its own separate update instead.
Eh, it's like the old protests where someone would be hanged/burned in effigy. A catharsis is desired, and a very violent one. But the people can't get the thing they want, so they just make a symbol representing the thing they hate, and commit mob violence on it.
You've got a plan for the reality beyond the hysteria, so don't sweat it too much.
Israel is pretty thorough on background checks for people coming in, that's been long established. But a 'ten year disarmament' is not something that has alot of... precedent, either domestically or internationally. The right to own guns s is either pretty heavily restricted to paperwork approval processes, uses limited to either range or sporting, or just not allowed at all. A time-limited prohibition has negative connotations even before considering the target audience's existing fears.
I think the 10 year disarmament extends from the UAR's bottom up mass mobilisation tendencies that forged the policies of TLM's "GIVE EVERY TRANS PERSON A GUN" Gaddafi. Politics grows from barrel of a gun, so the workers and oppressed need to be armed, given the training to use said arms effectively, and informed with the knowledge of whom said arms need to be used against and whom they need to be used in protection of. As a collorary: anyone who has intent to be a cult leader, reactionary terrorist, bourgeois in all but name or other kind of threat specifically needs to be disarmed; with people who were enthusiastic citizens of an ethnonationalist settler state being assumed to be a threat of some kind until proven otherwise.
I think the 10 year disarmament extends from the UAR's bottom up mass mobilisation tendencies that forged the policies of TLM's "GIVE EVERY TRANS PERSON A GUN" Gaddafi. Politics grows from barrel of a gun, so the workers and oppressed need to be armed, given the training to use said arms effectively, and informed with the knowledge of whom said arms need to be used against and whom they need to be used in protection of. As a collorary: anyone who has intent to be a cult leader, reactionary terrorist, bourgeois in all but name or other kind of threat specifically needs to be disarmed; with people who were enthusiastic citizens of an ethnonationalist settler state being assumed to be a threat of some kind until proven otherwise.
Yeah, that's why I said it's going to give negative connotations to the people that're supposed to be applying. Someone who isn't from The Gun Capital would take a look at that and think 'I can't own a thing I've never owned? Why would I need a gun? Does everyone over there have guns?', at which case the fear just spirals out from there. You can explain it from the perspective of defense policies like Sweden's Total Defense, but the UAR isn't inclined to explain jack shit to people.
The ban being applied in a blanket manner to a religious and ethnic group isn't helping either. It doesn't matter if you're a diehard National Religious Party member, an old peacenik leftie from the Alignment days, or even an Arab member of the Hadash–Ta'al joint list, as far as the UAR's concerned. If your papers said you had a link to the old "ethnonationalist settler state", you're a Collaborator.
Long answer: We do see an official name. But it's the official designation chosen by the government whose perspective we're currently seeing. It's a literary device to show how different each country or political bloc is.
Short answer: No.
Long answer: We do see an official name. But it's the official designation chosen by the government whose perspective we're currently seeing. It's a literary device to show how different each country or political bloc is.
Short answer: No.
I'm sure there's at least one cheeky response from the UAR suggesting that Germany and the US hold similar referendums (carving Roma and Sorb states out of Germany, indigenous American states out of the US, etc).
There was indeed, and in Germany's it was followed by "at least our Germans had the decency to either be sorry about what they did or open about how they truly felt". Though the UAR is disturbed when the response to the Roma part amounts to "they got what they deserved".
As a side note many a ZSR displaced citizen looks at OTL Germany and feels the need to apologize to the FSRD.
As a collorary: anyone who has intent to be a cult leader, reactionary terrorist, bourgeois in all but name or other kind of threat specifically needs to be disarmed; with people who were enthusiastic citizens of an ethnonationalist settler state being assumed to be a threat of some kind until proven otherwise.
