[Continuation] Schwarz-Rot-Gold: An Interwar Germany Quest

[X]The Soldier
[X]The Doctor
[X]The Detective
[X] The Eagle Unbowed

[X]The Soldier
[X]The Merchant of Death
[X]The Communist
[X]The Heir is Dead

I honestly want to see what could Soviets without Stalin look like, but I was convinced enough that for our German perspective this timeline is actually better and allows more leverages to regain our place in geopolitics. Also mind you that Poles wouldn't really like Vistula Country 2: Red Boogaloo forced on them and that region could become pain for Soviet government to placate for years, which will likely prevent them from attacking us even more surely.
Though timeline vote is still close enough - 23:19.

KnightofTempest said:

That assumes that Poland doesn't lose to the Soviets if we don't pick the Eagle Unbowed.

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I actually do assume here that Poland loses to Soviets. What I meant is that Reds get one more region that is extremely hostile to their regime, wide-scale anti-soviet partisan movement is to be expected. Soviets would have to go full Red Terror just to keep at least an illusion of control, which means massive commitment of troops that could be used elsewhere, putting down uprisings.

Something interesting to know about any eventual anschluss

[X]The Soldier: Fritz Muller has known little but war for most of his adult life. He was drafted at seventeen, and went to the front in 1914. Muller survived the war, survived the civil war that followed, and has put down his rifle in August 1920 to face a brave new world that he doesn't know how to navigate. His section is dead or crippled, his army has dissolved once more and the Kaiser that he took an oath to serve in 1914 is in Germany no longer. Fritz Muller has been naught but a soldier at war, and now he is one no longer.
[X]The Communist: Ernst Thalmann is a former soldier, a decorated one, who did a bunk from the Army in 1918 for the sake of the November Revolution and the Uprising that followed it. Thalmann's side of the war has lost...this time. The next time will be different, and that is why Ernst Thalmann has remained in Germany – to organize the workers and make sure that they are in a position to take what is theirs by right. Weimar is unstable, and presents opportunities.
[X]The Detective: Detective Arthur Biermann is part of the Berlin Special Branch, trained by a Belgian detective and now coming to terms with his new duties – the Special Branch was founded to deal with terrorism, insurrection and sensitive tasks. With the new peace in the republic, that task will hopefully be of less importance. Biermann wouldn't bet on it.
[X]The Heir is Dead: Yakov Sverdlov was Lenin's protege, and he survived his influenza infection in 1919 to direct the decossackization of Ukraine in 1919-1920. Upon his death, the succession in the Soviet Union has been thrown once more into doubt, as the moderate internationalist Sverdlov has left a vacancy that Lenin has hesitated to fill.

I would like to add some information on Soviet Russia, since this quest came from SB here.

1. Stalin is not the most likely heir, or rather he is generally an opposition leader. In the event of the death of Sverdlov, we will have the main battle Lenin - Trotsky. Stalin will also be nearby, but he is only gaining power so far and any strong blow can hit him. There is also a major economic debate about the NEP and market share in the Soviet economy.
2. Many do not understand the weakness of Russian industry. They need at the same time a large number of products for their own sales market, and at the same time machine tools for industry. IRL, the impossibility of solving this issue led to the adoption of the collectivization route, which made it possible not to spend limited state funds on market prices for grain, but to supply it to cities and factories as cheaply as possible. In the absence of a major isolation of the USSR, it is more likely to follow the path of Bukharin, a trade exchange between the village and the city in the style (the city makes machines - buys consumer goods - exchanges grain for consumer goods - the city grows and makes more machines).
3. For some reason, everyone considers the basic truth that the Soviets will ceaselessly march to the West, but this is contradicted by the apparent failure of the communist movement in Germany and Poland. In any case, this will cause a serious crisis in the issue of ideology (which assumes that the liberated proletarians join the red army, and do not shoot at it). At the same time, during 1921-1922 the RSFSR will be mired in supply, policy and management crises, the result of which was the formation of the USSR and the beginning of the NEP.
4. Being in total economic and political isolation, we may find ourselves in a situation where it is more profitable to be a trade partner of the USSR than an enemy. In turn, it will probably be possible to win preferences for itself on a number of issues of the Vensal Peace Treaty in response to major indignations of the Entente.
5. White has already lost, the main issue is the scale of the intervention. For example, Japan wants to retain a piece of Russia in the Far East. In fact, that's all, real opportunities to change the course of the war for the whites ended after the failure of the offensive on Moscow in 1919.

