Voting is open
[X]The Soldier
[X]The Doctor
[X]The Detective
[X]Eagle Unbowed

Well is it so wrong that I'm a monarchist in these times? (I can compromise, please don't hurt me)
 
Last edited:
Why do we need rearmament?
This is my thinking when it comes to the Rearmament of Germany in 1920. (Please, correct me or even go against me, I'm just trying to justify my thinking)

1. Appeasing the more Millatent members of our society: There is a reason that Hitler rose to power. Germany was under increasingly difficult situations and paranoia, with its armed forces that they thought was not defeated on the battlefield (Again, propaganda, but that thought is a powerful tool for the masses that do not have al the information we do at this time). If we can get those lads at least on board with an idea of, we're making progress into making ourselves a power, while playing for time. Hopefully, we can build up in a way that is not making France Shit Bricks.

2. Unemployment Solution: What is the best way to get millions of unemployed young men into the workforce, many of whom are unskilled or dirt poor men who have little prospects in the rebuilding German Economy? Give them a stable job in the army where they can at least not be a (possibly worse) drain on the state's expenditure in other ways (like unemployment pensions and the like). Or worse then that, become another Corpse buried in the Graveyards of Germany.

3. Government Legitimacy: All Political Power derives from the Barrel of a gun. Whoever has the most trained guns in any government can dictate policy. And if we want the republic to survive the coming storm of Soviets, Civil Strife or even worse things to come... Well we need all the guns we can get.

4. The Soviet Union is a threat to Germany. France is a threat to Germany. They are against us, and for better or for worse, a large standing force is a plenty powerful deterrent to... well war. And it would look better if we were the defenders just trying to defend ourselves from a very aggressive neighbor, then well... What the Nazis did.

Edit: Ninja'd
 
Last edited:
To your mind, what does that imply in terms of policy?

Diplomatically speaking, France is a holding action. Any concession that can be wrung from them through just our own diplomatic abilities will be minor, things of the nature of "reparations have been reduced by 5%" or "next month's shipment of steel as reparations will be delayed". Meaningful material gains in reducing the impact of the Treaty of Versailles on Germany is fundamentally hinged on a charm offensive of the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States is the only real source of credit left in the world left available to us and is key to both restarting our economy and through the leverage it possesses in Entente war debt, good ties with the United States will introduce a powerful diplomatic tool for us to wrench reductions of the reparations from the Entente. The United Kingdom is the other major guaranteeing power of Versailles that we can be sure of for Italy is a dumpster fire. The United Kingdom now wishes to see stability in Europe, and was historically becoming antsy with the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr from its very onset. France does not wish to become diplomatically isolated from its major allies and that fear of having to possibly confront Germany only with its own sphere is so intense that this is the only method by which concessions can be feasibly rung from the French. A full withdrawal from the Rhine can only be accomplished in the long term through this and the public discontent within France itself by the expenses of continued occupation.
 
I want to focus for a second on the Baltic. Just a military digression from our current discussion of France, but I feel it's worth discussing.
The Soviet navy is a shadow of the Imperial armada. It is unpopular at the moment, being liquidated bit by bit, and lacking much of the heavy numbers that made the Tsar's fleet imposing. It also has three battleships, and a metric ton of lighter ships that will mess up our fleet. Furthermore, we cannot really counter this heavy force with force of our own-it'll take years to get a fleet half the size the Ruskies have going. The Russians also have a sub fleet, which is rather distressing. All in all, the Russians will always win on the open seas, with the exception of the miracles of RNGesus. And there isn't really a way to counter them with bigger guns and tougher hulls. But we can counter them.

In 1918-1919, the British launched a naval campaign, with the aid of the Baltic countries, to hinder Russian naval operations in the Baltic. On August 18, 1919, British motor torpedo boats, with aerial support from a carrier, attacked the Russian naval base at Kronstadt, during nighttime. The aircraft were inconsequential, but three boats- CMB 88, CMB 79, and, CMB 31, found success. Under heavy fire which killed her captain, CMB 88 sank the Gangut class battleship Petropavlovsk, while the undamaged CMBs 31 and 79 sank another Gangut and the submarine depot ship Pamyat Azova. All in all, the raid lost three boats, and sank three capital ships.