Additionally, back in the HSB TLM world, the UAR did actually allow former Tkuma citizens to immigrate in and granted them amnesty in the name of reconciliation; and a large chunk of them proceeded to immediately start plan Plan Dalet 2.0 with bloody results. Hence the disarmament requirement and background checks.
The ban being applied in a blanket manner to a religious and ethnic group isn't helping either. It doesn't matter if you're a diehard National Religious Party member, an old peacenik leftie from the Alignment days, or even an Arab member of the Hadash–Ta'al joint list, as far as the UAR's concerned. If your papers said you had a link to the old "ethnonationalist settler state", you're a Collaborator.
The last one would actually be able to get through but yeah, doesn't help that "service in the IDF" counts as enough grounds for possible permanent ban on entry (or arrest if the individual is directly linked to any war crime).
The last one would actually be able to get through but yeah, doesn't help that "service in the IDF" counts as enough grounds for possible permanent ban on entry (or arrest if the individual is directly linked to any war crime).
1. Arrested upon application is just... whoof. That's gonna make a few more crisis.
2. Out of curiosity: Would the UAR be more amenable to the conservative/Islamist Arab citizens, or members of old labour organizations like Mapai and Histadrut who leaned more Golda Meir?
1. Arrested upon application is just... whoof. That's gonna make a few more crisis.
2. Out of curiosity: Would the UAR be more amenable to the conservative/Islamist Arab citizens, or members of old labour organizations like Mapai and Histadrut who leaned more Golda Meir?
1. The UAR would ask Israelis how what would they do if a Wehrmacht officer showed up in Israel one day applying for citizenship.
2. Neither. While somewhat less strict than t the r requirements for former Israeli Jews the UAR makes it clear that membership, ties or public support for Islamist movements of any kind is more than enough ground to bar you from entry indefinitely. As for the latter, the UAR distinguishes between the various strains of Zionist thought the same way it does with fascist ones, which is to say not at all.
The answer, at least to my perspective, would be 'why he was even allowed on the plane, if not to be arrested in a giant publicity stunt'. There's a reason I separated that out from the blanket ban. The 'all are extremists' thing, I get it. But that's separate, since the order of operations on that is pretty important.
The reason grabbing someone once they get off the airplane is going to cause more diplomatic problems is... well, like all political problems, the optics. Someone applies in good faith, they go through the screenings and told 'yes you can come', and once they're in the Levant they're put in a holding room until the police come to take them to jail. What you're describing is, de-facto, what is done to political dissidents like Raman Pratasevich or Cartel bosses like El Mayo. They are conducting safe, legal passage, and then get waylaid and arrested at the airport for political reasons. The UAR probably isn't intending to lure in war criminals and political extremists on their return program. But when it gets out people trying to go home have been treated like criminals for political reasons, that's one more bullet in the gun of Neo-Israel that could have been averted.
If that's not intended, I think it should be the person has to file their documents through the mail, and then told whether or not they've been denied. But if you want to use something like that for another international crisis, I'd definitely say go for it.
Ironically, if you have UAR operatives go to the US or wherever and then abduct whoever they want to prosecute for war crimes, that'd probably have less pushback because it's more 'normalized', especially if this is supposed to rhyme with modern day politics. People can make comparisons to Mossad going after Nazis abroad, but several authoritarian countries in Asia and Eastern Europe have stepped up efforts to go after their diplomatic and political opponents abroad. Stalin threw the Mandate issue into the mess we know just to get back at the British. Putin would veto a resolution punish the UAR yoinking IDF members back to Palestine because it'd infringe on his operations to get at dissidents who've fled to Europe. To say nothing of the CCP not wanting their transnational intelligence operations to be strangled before they even got off the planning board.
The answer, at least to my perspective, would be 'why he was even allowed on the plane, if not to be arrested in a giant publicity stunt'. There's a reason I separated that out from the blanket ban. The 'all are extremists' thing, I get it. But that's separate, since the order of operations on that is pretty important.