Melifaro said:

I would like to add some information on Soviet Russia, since this quest came from SB here.

1. Stalin is not the most likely heir, or rather he is generally an opposition leader. In the event of the death of Sverdlov, we will have the main battle Lenin - Trotsky. Stalin will also be nearby, but he is only gaining power so far and any strong blow can hit him. There is also a major economic debate about the NEP and market share in the Soviet economy.
2. Many do not understand the weakness of Russian industry. They need at the same time a large number of products for their own sales market, and at the same time machine tools for industry. IRL, the impossibility of solving this issue led to the adoption of the collectivization route, which made it possible not to spend limited state funds on market prices for grain, but to supply it to cities and factories as cheaply as possible. In the absence of a major isolation of the USSR, it is more likely to follow the path of Bukharin, a trade exchange between the village and the city in the style (the city makes machines - buys consumer goods - exchanges grain for consumer goods - the city grows and makes more machines).
3. For some reason, everyone considers the basic truth that the Soviets will ceaselessly march to the West, but this is contradicted by the apparent failure of the communist movement in Germany and Poland. In any case, this will cause a serious crisis in the issue of ideology (which assumes that the liberated proletarians join the red army, and do not shoot at it). At the same time, during 1921-1922 the RSFSR will be mired in supply, policy and management crises, the result of which was the formation of the USSR and the beginning of the NEP.
4. Being in total economic and political isolation, we may find ourselves in a situation where it is more profitable to be a trade partner of the USSR than an enemy. In turn, it will probably be possible to win preferences for itself on a number of issues of the Vensal Peace Treaty in response to major indignations of the Entente.
5. White has already lost, the main issue is the scale of the intervention. For example, Japan wants to retain a piece of Russia in the Far East. In fact, that's all, real opportunities to change the course of the war for the whites ended after the failure of the offensive on Moscow in 1919.

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1. While I would agree that Stalin seizing power is far from guaranteed, from what I've got on those events he's just one of the best in party at seizing power for himself and vanquishing his opponents, so I still see him as likely leader in the future.
2-3. This is absolutely true, Soviet state is rather weak and is even less capable of waging large industrial war similar to WWI than Russian Empire, but Red Scare is still a thing in the West. Remember that Britain and France literally fed Hitler right until WWII because of their fear of objectively still developing country incapable of doing anything to shake power of their governments. While French's fear of Germans is much bigger than of communism and they wouldn't be caught into this trap, Britain and US likely could be, and we can leverage this.
4. ...while also probably working with USSR in other side as in OTL.
(Also I feel shame now for not pointing this first now, eh).

Edit: it's probably worth to point out that socialist rebellion in Italy is still ongoing and while most likely it would be crushed, there's still a small chance of worker industrial state friendly to Soviet Russia appearing on map and breaking their isolation

[X]The Soldier
[X]The Merchant of Death
[X]The Communist

[X]Eagle Unbowed

Melifaro said:

For some reason, everyone considers the basic truth that the Soviets will ceaselessly march to the West, but this is contradicted by the apparent failure of the communist movement in Germany and Poland.

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We're talking about the Soviets though, the Polish communists were never as strong as the German ones, and the latter gave us a hell of a fight. The only reason they didn't snowball was that we were agressively on the offensive every single turn against them, and they didn't have the same ratio of officers and professionals soldiers as us. Or the Union for that matter. The KPD was arguably the strongest faction of our civil war.