If we are to have a navy worth a damn vs a Soviet menace, we ought to replicate the British success. MTBs are fragile, and their undersea counterpart U-Boats are countered both by destroyers, and we can't make a navy entirely ought of them, of course. We still need destroyers for escort and cruisers for intermediate tasks and long-range operations. But MTBs and U-Boats, are a very much useful tool to have in our inventory considering the Soviet fleet makeup, and destroyers have their weaknesses, not being able to protect port raids, for instance. The Soviet fleet is expensive and vulnerable to cheap counterattacks, and we ought to exploit this as much as possible. Modern technology on cheaper platforms is the best way forward if the German navy wishes to fight the Soviets for the time being, seeing as we're in the opportune moment where the torpedo net has been obsoleted due to speed, but the Soviets have older ships without torpedo bulges and belts.

I got this mostly from R.G Grant's Battle at Sea and this site I found.
 
@mouli, what happened to Hugenberg? When we raided the printers did we target his businesses as well? Did he decide to take a sabbatical to Sweden too? Or do we just not know his fate?
 
@mouli, what happened to Hugenberg? When we raided the printers did we target his businesses as well? Did he decide to take a sabbatical to Sweden too? Or do we just not know his fate?
Herr Hugenberg is a well-respected member of the media community and owns a large number of papers, some of which are under investigation for sedition. He is wealthy enough to be out on bail and is suing the government under free-speech protections to get his papers back. He is at present resident in lovely Koenigsberg, and had no choice - as a civilian, surely everyone sees that he had to go along with the army's coup? He supports the right sort of republic, you know.
:V
 
He is wealthy enough to be out on bail and is suing the government under free-speech protections to get his papers back.
Hah! What does ze dink dis is, America? What is dis "free speech"?? Anyway, hopefully he'll end up getting a looong free stay at a lovely government facility, with meals included! :V
 
Yes it has, and I'll quote that for you


There is also stuff from the previous thread about this, but it is far too late here to look through that and I need to sleep. If the Polish lose at Vistula, they're in deep doo doo and it is a matter of time before they're driven off of Poland.

Because there was no incentive THEN to do so. We are talking about redrawing the map and completely shifting the geopolitical dynamics in Eastern and Central Europe. There wasn't a threat of a power threatening to sweep through Europe in the name of Internationalism, we hadn't just fought a civil war that weakened us even more.

The Soviet Union wasn't literally in the gates of Warsaw then, and the Sanation regime was massively paranoid over the Soviet Union. And again, apples to oranges, you're completely ignoring the fact a National Socialist government that was on the process of rearming and would enter the Rhineland a year later was right next to France. You're applying 1930's logic to a alternate history early 20s. The Soviets are a threat to them if Poland falls, and they know that, where did all those Renault FT's in Polish hands come from? Certainly not us.

As you said, to an extent, if we want any meaningful foreign policy achievements, having the Poles fall would be a crucial tool to doing so. I just don't see us having substantial success without it happening.

That quote is regarding the Kresy Lands, it says nothing as to the ultimate fate of Poland. @mouli Could we have verification if anything has been said regarding how Poland will turn out regardless of which option is taken?

Is this implying that these weren't real threats in 1919? The Frontiers of Eastern Europe have been left blank for maps issued at this time because they changed so quickly. In the past year and a half the Ukrainian People's Republic has died, the West Ukrainian People's Republic has died, the Belarussian People's Republic has died, the survival of the Baltic States was and frankly still is in flux. The Hungarian Soviet Republic was threatening to bring the revolution to the whole of the Balkans. This argument is predicated on 1919 having been set in stone when in truth the ground then and now was not so different in the sense that the situation on the ground changes literally week by week. With that in mind, the French still pursued an extremely punitive course against us in 1919. I ask again, why is the situation different enough now for France to reverse its policy towards us?

