We can put ethical statements in a coherent framework, which helps us understand
and interact with the world. If we take:
We can draw further conclusions, question on what grounds we believe it to be true, draw distinctions from other moral principles and apply the principle to new situations. I don't think we need to have the possibility of empirical evidence in order to have meaningful conversation.
(Is rape wrong because it is a sub-category of sexual assault, which is always wrong? If not what makes some sexual assaults wrong and not others? If rape is wrong because it harms people, why is it acceptable to harm people in other ways and would a rape which did no harm be wrong? Is violating personal boundaries a unique type of harm, incomparable to physically hitting people?)
If we can say clearly what rape is and why it's wrong, we have a better idea of how to prevent rape and how to deal with rape and other similar incidents.
Yes, good use of a morally relative system that uses evidence. We can construct reasons why we think a crime is harmful and in what ways it violates the objectives and goals for given situation (even a situation as broad as a society) and draw from real life examples in order to illustrate or refine our points. For example, we can say that victims of rape suffer either physically or mentally, and we can define the criteria for what is and is not rape and what acceptable punishments should be by engaging in discussion and reviewing previous cases.
What you
didn't do was say rape is wrong because it is a thing which is inescapably wrong, and that's more or less what an absolute morality (according to Wittgenstein) would argue.
I sort of wish other people had read the lecture I put up, since I'm now put in the position of defending a point I was making
from it.
I'm not sure what miracles have to do with this at all.
I'm not talking about miracles. People in the past didn't solely believe that everything was miraculous and unobservable. They often believed in mechanics. The Ancients didn't think the world was round purely because of miracles but because of how curvature affected sight and so on.
It's not that they thought it was all miracles and ended up wrong. They often based their views on observation and ended up wrong.
You seem to want to define away that mistake away as some linguistic fuckery on their part. It...wasn't.
Using the example of miracles was a mistake because it muddied the waters. Apologies. I was not trying to talk about people in the past or how they conceived of unexplained phenomena, but trying to address a particular kind of language that often gets used in (again, what Wittgenstein would have considered) incorrect ways.
Wittgenstein said:
we all know what in ordinary life would be called a miracle.
It obviously is simply an event the like of which we have never yet seen.
Now suppose such an event happened. Take the case that one of you suddenly grew a lion's head and he began to roar.
Certainly that would be as extraordinary a thing as I can imagine.
Now whenever we should have recovered from our surprise, what I would suggest would be to fetch a doctor and have the case scientifically investigated and if it were not for hurting him I would have him vivisected.
And where would the miracle have got to? For it is clear that when we look at it in this way everything miraculous has disappeared; unless what we mean by this term is merely that a fact has not yet been explained by science which again means that we have hitherto failed to group this fact with others in a scientific system.
This shows that it is absurd to say "Science has proved that there are no miracles."
The truth is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a miracle.
For imagine whatever fact you may, it is not in itself miraculous in the absolute sense of that term.
For we see now that we have been using the word "miracle" in a relative and an absolute sense.
Wittgenstein is bringing attention to the fact that we use words in different ways depending on the circumstances, and that one word can have very different grammars and functions in different contexts (He uses, in another work, the word Water. It can be a command, an answer, a relieved exclamation, a list of ingredients, etc.). In this case he's talking about relative vs. absolute uses of those terms:
Now instead of saying "Ethics is the enquiry into what is good" I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living.
I believe if you look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is that Ethics is concerned with.
Now the first thing that strikes one about all these expressions is that each of them is actually used in two very different senses.
I will call them the trivial or relative sense on the one hand and the ethical or absolute sense on the other.
He goes on to say that the relative sense of a word relies more on conceptions of the use and meaning of that word as decided by those who use the language. He uses 'good' as an example, and that a 'good' road would be a road that matched certain criteria for its use; will it get you to your destination, will it get you there quickly (if that is your goal), is it well paved, is it scenic (if you care about aesthetics) etc.
But Ethics and absolutism don't use words like good in that sense.
Every judgment of relative value is a mere statement of facts and can therefore be put in such a form that it loses all the appearance of a judgment of value: Instead of saying "This is the right way to Granchester," I could equally well have said, "This is the right way you have to go if you want to get to Granchester in the shortest time"; "This man is a good runner" simply means that he runs a certain number of miles in a certain number of minutes, etc.[...] The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal.
Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, "the absolutely right road."
I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going.
And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about.
And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera.
No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge
So the point he's making is that something described in absolute terms is actually a kind of tautology. Something that is an absolutely right road would be the road that everyone would have to take regardless of destination or personal preference. Which is absurd sounding.
What he wants us to be aware of, is that language has certain limits, and one of those limits is what we can imagine. So having an absolute good in ethics is impossible because we cannot discuss what that would mean. Maybe we can feel it for ourselves, but that's sort of useless since we need to be able to apply our ethics in a social context.
Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water [even] if I were to pour out a gallon over it
I may have just made this more confused, and I apologize, but I'm partially trying to work through these ideas myself. Thanks for your patience.
I don't believe in objective morality because we are subjective beings and we cannot experience an objective universe.