Elysian Odyssey (EU4 Quest - Byzantium in the New World)
- Thread starter Sayle
- Start date
- Location
- canada
sorry to bug you @Sayle but in this quest is the relative protection armor grants made of certain materials true to real life? just want to check because furs and leather offer almost no protection even when compared to a decently made linen gambison. Let alone compared to the plate or chain armor that I presume our troops are equipped with.
Unless they they have shields they will have to dodge every strike rather than take the hits because furs and leathers are barely capable of turning aside a weapon.
[X] Theophilos will lead those already in the city against the barbaroi.
In any case under the presumption that is the case this should be an easy win even with them outnumbering us. Unless they get us at a major tactical disadvantage our weapons will go through them like a cool knife through warm butter. (not quite as fast as a hot knife through butter but very fast all the same.)
- Location
- Norway
But we might be able to estimate it, depending on how much narration Sayle decides to give us on seeing Theo's leadership in action. (Which seems to be leading 9-1 so far.) Also Sayle discussed having generals at one point but they haven't come up in play yet.
[X] Theophilos will lead those already in the city against the barbaroi.
Noroboro
Consistency is key and I’m consistently tired :)
- Location
- Canada
[X] Theophilos will lead those already in the city against the barbaroi.
Let's hope sallying forth will work and that Theophilos is a good general. Cavalry will likely be our deciding factor here, most of the natives likely have never seen horses with men atop them. Who knows? Maybe they'll think the cavalry are ancient Greek Centaurs
Let's hope sallying forth will work and that Theophilos is a good general. Cavalry will likely be our deciding factor here, most of the natives likely have never seen horses with men atop them. Who knows? Maybe they'll think the cavalry are ancient Greek Centaurs
[X] Theophilos will lead those already in the city against the barbaroi.
Here's to hoping that our cavalry advantage can take care of them
Here's to hoping that our cavalry advantage can take care of them
- Location
- Tarn-Vedra
[X] Theophilos will lead those already in the city against the barbaroi.
The Battle of the Potawatomi River
Theophilos' decision to sally from the city and engage the barbaroi was not hotly contested by what documentation we have of the time, although the prospect of taking a numerically inferior force against an approaching enemy must have seemed risky to those involved. There has been plenty of debate over what exactly was Theophilos' reasoning for such a decision, though it is generally agreed that the risk to Odessos would have been the primary motivating factor. The Basileus was not one for indecisiveness and showed adroit and effective management of the army as they left the roads, demonstrating a grasp of the terrain which is all the more impressive considering his inexperience in warfare. By the contemporaneous accounts of the early maneuvers the Emperor seemed determined to bring the barbaroi to battle and make best use of his cavalry as a decisive factor.
But in command of the opposite force was the newly ascended Chief Mumagechee, who seemed determined to stack the odds as much in his favor as possible. The Romans came under repeated attack from archers and skirmishers as they slowly corralled the native force against the Potawatomi river, a repeated series of engagements which did little to inflict casualties but did disrupt the column and forced Theophilos to rely increasingly on his cavalry for mobility. By the second day of loose contact it was clear to both commanders that a pressed battle was inevitable - Mumagechee could not ford the Potawatomi and risk his rear, and so would be obligated to break the Roman army. Against a native force that resembled a well-organised mob more than a formation, Theophilos appears to have been anticipating victory before the battle even began. The order to advance was given with tightly packed infantry attempting to force the barbaroi against the river. Theophilos held his cavalry in reserve, waiting for the opportunity to deliver a hammer blow.
This was a fatal mistake. Instead of attempting to break free, Mumagechee kept his men back until they were thoroughly engaged, allowing less than fifty meters of space to retreat. This is likely to have been to persuade his forces to fight rather than flee, but it had the side-effect of negating the Roman cavalry who suddenly lacked the ability to maneuver. That Theophilos pressed on and attempted to win the battle at nearly 2:1 odds with infantry alone can only be described as arrogance - believing that his own soldiers, equipment, and tactical acumen were nakedly superior in every respect. The unfortunate reality was that this was not true, and Mumagechee may not have been the Emperor's equal in the open field or ability to maneuver, but was certainly not overtly inferior. Some four hours into the battle it was becoming clear to Theophilos that he would be unable to rout the Potawatomi forces before nightfall, if at all. The Emperor ordered a withdrawal, and was finally able to use his cavalry to best effect to secure a minimally damaging retreat.
The casualties are difficult to tally, and indeed Roman historians of the time described the battle as merely a light skirmish. But Theophilos lost nearly a fifth of his forces in the battle, and the psychological blow of being unable to overwhelm a seemingly more primitive opponent seems to have shaken the Emperor who acted very cautiously from then on. Mumagechee withdrew in good order across the river and the two would meet again only when the full force of the Elysian militia had assembled. Declarations at the time touted it as a victory, forcing the barbaroi to withdraw away from Odessos entirely, but the Battle of the Potawatomi River was a stark glimpse into the reality that the Elysians were contending with native tribes which had to be taken far more seriously as threats than they had been. Theophilos would defeat Mumagechee in the Battle of Nea Konstantinopolis two weeks later, forcing the Potawatomi forces into a general retreat with the strength of the entire Elysian militia.
Silver and Steel: Elysia and Indigenous Peoples. London Publishing House, 1972.
Roman Casualties: 2400 Men
Roman Army: 5600 Men
Potawatomi Casualties: 3200 Men
Potawatomi Army: 3800 Men
[ ] Begin a general campaign into Potawatomi territory.
[ ] Conduct a retributive raid into Potawatomi territory.
