Remember the army that Beauregard had which is now in command of Hardee had about 50,000 while the army at Fayetteville had about 7,500. Though do remember there were troop movements at Fayetteville so possibly more? So Slocum might force Hardee to send more troops there to stop a flanking and going more inland of North Carolina. Which should helps Meade go to Hillsboro which is to make Jackson worried about Danville.
A Regiment at War: A American Civil War Quest
- Thread starter Skrevski
- Start date
Duke William of
I really need to finish my quests. :V
- Pronouns
- He/Him
Union strategy must take advantage of the fact that the Union has more manpower than the Confederacy, which we are doing.
While we can afford to split up our army to attack multiple positions, the Confederates are becoming increasingly stretched for soldiers and thus have to be far more careful with their troop placements andd such.
I know that the Confederates are nowhere near the breaking point when it comes to available soldiers, but they're still hurting, and we muet take advantage of this.
Union strategy must take advantage of the fact that the Union has more manpower than the Confederacy, which we are doing.
While we can afford to split up our army to attack multiple positions, the Confederates are becoming increasingly stretched for soldiers and thus have to be far more careful with their troop placements andd such.
I know that the Confederates are nowhere near the breaking point when it comes to available soldiers, but they're still hurting, and we muet take advantage of this.
Exactly. Got to use those numbers against the Confederacy. Just need to add in the aggressive part and have the armies attack about the same time.
Still shouldn't underestimate them though. They are on the defensive while we are the ones attacking. So better expect them to make full use of that defense advantage. Not to mention Hardee and Jackson might try something so need to make sure we can make them hurt when they do.
Ah see I I differ I suppose from others intrested in the quest because of seeing the civil war as fundamentally inseparable from sociopolitical context and ideological struggle
a war about white supremacy
that's also why I was interested in Butler and Brooks
their views on slavery being things we could use and take advantage of in waging a war about slavery to further push things along in a more dramatic fashion than otl
helping free more slaves to escalate the general strike of the enslaved to borrow a concept from Du Bois
a war about white supremacy
that's also why I was interested in Butler and Brooks
their views on slavery being things we could use and take advantage of in waging a war about slavery to further push things along in a more dramatic fashion than otl
helping free more slaves to escalate the general strike of the enslaved to borrow a concept from Du Bois
- Location
- Ohio
I am trying really hard to not go super deep into this very concept. It is a MAJOR point that gets a lot of negative discussion and discord and I just want to keep it out of the quest the best I can. Obviously, the question of slavery has and will come up, but also want to remind it is not just a war about slavery but a host of other issues and didn't really become "about" slavery until the Emancipation Proclamation in late 62/early 63.
Just wanted to let you know and others as they come into the quest and read things.
- Location
- Mid-Atlantic
Personally, I see no problem in being candid about the politics of the era, because you can enjoy knowledge and discussion of the Civil War while being aware that the Union and Confederate sides weren't just opposing football teams or something.
But @Skrevski works very hard at this and does a good job, and while I think his aversion on the matter is misplaced, I think we should all agree that he's earned the right to have it respected.
But @Skrevski works very hard at this and does a good job, and while I think his aversion on the matter is misplaced, I think we should all agree that he's earned the right to have it respected.
Ehm, Skrevski? For the Confederacy, the secession and the war that followed was primarily about slavery, from the highest officers and proclamations to the soldiers fighting the war from the start. It's the Union that went into the war answering the Confederacy's 'we will make our own United States, with slaves', by saying 'you already have that, get back here'.
- Location
- Ohio
It wasn't primarily about Slavery for the Conferdates either. A major issue was they didn't feel like they were being represented correctly and listened to by the Federal Government and that their rights were being tramped on from the Federal Government. Slavery certainly was a big part of it but it was not the primary reason for the start of the war as there were multiple reasons that the war took place.
Also the above post was about the Union, as we were discussing things about the Union commanders.
