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A Regiment at War: A American Civil War Quest

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One thing future historians are going to comment on is Yates eye for talent and his ability to manage his sub commanders. Throughout our tenure as army commander we have accumulated what is probably the best collection of corps commanders among armies on both sides. We have Buford who has been the mvp. Meade and slocum who like their otl selves are good enough to command their own armies. Sturgis and Wilcox who had been ever dependable. Rodman who has definitely proven himself and Cox who captured Wilmington for us. Throughout the multiple battles we have fought all of them have performed reliably and risen to the occasion. What's more we seem to have a good team ethic ongoing without any of the micromanagement, ego clashes or infighting that often troubled armies in this period. When we ask our corps commanders to perform a task we are fully confident they will do it without any need to look over their shoulders.
 
Bharatavarsha said:
One thing future historians are going to comment on is Yates eye for talent and his ability to manage his sub commanders. Throughout our tenure as army commander we have accumulated what is probably the best collection of corps commanders among armies on both sides. We have Buford who has been the mvp. Meade and slocum who like their otl selves are good enough to command their own armies. Sturgis and Wilcox who had been ever dependable. Rodman who has definitely proven himself and Cox who captured Wilmington for us. Throughout the multiple battles we have fought all of them have performed reliably and risen to the occasion. What's more we seem to have a good team ethic ongoing without any of the micromanagement, ego clashes or infighting that often troubled armies in this period. When we ask our corps commanders to perform a task we are fully confident they will do it without any need to look over their shoulders.
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Honestly hope I have modeled that correctly, feuds and clashes were quiet common as you said, in this period and while I think the commanders mesh well with each other, I sometimes wonder if I do it too much. Again like to keep things as realistic as I can!
 
Skrevski said:
Honestly hope I have modeled that correctly, feuds and clashes were quiet common as you said, in this period and while I think the commanders mesh well with each other, I sometimes wonder if I do it too much. Again like to keep things as realistic as I can!
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I think what makes it work is Yates's charisma(butt-kissing, lol). He listens to his commanders when they suggest stuff, he trusts them enough to give them operational independence at times, he makes sure to speak with them personally to make sure no feathers are ruffled, and he's not McClellan. :V

It also helps that he's really good at both politics and warfare.
 
Small question at what point will the Confederates surrender, when we capture Atlanta or will they move their capital again to Jackson or something?
 
Hmmm get the feeling that McClellan is gonna try discrediting Yates by using the North Carolina/Virginia campaign. On paper at the beginning the numbers say Yates should of won easily. Obviously that's ignoring the type of general Beauregard is, Confederacy getting reinforcements to replace their loses and just other things that can't just be predictable. Basically McClellan gonna really criticize how close Yates and Beauregard were in campaign.
 
mrsean22 said:
Hmmm get the feeling that McClellan is gonna try discrediting Yates by using the North Carolina/Virginia campaign. On paper at the beginning the numbers say Yates should of won easily. Obviously that's ignoring the type of general Beauregard is, Confederacy getting reinforcements to replace their loses and just other things that can't just be predictable. Basically McClellan gonna really criticize how close Yates and Beauregard were in campaign.
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I do wanna bring up some of the stuff taking place back north so you might get some insight to what is happening with him soon enough.
 
mrsean22 said:
Hmmm get the feeling that McClellan is gonna try discrediting Yates by using the North Carolina/Virginia campaign. On paper at the beginning the numbers say Yates should of won easily. Obviously that's ignoring the type of general Beauregard is, Confederacy getting reinforcements to replace their loses and just other things that can't just be predictable. Basically McClellan gonna really criticize how close Yates and Beauregard were in campaign.
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People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones. But hey it's McClellan.
 
Skrevski said:
Honestly hope I have modeled that correctly, feuds and clashes were quiet common as you said, in this period and while I think the commanders mesh well with each other, I sometimes wonder if I do it too much. Again like to keep things as realistic as I can!
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I do think that we might've had it a little too easy, given how awful a time OTL union commanders had trying to manage the egos and personalities of their own generals. That being said, the literal "starter skill" we picked out for Yates was a social one, so it makes sense he'd be good at handling this kind of stuff - I think in a recent battle we had a scene where Meade nearly blew a fuse, but Yates and his staff managed to cool him down. That being said, we've gotten pretty lucky with our less exceptional subordinates all falling ill/getting injured, allowing us to replace them with competent and loyal generals whose careers we have made and we've been working with for a while.
 