The reason grabbing someone once they get off the airplane is going to cause more diplomatic problems is... well, like all political problems, the optics. Someone applies in good faith, they go through the screenings and told 'yes you can come', and once they're in the Levant they're put in a holding room until the police come to take them to jail. What you're describing is, de-facto, what is done to political dissidents like Raman Pratasevich or Cartel bosses like El Mayo. They are conducting safe, legal passage, and then get waylaid and arrested at the airport for political reasons. The UAR probably isn't intending to lure in war criminals and political extremists on their return program. But when it gets out people trying to go home have been treated like criminals for political reasons, that's one more bullet in the gun of Neo-Israel that could have been averted.
If that's not intended, I think it should be the person has to file their documents through the mail, and then told whether or not they've been denied. But if you want to use something like that for another international crisis, I'd definitely say go for it.
Ironically, if you have UAR operatives go to the US or wherever and then abduct whoever they want to prosecute for war crimes, that'd probably have less pushback because it's more 'normalized', especially if this is supposed to rhyme with modern day politics. People can make comparisons to Mossad going after Nazis abroad, but several authoritarian countries in Asia and Eastern Europe have stepped up efforts to go after their diplomatic and political opponents abroad. Stalin threw the Mandate issue into the mess we know just to get back at the British. Putin would veto a resolution punish the UAR yoinking IDF members back to Palestine because it'd infringe on his operations to get at dissidents who've fled to Europe. To say nothing of the CCP not wanting their transnational intelligence operations to be strangled before they even got off the planning board.
Its not really grabbing people off a plane so much as Israelis applying without knowing that some of the things they do routinely as part of service or even daily life (such as inhabiting a settlement) is classified as a war crime by Comintern and UAR law (and technically OTL international law too but no one cares about that). The UAR will have operations to hunt down remaining known war criminals but thats a story for another day.
In any case I should note that the number of Jewish Israelis applying for this will never exceed 40 in the first ten years, most of the outrage just comes from the idea that they are restricted at all while the human animals are given the right to come and go as they please. Most are convinced the UAR will collapse in a few years anyway and they can rebuild Eretz Israel in no time.
I have planned to write an omake of this TL featuring a person that found himself, albeit reluctantly due to his dire situation, as part of an minor insurgent group that is conducting raids into UAR border towns alongside some passage that Mauritania have fallen into civil war due to the loss of the central government after Wamda.
after watching the modern tno serise on youtube, im curious how's jorg haider and the fpo are doing, considering the party form by ex-nazi service member.
He died in a car crash in 2008, wonder if anything different this time
"The Avatar director guy?"—president Tarek Afif upon being informed who is the leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
While the Capitalist world (no longer the only one) was amid an economic and social meltdown, the UAR was having its own troubles, namely regarding its newfound allies in the Murdered Hope timeline.
Within two years of the Wamda, the Republic's emergency mobilization had stabilized the UAR's economy and reoriented it to a state more fitting for its current status, bereft of the massive comintern economic machine it was plugged into. This still left the Arab economy on equal ground with its American counterpart, especially as the latter struggled to recover from the post-Wamda resource shocks.
This meant that the UAR was quickly in a position to begin fully focusing on the task of building its allies up to a standard fitting of their long march counterparts and here began the problems.
The socialist nations of this world, to one extent or another, retained the use of market mechanisms such as currencies within their economies while the UAR had long abolished such anachronisms in favor of labor vouchers, cybernetic exchange mechanisms, and other methods of non-capitalist exchange, which would result in complications when ascertaining the values of UAR industrial aid vs the value of resources provided by their newfound allies in turn.
This hiccup was further compounded by the fact that it quickly became clear almost all of Cairo's new associates had internal forces that were not taking kindly to the fact that Cairo was not content to be as Moscow once was, giving away aid to its third world allies and not asking too many questions provided they stay loyal.
