Axslashel
I am a pessimist not a realist.
- Location
- Land of the Midnight Sun
All the vehicles are connected by invisible rubberbands obviously
Cliches you can't stand
- Thread starter Mithras
- Start date
- Location
- Volksstaat Hessen, Deutsches Reich
Brain activity continues throughout sleep. We experience that as dreaming, for example. Make no mistake, the dreaming subconsciousness is as much part of the "I" as the conscious, deliberate part.
Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
As every time this happens, allow me to quote Alistair Young:
"Interruptions in consciousness can't cause a break in identity because we sleep, which interrupts our narrative thread of consciousness. Except, [some] argue, it doesn't. Which we could argue and I'd be prepared to argue: we certainly have some type of consciousness going on in REM sleep, but it gets a lot more dubious in deeper sleep states than that. But in any case, and here's my point: it doesn't matter, because sleep is only the least of the interruptions in consciousness which can be examined. There are also unconsciousness, anaesthesia, coma (natural), coma (medically induced), various states of suppressed brain activity using TMR, extreme hypothermia simulating brain death, and seizure disorders which may not suppress all electrical activity in the brain, but do derange it all to hell. [...] In short: people have come back from having a null electroencephalogram, which is to say a complete absence of consciousness and indeed dynamic mind-state. (Which is why checking for brain death in a medical context requires a sustained absence of such, not just noticing said absence is present.)"
Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
By definition, yes.
(at least at first, of course, but as time passes your experiences diverge, and so are the two resulting persona)
- Location
- Finland
I don't think anything intangible is lost.
But the existence of 2 Rikers due to transporter malfunction kinda points towards it being more of a long range copier than a transporter.
It does make very good copies though.
cB557
voOOP
When I say "subjective experience of the world," I don't mean like, they have the same thoughts and memories, I mean like qualia. And to grant that their thoughts and memories are capable of diverging at all means they have different qualia.
So they've got different bodies, separate experience of the world, but they're somehow still the same person?
Let's come at this from a different direction. You've been focusing on how your experience is shared by the copy, but if we look at it from the other direction it becomes even more suspect. If you and the copy are the same person, then from the copy's perspective a part of themself dies. Even if it's not a permanent death, you'd think they'd notice an entire half of their experience of the universe ceasing to exist. But they don't notice anything about that, because they have an entirely separate experience of the universe from the original, because they're two different people.
So they've got different bodies, separate experience of the world, but they're somehow still the same person?
Let's come at this from a different direction. You've been focusing on how your experience is shared by the copy, but if we look at it from the other direction it becomes even more suspect. If you and the copy are the same person, then from the copy's perspective a part of themself dies. Even if it's not a permanent death, you'd think they'd notice an entire half of their experience of the universe ceasing to exist. But they don't notice anything about that, because they have an entirely separate experience of the universe from the original, because they're two different people.
Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
There's a misunderstanding there. I'm not saying that, somehow, you'll literally share your experiences like some kind of hive mind. Of course not. There still is two individuals. That are, at first, the same person, in that they have the same memories, the same thoughts, that they would react the same presented to the same stimuli — but as, by virtue of not being presented by the same stimuli, experience will inevitably make them diverge.
- Pronouns
- She/Her
Your still conscious when your sleep. Part of your brain is still wokring
cB557
voOOP
And what I'm saying is that by having those two separate experiences of the world, they are automatically two different people. Initially otherwise identical people, sure, but two things being identical doesn't make them not two separate things. Because you and the copy experience the world separately, when you die, the copy doesn't carry on your experience of the world. You just die, and your experience of the world ends, and the copy's life and experience of the world continues on unaffected as its own separate thing.
And I know you weren't saying that you and the copy actually share a brain, but that's kinda what I think is the problem with your argument. Like, not specifically the lack of a hive mind, but just that this supposed fundamental connection between you and the copy only seems to exist when it comes to you not dying in the transporter because the copy is just as you as you. If there's such a strong, fundamental connection between you and the copy, surely there'd be other places where it matters. But even in the instant of the transport, there's only "you!you dies, but you don't actually die because clone!you is still alive, and that's just as you as you!you." And I was just thinking, surely there should be some other effects from that other than just "I'm not really dead." Like surely there should be other ramifications to swapping vessels like that, or to the destruction of your old body's experience of the universe. And I take the fact that this supposed connection does not seem to have any other effects in any other circumstance, or even in the same circumstance, as evidence that this connection isn't actually there. Two different things are still two different things whether or not they're identical.
- Location
- Finland
Star Trek transporter pulls a person apart, killing them, and then makes a copy somewhere else, creating a brand new person with preset personality and memories installed.
They are, functionally, the same person, but if not for the "pull apart" bit, you would have two separate persons.
They are, functionally, the same person, but if not for the "pull apart" bit, you would have two separate persons.
Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
I don't think there's a magical connection. I just consider something going around that has my memories, my train of thought, and experience the world as I do to be close enough to not bother making the difference.