Yates ass kissing/charisma was the starter skill. Not to mention Yates has been learning what these people he works with are like even before Yates has been leading a army. Even if everyone didn't get along I can see Yates making sure it doesn't interfere with the campaign itself. Doesn't hurt that everyone in this army is where they are at in position and rank because of Yates. :V

Edit: Yates was able to calm Meade down....Like that's impressive in of itself. Can just see people in the Union military and just historians making jokes about it.
 
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History Teacher: "The one thing that singled Yates out, much like Grant, was an ability to soothe the ego's and understand the minds of his subordinates"
Student: "I said that in my essay! Why did you fail me?"
History Teacher: "Writing 'Yates Kissed Ass like it was his wife' is not an acceptable method of explaining it"
 
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Analysis of Antietam - Planning and Politics
  • Sidestory
    • Planning and Politics​

    As September 14th crawled to an end, the leadership of the Army of the Potomac assembled at the "Mountain House," recently reclaimed from the Confederacy and possessing a magnificent view over the flatlands of western Maryland, currently occupied by the audacious advance of the rebel Army of Northern Virginia. Initially, Major Generals Yates, Hooker, Hatch, and Meade stood observing the now visible enemy and commenting on the recent bitter fighting for the position they now stood over. Particularly, they expressed relief at the speed in which it had been taken - the Confederates could only muster three brigades under D. H. Hill in time, but clearly visible moving into Hagerston were several rebel divisions. Who knew how awful the fighting would have been should they have been given time to arrive, the officers muttered. Certainly speaking, the sight must have pressed in how important speed was to the recent successes, a consideration that may well have played a crucial factor in the next few days.

    For they would not remain alone: riding up the hill to join them was a plurality of the AotP's general staff. Considering the importance of the various personalities to the proceeding discussion, the complexity of their motivations, and importance of context in understanding why they acted the way they did, some time will be spent going over the individual actors.

    George McClellan was in many ways perhaps the most fitting commander for the Army of the Potomac in the early war. While his incessant politicking was subject to scorn even at the time, it has to be acknowledged that such a thing was almost certainly inevitable given the proximity to Washington and the habit of Congress/the Presidency overriding the commander's authority. McClellan was a natural at the art of army politics as well as a talented logistician, and he'd done much to restore the AotP after Pope's disastrous misrule as well as his own position. By all signs, the general's return to grace was almost guaranteed - should he prove successful in routing Lee's invading force.

    It was this task McClellan obsessed over as his carefully articulated plan was swiftly undermined by both rebel action and his own subordinates. A leader used to commanding from the rear, he must have been unnerved to at least some extent listening to the screams and moans of the nearby wounded from Yates' headless assault while watching the butternut grey southerners array in Pleasant Valley beneath him. McClellan was a cautious, cautious military commander, and although his attempt to avenge his defeat in the Peninsular Campaign had started strong, already the threads were unraveling.

    Ambrose Burnside was also a man thoroughly out of his comfort zone that day, having led a dizzying rush through the fog of war and sporadic rebel screens to arrive at their currently fortuitous position. Perhaps more disconcerting to the general was the role he had assumed politically as leading the faction opposed to McCellan's conservative strategy in alignment with a personal foe, Joe Hooker. Burnside was not someone who enjoyed tipping over apple carts or employing audacious new strategies on the fly. But he was also a rational man who wanted to win the war, and his faith in the trio had been validated throughout the past two days' heady progress. So, however out of his comfort zone he may have been, the general applied himself to providing the aggressive faction the rank and veterancy they needed to be taken seriously.

    Edwin Sumner had been a good general, he believed. His career against the 'injuns' on the frontier had been solid, and the man probably would've been far happier still on the open plains of the western front. But Sumner passed seniority and experience the Union desperately needed, and so he was thrown into the meatgrinder in the East. Now, the general was past his prime and out of his familiarity, burned by the bitter politics and brutal combat of the East. Nonetheless, Sumner put himself into his task with grim determination, attempting to adopt a relatively neutral role in the general staff to ease cooperation and trying to adapt to the vastly different environment of the world's first industrial war.

    Fitz John Porter was a man who'd come out the bottom of the military's toxic internal blame games, and was desperately looking for an out. A disaster of the magnitude of Second Manasses demanded a scapegoat, and Pope was determined to abdicate responsibility for it. Conspiring with Irwin McDowell, who'd been in command for First Bull Run and entered what can best be described as a nervous breakdown during the battle, the two pinned blame for the defeat on Porter, going so far as to strip him of rank and imprison the man. While his performance had admittedly been mediocre, it was hardly worse than any other member of the Union military high command had shown that day, and the ensuing farce of justice went to show just how deeply ridden the AotP was wracked with partisan bickering.