Cuba was the golden child of the new Comintern, it had no other options for long term survival and was more than happy to toe the Cairo line and would see an almost miraculous transformation over a period of just two years as tens of thousands of displaced Cubans and Comintern labor volunteers coupled with tonnes of aid arrived in the besieged island bastion.
Roads were repaired, hospitals refurbished with top-of-the-line equipment, public transport bolstered with fleets of busses, agricultural production was upgraded, food imports trickled in, and infrastructure was repaired with almost no cost to Havana.
The presence of the displaced Cubans and a plethora of literature and data on the economics and trials of their Cuba was extremely helpful as well, as they helped the republic have a coherent roadmap for its development and avoid certain mistakes, though there were concerns within both Cuba and the UAR itself that such a strategy may be too rigid and introduce elements that are not fitting for this Cuba's still divergent material conditions.
Regardless for now, while American citizens were grappling with homelessness and layoffs, their Cuban counterparts were seeing meteoritic rises in living standards, enough that many could and did take vacations to tour the new Middle East and its many wonders. Compared to these benefits, the increased assassination attempts on President Castro (and the other Castro) along with more frequent standoffs with American naval patrols were almost inconsequential. Cuba was quickly leaving the day of its long siege behind and marching to a bright new future.
Vietnam and Laos were much more hesitant partners, both nations had by the time of the Wamda slowly introduced market elements to their economies in imitation of the Chinese in order to survive the fall of the Eastern Bloc, and unlike Cuba, a deranged sadistic embargo regime did not limit their ability to trade internationally.
This meant that by the early 2000s, Vietnam was host to a growing capitalist class, foreign investments, and the private sector (indeed the party had committed itself to expand the latter's share of the economy in 2001) while Laos' economy had suffered through years of IMF mandated privatization of state's assets and the other rigors that were familiar to any former socialist nation post-1989.
This meant that both nations were reluctant to wholly nationalize their industries as their new superpower ally continued to recommend, fearing that this would result in social instability and invite even more sanctions and economic punishment from the rest of the world; to say nothing of the fact that there was no shortage of party members and government officials in both nations who had tasted the sweet nectar of liberalization's wealth and were not keen on seeing it taken away so soon, and others who were dedicated socialists but had concerns and doubts about the UAR's model of it (that the Middle Easterners espoused a version of Stalinist economics was worrying enough).
Even so, the Southeast Asian nations would manage some respectable progress in two years with the aid they were given, and Laos' people in particular were quite thankful to the UAR's aid and help in revitalizing their ailing economy and breathing new life into its rural development programs. Especially appreciated were the IRB detachments sent to help remove the unexploded ordinance and mines left from the Vietnam War as well as the medical teams dispatched to help with the lingering side effects of the chemical weapons gleefully deployed by the US military, though many were more than a little concerned or insulted when Comintern aid workers considered their worst disaster's zones to be "mildly to moderately ruined".
As a side note, the displaced citizens of the long march's Union of Southeast Asia would find themselves in a unique predicament. Though some would manage to integrate quite well into their now divided homelands, most found these versions to be so utterly different that they might as well have been foreign nations that happened to speak the same language (and even then the differences in dialects and loanwords were sometimes enough that long march variants could be classified as separate dialects), and so despite contributing immensely in the coming years; most of the Southeast Asian diaspora would stay put in the UAR, adding a new community to the rich cultural tapestry of the three seas nation.
Venezuela was far more amenable to emulating the Cairo model, but the transition was proving slow, messy, and not without internal opposition; though in this case, the majority of the opposition would come from communitarian anarchist-leaning leftist groups as opposed to internal elites (for now at least) and economic recovery programs would find themselves struggling with the bureaucratic weight of years of abandoned initiatives and government campaigns, even as public transport capabilities were expanded immensely. Slowing things down a bit more was Cairo's unease with Chavez and his brand of "Bolivarian Socialism" and its resemblance to National Communism.
But Venezuela was a golden child compared to China and North Korea.