You keep presuming the Fall of Poland if that option is taken and I have already outlined why I think that isn't a reasonable conclusion so I will not reiterate that. Rearmament in the Weimar Republic was already preceding well before the Nazis took power and this was public knowledge to anyone who was inclined to dig a little. As far as the French were concerned Hitler simply went out and said it. And regarding arms sales, does this mean that we are aligned with South America because most of their service rifles are Mausers of some sort? You are being ignorant of the basic axiomatic principles of each country's foreign policy.

Relying on the Poles falling to do anything is a ridiculous crutch. There is room to maneuver and you are refusing to see it.
 
@mouli Could we have verification if anything has been said regarding how Poland will turn out regardless of which option is taken?
The worst-case for Poland is a Soviet ripping off of Eastern Poland, substantial chunks of Eastern Poland, leaving Poland crippled and riddled with communist agitators. A Polish Soviet Republic is a bridge too far for Russia when it has not yet even ended the Russian Civil War. Russia is profoundly exhausted, to an extent that makes Weimar Germany look buff and fresh.
Poland will exist, the question is what alignment the rump of Poland eventually moves to. In the worst case.
 
Is this implying that these weren't real threats in 1919?
None approaching the level of the Red Army's more than a hundred thousand men waltzing onto Poland and installing a puppet state or seizing a bunch of land for itself right after conquering Ukraine. It was assumed that they would then do the same to Central Europe, and then why stop after that? Don't take my word on that, take the Right Honorable Edgar Vicent's. A contemporary and British diplomat in Berlin right now.
The Hungarian Soviet Republic was threatening to bring the revolution to the whole of the Balkans.
They were a joke, and nowhere near the Union's level. Their neighbors promptly took care of them.
With that in mind, the French still pursued an extremely punitive course against us in 1919. I ask again, why is the situation different enough now for France to reverse its policy towards us?
Because this is much, much worse than the situation in the East then. They didn't even know that the Whites would win or not at that point. The situation was a lot more rosy for them then.
And regarding arms sales, does this mean that we are aligned with South America because most of their service rifles are Mausers of some sort? You are being ignorant of the basic axiomatic principles of each country's foreign policy.
I assume you are referring to my comment towards French equipment in Polish hands. Again, apples to oranges, South America was a dumping ground for military cast offs, while they gave those arms to the Polish to fight the Soviets and guard against the Germans, not just to make a quick buck like the former. Arms sales don't mean anything until they do.
Relying on the Poles falling to do anything is a ridiculous crutch. There is room to maneuver and you are refusing to see it.
You just said the French are deeply unreasonable and won't accede to any requests unless the British and Americans force them to. How is relying on them not a crutch?? Poland falling or being relegated to irrelevance is as much a tool in diplomacy as the former, the difference is that it expands the limit of concessions we can reasonably expect and allows us to reason with the French.
 
Last edited:
None approaching the level of the Red Army's more than a hundred thousand men waltzing onto Poland and installing a puppet state or seizing a bunch of land for itself right after conquering Ukraine. It was assumed that they would then do the same to Central Europe, and then why stop after that? Don't take my word on that, take the Right Honorable Edgar Vicent's. A contemporary and British diplomat in Berlin right now.

They were a joke, and nowhere near the Union's level. Their neighbors promptly took care of them.

Because this is much, much worse than the situation in the East then. They didn't even know that the Whites would win or not at that point. The situation was a lot more rosy for them then.

I assume you are referring to my comment towards French equipment in Polish hands. Again, apples to oranges, South America was a dumping ground for military cast offs, while they gave those arms to the Polish to fight the Soviets and guard against the Germans, not just to make a quick buck like the former. Arms sales don't mean anything until they do.

You just said the French are deeply unreasonable and won't accede to any requests unless the British and Americans force them to. How is relying on them not a crutch?? Poland falling or being relegated to irrelevance is as much a tool in diplomacy as the former, the difference is that it expands the limit of concessions we can reasonably expect and allows us to reason with the French.
So a 4 month war involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers and tens of thousands of deaths is nothing and the neighbors promptly taking out the trash, but the Soviet Invasion of Poland is a world ending threat when the Poles initiated hostilities in the first place and the Soviets have already been on a wave throughout Eastern Europe since the armistice in 1918? Why is Poland as a domino the crucial infallible piece that will reverse French foreign policy in regards to Germany?