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- Location
- Canada
I'm not American, so I don't know much about US politics, but didn't the South have extra votes because slaves were counted as 1/2 a man? So the South controlled Congress even with a lower voting population compared to the North?
If i'm wrong sorry. But how can they say they weren't being listened to?
- Location
- Ohio
Slaves weren't able to vote and were counted as 3/5s of a man. As to control of Congress, I'll let someone else with better knowledge on that point answer as I don't have the best hold on that aspect. I know it was a mess and there were people both in the South and the North that wanted slavery and that is why there were so many compromises and willing and dealings in the lead up to the Civil War. But I don't think they controlled Congress, but I completely admit I could be wrong on this. Politics is very much not my strong suite ;/
Duke William of
I really need to finish my quests. :V
- Pronouns
- He/Him
The problem with those two(and I assume you meant Hunter instead of Brooks) is that they were idiots, plain and simple. They went about implementing their ideals in the worst way possible and were laughably incompetent at any military activity.
Grant is an unbelievably better example of a Union General who wanted to abolish slavery wholeheartedly, in that he still had his wits about him.
And we're making headway with befriending him, so we're gonna have a strong ally in regards to the slavery issue.As to the question on the causes of the ACW, I'd actually recommend Oversimplified's series on it. Despite being mostly humorous edutainment, it's actually a good source as to understanding why the Civil War started. Overall, though, I'd still recommend more serious sources over Oversimplified.
- Location
- Ohio
I am big on books and primary sourcesThe problem with those two(and I assume you meant Hunter instead of Brooks) is that they were idiots, plain and simple. They went about implementing their ideals in the worst way possible and were laughably incompetent at any military activity.
Grant is an unbelievably better example of a Union General who wanted to abolish slavery wholeheartedly, in that he still had his wits about him.
As to the question on the causes of the ACW, I'd actually recommend Oversimplified's series on it. Despite being mostly humorous edutainment, it's actually a good source as to understanding why the Civil War started. Overall, though, I'd still recommend more serious sources over Oversimplified.
Duke William of
I really need to finish my quests. :V
- Pronouns
- He/Him
I as well, absolutely, especially in regards to accuracy and such.I am big on books and primary sources
However, for those who don't want to spend money on this type of stuff, free history videos are a good start, and they can buy later if they want to learn more.
Antietam - Planning and Politics II
- Location
- United States
Antietam - Planning and Politics II
The second meeting of the AotP's leadership was much more orderly than the first. Instead of an impromptu collection of generals on horseback quickly hashing out a plan of action, the entirety of the leadership was called to the "Pry Farm House," a building that McClellan had repurposed to become the army's new field headquarters.
General McClellan had carefully composed himself before calling in his subordinates, but the man had been in quite a state of excitement for the Battle of Little Antietam Creek. The attack had been very much contrary to McClellan's normal modus operandi and the man had started experiencing second thoughts almost immediately. From his commanding position on South Mountain, unusually close to the fighting, the general could see nearly the entire day's action with his own eyes and found the result deeply unsettling - reportedly, the usually composed Pennsylvanian General was driven to deeply emotional fits by witnessing the gruesome killing during the initial assaults on the rebel line, and nearly collapsed when he realizing how close the IX Corps was to having its flank turned.* The near disaster heavily rattled the meticulous general and likely influenced his decision-making on the next day. He also couldn't resist the urge to micromanage his subordinates, ignoring his decision to maintain the 'Wing' system and personally messaging Corps commanders to give orders and demand updates.
