What's the most Cringeworthy Alternate History you've ever read?

In that case, the bureaucratic class is probably going to have its own aspirations though, similarly to the bourgeoisie
I wonder how they would be different, and how they would be similar. I'd have to look more into pre- and early industrial states with large bureaucratic apparati, probably China as you mentioned but likely also Korea, Khmer, and possibly some of the Caliphates. Perhaps less focus on trade, and a lot more on centralization?
 
I wonder how they would be different, and how they would be similar. I'd have to look more into pre- and early industrial states with large bureaucratic apparati, probably China as you mentioned but likely also Korea, Khmer, and possibly some of the Caliphates. Perhaps less focus on trade, and a lot more on centralization?

If there's trade, it'll be state sponsored expeditions. China did that in the past. I think one of the big differences would be no democracy, at least not for the common people (landed or not). The bureaucracy is likely to just sideline the landed aristocracy from the inside using the monarchy's power, while also sidelining the monarch and making him a figurehead.

I can't see the Caliphate (various iterations) being it, considering it was a stretched thin ruling class of Arab settlers in a lot of places. It had its hands full with keeping itself whole. Maybe one that fell back on a strong core without collapsing?

One possibility I hate is the Eastern Roman empire. They were much more bureaucratic than the rest of Europe. But on the other hand, I can't see that one staying purely bureaucratic. Too many people likely to copy them without the state structures and powerful merchants running around.

Another I just thought about is an Incan or mesoamerican one. The Incan had a pretty elaborate centralized corvee labor system that could lead to a very different industrial system.

Another fun possibility would be a church lead industrialization. I think this has the potential to be even more alien to us.
 
Another fun possibility would be a church lead industrialization. I think this has the potential to be even more alien to us
Huh. They have the money and the educated personnel, I suppose they could in some odd counterfactual. Would certainly make the schismatic wars more interesting.

And I suppose the old joke "The Pope, How many divisions does he have?" Would have actual relevant answers :V
 
I'm questioning whether all hypothetical industrializing societies would even have a distinctive "bourgeoisie" that would mirror the developmental trajectory of 19th century Europe.
Practice shows that it is impossible to bypass the capitalist stage of development - one way or another, but it is the trade and craft strata that are interested in industrialization. In particular, if we are talking about societies where such processes took place under local leadership, and were not carried out at the expense of outside leadership.
See, now you're really making a lot of casually Eurocentric assumptions about how societies work. Like, to the extent of modeling specific taxation systems in place in 18th century France or whatever.
These are just details - practice shows that outside of Europe the bourgeoisie somehow have to fight the resistance of outdated classes - for example, in China and Japan.

Now that's a more interesting line of thinking. It's easy to analyze existing class structures, compared to predicting future ones. One possibility I've theorized is that of an industrialization by the top, where a monarch and their bureaucracy tie themselves to the new technology while the aristocracy remains behind as OTL. Potentially something to explore for societies where there was already a large bureaucratic element to central government, like China? In that case, the bureaucratic class is probably going to have its own aspirations though, similarly to the bourgeoisie.
We have an example of the Meiji Restoration - when the Shinto monarchy and lower aristocracy chose to lead a coup of artisans and merchants against the samurai, guaranteeing free enterprise and a constitution.
In any case, this is not impossible - at a certain stage, the bourgeois state requires a huge bureaucratic machine.
Another I just thought about is an Incan or mesoamerican one. The Incan had a pretty elaborate centralized corvee labor system that could lead to a very different industrial system.
This system is not unknown in the Bronze Age Middle East - you can't jump from it to factories.
 
The Tawantinsuyu mit'a was and applied to and is still used in modern Peru from 1960 and massively accelerated and expanded the creation and maintenance of infrastructure in the Peruvian state by cutting some 30-40% off the cost, via co-financing public works with local communal labour. South Korea also applied the same system and it was a massive part in kickstarting and accelerating the Korean industrial development, and notably did so after noticing the significant benefits that the Peruvian state received from making use of it. In both cases, the industrial development of either state was aided irreplacably by the use of the mit'a to substitute for costs with labour co-financing.
 
Practice shows that it is impossible to bypass the capitalist stage of development - one way or another, but it is the trade and craft strata that are interested in industrialization. In particular, if we are talking about societies where such processes took place under local leadership, and were not carried out at the expense of outside leadership.
I think there's a complication you're pushing past here. Historically, all industrialization has involved either being Europe, or engaging economically with Europe. The need to engage with European institutions, and the tendency of local leaders to try to replicate those institutions in an attempt to more quickly copy and compete with European technology, may well have crushed out alternate paths to industrialization.
 