    Once Pope was ousted by McClellan, he'd wasted no time in restoring Porter to command, but with his kangaroo court-martial still well underway, the man was grasping for a solution. If only he could clear his name through battlefield success and prove his critics slanderous, Porter could retain his career and reputation. The issue was that the V Corps was currently acting as the army's reserve and simply too far from the front to participate in the fighting, which perhaps goes to explain some of the man's more seeming irrational and erratic moments during the battle.

    Joe Hooker was a man who considered himself a fighter, and increasingly fiercely resented his subordination to the seemingly gutless conservatives who commanded the Army of the Potomac. An infamous rank climber who often got into feuds with his fellow generals (including his current superior, General Burnside), he saw the current battle as a moment of destiny for not only the United States of America, but a potential opportunity to launch himself into national prominence as someone instrumental in the decisive defeat of the first Confederate invasion onto Union soil. This could only happen if the bunglers were prevented from seizing defeat from the jaws of victory, however - a task that would require every bit of his social and political acumen.

    Sebastian Yates was, by all indications, a man far in over his head. A former lawyer with nominal military experience, he'd volunteered for the second wave of Northern mobilization and at point seen a little under a year's fighting. Described as genial, well-read, and a 'people pleaser' by prior civilian contemporaries, at first glance one might expect him to be an otherwise average effete New Englander political general. The taste of combat seems to have awakened something within the man's blood, however, and he'd swiftly earned a reputation as a highly aggressive and audacious commander. A combination of prior connections, a talent for making friends, and a chain of successful military actions had seen him receive promotions with remarkable speed, although it would be retroactively exaggerated - during the Union army's massive expansion, those with connections or talent could swiftly rise through the ranks. Yates was unusual, then, for possessing both.

    Something that was likely weighing on his mind were the recent experiences during the Virginia campaign. Yates had received a bullet wound to the arm at Raccoon Ford, fought bitterly at Bull Run, and then led a counterstrike against Stonewall Jackson's overextended force - all valorous, costly actions whose efficacy had been rendered meaningless due to the strategic blundering and cowardice of his superiors. If McClellan fretted about his orders being potentially disobeyed, his attention most likely would've fallen on characters like Hooker - a fellow opportunistic army careerist - or Kearny - who was rumored to already being groomed as a potential successor by Lincoln and had previously expressed strong disagreement with the general's strategy. But it was the modern John Paul Jones who would prove the one willing to take matters to the ultimate conclusion.

    The First Meeting​

    Accounts of what exactly was said and planned between the generals present at the Battle of Antietam tend to be heavily apocryphal, in no small part due to those present all recounting noticeably - and sometimes dramatically - different testimonies over the events. Nonetheless, a number of common threads emerge that we can assume with reasonable accuracy it went something like this:

    • McClellan is confronted over his wildly overinflated rebel troops counts by the Right Wing, who believe themselves to have been vindicated in their skepticism. Yates, having led the vanguard, gives his personal testimony in support of the idea. The general is cajoled into accepting an aggressive posture but continues to hedge on the concept that there might be a considerable rebel reserve being kept out of sight.
    • Hooker and Porter immediately begin to clash over how the army should be deployed during the night. Hooker believes that they should move into a close enough position that a general attack can be launched in the morning, while Porter urges for a more cautious movement that will allow for the full reserve, including his V Corps, to catch up.
    • The arrival of a messenger from Harper's Ferry revealing it is currently under siege by Jackson ends up sealing the argument, as it is confirmed the rebel army is split into separate, vulnerable sections. Finally convinced, McClellan orders that the army be moved up to attack in the morning - the plan is to surge down into the valley and crush the rebel army against the 'Little Antietam' river with a simultaneous strike by Yates and Hooker in the north, along with Kearny and Franklin to the south. As part of the compromise to see the plan through, Burnside suggests allowing Franklin to catch up and fully take command of the Left Wing before pressing the attack instead of letting Kearny move immediately - this will have dramatic consequences for the first day of the battle.
    • Political games continue as ever - McClellan proposes dissolving the Right Wing, essentially removing Burnside from his position and assuming direct control over his three Corps while keeping Franklin in command. The proposal is tabled at the moment but will come up again, as McClellan no longer regards Burnside as reliable and moves to sideline him.
    The meeting at the Mountain House is adjourned and the generals move to assume command over their respective commands, preparing for a decisive clash with Lee in the morn. Meanwhile, the Confederate army had no such time to plan and prepare. Lee was surprised at how effectively McClellan had rebuilt the Army of the Potomac, and his ambitious plan had left his army spread out trying to secure multiple locations at once, including Harpy's Ferry, an arsenal that would've been a delectable grab for the Southerners, who even then were always hungry for more supplies. The rapid two-day advance by the Union dashed the general's hopes of being able to secure it before reconsolidating - indeed, reports indicate the location was reportedly within days of surrendering - and Lee was forced to order Jackson and McLaws to rush back in all haste, their tasks incomplete. Simultaneously, Lee and Longstreet would attempt to stall the Yankees at the mountain passes, falling back behind the little Antietam if needed. Ideally, there they'd be able to deliver a withering defeat upon the northerners as intended and secure the needed win for the Confederacy. If not, then the army could be in grave danger, they increasingly realized.
     