Note: It's likely this incident that firmly cemented Yates as a 'bumbling, reckless political appointee' in McClellan's mind, and the first recorded impression of the man given by the Pennsylvanian. Whatever his rationale was for keeping Yates as a Corps commander during McClellan's reorganization of the AotP we cannot know - in his memoirs George claimed that it was political pressure from the Radical Republicans that kept him in office, similar to how Generals Fremont and Butler achieved undue prominence with destructive consequences, but this is likely anachronistic; while his father was a reasonably prominent lawyer with abolitionist tendencies, Yates had only really entered Washington's radar via his self-publicized victory at Chantilly (a move that somewhat contradicts traditional narratives about the future president, who always depicted himself as someone whom power and responsibility were thrust upon) and became the quintessential RR darling after Antietam, not before. Given the highly politicized atmosphere in Washington at the time, however, it's possible McClellan may have felt restrained in his ability to appoint and replace generals as he pleased, and enduring a political general as a Corps commander was probably a compromise endured in order to push for concessions somewhere else.
Still, the day had ended in victory, the rebels driven behind the Antietam river and their attack on Maryland stingingly rebuked. His frayed nerves aside, McClellan was feeling quite satisfied with himself, and wasted no time wiring a telegram to the capital proclaiming "no greater victory having been seen in the western hemisphere since the time of Washington" and assuring the president that "the rebel invasion of Maryland had been thoroughly thwarted." It didn't take long for the normal rationalizing to set in, however. McClellan clung to his underdog status with pathological persistence, and the day's clean victory only seemed to have egged on his sense of delusionally paranoid caution. The infamous 'Stonewall' Jackson served as the perfect object of his obsession, the man living rent-free in the heads of much of the Union, and McClellan - egged on by his Pinkerton aide - became convinced that the man had broken off his siege of Harper's Ferry only to link up with a phantom Confederate reserve and was prepared to launch a devastating attack on the morrow.
His generals balked, however. If the previous successes on the campaign only served to stoke the trio's confidence and ambition, the day's taste of blood lit a fire that could not be smothered. Metaphorical battle lines were drawn between the remaining generals - Mansfield and Burnside obviously being unable to attend. Kearny and Hooker pushed for an aggressive double envelopment to double-down on their momentum and deal a crushing blow to Lee's forces, while Franklin and Porter backed McClellan's stated desire to consolidate the army before deciding on a new course of action. The matter was complicated by the uneven allocation of fighting - Kearny and Franklin hadn't seen any combat whatsoever and their Corps were almost completely fresh, while Yates was reportedly rattled by both the close call with McLaws, as well as the death/wounding of Mansfield and Burnside on the daring flanking attack that he had most likely pushed for them to take.
Sumner would attempt to propose a compromise. The Antietam presented a formidable natural barrier, and he argued that the army should rest its battered Corps behind it and rely solely on the northern thrust meant to bypass the river, one which would be conducted with the majority of the AotP's strength. In the end, however, Yates elected to support the full-commit plan, even if it meant pushing his battered Corps through a contested river crossing (a task few military leaders would await without trepidation) and his decision would carry the support of Alpheus Williams, Mansfield's replacement and acting commander of the XII Corps.
With the significant majority of his Corps leaders in consensus about maintaining aggressive momentum, McClellan caved to the pressure, likely still concerned about his uncertain political position and no doubt paranoid about Lincoln seizing the opportunity to see him replaced. Although disaster at Harpy's Ferry had been averted at the last moment, the debacle was a poignant reminder of how much political interference the general endured from Washington. McClellan's caution may well have also warred with his originally expressed desire for a decisive victory to swiftly end the Civil War - and more personally, it would cement his reputation as a hero so badly tarnished by the Peninsular Campaign. The thought of being able to roundly avenge his humiliations on both the South and his domestic enemies must have been extremely seductive.
For all these reasons, George McClellan reluctantly conceded to the proposed plan, pressured and tempted in equal amounts towards enacting a battle plan that warred against all his professional instincts (the only allotted reserve was Porter's Corps who still hadn't properly caught up with the rest of the army - it's hard to imagine someone like McClellan agreeing to it at anything but gunpoint). Theoretically, this wasn't much different from the battle on the Little Antietam - but the second day's fighting was going to be on a much larger scale, and thus the demand for central coordination was significantly higher.