As for the Soviets marching west, it has been stated that they have been more successful than OTL already, the Red Army in Poland is much less battered and the Polish one is in a worse state than in real life. And to the West, the fall of Poland would have been a disaster that would leave Central Europe as the next target. We know from hindsight they'll need to stop and recover, but they didn't at the time, and we can take advantage of that, especially since they are stronger than OTL. To them, it was inevitable they would try to expand following a Polish loss, it would be a matter of time. That's why they considered it a basic truth.

Regarding the the rearmament question, the fact that nuclear weapons arent going to be a thing for a couple of decades does in fact make it a critical security risk to be disarmed like we are. Sure, most people don't want war right now, but give it two decades and there are absolutely no guarantees that public opinion in France or somewhere else hasnt turned jingoistic. More yet, not having a military that's up to snuff can easily turn into a massive diplomatic liability of France feels like pushing their weight around, like they most certainly have nothing against right now seeing as they are squatting in some of our richest industrial lands. Once the Great Depression hits this whole peace business we have going in Europe is rapidly going to become a lot more uncertain, and by then I want to be able to do some rearmaments, as well as build up trained reservists.

Mr. Sandman said:

We know from hindsight they'll need to stop and recover, but they didn't at the time, and we can take advantage of that, especially since they are stronger than OTL.

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and many soviet leaders within the soviet union itself don´t know that either. Lenin dreamed of carrying the revolution into germany, who he saw as the actual big promised land for communism to start the world revolution. Now after a big ass civil war that "proofed" that there is a suppressed proletariat in germany with german communists pressing lenin to liberate them from the weakened german republic, i suspect the soviets will launch an ideological crusade into our direction, though given the distance, supply problems and constant Polish guerilla resistance and raids from the polish rump state and we should be able to utterly savage them, maybe even throw them back a little and secure danzig and the polish corridor

Mr. Sandman said:

Because the Soviets might be a threat either way, it was implied in the previous thread they're beefier than before, and the army is a good escape valve for unemployment. And we won't need to rearm the way the Nazis did, at least I hope not, since we don't know what will come in the future. It will also be a massive domestic victory, which will strengthen the government, something important in the aftermath of a civil war. Hindenburg and his fellows, for example, will look at us with much more respect. As will conservative voters. These are only a couple my sleep addled mind can conjure up.

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Magoose said:

This is my thinking when it comes to the Rearmament of Germany in 1920. (Please, correct me or even go against me, I'm just trying to justify my thinking)

1. Appeasing the more Millatent members of our society: There is a reason that Hitler rose to power. Germany was under increasingly difficult situations and paranoia, with its armed forces that they thought was not defeated on the battlefield (Again, propaganda, but that thought is a powerful tool for the masses that do not have al the information we do at this time). If we can get those lads at least on board with an idea of, we're making progress into making ourselves a power, while playing for time. Hopefully, we can build up in a way that is not making France Shit Bricks.

2. Unemployment Solution: What is the best way to get millions of unemployed young men into the workforce, many of whom are unskilled or dirt poor men who have little prospects in the rebuilding German Economy? Give them a stable job in the army where they can at least not be a (possibly worse) drain on the state's expenditure in other ways (like unemployment pensions and the like). Or worse then that, become another Corpse buried in the Graveyards of Germany.

3. Government Legitimacy: All Political Power derives from the Barrel of a gun. Whoever has the most trained guns in any government can dictate policy. And if we want the republic to survive the coming storm of Soviets, Civil Strife or even worse things to come... Well we need all the guns we can get.

4. The Soviet Union is a threat to Germany. France is a threat to Germany. They are against us, and for better or for worse, a large standing force is a plenty powerful deterrent to... well war. And it would look better if we were the defenders just trying to defend ourselves from a very aggressive neighbor, then well... What the Nazis did.