Huh. They have the money and the educated personnel, I suppose they could in some odd counterfactual. Would certainly make the schismatic wars more interesting.

And I suppose the old joke "The Pope, How many divisions does he have?" Would have actual relevant answers :V

Imagine if, for example, the church starts using its power to keep some technologies for itself, maybe by claiming they're too dangerous for Christians to use against each other. Of course, you'd probably have to derail the reform for that to be an option.
 
Imagine if, for example, the church starts using its power to keep some technologies for itself, maybe by claiming they're too dangerous for Christians to use against each other. Of course, you'd probably have to derail the reform for that to be an option.

...This is just the plot of Safehold, isn't it.
 
I think there's a complication you're pushing past here. Historically, all industrialization has involved either being Europe, or engaging economically with Europe. The need to engage with European institutions, and the tendency of local leaders to try to replicate those institutions in an attempt to more quickly copy and compete with European technology, may well have crushed out alternate paths to industrialization.

Also, the outsized power wielded by European nations, which in and of itself was fueled by the extraction of wealth and resources from the Americas, basically allowed European powers to subjugate vast numbers of societies and polities that might otherwise have developed along very different lines. Tbh even the concept of "industrialisation" in and of itself is one that is heavily influenced by the European industrial experience.

But the European industrial experience is the dominant one because European states subjugated most of the world and under colonialism, most colonised territories were de-industrialised.

Industrialisation under colonialism is really rare and mostly limited to very peculiar examples like Korea under Japanese rule.
 
Hmm I know the medieval Cistercian monks beyond being renowned metallurgists and masters of hydraulic engineering were heavily involved in technological, farming and economic innovations which they spread though medieval Europe via their system of monasteries and even apparently having water power powered factories in their monasteries.
 
Hmm I know the medieval Cistercian monks beyond being renowned metallurgists and masters of hydraulic engineering were heavily involved in technological, farming and economic innovations which they spread though medieval Europe via their system of monasteries and even apparently having water power powered factories in their monasteries.

A lot of monasteries and religious orders actually produced some pretty impressive innovations and scientific developments historically-speaking.

Which makes sense: people lived in a cloistered environment with considerable access to scholarship and knowledge, along with the time and resources to pursue research in a way that wouldn't have existed in any institutional sense anywhere else outside of universities (which were frequently controlled by the Church) and the like.
 
Given that there was in fact a Kurdish revolt during the HOI4 years, it would have been hard to avoid mentioning the Kurds, and how Turkey interacted with them.

Also, the Dersim Massacre isn't quite as much of a taboo subject as it once was in Turkey. Erdogan openly apologised for it in 2011.

It's really, REALLY gradual (and certain topics like the Armenian Genocide are still largely taboo) but it's becoming more possible to actually discuss certain unpleasant elements of Turkey's past in a way that wasn't true for decades.
 
A bit of clarification on why the Turkish government seems to have shifted its attitude on the Dersim Massacre: the Dersim Massacre took place during the time of Ataturk.

Although Ataturk's government introduced a number of beneficial and progressive reforms to Turkish law, society, and governance, it also had a number of downsides. Ataturk very sharply broke away from Turkey's Islamic and Ottoman past to create a new Turkish identity that would be secular and heavily European in inspiration. The latter choice was perhaps most notably embodied in adopting a Latin-based script for the Turkish language rather than an Arabic-based one as it had been in Ottoman times.

The problem with this approach was that for many Turkish people, this was a very sudden and shocking break from centuries of culture as they had known it. It was a top-down decision imposed against the will of a large part of Turkey's population and it attracted considerable resistance. Many of these policies had to be imposed by force rather than implemented through popular support and cooperation. Much like Reza Shah in Iran: Ataturk's reforms and programmes of modernisation were not democratic in their implementation.

This kind of forceful implementation of Kemalism anticipated the future problems Turkey would have with military interference in politics, which would frequently occur under the auspices of maintaining Kemalism when a Turkish leader was seen as too Islamist or otherwise not committed to upholding Ataturk's legacy.

Erdogan represents a very different trend in Turkish politics. His party, the AKP, represents a more conservative, Islamist turn in Turkish politics and a rejection of the staunch secularism that defined Ataturk and Kemalist ideology. Moreover, Kemalist parties such as the CHP tend to be a source of opposition to Erdogan, so he actually doesn't politically lose a lot from examining some of the more controversial aspects of Ataturk's rule, most notable of which is the Dersim Massacre.
 