The Grand Army of the Potomac had been a cauldron of internal politicking and tension since the war started, and an astute observer might well have been able to guess it would be on the morrow that it would finally erupt.
***
The generals of the Confederacy also convened with the end of the day's fighting, meeting together in an apartment Lee's subordinates had been offered by a sympathetic local in Sharpsburg. The willing collaborator would prove the exception rather than the rule, however. A significant part of the rationale for the Maryland campaign was that the eponymous state would rise up for the Confederacy should a southern army move to liberate them. With the aid of the locals, Lee would be able to replenish both his battered army's supplies and ranks, but the silent streets and weary stares from the population of Sharpsburg must have served to underline the dire turn their initially promising invasion had taken.
It was not an encouraging situation. Lee had beaten the Union back in two separate campaigns despite being outnumbered, but there was a key difference between the Virginian campaigns and their present circumstances. Then, the Confederates had been able to bewilder and intimidate their opponents through audacious gambles and daring attacks despite being outnumbered. Now, however, the Army of Northern Virginia braced for their enemy's next move, grimly digging what breastworks they could and preparing for another day of fighting. The Confederate army's strength had waned considerably from the time of the Peninsular Campaign, and while historians debate over their exact numbers at the time, it's estimated they laid somewhere between 30 to 35 thousand men, many of them exhausted from the fighting and marching undergone in the past few months.
Robert E. Lee was in a grim mood that night as he listened to his commanders debate over their plan of action. His gamble of splitting his army up to seize crucial supplies and encourage an indigenous Marylander rebellion had failed, and the price was paid during the Battle on the Little Antietam, something that no doubt weighed heavily on the general who was prone towards fits of self-recrimination for failures real and perceived (Lee would suffer a near nervous breakdown after the conclusion of the Maryland campaign and be forced into medical leave for over a month after in North Carolina). Now, he had to make a fateful decision: whether it was time to admit the invasion a failure and withdraw, or attempt to defeat the Yankees in a pitched battle now that the entire army was assembled.
It was a striking turn from the initial optimism that the campaign had started out with, but a logical conclusion to the first day's fighting. The Union had been prevented from overwhelming the Confederates piecemeal, but the cost in supplies, lives, and morale was significant. General Longstreet, whose Corps had been on the receiving end of the vicious northern assault, was firmly of the opinion that the army had to cut their losses before an even worse catastrophe was suffered. Exact Union numbers were unclear, but scouts could pick up movement well into the night and particularly pessimistic placed their numbers at nearly, or even over, two times that of the rebel force. Should the southerners dig in their heels in enemy territory, Longstreet unapologetically emphasized, they faced defeat the likes of which could sink any prospects of winning the war.
'Stonewall' Jackson unsurprisingly formed the opposition. His men, although surely exhausted by the eleven-mile march they'd undergone to link up with the rest of the army, were as of yet fresh - and Jackson wasn't the kind of man who gave up strong positions without a drop of blood spilled. He was undoubtedly also frustrated over the aborted siege on Harpy's Ferry, whose garrison had provided a feeble and incompetent resistance, and no doubt would've surrendered given another day or two of bombardment. Tall odds were no stranger for the native West Virginian, and he argued that to abandon the situation as hopeless was to invite defeatism in the ranks and encourage a fierce Yankee pursuit. In this stance he was bolstered by J.E.B. Stuart, who spoiled for a fight himself and wanted to redeem his cavalry for their inability to stall the Yankees long enough to properly reform the splintered rebel army before they were set upon.
Lee seriously considered withdrawing. While famous for his aggressive actions, the general judiciously chose his targets and always picked fights for a reason, not for their own sake. To him, the coming day's battle stank of playing to the enemy's tune and accepting an unwise engagement, something his military instincts revolted against. Yet there wasn't really a better place to pick a fight either, not unless he was willing to withdraw all the way back to Virginia, defeating the entire purpose of the campaign.