The FT is a cast off and less than 200 of them made it to Poland total out of over 3800 produced. Was it modern at the time? Yes. Was it also part of a massive stock of war surplus? Also yes. Finland ended up purchasing 34 tanks. Brazil purchased 52. My issue with this statement is that when you first posited it, you implied this aid was specifically to combat the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union alone, whereas here you have acknowledged the German element in this equation. While France did support Poland with arms and a military mission, as far as France was concerned this aid was primarily oriented towards the purpose of containing Germany, and while the possibility of the Soviets attacking again later on was real and acknowledge by the French, the primary purpose of the Franco-Polish alliance and accompanying aid was not to oppose the Soviet Union but rather to contain Germany.

What makes it a crutch is that you stated that you can't see any substantial success without Poland falling. Even if Britain and the United States weren't there or had alternate stances, there would be other paths to take, I've just outlined the most easy ones available to us. If you can't see a foreign policy without an annexed or puppet Poland your view is excessively rigid.
 
So a 4 month war involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers and tens of thousands of deaths is nothing and the neighbors promptly taking out the trash
You're putting words in my mouth. Nowhere have I implied or stated this. Especially since the French did react strongly to it, they delayed reparations and took a blind eye towards a series of treaty violations on our part. The point is moot, since the war is over, the issue at hand is whether they will consider the Soviets a threat to Germany and Central Europe and react accordingly.
Poland is a world ending threat when the Poles initiated hostilities in the first place and the Soviets have already been on a wave throughout Eastern Europe since the armistice in 1918?
Also not true, the Whites were at their peak in 1919. The Soviets are in an infinitely better position right now and is a much bigger threat if they get Poland. You're putting words in my mouth yet again, I hardly consider them a world ending threat. They are a significant one to European stability if they win in Poland however, which is something we can use to our advantage.
Why is Poland as a domino the crucial infallible piece that will reverse French foreign policy in regards to Germany?
Because contemporary foreign observers literally described this when predicting a potential fall of Poland. They considered it the last major roadstop towards going into Central Europe. And considering we have a smaller army than most of them, why not us too? It would certainly change their calculations I'd think.
The FT is a cast off and less than 200 of them made it to Poland total out of over 3800 produced. Was it modern at the time? Yes. Was it also part of a massive stock of war surplus? Also yes. Finland ended up purchasing 34 tanks.
Now that you mentioned it, Finland! Another place where the French were selling to a nation threatened by communists. What you are implying is that just because they sold it to other countries means they didn't send it to Poland to support them, which is just not true. Also the FT is just an example, and 200 tanks for a nation such as Poland in 1920 is not the pittance you imply it is.
What makes it a crutch is that you stated that you can't see any substantial success without Poland falling. Even if Britain and the United States weren't there or had alternate stances, there would be other paths to take, I've just outlined the most easy ones available to us. If you can't see a foreign policy without an annexed or puppet Poland your view is excessively rigid.
Putting words in my mouth. Nowhere have I said it is impossible to conduct foreign policy without Poland falling, just much more difficult. I am just pointing out that no, there is no way the French will consider rearmament or ceding an inch of German land any sooner than in OTL unless we either:
A. Crit a bunch of times interacting with them.
or
B. Give them a reason not to be so inflexible, namely not being stomped by the Soviet Union because we are bankrupt and have our armed forces limited to only 100.000 men.

Anyway, this is not productive. We're not changing each other's minds and I am in desperate need of sleep, which is making me more salty than usual, so I apologize if ai came off that way. I think I've made my point clear though: the Soviets as our neighbors would change the political calculus of keeping us as weak as possible. It is something we can take advantage of, and besides, it makes it plain more interesting, which is important since this is (at least for me) supposed to be fun.
 