The PRC with its devolution into a hundred fiefdoms of economic zones, state-private enterprises, and municipalities along with a party pulling in so many directions was proving to be the source of more headaches than the rest of the neo-Comintern combined, enough that many of the older generations were quite thankful that Deng Xiaopeng hadn't been elected Comintern chairman in that fateful year. It also quickly became clear that many of the Chinese industrial zones had working conditions that would not look out of place in Victorian Britain, and the less said about the Hukou system the better.
Cairo was finding that the process of sending aid and aid workers, letting alone ensuring that they reach the intended destination, was a byzantine and complex process not helped by the fact that the CPC seemed to oscillate between reserved friendship and cold politeness seemingly overnight as neo-maoists, princelings, and dengists struggled to decide on a coherent direction for the party even they were finding their options being limited by America's rising hostility and Russia's irreversible pivot to the west even as they detested the UAR's constant criticism and outcry at what they saw as necessary measures for survival, especially when such criticism began filtering into the popular masses despite attempts at censorship (that the UAR had a contingent of PUC citizens who were more than happy to compare the two Chinese socialist states was simply cherry on the top).
For its part, the UAR was beginning to question if this alliance was worth the domestic discontent as citizens were not exactly keen on being allies with a nation that had recreated industrial nightmares reminiscent of Guangdong, and Alexandria was even threatening an expulsion vote in 2006.
For a period, it seemed as if the Dragon and the Eagle could not share a single sky.
The North Koreans for their part were openly grateful for Comintern food aid pouring in but were less grateful for the criticism and demands that quickly started to accompany it.
If the Arabs were uneasy about Bolivarian socialism then they were barely tolerant of Juche, which seemed to all the very worst of national communism brought to agonizing life and furnished with a monstrous cult of personality and bloated security apparatus that wouldn't have looked out of place in the long march's post-imperial Japan; while the damage of the Korean War may excuse some things, it could only go so far with both Cairo and Alexandria making their disapproval clear, much to the bafflement of outside observers and the annoyance of Pyongyang.
On the latter's part, once it became clear that the Arabs' pushes for radical changes were not merely for show, the ruling elite of the WPK and KPA came very close to severing all ties with the Middle Eastern giant, after all they had survived almost complete isolation before and could do it again if necessary, the mercuric Kim Jong Il certainly wasn't keen on having his rule be questioned and threatened after all he had done to secure it.
But ultimately pragmatism and greed would win over paranoia, for the time being at least. While the Arabs' idealism was an obstacle, it was hardly an insurmountable one and the resources they were providing were too valuable to pass up, especially as the South was buckling under the pressure of the financial crisis and the North had a chance at once again grabbing the initiative in the long war.
And so for now the North Korean regime would play along, instituting minor reforms and worker exchange programs that for now seemed enough to satisfy the International, and as a further show of unity; the third son of Kim Jong Il would be taken out of his officer training in Kim Il Sung university and instead be enrolled into Cairo University, followed swiftly by the the dictator's youngest daughter. Of course, as with many reforms and minor modifications and pragmatic changes, it would become clear that Pyongyang had set off a domino of events that may soon get out of hand.
All in all, the neo-Comintern was proving to be something of a mixed bag overall, the triumphant feelings of its early beginnings quickly giving way to less glamorous and harsh realities, even so there remained a mood of measured optimism, things were improving even if it was too slow in the eyes of many, and the older generations of the UAR were keen to remind their youngsters that as bad as things looked like in the world of Oceania unborn….
| It wasn't closest to being the worst it could get |
This hiccup was further compounded by the fact that it quickly became clear almost all of Cairo's new associates had internal forces that were not taking kindly to the fact that Cairo was not content to be as Moscow once was, giving away aid to its third world allies and not asking too many questions provided they stay loyal.
For all the Moscow-aligned nations hated getting sneered at and being handed cast-offs or lower quality export models, the leaders didn't give a shit in hindsight when faced with Western domestic policy requirements for aid.