  • Sidestory
    • DAOT said:
    Can yate at least implant this in the military? "never to send a Man to do a job that a bullet or bomb could do better."
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    Skrevski said:
    You are talking about something that might take place after MAYBE WW1/Interwar but most likely WW2. As said this is VERY Modern thinking and I really don't think Yates would even think of this at all.
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    I feel like that kind of thinking is a very common alternate history fallacy "because this didn't happen in the past that means that it couldn't happen in the past". Or, more accurately for this case "People in the past didn't think about this, wich means that they couldn't think about it".

    Progress, especially when it comes to something like military thinking and tactics, isn't some orderly and predictable tech tree where you need to have mastered certain inventions and/or new ways of thinking in order to unlock the next level of upgrades.

    Now, that isn't to say that I believe that Yates should develop those kind of thoughts. That would have to be determined by what kind of situations he experiences during the war and such, and it's been too long since I've read this quest from front to back for me to be convinced one way or the other.

    But I feel like "This is a very modern though and he is a guy from the 1800s" is not a very convincing argument on it's lonesome.

    I mean, Democritus was from ancient greece, and he was the one of first persons to argue in favor of an atomic understanding of how matter and the universe in general was structured. The only reason it took us millenia to finally realize he was right was because people like Aristotle were more convincing when teaching the way they thought the universe worked.

    Edit: Oh shit, an Omake droped while I was writting this.
    Taut_Templar said:
    But it was the modern John Paul Jones who would prove the one willing to take matters to the ultimate conclusion.
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    Love it. It really is a somewhat apropiate moniquer when you think about it. Both of them disregarded the "sane options" in favour of audacity and agresiveness.

    Madlad's, the both of them.
     
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    Duke William of said:
    Glad to see the continuation of the Antietam omake. :)
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    Yeah, it's been in the backlog for a while, but the recent discussion gave me a surge of inspiration. Glad to see people've been eagerly awaiting the sequel.
    Shador said:
    Love it. It really is a somewhat apropiate moniquer when you think about it. Both of them disregarded the "sane options" in favour of audacity and agresiveness.

    Madlad's, the both of them.
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    I also picked it specifically because John Paul Jones was noted as not visually appearing like someone capable of pulling off the absolutely wild stunts he accomplished, while Yates also isn't somebody you'd pick out of a crowd for being willing to mutiny rather than be told he couldn't attack anymore.
     
    Great to see the Antetiam history view is back. Lots of things in it. Get to see who these people are and how they think. All them look pretty accurate.

    Yates was basically a unknown so only could look at his civilian background and what he has done during the war up to that time. So yeah wouldn't really expect Yates to disobey orders so they can win a battle.

    Ah the McLaws flanking attack. Think the thought process was Kearny has our back. Wouldn't just let McLaws go without a fight....which is what happened. Not Kearnys fault. Franklin decided to take his sweet ass time. Well at least Yates learned to never let this happen again.

    Now I wait for the next part of the Antetiam history part. Very great stuff Templar.
     
    Honestly, one of the things I've always been interested in is the Confederate reaction to Antietam going completely sideways due to Union generals mutinying in order to keep punching them.
     
    Do love the little hints on what is going to happen from these early decisions from McClellan and Burnsides. McClellan wanting to get full control of Burnsides troops because doesn't like them being so aggressive. Burnsides suggests Kearny wait for Franklin and for Franklin to take command once he arrives. Can just see how past decisions are lead to this and how these decisions causes future actions and how certain people react.
     
    mrsean22 said:
    Do love the little hints on what is going to happen from these early decisions from McClellan and Burnsides. McClellan wanting to get full control of Burnsides troops because doesn't like them being so aggressive. Burnsides suggests Kearny wait for Franklin and for Franklin to take command once he arrives. Can just see how past decisions are lead to this and how these decisions causes future actions and how certain people react.
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    I like making sure that votes and the options you guys take matter and really do affect things. Sometimes an option a vote won't come up for weeks but man oh man you can be sure it will come up later! I do also like doing some foreshadowing on stuff as well.
     
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