That last point proved the sticker. General Lee hadn't invaded Maryland on a lark, and all the reasons that had encouraged him to make such an aggressive, risky maneuver still applied. President Jefferson strongly believed that delivering a major defeat to the Union on their own soil would prove the key needed to convince European powers to acknowledge the Confederacy, just like the battle of Saratoga a century ago had earned America foreign recognition. Lee most likely held a more realistic attitude towards the matter, but there was still hope that a major victory in Maryland could sway the hearts of the Unionist slave states, empower the Copperheads in the upcoming midterm elections, and further demoralize the already shaken North, reeling from their back to back defeats. The grand strategy of the South was never to dictate terms in Philadelphia, but to exhaust enough of the Union that they'd be willing to let the southern states go. Conversely, suffering a decisive defeat by the Yankees would scutter all these possibilities and encourage the northerners to press ever harder. From a purely tactical standpoint, Lee probably agreed with Longstreet that they should call the campaign off and return to the Confederacy to replenish their depleted army, but as the overall commander, the Virginian had to take into account the broader strategic context - in which the costs of withdrawal were far higher than a disappointing anticlimax.
In the end, despite considerable agonizing over the decision, Lee chose to stand his ground in Sharpsburg and meet the Union attack on the next morning. Jackson would lead his footsore soldiers to take up positions in the north, where the main thrust was expected to land, while Longstreet's battered Corps would anchor the right flank as well as cover the river crossings. Outnumbered and off balance, the Army of Northern Virginia nonetheless settled down for a second day of fighting, seemingly unable or unwilling to accept the real possibility that they might be courting disaster.
Information Post - Motivations/Intent.
- Location
- Ohio
Motivation/Intent of the Quest
I am posting this as a lot has come up recently in the quest about questions about how I direct the quest and about my interests and abilities to keep the quest going.
I write this to have fun, research more into the Civil War, and just hang out with some amazing people that follow this quest. I take great joy in reading books and primary sources on the subject and presenting a realistic flow to things within the quest while not pushing into the extremes.
I have studied the Civil War since I want to say about 12 or 13 but really got into it when I was around 16 and went to Gettysburg and explored the battlefield. Since then (24 years later) I think I can safely say I have read over 150-200 books and spent countless hours reading primary sources including the Official Records of the Civil War from both sides and the communication between commanders as well on the subject. I am by no means an expert and am still an amateur but I do consider myself at least able to talk about the Civil War with some authority and ability.
I have made my opinions known that I am not very into Politics, it just does not lie within my area of interest. I have come around to discussing some points of it for this quest, a lot of people wishing to see it and without a doubt it being a major part of the Civil War. I do, however, wish to say that it still is not a major interest of mine and that I am focusing this quest mostly on the military aspects as I love the tactic and strategic nature of military operations and seeing doctrine, tactics, and equipment change over time.
Politics will not be the focus of this quest, but an accompaniment to it. While I shall work to include it and am willing to discuss it, I will not be inviting discussions that are aimed at shaping or forcing views, causing an argument just to argue, nor seeing the quest turn into a flame war and ask if that is your intent that you refrain from doing so and move on. Discussion is great and welcomed, but arguments and ill will are not. If you don't like that or can't do that, then this quest isn't for you.
The quest is here for all of us to have a great time exploring the Civil War through military means, hanging out with some pretty amazing people here, and just having a fun and relaxing time.
Thank you all for your continued support and understanding.
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Duke William of
I really need to finish my quests. :V
- Pronouns
- He/Him
Yay, another Antietam omake.
Just gonna single out one particular part of this passage here
Just gonna single out one particular part of this passage here
Just like at Gettysburg in OTL, Longstreet's words prove to be prophetic to a devastating degree.
And thank you for the sheer amount of time and effort you spend to make this quest great for us all.