Edit: Ninja'd

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You're picking pretty much to worst part of the treaty to demand concessions to.

Given the size of the German army during war time and the scale of the Soviet threat, aiming for an army that can soak up a decent chunk of unemployment, scare off the Soviets and please the militarists basically means giving Germany the army of a great power. Even the US and UK are going to balk at that. The demilitarization was mostly seen as justified, even by Wilson. Heck. Even the German proposals at Versaille included it because they realized that it was a red line.

Here's the areas you're more likely to get concessions at, because they were unpopular even in the Entente:

• Self determination in the German eastern territories/Austria.
• War reparations
• Admittance into the League of Nations

It has been argued that the collapse of Austria Hungary and Russia left Germany in a stronger position in 1919 than it had been in 1914. Surrounded by weaker states in the east rather than strong potential enemies, it's industrial heartland intact, French demographics being blown to smithereens and the removal of the drain that was the German colonial empire.

Allowing Poland to fall in order to have a small shot at re-negotiating the part of the treaty that is the least likely to be changed is a mistake. It echoes Brüning's plan to intentionally blow up the German economy in order get rid of reparation payments (which ended up setting the stage for Hitler). Sure we might be able to get some concessions, but you're creating a bigger problem here.

Yep

A poland victory at vistula esentially set back communist expansion on europe

Giving the government on germany free sopace to breath

Instead of launching even more unstability into it

matvprok said:

1. While I would agree that Stalin seizing power is far from guaranteed, from what I've got on those events he's just one of the best in party at seizing power for himself and vanquishing his opponents, so I still see him as likely leader in the future.
2-3. This is absolutely true, Soviet state is rather weak and is even less capable of waging large industrial war similar to WWI than Russian Empire, but Red Scare is still a thing in the West. Remember that Britain and France literally fed Hitler right until WWII because of their fear of objectively still developing country incapable of doing anything to shake power of their governments. While French's fear of Germans is much bigger than of communism and they wouldn't be caught into this trap, Britain and US likely could be, and we can leverage this.
4. ...while also probably working with USSR in other side as in OTL.
(Also I feel shame now for not pointing this first now, eh).
Edit: it's probably worth to point out that socialist rebellion in Italy is still ongoing and while most likely it would be crushed, there's still a small chance of worker industrial state friendly to Soviet Russia appearing on map and breaking their isolation

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Unlike Trotsky, Frunze, Voroshilov or Bukharin, Stalin has a support based only on a high share of executive power. Upon joining the system, which transfers legislative acts from the state to regions and cities (the Party Secretariat, and he himself is the Secretary General).
This allows him to form small groups of loyalists in them, but does not give him ultimatum power, because he cannot contradict collegial decisions, because this is not the 30th and the party can easily remove him from this position for minor offenses. Moreover, his policy on a number of issues does not make it easy for him to find allies, and Lenin does not like him. Stalin, like Khrushchev, defeated the political giants in the battle.
Let me just remind you that at this moment the political balance is so delicate that Bukharin was dealt a rather strong blow in the 24th only for a typo in the text, from which it can be assumed that he does not approve of the NEP policy. Stalin can also become part of a scandal and lose power greatly.

Both yes and no on the issue of the red threat. The main problem of the RSFSR is that there is simply no information about them. Literally, in 1920, the crisis in Soviet Russia was strong enough for the country to begin demobilization under the conditions of a civil war (which, by the way, they had already won). Also, due to the war, the soviet railway and steam locomotive factories were in great exhaustion. In fact, in the interval 1920-1921, Russia does not want to fight, but to buy a hundred or two trains for gold in order to return the mobilized soldiers home.

