On the methods of finding and destroying enemy armour.
Current trends in the development of tanks point towards a paradigm shift in the method that we will conduct war from this point onwards. Tanks are rapidly advancing past the initial requirements layer down for them (that of mobile bunkers able to weather machine-gun fire and allow for the advance of soldiers behind them) and many different theories are appearing on how to utilise these new weapons. This document is an attempt at creating what could amount to being the basis of anti-tank warfare and will as such make the assumption that tanks will continue to be used along a two or three level doctrine with specialist units developing as the need is required.
On the defence of fixed positions, there is a lot of current experience that can be drawn from recent conflicts. Primarily that a ditch that is 2 thirds the tank's length in width and at-least as deep is enough to halt a tank for some time, but that tanks also find it difficult to operate in confined areas such as forests. From this we can posit two things:
A) that tanks require support to be effective, or else in confined areas where mobility is simpler for infantry tanks can be encircled and captured/destroyed by infantry (recommendation is to issue an explosive either strong enough to damage a tank's tracks or gun mount or small enough to fit through a hatch/gun barrel and render damage to the interior of the vehicle)
B) that trenches will be surmountable is of no debate, fascines have been used since early siege warfare to facilitate the crossing of obstacles (both deep and tall), to circumnavigate this problem (for a short while) an unexplored shell should be placed with a percussive instrument near the fuze, if the percussive trigger is activated due to a simple weight mechanism the shell should explode and deliver either a killing force to the underneath of the tank or again, mission kill behind defined as destroying the tracks.
This author does not advise these reactive shells being made weight sensitive to anything less than 3 tons so as to not be activated by infantry who might be retreating at speed with their lighter frontline equipment.
For mobile defence the idea of towing a light artillery (or converted tank) gun on a chassis similar to that of the old field artillery pieces with a low profile and equipped with high velocity armour piercing shells that have an explosive filler (such as a miniaturised bunker buster sheep employed when bombarding emplaned fortifications) should be enough. The crews should be taught basic to advanced levels of camouflage and should either be deployed in forward emplacements to blunt an offensive (the possibility of combining the anti-tank detachment with the machine gun detachment should provide an impressive defensive force) or as a mobile reserve in the rear lines and employing long range sniping interference against enemy frontline artillery or tanks.
For a more mobile option the idea of converting armoured cars by removing the turrets, lowering the ground clearance and having the gun run the length of the vehicle (that is either open topped or open ended to facilitate crew ergonomics and ammo replenishment) or for a tank to undergo the same conversion (with no open top or open end) and a gun that clears the front of the vehicle with relatively heavy armour at the front for position/tank destruction in forward moving assaults. Furthermore this move would allow the deployment of tank mounted artillery that would allow a heavy unit to assault fortified units without needing to wait for siege artillery or destroy heavy tanks. Heavy artillery on a well protected tank should however be the remit of storm pioneer units that will be tasked with destroying hard-points and the development of a smoke shell could prove beneficial.
Finally, on the auto-gun as an anti tank weapon. the development of auto weapons should be deemed to be a short term development at this time, the current design is unable to carry anything but the smallest of anti-tank shells and should not be considered for much but close defence for tanks and other vehicles, they cannot be trusted to penetrate the fronts of assault vehicles (or even the sides of certain designs) reliably and when able to penetrate the enemy they will not have ability to do the damage a shell fired from a larger calibre gun will without sacrificing reliability in the field.
On the subject of circumnavigating an enemy's defence, there is one thing that is required above all, intelligence and knowledge of the enemy. As mentioned above this is a developing method and it is to be expected that different nations will come up with different methods. As such there are two possible means of dealing with this, firstly, peace time information gathering should attempt to have a basic understanding of the nations evolution of theories (with wartime information gathering needing to have a priority on enemy doctrine shifts) and that this information should be disseminated amongst both tank units and planning staffs.
For during combat a special detachment should be formed that are taught in reconnaissance, ambush and skirmish tactics and light infantry methods, this unit should actively search ahead of units wherever possible and attempt to discover enemy positions before radioing back the information. The unit should also be ready to deal with the enemies scouts, as such the auto guns that where are unable to serve as anti tank weapons would do well here, a armoured car or mobile light tank able to deal significant damage to other light vehicles and infantry seems to be highly suited to this kind of work.
In conclusion, though the pace in the change of doctrines is due to increase thanks to technological developments and the will to implement them means that specialist methods and units will be required to employ all the advancements that are occurring, and that the future of mechanised combined arms warfare requires an ability to quickly adopt changes of both equipment and doctrinal natures or leave the army lagging behind the enemy.
Edit no.2: still 1000+ words but this time more coherent and follows the title more.