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- Location
- Mid-Atlantic
The thing is, the Confederates didn't feel they were being represented correctly because they were at risk of losing federal support for expanding slavery, recapturing fugitive slaves, and occasionally kidnapping free blacks and lying and saying they were fugitives too. The Confederates felt they weren't being listened to by the federal government because, well, the above. The Confederates felt that their rights were being tramped on because their right to own slaves and have everyone else respect that and do their best to help keep the slaves in bondage was, to the eye of the Southern political class, not being respected well enough.
Insofar as the war was about states' rights, by far the most significant right being fought over was the "right" to own slaves.
This is heavily supported in Confederate primary sources, such as this (in)famous speech by Alexander Stephens, which I gather was fairly well received at the time among Confederates though I could be wrong..
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- Location
- Ohio
When we finally go to the time skip I plan to add in snippets from books and stuff written about him.
Sertorius
Rebellious Legate
- Location
- Roma Invicta
... and he lived happily ever after to the end of his days.When we finally go to the time skip I plan to add in snippets from books and stuff written about him.
The End.
- Location
- Ohio
Duke William of
I really need to finish my quests. :V
- Pronouns
- He/Him
Taking some cues from @Taut_Templar, I figure it would be fun to consider the perspective of both Jackson and Hardee of Yates, and figure out how they'll deal with the Despoiler of Richmond.
Templar has already covered most of what the Confederates know about Yates, so I'll jump into his actions during 1863, so far.
The Battle of Warwick Swamp and the Southern Virginia Campaign weren't too mind-breaking and ingenious of military actions, so there's not much to be found from there that you wouldn't from another standard competent officer.
North Carolina, however, is a different story. And that's without getting into how Meade was able to capture Goldsboro briefly, as well as manage a good fighting retreat against D.H. Hill
Yates, after getting a few good licks in against the Rebs in Southern Virginia, proceeds to wheel about almost his entire army toward New Bern, leaving only a Corps and the Cavalry to defend the Meherrin River against any possible attacks by Beauregard. Then, after he's linked back up with Meade proceeds to immediately assault Hill's positions at Southwest Creek. There, he manages to get his opponent's dander up, predicting correctly that Hill would launch an audacious flanking maneuver to his left, subsequently halting the attack dead in its tracks before a final push on Hill's primary positions finally breaks the Rebs.
Second Goldsboro was a costly battle that, nonetheless, sees Yates manage to drub the Rebels yet again, though this time he does not immediately pursue the Rebs due to high casualties and his men being tired.
Then, Beauregard, under intense pressure from the government and Lee, launches an attack on Slocum's independent wing at Bentonville, hoping to crush a separated part of Yates's army before swinging around to beat the other half. Sadly for him, though, the gamble falls flat since Slocum is able to link up with the rest of the army and push back Beauregard's forces. Still, it wasn't too bad a mistake for the Rebs, since they still had good defensive terrain when the Union attack inevitably came the next day, and by then Beauregard's forces would be prepared to fight. Besides, it wasn't like Yates had anymore tricks up his sleeve, right? ...right?
nope
Yates then proceeds to swing basically his entire army around Beauregard's right and quickly march towards Raleigh, leaving only a token force of sharpshooters and cavalry back at Bentonville, bypassing the Rebel army entirely and forcing them to hurriedly evacuate towards the capital before the Yanks can waltz in and takes up defensive positions.
At the Battle of Raleigh, Beauregard is finally able to get one up on Yates by correctly predicting the man would try to cut off his retreat, stationing A.P. Hill's corps to defend said location. Unfortunately for Beau, Yates sends two entire corps and all his cavalry that way who, through sheer determination and numbers, manage to push back the Rebs and force Beauregard to retreat, which results in most of the Rebel army getting away but the Rebel artillery being essentially wiped out.
So, while Yates will still be eyed with no small amount of frightful contempt by the Confederates, they now have a playbook specifically for Yates and will be able to better predict and counter Yates's moves. Yates's affinity for trickey and maneuver, however, will definitely have them more than a little paranoid about the antics the man will get up to. The fact that Yates is an eager advocate for any technology and policies that will help end the war sooner does not help things for the Rebs.