Formed by the USSR, conducting demobilization and beginning market representations, will cause a sharp warming of relations, for this will be perceived by analogy with Thermidor. Even if not, Trotsky, the "main candidate for the role of Napoleon" is against the demilitar of the army and wants to militarize the economy. However, even he understands the need for demobilization and wants to simply militarize the civilian spheres.
"Our goal is not developed countries, capable of building socialism, but transitional undeveloped countries that still dominate feudal remnants against the background of changes in society, "and so on.
In essence, for several years, especially if, like the IRL, the USSR will have good relations with Britain, by 1924-1925 the red threat will finally subside, and the world will be sure that the communist project has failed, at least compared to 1920.

Moreover, with the fall of Poland, does this not mean that Danzig is returning to Berlin?

armentho said:

Yep

A poland victory at vistula esentially set back communist expansion on europe

Giving the government on germany free sopace to breath

Instead of launching even more unstability into it

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We just shot or exiled most of our communists, and their movement was massively discredited in the last month of the war, when they burnt our food after saying them starving was our fault, which massively backfired when we churned out incredibly effective propaganda. Having the Soviets as neighbors will be more a matter of a external enemy than internal ones.

armentho said:

Giving the government on germany free sopace to breath

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We won't have that unless we renegotiate Versailles, our reparations are larger and our industry is not intact like in OTL. The Soviets give us a big excuse to do that.

Melifaro said:

In essence, for several years, especially if, like the IRL, the USSR will have good relations with Britain, by 1924-1925. The red threat will finally subside, and the world will be sure that the communist project has failed, at least compared to 1920.

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We're in 1920 though, and there is no guarantee Anglo-Soviet relations will warm up, especially with the fall of Poland. We also have no ideia what the leadership will look like then.

Also, the earlier we enter negotiations with the Entente following the potential fall of Poland, the more advantageous a position we'll be in. Something to keep in mind.

Dutch said:

It has been argued that the collapse of Austria Hungary and Russia left Germany in a stronger position in 1919 than it had been in 1914. Surrounded by weaker states in the east rather than strong potential enemies, it's industrial heartland intact, French demographics being blown to smithereens and the removal of the drain that was the German colonial empire.

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We need to keep in mind that regardless of if the Poles win or not, we are in a much weaker position than you described. The French are occupying the Rhineland before they did OTL, and they're not likely to retreat unless given a reason to do so. Case Violet (one of the offensives into KPD territory) killed a lot of our industrial workers and did damage to our industrial heartland, and the Poles will probably be much more hostile than OTL because of what the Triad was implied to have done in Silesia.

The only major advantage we have in relation to real life righf now is a more stable government, since then SPD and Zentrum are much stronger and a lot of destabilizing elements in German politics have been taken out of the picture. Which is a big one, to be sure! And the real silver lining of having the civil war happen.

Anyway, it will be a challenge to run this country, but I'm sure it'll be interesting and I'm excited to participate in doing so! Also, @mouli, how are the Italians doing? Are they still having big trouble with the communists?

@mouli Curse you for making me make a new account. And bless you for continuing this. Anway votes:
[X]The Soldier
[X]The Doctor
[X]The Detective

Melifaro said:

Moreover, with the fall of Poland, does this not mean that Danzig is returning to Berlin?

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No, it doesn't by default. Its a "free city" administered by Poland. Which was often a fig leaf for it being seized by Poland. It was neither lost from nor part of Germany, which kept the sore open and weeping.
Edit: Although the gamble of seizing it to prevent it from "falling into communist hands" is open to us. This violates the ToV and we should be sure that the French are too distracted to escalate anything and the UK/USA are ambivalent.
Edit edit: Most of the "stuff" the Reich lost has been placed under "LoN administration", which could (and was at that time) be read as "will be returned at a later date". Or was plain hypocritical as a fig leaf to seize territory.
Edit edit edit (god damn it, brain): A lot of the german grievance can be summed up as getting a major case of "rules for thee, but not for me" by the victors. I am not going to get into an argument whether or not this was justified or not, but that was a major part which drove internal politics. Somehow dealing with this is curcial to keep the revanchists under control in the long-term.

mouli said:

This is a good point. What are your goals? What are the broad means you want to use? Use that to pick a choice. Rearmament is a tool/objective that is not an end in and of itself, it is subordinate to the goal of defense/projection of power.