I think there's a complication you're pushing past here. Historically, all industrialization has involved either being Europe, or engaging economically with Europe. The need to engage with European institutions, and the tendency of local leaders to try to replicate those institutions in an attempt to more quickly copy and compete with European technology, may well have crushed out alternate paths to industrialization.
This is not correct. There has been one industrial revolution but there has been plenty of industrialization and industry outside of Europe- Mughal Bengal notably was one of the most productive places in the world before British de-industrializing and economically protectionist policies steadily reduced its potency. Notably a large amount of the traits of an early industrial economy were present such as intensified urbanism as surplus production permitted more and more people to move into the townships and cities to work on mass-scale manufactories. However, an industrial revolution as we know it has only happened once and its exact causes and origins remain something of a mystery to be argued over- I believe @Admiral Skippy has much more to say about this, since it's with him I've had the majority of these discussions and he has notably read actual literature on the industrial revolution.
 
This is not correct. There has been one industrial revolution but there has been plenty of industrialization and industry outside of Europe- Mughal Bengal notably was one of the most productive places in the world before British de-industrializing and economically protectionist policies steadily reduced its potency. Notably a large amount of the traits of an early industrial economy were present such as intensified urbanism as surplus production permitted more and more people to move into the townships and cities to work on mass-scale manufactories. However, an industrial revolution as we know it has only happened once and its exact causes and origins remain something of a mystery to be argued over- I believe @Admiral Skippy has much more to say about this, since it's with him I've had the majority of these discussions and he has notably read actual literature on the industrial revolution.

Tbf, I think Simon's point about the European model of industrialisation and development being so pervasive that it caused leaders and governments in non-European societies to imitate them is a perfectly valid one. If you look at the modernisation programmes of Japan, the Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms, or those of Muhammad Ali Pasha's Egypt, these modernisations are almost always done under explicitly European auspices. Made all the moreso because these programmes involved large-scale participation by European advisors and instructors who in some cases actually held positions in national governments and this contributed to the explicitly European inspirations of these reforms. And it fed into cultural notions of European superiority.

Weirdly enough, I think we miss that a lot of historical "modernising" leaders who imitate "the West" in lieu of their own societies actually... kind of hate their countries in some respects. Peter the Great in his reforms of Russia strongly rejected traditional Russian culture, religion, and government and eagerly copied European institutions wholesale in his programmes of development. And he did so with a zeal that suggests something more than merely a pragmatic ruler who embraces reform as a means of enhancing state authority. And this is even more acute in countries that would have been regarded as "backwards" or "inferior" or both compared to white Europeans. The societies that are exposed to these kinds of attitudes often internalise them in certain ways.

Though I wholly agree with your point that industrialisation experiences did take place elsewhere in the world. Like, we need to remember that the "Great Divergence" (i.e. the question of why Europe had an industrial revolution and say, China, did not) was in many ways an engineered phenomenon.

Cycles of European imperial expansion and colonisation of various regions of the world (first the Americas and later Africa and Asia) played a huge role in the emergence of Europe as the centre of power in the world because these conquests supercharged European wealth and power and ultimately helped facilitate European conquests in other regions as well. So it isn't always about what Europe has or doesn't have: it's about the fact that European nations were often in an excellent position to eliminate potential rivals or competitors for power or wealth. And in turn this also redirected the flow of wealth (and therefore power) towards Europe.
 
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Hmm I know the medieval Cistercian monks beyond being renowned metallurgists and masters of hydraulic engineering were heavily involved in technological, farming and economic innovations which they spread though medieval Europe via their system of monasteries and even apparently having water power powered factories in their monasteries.

The problem is scaling up, and the key would be to transition from monks working on their own in monasteries, which could never become the dominant mode of production, to monks organizing the rest of society into working units.
 
I think there's a complication you're pushing past here. Historically, all industrialization has involved either being Europe, or engaging economically with Europe. The need to engage with European institutions, and the tendency of local leaders to try to replicate those institutions in an attempt to more quickly copy and compete with European technology, may well have crushed out alternate paths to industrialization.
Firstly, the European experience of studying by us thoroughly, from beginning to peak. Other regions were either just beginning or were far from it. Therefore, ignoring the European experience leads to speculation. Secondly, the development of colonialism is inevitable, which will lead to the invasion of Europeans into Asia and America, which will inevitably affect the development of local societies. And a world without European Colonies is already a very "soft" Alternative History. Thirdly, this is still a reactionary way, to single out different cultures into independent entities, like paralleled universes with their own laws of physics, here the emphasis should be on general laws - although these laws are not absolute, but relative.

Korean industrial development
As far as I remember, South Korea is a classic country of neoliberal capitalism, where the economy is controlled by corporations. Peru in many ways is also slightly different from other states. Moreover, both Korea and Peru are products of colonization - that is, not a very good example.