… really? Like, the meme works in the quest because it's a hyperbolic, insane world. If Cuba's supposedly doing so good for its people, why are there people trying to shoot either Castro? Is this still exiles trying things?
There sure as hell can't be any CIA efforts, they got busted and had their hands tied on that since the late 70s.
Unless this is like that propaganda piece the Cuban government put out about how many times Casto's had assassination attempts.
Even so, the Southeast Asian nations would manage some respectable progress in two years with the aid they were given, and Laos' people in particular were quite thankful to the UAR's aid and help in revitalizing their ailing economy and breathing new life into its rural development programs. Especially appreciated were the IRB detachments sent to help remove the unexploded ordinance and mines left from the Vietnam War as well as the medical teams dispatched to help with the lingering side effects of the chemical weapons gleefully deployed by the US military, though many were more than a little concerned or insulted when Comintern aid workers considered their worst disaster's zones to be "mildly to moderately ruined".
Venezuela was far more amenable to emulating the Cairo model, but the transition was proving slow, messy, and not without internal opposition; though in this case, the majority of the opposition would come from communitarian anarchist-leaning leftist groups as opposed to internal elites (for now at least) and economic recovery programs would find themselves struggling with the bureaucratic weight of years of abandoned initiatives and government campaigns, even as public transport capabilities were expanded immensely. Slowing things down a bit more was Cairo's unease with Chavez and his brand of "Bolivarian Socialism" and its resemblance to National Communism.
The UAR's about to get real-world experience with the reason people believe Horseshoe Theory, and the omnipresent temptation of leftist movements to bolster their political power with nationalism.
The PRC with its devolution into a hundred fiefdoms of economic zones, state-private enterprises, and municipalities along with a party pulling in so many directions was proving to be the source of more headaches than the rest of the neo-Comintern combined, enough that many of the older generations were quite thankful that Deng Xiaopeng hadn't been elected Comintern chairman in that fateful year. It also quickly became clear that many of the Chinese industrial zones had working conditions that would not look out of place in Victorian Britain, and the less said about the Hukou system the better.
The most pithy way I can describe the CCP's approach is "wield the sledgehammer of state power over capital with the precision of a brain surgeon." Of course what you actually get down at the lower levels is something closer to the corruption and stagnation of the old Soviet bureaucracy, but the way these lower party members think, how they see their role in essentially winning the competition of capitalism, of fulfilling their own ambitions for a western middle class life, and serving the demands of Beijing, has many unique characteristics.
If the Arabs were uneasy about Bolivarian socialism then they were barely tolerant of Juche, which seemed to all the very worst of national communism brought to agonizing life and furnished with a monstrous cult of personality and bloated security apparatus that wouldn't have looked out of place in the long march's post-imperial Japan; while the damage of the Korean War may excuse some things, it could only go so far with both Cairo and Alexandria making their disapproval clear, much to the bafflement of outside observers and the annoyance of Pyongyang.
On the latter's part, once it became clear that the Arabs' pushes for radical changes were not merely for show, the ruling elite of the WPK and KPA came very close to severing all ties with the Middle Eastern giant, after all they had survived almost complete isolation before and could do it again if necessary, the mercuric Kim Jong Il certainly wasn't keen on having his rule be questioned and threatened after all he had done to secure it.
That's how you get the closer ties with Russia going. They're already taking deliveries of modern every so often ATPOTL, bringing it back to the open coordination just needs a bit of… understanding with Beijing.
And so for now the North Korean regime would play along, instituting minor reforms and worker exchange programs that for now seemed enough to satisfy the International, and as a further show of unity; the third son of Kim Jong Il would be taken out of his officer training in Kim Il Sung university and instead be enrolled into Cairo University, followed swiftly by the the dictator's youngest daughter. Of course, as with many reforms and minor modifications and pragmatic changes, it would become clear that Pyongyang had set off a domino of events that may soon get out of hand.