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In very short: Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit!

In short:

• Restore/recoup the sovereingty lost by the ToV (w.r.t. foreign policy, we are not members of the League of Nations, that is to say "international polite society")
• Stabilize the "new German state", this nesscitates:
  • Convincing the monarchists to support the new state - we relied on them during the civil war, so giving them a raw deal sets a bad example. Also, we don't want "Civil war, second ed"
  • Squashing the Stooges and the Communists
  • Resolving (somehow...either reversing or resolving it that the claim does no longer exist) the issues brought by the ToV, including but not limited to:
    • A-L
    • Danzig/Corridor
    • Sudetenland
• Get Germonies
• Prosperity, wealth, and a permanent roaring 20s in Germany
  • Rights for all, duty for all and comfort for all. A well oiled machine.

Edit: I definitly agree that the lever to move the French are the UK and USA.

[X]The Soldier
[X]The Merchant of Death
[X]The Detective
[X]Eagle Unbowed

[X]Eagle Unbowed

[X]The Merchant of Death: Gustav Krupp made a deal with the Devil in 1920, a deal to sell arms in conjunction with Sir Basil Zaharoff and Vickers Corporation. Sir Basil has sold arms the world over to anyone who can pay, and with Krupp's former war-plants now disassembled and being 'scrapped' in France by Zaharoff, German-pattern arms will be seen in every war from China to the Balkans. A brave new world, full of rich markets, now beckons.
[X]The Communist: Ernst Thalmann is a former soldier, a decorated one, who did a bunk from the Army in 1918 for the sake of the November Revolution and the Uprising that followed it. Thalmann's side of the war has lost...this time. The next time will be different, and that is why Ernst Thalmann has remained in Germany – to organize the workers and make sure that they are in a position to take what is theirs by right. Weimar is unstable, and presents opportunities.
[X]The Detective: Detective Arthur Biermann is part of the Berlin Special Branch, trained by a Belgian detective and now coming to terms with his new duties – the Special Branch was founded to deal with terrorism, insurrection and sensitive tasks. With the new peace in the republic, that task will hopefully be of less importance. Biermann wouldn't bet on it.
[X]The Heir is Dead: Yakov Sverdlov was Lenin's protege, and he survived his influenza infection in 1919 to direct the decossackization of Ukraine in 1919-1920. Upon his death, the succession in the Soviet Union has been thrown once more into doubt, as the moderate internationalist Sverdlov has left a vacancy that Lenin has hesitated to fill.

Reconsidered who I wanted for PoVs - Krupp in particular seems like a unique perspective compared to everyone else - but after consideration, I'm sticking with The Heir is Dead. A weaker Poland and a Weaker Soviet Union are good for Germany because the country is currently even more fucked than in OTL and desperately needs some breathing room to recover. Taking back our eastern territories will also be a huge sop to our nationalist and monarchist compatriots, who need to be appeased after hard-carrying the Republic in the civil war.

absent said:

No, it doesn't by default. Its a "free city" administered by Poland. Which was often a fig leaf for it being seized by Poland. It was neither lost from nor part of Germany, which kept the sore open and weeping.

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Danzig in the last quest spent its time hoping for League of Nations security, but I don't think we got the results of that. We did use them as a gateway to Poland for weapons, though, so that's something.
@mouli, how did it go over with the LoN?

Tactitron said:

@mouli, how did it go over with the LoN?