By the end of all this, I highly suspect Yates will be regarded as the Union's Lee/Jackson, maybe even its Napoleon due to his audacious and aggresive gambles, affinity for trickery, ans mastery of maneuver.
But how would they view Yates personally, though?
Hardee will probably have a standard dislike/begrudging respect that most of the Confederate high command have against Yates. Dislike due to how many times he's beaten them and the capture of many of their important cities, and begrudging respect due to the sheer military talent and acumen Yates has.
Jackson, though? I highly suspect that he highly disdains, if not loathes, Yates.
Reasoning:
1. Chantilly. While Jackson was arguably first defeated in one of the many battles at Winchester in the Shenandoah, Yates was the first to strike a more decisive defeat against Jackson at Chantilly, which I'm going to guess made Jackson have a slight grudge against the man for.
2. Antietam. While many Confederate commanders no doubt dislike us due to the Battle of Antietam, Jackson had the misfortune to be present at said battle. While he had undoubtedly held himself well and managed to evacuate most of his men in an orderly manner, he undoubtedly began to seriously dislike Yates for his role in the unmitigated Confederate disaster that unfolded there.
3. The capture of almost all Virginia. Back then, people were extremely proud of the state they were from, a sort-of nationalism but for individual states. So, it would be no surprise to me that Jackson(along with the rest of all Virginia) would be more than a little miffed with Yates for waltzing into Petersburg, subsequently thrashing not one or two but three Confederate armies sent to crush him, before simply marching into both the Confederate and Virginian Capital of Richmond, resulting in the occupation of almost all of Virginia. I honestly wouldn't be surprised if Jackson held himself a little responsible for the debacle there, due to how he could possible have sent even just a little more men with Hill and how that could have possibly made a difference. We know it wouldn't have helped, but Jackson's probably not as composed about this as we are.
4. Our constant thrashing of D.H. Hill. Jackson, by all accounts, was a genuine friend of Hill, who was also his brother-in-law. Yates constantly humiliating Hill and tarnishing his reputation via several drubbings of the man can't have endeared the humble general to Jackson, who along with Longstreet is probably the only reason Hill still has a job in the army, let alone a position as an officer.
Given all this, it's reasonable to conclude that Jackson doesn't have the... highest opinion of us, to put it mildly.
Bloody hell, this took longer and more words than I expected.
Templar has already covered most of what the Confederates know about Yates, so I'll jump into his actions during 1863, so far.
The Battle of Warwick Swamp and the Southern Virginia Campaign weren't too mind-breaking and ingenious of military actions, so there's not much to be found from there that you wouldn't from another standard competent officer.
North Carolina, however, is a different story. And that's without getting into how Meade was able to capture Goldsboro briefly, as well as manage a good fighting retreat against D.H. Hill
Yates, after getting a few good licks in against the Rebs in Southern Virginia, proceeds to wheel about almost his entire army toward New Bern, leaving only a Corps and the Cavalry to defend the Meherrin River against any possible attacks by Beauregard. Then, after he's linked back up with Meade proceeds to immediately assault Hill's positions at Southwest Creek. There, he manages to get his opponent's dander up, predicting correctly that Hill would launch an audacious flanking maneuver to his left, subsequently halting the attack dead in its tracks before a final push on Hill's primary positions finally breaks the Rebs.
Second Goldsboro was a costly battle that, nonetheless, sees Yates manage to drub the Rebels yet again, though this time he does not immediately pursue the Rebs due to high casualties and his men being tired.