On the one hand, everyone's favorite communist anime girlboss is here. Yay.
On the other, the UAR just handed the Kim regime a shit-ton of hostages in exchange for an equal number of spies being put into the UAR economy.
All in all, the neo-Comintern was proving to be something of a mixed bag overall, the triumphant feelings of its early beginnings quickly giving way to less glamorous and harsh realities, even so there remained a mood of measured optimism, things were improving even if it was too slow in the eyes of many, and the older generations of the UAR were keen to remind their youngsters that as bad as things looked like in the world of Oceania unborn….
| It wasn't closest to being the worst it could get |
The quote at the start made me think the WPK made James Cameron their General-Secretary for a moment.
China probably won't quit state capitalism any time soon, but I wonder if it'll lead to a more state-oriented direction becoming adopted that's closer to Chen Yun's policies than Deng's.
As much as i want a neo-maoist revival, the memory of the great leap forward will still be there, so we either get a deluted state socialist or a orthodox dengist as the new chairman
Also, while i can see why russia is starting to move west, putin is still a paranoid wreck that genuinely belive that the cia is a all knowing super agency and will likely obscure any move by the US in his backyard.
He is also likely still gonna consilidate power around him and his oligarch buddy like In OTL, we can expect wagner or something similar coming sooner or later.
Cairo was finding that the process of sending aid and aid workers, letting alone ensuring that they reach the intended destination, was a byzantine and complex process not helped by the fact that the CPC seemed to oscillate between reserved friendship and cold politeness seemingly overnight as neo-maoists, princelings, and dengists struggled to decide on a coherent direction for the party even they were finding their options being limited by America's rising hostility and Russia's irreversible pivot to the west even as they detested the UAR's constant criticism and outcry at what they saw as necessary measures for survival, especially when such criticism began filtering into the popular masses despite attempts at censorship (that the UAR had a contingent of PUC citizens who were more than happy to compare the two Chinese socialist states was simply cherry on the top).
That's the clincher. If it were the same situation as in our timeline which had the US and China in an uneasy but workable relationship (until the US recognized the PRC as the threat it was around 2013-2015 and began to triangulate against it in earnest), then Beijing could easily find itself with more bargaining power and the UAR would be much less hesitant to antagonize it. For it's part, the US would love to position the PRC as its own asset against the UAR and means to divide the international communist movement just as it did in the 70s against the Soviet Bloc.
But it isn't the same situation. The rest of the world is shaping up to be devoured into a prolonged conflict between a genuine socialist alliance positioning themselves as envoys of a New World (not simply content with making a red-painted alliance of nations like the Soviets did), and the guardians of the Old in NATO and its satellites, looking to rev up another anticommunist crusade to match a much stronger existential threat. If the days of cold realpolitik between peer nations almost always superseding class warfare and ideological concerns weren't gone by the Wamda, they'll be gone by the decade's end.
If China is excluded from the Comintern, even ignoring the certain crisis of legitimacy, it virtually has nothing to offer in the changed geopolitical arena, especially now that its biggest customers are looking to bite the bullet and decouple themselves from the "world's workshop" with Russia in tow, bringing their industrial and manufacturing bases back from the commie developmentalist fence-sitters and to either the metropole directly or to weaker, more reliable satellite states in the periphery. And it's not like China can easily carve out its own bloc from the third world with something like the Belt and Road Initiative when both pre-existing blocs are there to one-up their offer, not willing to concede a sliver of the pie to a third contender.
The DPRK's path is also heading the same way even with the country's sharply differing circumstances. The much greater aid provided to it and open exchanges have already compromised the "hermit kingdom" in numerous ways, and it will find it harder to enter siege mode as it did during the great famine. As a bonus, there could be hope that the UAR's as-of-now cordial relationship with the ROK (going by the last update) can potentially make it a good mediator for an official end to the Korean War and reconcilation between both sides of the DMZ.