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The League made a protest that was quietly stalled and defanged by the British and French, at least w.r.t. German-made arms headed for Poland. Danzig has a League guarantee but, crucially, not an Anglo-French guarantee. It exists as an uneasy codominium between Germany and Poland and itself, and balances the two former powers simply to exist.

mouli said:

The League made a protest that was quietly stalled and defanged by the British and French, at least w.r.t. German-made arms headed for Poland. Danzig has a League guarantee but, crucially, not an Anglo-French guarantee. It exists as an uneasy codominium between Germany and Poland and itself, and balances the two former powers simply to exist.

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So the LoN is its OTL dithering club of "respectable countries" doing as much harm as good?
Edit: It makes me bite the table.
Edit edit: Crap. This means if the Reich doesn't defend Danzig and the League guarantee isn't threatening enough, someone (read: Poles and/or Soviets) might be tempted to seize it.

[X]The Merchant of Death
[X]The Communist
[X]The Detective
[X]Eagle Unbowed

This is a genuinely difficult vote, because there's so much uncertainty around it and strong arguments on both sides, and I think either position winning does not make too much difference on our eventual policy choices.

I think, here, that Dutch and Sturmi are broadly right on the historical analysis, with the following key takeaways:

• Washington and London are our points of leverage; Paris is not movable in the span of time of this quest
• the border on the West is fixed
• the places where we can negotiate are:
  • self-determination in the East,
  • reparations,
  • LoN membership.

The vote, as I see it, comes down to two options: guaranteed stronger Poland at the risk of rolling the dice in the USSR, if we pick Eagle Unbowed; or guaranteed leadership chaos in Russia at the expense of a weaker Poland.

I'm persuaded that a weaker Poland will not be willing to negotiate on the contested border claims -- and if we move to secure those by force or coercion, we will cause more resentment among the Poles and pushback from the Entente. That means if our priority is Silesia, Austria, the Sudentenland or the Corridor, or resolving final status of Klaipeda/Memel, we would prefer the guarantee of a stronger Poland that is in more of a mood to make concessions rather than a weaker Poland less able to resist German pressure.


The other option is also good, though I have much more difficulty reasoning through its long-term effects. For people who are more familiar with the period, what would a Bukharin-led USSR look like through the 30s?

Secretariat said:

This is a genuinely difficult vote, because there's so much uncertainty around it and strong arguments on both sides, and I think either position winning does not make too much difference on our eventual policy choices.

I think, here, that Dutch and Sturmi are broadly right on the historical analysis, with the following key takeaways:

• Washington and London are our points of leverage; Paris is not movable in the span of time of this quest
• the border on the West is fixed
• the places where we can negotiate are:
  • self-determination in the East,
  • reparations,
  • LoN membership.

The vote, as I see it, comes down to two options: guaranteed stronger Poland at the risk of rolling the dice in the USSR, if we pick Eagle Unbowed; or guaranteed leadership chaos in Russia at the expense of a weaker Poland.

I'm persuaded that a weaker Poland will not be willing to negotiate on the contested border claims -- and if we move to secure those by force or coercion, we will cause more resentment among the Poles and pushback from the Entente. That means if our priority is Silesia, Austria, the Sudentenland or the Corridor, or resolving final status of Klaipeda/Memel, we would prefer the guarantee of a stronger Poland that is in more of a mood to make concessions rather than a weaker Poland less able to resist German pressure.


The other option is also good, though I have much more difficulty reasoning through its long-term effects. For people who are more familiar with the period, what would a Bukharin-led USSR look like through the 30s?

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Striking vote. No clue which is better. We aren't getting ahead by coercion without re-enacting OTL. London and Washington to move France.
Perhaps we can open some sort of alt-Kama Tank School in Posen as a gesture of mutual defence some time down the road? Also, we should keep in mind that the French Republic was rather unstable in the inter-war. So assuming there will be no "disturbance" in France we can exploit to redress the ToV is pessimistic. Of course, we might as well get French-Hitler or communists on both sides (in either case, I'd advocate notifing the rest of the Entente that the treaty is no longer fulfillable, since you can't have a treaty with a party that ceases to exist).