Although Ataturk's government introduced a number of beneficial and progressive reforms to Turkish law, society, and governance, it also had a number of downsides. Ataturk very sharply broke away from Turkey's Islamic and Ottoman past to create a new Turkish identity that would be secular and heavily European in inspiration. The latter choice was perhaps most notably embodied in adopting a Latin-based script for the Turkish language rather than an Arabic-based one as it had been in Ottoman times.
You know - in fact, we are talking about an Islamic society, where various spheres of society are controlled by clerics. So I think that Ataturk achieved outstanding results, and was on the right path (even taking into account the genocide of the Kurds - unfortunately, a bourgeois-democratic revolution took place in Turkey, not a socialist one). And it must be said that despite the reactionary government, Turkey as a whole is a progressive country relative to many countries in the Middle East.
Much like Reza Shah in Iran: Ataturk's reforms and programmes of modernisation were not democratic in their implementation.
Oh - just do not compare them, this is a monstrous mistake. Mustafa Kemal was a cruel, narrow-minded bourgeois mindset, but still an effective politician and revolutionary. Reza Pahlavi was a mistake, even against the background of his father - not only was he a cruel asshole showing his luxury, but he also sold out to the British and Americans. As for domestic policy, its modernization has not advanced further than Tehran. Despite the fact that they like to show us photographs of female students who do not wear the hijab, the life of the majority of the population outside the big cities has changed little. Add to this huge social stratification. In fact, paradoxically, it was the Islamists who played a modernizing role in Iranian history (as opposed to, say, Afghanistan) - they established industrial management, increased social mobility, and created a civil nation. Actually, this is the source of the current crisis - the reactionary ideology does not meet the requirements of modernization (I am sure that the percentage of women who smoke is higher than in the Developed Countries).

This is not correct. There has been one industrial revolution but there has been plenty of industrialization and industry outside of Europe- Mughal Bengal notably was one of the most productive places in the world before British de-industrializing and economically protectionist policies steadily reduced its potency. Notably a large amount of the traits of an early industrial economy were present such as intensified urbanism as surplus production permitted more and more people to move into the townships and cities to work on mass-scale manufactories.
Urbanization would still require mass movements and the abolition of social privileges in order to increase social mobility. Here, by the way, a problem arises that interferes with the prosperity of India - the caste system. Some of my colleagues, it is true, argue that the caste industrialization option is not incredible, but even in this case, a shift in the center of power from kshatriyas to merchants is outlined. In addition, I'm not sure that modern India can be taken as an example - for its social structure was cemented by the British colonialists.
However, an industrial revolution as we know it has only happened once and its exact causes and origins remain something of a mystery to be argued over- I believe @Admiral Skippy has much more to say about this, since it's with him I've had the majority of these discussions and he has notably read actual literature on the industrial revolution.
In The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Professor Robert Allen pointed out that the emergence of Chinese industry was held back by factor price ratios. In England, there was expensive labor and relatively cheap coal. In China, which had already switched to coal at that time, it was the other way around, so cheap labor did not stimulate innovation that could replace it, and expensive coal stimulated energy savings, but not labor.

Weirdly enough, I think we miss that a lot of historical "modernising" leaders who imitate "the West" in lieu of their own societies actually... kind of hate their countries in some respects. Peter the Great in his reforms of Russia strongly rejected traditional Russian culture, religion, and government and eagerly copied European institutions wholesale in his programmes of development. And he did so with a zeal that suggests something more than merely a pragmatic ruler who embraces reform as a means of enhancing state authority. And this is even more acute in countries that would have been regarded as "backwards" or "inferior" or both compared to white Europeans. The societies that are exposed to these kinds of attitudes often internalise them in certain ways.
Do you know who blamed the modernizers for this? Moscow boyars, samurai, and Islamic muftis - that is, representatives of the reactionary forces of society who would prefer the old order to survive. It is like listening to the words of a representative of the French counter-revolutionary emigration about the horrors of the Great Terror. Yes, and they themselves were not great patriots, and gladly collaborated with foreign invaders - for example, British rule in India was based on the rajahs and brahmanas. If, say, an analogue of Peter the Great appeared in the Deccan, they would have screamed about the death of "people's identity", although he had defended national independence. Besides, I'll tell you frankly - it's all a form (the reforms of Peter the Great were only one of the stages of the establishment of capitalism in Russia - not the first, and not the last). If Japan had no need to compete with Europe, then they would not have to wear European uniforms, but they would still have to fight the resistance of the samurai and develop parliamentism.
 