Current trends in the development of tanks point towards a paradigm shift in the method that we will conduct war from this point onwards. Tanks are rapidly advancing past the initial requirements layer down for them (that of mobile bunkers able to weather machine-gun fire and allow for the advance of soldiers behind them) and many different theories are appearing on how to utilise these new weapons. This document is an attempt at creating what could amount to being the basis of anti-tank warfare and will as such make the assumption that tanks will continue to be used along a two or three level doctrine with specialist units developing as the need is required.
On the defence of fixed positions, there is a lot of current experience that can be drawn from recent conflicts. Primarily that a ditch that is 2 thirds the tank's length in width and at-least as deep is enough to halt a tank for some time, but that tanks also find it difficult to operate in confined areas such as forests. From this we can posit two things:
A) that tanks require support to be effective, or else in confined areas where mobility is simpler for infantry tanks can be encircled and captured/destroyed by infantry (recommendation is to issue an explosive either strong enough to damage a tank's tracks or gun mount or small enough to fit through a hatch/gun barrel and render damage to the interior of the vehicle)
B) that trenches will be surmountable is of no debate, fascines have been used since early siege warfare to facilitate the crossing of obstacles (both deep and tall), to circumnavigate this problem (for a short while) an unexplored shell should be placed with a percussive instrument near the fuze, if the percussive trigger is activated due to a simple weight mechanism the shell should explode and deliver either a killing force to the underneath of the tank or again, mission kill behind defined as destroying the tracks.
This author does not advise these reactive shells being made weight sensitive to anything less than 3 tons so as to not be activated by infantry who might be retreating at speed with their lighter frontline equipment.
For mobile defence the idea of towing a light artillery (or converted tank) gun on a chassis similar to that of the old field artillery pieces with a low profile and equipped with high velocity armour piercing shells that have an explosive filler (such as a miniaturised bunker buster sheep employed when bombarding emplaned fortifications) should be enough. The crews should be taught basic to advanced levels of camouflage and should either be deployed in forward emplacements to blunt an offensive (the possibility of combining the anti-tank detachment with the machine gun detachment should provide an impressive defensive force) or as a mobile reserve in the rear lines and employing long range sniping interference against enemy frontline artillery or tanks.
For a more mobile option the idea of converting armoured cars by removing the turrets, lowering the ground clearance and having the gun run the length of the vehicle (that is either open topped or open ended to facilitate crew ergonomics and ammo replenishment) or for a tank to undergo the same conversion (with no open top or open end) and a gun that clears the front of the vehicle with relatively heavy armour at the front for position/tank destruction in forward moving assaults. Furthermore this move would allow the deployment of tank mounted artillery that would allow a heavy unit to assault fortified units without needing to wait for siege artillery or destroy heavy tanks. Heavy artillery on a well protected tank should however be the remit of storm pioneer units that will be tasked with destroying hard-points and the development of a smoke shell could prove beneficial.
Finally, on the auto-gun as an anti tank weapon. the development of auto weapons should be deemed to be a short term development at this time, the current design is unable to carry anything but the smallest of anti-tank shells and should not be considered for much but close defence for tanks and other vehicles, they cannot be trusted to penetrate the fronts of assault vehicles (or even the sides of certain designs) reliably and when able to penetrate the enemy they will not have ability to do the damage a shell fired from a larger calibre gun will without sacrificing reliability in the field.
On the subject of circumnavigating an enemy's defence, there is one thing that is required above all, intelligence and knowledge of the enemy. As mentioned above this is a developing method and it is to be expected that different nations will come up with different methods. As such there are two possible means of dealing with this, firstly, peace time information gathering should attempt to have a basic understanding of the nations evolution of theories (with wartime information gathering needing to have a priority on enemy doctrine shifts) and that this information should be disseminated amongst both tank units and planning staffs.
For during combat a special detachment should be formed that are taught in reconnaissance, ambush and skirmish tactics and light infantry methods, this unit should actively search ahead of units wherever possible and attempt to discover enemy positions before radioing back the information. The unit should also be ready to deal with the enemies scouts, as such the auto guns that where are unable to serve as anti tank weapons would do well here, a armoured car or mobile light tank able to deal significant damage to other light vehicles and infantry seems to be highly suited to this kind of work.
In conclusion, though the pace in the change of doctrines is due to increase thanks to technological developments and the will to implement them means that specialist methods and units will be required to employ all the advancements that are occurring, and that the future of mechanised combined arms warfare requires an ability to quickly adopt changes of both equipment and doctrinal natures or leave the army lagging behind the enemy.
Edit no.2: still 1000+ words but this time more coherent and follows the title more.
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