- Location
- Volksstaat Hessen, Deutsches Reich
This is an attempted reductio ad absurdum that just doesn't work. To begin with, he starts with several wrong assumptions, for example that only the conscious level is relevant for ego continuity. But to think of only our conscious, deliberative part as the "true self" is a fallacy that psychology, biology and neurology have long since debunked. You are in fact as much the weird subconscious and unconscious stuff "you" have "no control" over, as you are the conscious part. Furthermore, in most of those conditions he lists, neurological continuity is in fact given, and hence they can't serve as examples for his argumment.
But where the reductio ad absurdum truly fails is that the implicit assumption that we will just have to recoil from that conclusion, that it is unthinkable that people experiencing temporary brain death might have a death of personality, and thus it can't be. Essentially, it's an appeal to consequences, a fallacy. If the logical conclusion is that people who experienced brain death experienced a death of personality, then... why can't that be? Of course, the person waking up from that is in all forms identical. As I have said before, it's sort of the difference in German between selbe (one and the same) and gleiche (same as in the same type, identical). It is an identical person, and as such can externally be treated as if it is one and the same person, as there is no difference... but what matters is indeed the internal state.
So how does that change when one of the two dies or disappears in the process? I mean that is what I am saying: The upload is not the same individual as the person it was uploaded from. As I have said, yes, they will be identical, but they will not be one and the same, and that is what matters.
- Location
- Finland
If i have a transporter, or a replicator, take apart a coin and then recreate two identical coins, i don't have one coin, i have two.
And if i have transporter (isn't that thing basicly a replicator with better range?) pull apart a person, and create two copies, i have two people, not one, and if i shoot one of them it is murder no matter how much i explain that the person who died is standing right there, or that i can make more copies.
And if i have transporter (isn't that thing basicly a replicator with better range?) pull apart a person, and create two copies, i have two people, not one, and if i shoot one of them it is murder no matter how much i explain that the person who died is standing right there, or that i can make more copies.
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Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
I actually cut the quote short. The part just after is "(Or advance the argument that a large number of coma patients, etc., are in fact completely different people to the ones who went under in the first place, if you want to retain argumentative coherency)". Which appears to be your point. With which most people seem to disagree, as we don't go around delivering new certificate of birth for people that get out of a coma or something.
That doesn't change.
Why? Why would there be some innate you-ness that'd be lost that way? An identical thing is just as good as the thing itself.
- Location
- Volksstaat Hessen, Deutsches Reich
Because I don't care about me-ness? The world can go on perfectly fine without me. Whether there is "Susano type" around is completely irrelevant. But what matters is existence, or non-existence. If I am dead, I am dead, regardless of whether there is a copy of me running around still. It's not like I can "hop into it", so to speak.
Which also fits with that:
Yes, because as I have said externally, everything stays the same. As far as friends, family, society etc are concerned. But those are secondary concerns.
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Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
From your internal perspective of "getting through the teleporter", you just closed your eyes and appeared somewhere else. Your memories are the same. Your train of thoughts is the same. Your desires are the same. Your reactions are the same. Why would it matter if the body having them isn't the same?
(and, yes, that extend to the case where you don't remove the original. There's just two of you, now.)
- Location
- Volksstaat Hessen, Deutsches Reich
Well, no, that is exactly what I dispute. For the person coming out of the teleporter, this would be their perception. But the person going into it - well, finis. That "stream of ego" just ended. It would be no different than, I dunno, transplanting memories of wrong events - just because you have the memories doesn't make it the truth.
As I have said, yes, externally nothing would change, but fuck external.
And indeed, the "two of you" example makes that blatant. You cannot be two, unless it is some sort of hivemind with two bodies.
Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
Why not?
I do not care. Like, that's just what is on the bottom of that argument, isn't it? Yeah, a stream of consciousness would end. As long as it's picked up afterwards, I do not care.
- Location
- Voidbetweenstars
Why so?
Your the one trying to prove a positive here. Why would 2 clones be 1 person? A copy can be better then the original, but a copy isn't the original.
Vyslanté
The self is a prison
- Location
- European Union
To use Valmond's example : let's say you use the machine on a coin. You now have two identical coins. It doesn't matter who was the "original" one and which one is the "copy" ; they're still identical coins, that can both be used interchangeably for coin things. They're not the same in the meaning that they're indeed two different objects, but they're the same in the sense that they're identical, interchangeable, indistinguishable.
SoothingCoffee
Umumumu
- Location
- The Library
When the Main Character loses their power. Regardless of the reasons, good or bad, whenever the (likeable/personally-invested) Main Character gets brought down, and loses their power, it just feels incredibly not good as a reader. Makes me still uncomfortable. I'd still read through it, because I get that there's gonna be payout in the end, but it's pretty uncomfortable. That's the point, I guess -- it's supposed to be a low point for the character, but when it's stretched into chapters, and volumes, it can be downright unbearable.
It depends on how much the Main Character is affected internally (emotionally, etc) -- but even then, it feels like the main character has lost a chunky bit of their agency in the story. It's very bleh.
It depends on how much the Main Character is affected internally (emotionally, etc) -- but even then, it feels like the main character has lost a chunky bit of their agency in the story. It's very bleh.
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- Location
- Voidbetweenstars
Inflation would argue that more of the same thing devalues both however. And if the value is less thier not the same as before the copy was made. aka the act of copying damages what gets copied. Which means not the original in effect.