Last edited:
[X]The Soldier: Fritz Muller has known little but war for most of his adult life. He was drafted at seventeen, and went to the front in 1914. Muller survived the war, survived the civil war that followed, and has put down his rifle in August 1920 to face a brave new world that he doesn't know how to navigate. His section is dead or crippled, his army has dissolved once more and the Kaiser that he took an oath to serve in 1914 is in Germany no longer. Fritz Muller has been naught but a soldier at war, and now he is one no longer.

[X]The Doctor: Professor Emil Fischer is a practicing surgeon and teacher at the Katharinenhospital in Stuttgart, and has seen the war close-up. Most of the severely wounded were dispatched to his wards for reconstruction, and before that he was a surgeon on the Western Front. Emil Fischer has seen death and conducted triage for five bloody years, and now comes peace. Dr. Fischer has doubts as to the durability of that.

[X]The Detective: Detective Arthur Biermann is part of the Berlin Special Branch, trained by a Belgian detective and now coming to terms with his new duties – the Special Branch was founded to deal with terrorism, insurrection and sensitive tasks. With the new peace in the republic, that task will hopefully be of less importance. Biermann wouldn't bet on it.

[X]The Heir is Dead: Yakov Sverdlov was Lenin's protege, and he survived his influenza infection in 1919 to direct the decossackization of Ukraine in 1919-1920. Upon his death, the succession in the Soviet Union has been thrown once more into doubt, as the moderate internationalist Sverdlov has left a vacancy that Lenin has hesitated to fill.
 
[X]The Soldier: Fritz Muller has known little but war for most of his adult life. He was drafted at seventeen, and went to the front in 1914. Muller survived the war, survived the civil war that followed, and has put down his rifle in August 1920 to face a brave new world that he doesn't know how to navigate. His section is dead or crippled, his army has dissolved once more and the Kaiser that he took an oath to serve in 1914 is in Germany no longer. Fritz Muller has been naught but a soldier at war, and now he is one no longer.

[X]The Doctor: Professor Emil Fischer is a practicing surgeon and teacher at the Katharinenhospital in Stuttgart, and has seen the war close-up. Most of the severely wounded were dispatched to his wards for reconstruction, and before that he was a surgeon on the Western Front. Emil Fischer has seen death and conducted triage for five bloody years, and now comes peace. Dr. Fischer has doubts as to the durability of that.

[X]The Detective: Detective Arthur Biermann is part of the Berlin Special Branch, trained by a Belgian detective and now coming to terms with his new duties – the Special Branch was founded to deal with terrorism, insurrection and sensitive tasks. With the new peace in the republic, that task will hopefully be of less importance. Biermann wouldn't bet on it.

[X]The Heir is Dead: Yakov Sverdlov was Lenin's protege, and he survived his influenza infection in 1919 to direct the decossackization of Ukraine in 1919-1920. Upon his death, the succession in the Soviet Union has been thrown once more into doubt, as the moderate internationalist Sverdlov has left a vacancy that Lenin has hesitated to fill.
 
[X]The Soldier
[X]The Communist
[X]The Detective

I believe it's important to see 1. The ground perspective; 2. Our main internal threat; 3. The results of our counterinsurgency policies.

[X]The Heir is Dead
What I can expect from this choice is that it will keep the Soviets from having a moment to catch their breath. They get a region that is mostly hostile to them and royally piss off the Poles, who are now (somewhat more) focused on the Reds. Polish nationalists have much anger for the people they don't like.
 
[X]The Soldier
[X]The Communist
[X]The Detective

I believe it's important to see 1. The ground perspective; 2. Our main internal threat; 3. The results of our counterinsurgency policies.

[X]The Heir is Dead
What I can expect from this choice is that it will keep the Soviets from having a moment to catch their breath. They get a region that is mostly hostile to them and royally piss off the Poles, who are now (somewhat more) focused on the Reds. Polish nationalists have much anger for the people they don't like.

That assumes that Poland doesn't lose to the Soviets if we don't pick the Eagle Unbowed.

For all we know, not picking that puts the Soviets on our border. . .
 
Voting is open
Back
Top