Then, Beauregard, under intense pressure from the government and Lee, launches an attack on Slocum's independent wing at Bentonville, hoping to crush a separated part of Yates's army before swinging around to beat the other half. Sadly for him, though, the gamble falls flat since Slocum is able to link up with the rest of the army and push back Beauregard's forces. Still, it wasn't too bad a mistake for the Rebs, since they still had good defensive terrain when the Union attack inevitably came the next day, and by then Beauregard's forces would be prepared to fight. Besides, it wasn't like Yates had anymore tricks up his sleeve, right? ...right?
nope
Yates then proceeds to swing basically his entire army around Beauregard's right and quickly march towards Raleigh, leaving only a token force of sharpshooters and cavalry back at Bentonville, bypassing the Rebel army entirely and forcing them to hurriedly evacuate towards the capital before the Yanks can waltz in and takes up defensive positions.
At the Battle of Raleigh, Beauregard is finally able to get one up on Yates by correctly predicting the man would try to cut off his retreat, stationing A.P. Hill's corps to defend said location. Unfortunately for Beau, Yates sends two entire corps and all his cavalry that way who, through sheer determination and numbers, manage to push back the Rebs and force Beauregard to retreat, which results in most of the Rebel army getting away but the Rebel artillery being essentially wiped out.
So, while Yates will still be eyed with no small amount of frightful contempt by the Confederates, they now have a playbook specifically for Yates and will be able to better predict and counter Yates's moves. Yates's affinity for trickey and maneuver, however, will definitely have them more than a little paranoid about the antics the man will get up to. The fact that Yates is an eager advocate for any technology and policies that will help end the war sooner does not help things for the Rebs.
By the end of all this, I highly suspect Yates will be regarded as the Union's Lee/Jackson, maybe even its Napoleon due to his audacious and aggresive gambles, affinity for trickery, ans mastery of maneuver.
But how would they view Yates personally, though?
Hardee will probably have a standard dislike/begrudging respect that most of the Confederate high command have against Yates. Dislike due to how many times he's beaten them and the capture of many of their important cities, and begrudging respect due to the sheer military talent and acumen Yates has.
Jackson, though? I highly suspect that he highly disdains, if not loathes, Yates.
Reasoning:
1. Chantilly. While Jackson was arguably first defeated in one of the many battles at Winchester in the Shenandoah, Yates was the first to strike a more decisive defeat against Jackson at Chantilly, which I'm going to guess made Jackson have a slight grudge against the man for.
2. Antietam. While many Confederate commanders no doubt dislike us due to the Battle of Antietam, Jackson had the misfortune to be present at said battle. While he had undoubtedly held himself well and managed to evacuate most of his men in an orderly manner, he undoubtedly began to seriously dislike Yates for his role in the unmitigated Confederate disaster that unfolded there.
3. The capture of almost all Virginia. Back then, people were extremely proud of the state they were from, a sort-of nationalism but for individual states. So, it would be no surprise to me that Jackson(along with the rest of all Virginia) would be more than a little miffed with Yates for waltzing into Petersburg, subsequently thrashing not one or two but three Confederate armies sent to crush him, before simply marching into both the Confederate and Virginian Capital of Richmond, resulting in the occupation of almost all of Virginia. I honestly wouldn't be surprised if Jackson held himself a little responsible for the debacle there, due to how he could possible have sent even just a little more men with Hill and how that could have possibly made a difference. We know it wouldn't have helped, but Jackson's probably not as composed about this as we are.
4. Our constant thrashing of D.H. Hill. Jackson, by all accounts, was a genuine friend of Hill, who was also his brother-in-law. Yates constantly humiliating Hill and tarnishing his reputation via several drubbings of the man can't have endeared the humble general to Jackson, who along with Longstreet is probably the only reason Hill still has a job in the army, let alone a position as an officer.
Given all this, it's reasonable to conclude that Jackson doesn't have the... highest opinion of us, to put it mildly.
Bloody hell, this took longer and more words than I expected.
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- Location
- Ohio
"Back in my day we predicted this! Damn whippersnappers! Now get off my lawn!!"Yates walking with his cane at the time of World War One: Trench warfare. Hmmm so basically the later years of the Civil War but bigger?