Could you guys take this conversation somewhere else? It's getting tiring to see this thread focus on one topic so long, especially when it not about AH in a meta sense.
 
Could you guys take this conversation somewhere else? It's getting tiring to see this thread focus on one topic so long, especially when it not about AH in a meta sense.
I mean, I dunno, I think that trying to be scholarly about things is kind of nice.

And this is even more acute in countries that would have been regarded as "backwards" or "inferior" or both compared to white Europeans.
Such as Russia at the time? :p

I mean, remember the flexibility of the definitions of terms like "white" and "European." Sure, the racial construct 'whiteness' didn't quite exist in full pervasive form in the early 1700s (outside, perhaps, the American colonies where race-based caste systems were a key part of maintaining the social order). But the stereo-archetype of the Russian people as being brutish, backwards, the 'big dumb cousins' of Europe, a product of savage conditions on the edge of the known/civilized world and commingled with outright barbarians: "Scratch a Russian and you'll find a Tartar," the saying once went. Any admirable qualities get explained away by the interaction of the Fremen mirage with the harsh Russian climate.

I think that to some extent you really can analyze the history of Russia in terms of being one of the most "white-adjacent but not white" nations to end up staring down the barrel of the white-European technical and economic advantage during the Early Modern period.

Firstly, the European experience of studying by us thoroughly, from beginning to peak. Other regions were either just beginning or were far from it. Therefore, ignoring the European experience leads to speculation. Secondly, the development of colonialism is inevitable, which will lead to the invasion of Europeans into Asia and America, which will inevitably affect the development of local societies. And a world without European Colonies is already a very "soft" Alternative History. Thirdly, this is still a reactionary way, to single out different cultures into independent entities, like paralleled universes with their own laws of physics, here the emphasis should be on general laws - although these laws are not absolute, but relative.
Except that the combination of "Europe is the only place that completed the process, so we can observe it in detail" and "we desire to derive general laws from the places we observe" leaves you in the position of the drunk looking for his keys under the lamppost because that's where the light is.

This leads to fallacies like "to industrialize, you must have a Protestant Reformation in which your organized scholastic religoius hierarchy is replaced by a bunch of competing sects focusing on individual salvation and virtue." Or "to industrialize you need a cold climate that breeds robust, clean-living people and hard living."

No. No you do not. You only "need" that because for various largely unrelated reasons a Protestant Reformation happened to take place in the specific small bits of a specific subcontinent where the Industrial Revolution happened.

...

It's sampling bias. We look at the countries that first conjured up this enormous transformation, then assume that everything about them and how they navigated the transformation was somehow significant, somehow. That everything about them was relevant to the exact details of how they accomplished this and built up a world-beating advantage. Which then becomes a vehicle for the racial, religious, cultural, or class biases of that particular society.

Of course it was white people and not brown people, because naturally white people are the brains of the planetary outfit, and never mind all the perfectly functional societies they destroyed with violence to eliminate competition!

Of course it was Protestants and not Catholics, and certainly not filthy heathens who don't even worship a guy who got nailed to a post, how can you even have industrialization without worshipping a guy who got nailed to a post?

Of course it had to be merchants and not priests who masterminded industrialization, because how can you even have an industrial revolution without massive private capitalists taking over the material underpinnings of society? It's unthinkable!

Hence my characterization of the stereotypical linear model of history as being Eurocentric. The model dates back to the 19th century. Its reference pool for describing this history was almost entirely drawn from Europe due to the limits of the scholarship of the age. The authors were quite simply ignorant of competing models for building a pre-industrial civilization, or of the history of how various pre-industrial civilizations had been aborted by the rise of Europe. They did not know and could not have known about these other data points. So what is the likelihood that they got everything right, when constructing a linear model of history that coincidentally happens to exactly reprise the development of Europe, specifically?
 
Could you guys take this conversation somewhere else? It's getting tiring to see this thread focus on one topic so long, especially when it not about AH in a meta sense.
I kinda agree with you, but at the same time, this has really turned into our general discussion thread. And this isn't the first time, nor will it be the last, that we've gone off into a pages long discussion of some point or other
 
Except that the combination of "Europe is the only place that completed the process, so we can observe it in detail" and "we desire to derive general laws from the places we observe" leaves you in the position of the drunk looking for his keys under the lamppost because that's where the light is.
Okay - I didn't put it quite correctly. However, our models need some justification based on previous experience and a model for comparison, otherwise all this will look unfounded. Besides, as I said, history is not a physics, and its laws are not so clearly determined.
On the other hand, I can ask you not to go to the opposite extreme - to deny any common path of human history.
 
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