[ ] Set a watch on the border and return to the capital.
There is a two-hour moratorium on voting. Votes prior will be discounted.
But in command of the opposite force was the newly ascended Chief Mumagechee, who seemed determined to stack the odds as much in his favor as possible. The Romans came under repeated attack from archers and skirmishers as they slowly corralled the native force against the Potawatomi river, a repeated series of engagements which did little to inflict casualties but did disrupt the column and forced Theophilos to rely increasingly on his cavalry for mobility. By the second day of loose contact it was clear to both commanders that a pressed battle was inevitable - Mumagechee could not ford the Potawatomi and risk his rear, and so would be obligated to break the Roman army. Against a native force that resembled a well-organised mob more than a formation, Theophilos appears to have been anticipating victory before the battle even began. The order to advance was given with tightly packed infantry attempting to force the barbaroi against the river. Theophilos held his cavalry in reserve, waiting for the opportunity to deliver a hammer blow.
This was a fatal mistake. Instead of attempting to break free, Mumagechee kept his men back until they were thoroughly engaged, allowing less than fifty meters of space to retreat. This is likely to have been to persuade his forces to fight rather than flee, but it had the side-effect of negating the Roman cavalry who suddenly lacked the ability to maneuver. That Theophilos pressed on and attempted to win the battle at nearly 2:1 odds with infantry alone can only be described as arrogance - believing that his own soldiers, equipment, and tactical acumen were nakedly superior in every respect. The unfortunate reality was that this was not true, and Mumagechee may not have been the Emperor's equal in the open field or ability to maneuver, but was certainly not overtly inferior. Some four hours into the battle it was becoming clear to Theophilos that he would be unable to rout the Potawatomi forces before nightfall, if at all. The Emperor ordered a withdrawal, and was finally able to use his cavalry to best effect to secure a minimally damaging retreat.
The casualties are difficult to tally, and indeed Roman historians of the time described the battle as merely a light skirmish. But Theophilos lost nearly a fifth of his forces in the battle, and the psychological blow of being unable to overwhelm a seemingly more primitive opponent seems to have shaken the Emperor who acted very cautiously from then on. Mumagechee withdrew in good order across the river and the two would meet again only when the full force of the Elysian militia had assembled. Declarations at the time touted it as a victory, forcing the barbaroi to withdraw away from Odessos entirely, but the Battle of the Potawatomi River was a stark glimpse into the reality that the Elysians were contending with native tribes which had to be taken far more seriously as threats than they had been. Theophilos would defeat Mumagechee in the Battle of Nea Konstantinopolis two weeks later, forcing the Potawatomi forces into a general retreat with the strength of the entire Elysian militia.
Silver and Steel: Elysia and Indigenous Peoples. London Publishing House, 1972.
Roman Casualties: 2400 Men
Roman Army: 5600 Men
Potawatomi Casualties: 3200 Men
Potawatomi Army: 3800 Men
[ ] Begin a general campaign into Potawatomi territory.
[ ] Conduct a retributive raid into Potawatomi territory.
[ ] Set a watch on the border and return to the capital.
There is a two-hour moratorium on voting. Votes prior will be discounted.
- Location
- USA
Methinks we need to spend more on the military soon.
Are these numbers referencing how many men we respectively lost and the current armies we both have?
Are these numbers referencing how many men we respectively lost and the current armies we both have?
ConfusedCanuck
Where did it all go wrong?
- Location
- Neverland
Thus would be the best time to launch a retaliatory campaign against them we are still at a stage in our nations growth where if multiple tribes unite to crush us we would lose. Our best bet is to show them we're not weak and won't take this lying down.
- Location
- USA
I'm not sure if we could effectively prosecute a campaign into Powatomi territory. We don't have the clear qualitative advantage in troops that we think we had, as our first battle with the natives can attest. Furthermore we are fighting with mostly militia soldiers rather than professionals, so I'm not entirely sure if we can expect success if we drive too deep into enemy territory, even with a nominal numerical advantage. I agree that while the timing may be right for us strike back at our foes here, I'm just not sure if a campaign is an answer. A retaliatory raid is something we can more likely accomplish as that's just a quick in and out.
Am I correct to assume then that if we choose to forge ahead further, that Theophilos will be the commander of any further military incursion?
Maybe not but remember that we only did as badly in that first battle as we did because they both out numbered us to nearly 2 to 1 and prevented the use of our Calvary. We now out number them by a solid 1800 and our troops are now bloodied and experienced.
- Location
- USA
True, but a defensive campaign within your own territory with troops motivated to defend their homes and families is a much different beast than an offensive campaign into enemy territory, especially as we won't know the terrain there well, and we also will be further away from our logistics network. That could be enough of a factor to mitigate our current numerical advantage. Also, if the Emperor is the commander of the force I'm not entirely sure if his new caution will an asset or a detriment here.
- Location
- Norway
I think we should do at least a punitive raid, maybe a full campaign, but prosecuting the campaign might be hard. Especially since we'd apparently be campaigning into territory that we haven't even mapped.
Elysian geographers are like "The whomst?"
While a retaliatory raid might be seen as a sound option it would not erase the paranoia and perceived weakness of the throne if we fail. A campaign will be better since we already have the professional soldiery of the dynatoi and the Old Republic used to be militia armies before allowing any such patrician to buy an army for the Senate. We need the throne to be firm and we need a triumph to glorify our deed and say that the emperor is a true successor to Caesar, Constantine, and Justinian.
I think we should do at least a punitive raid, maybe a full campaign, but prosecuting the campaign might be hard. Especially since we'd apparently be campaigning into territory that we haven't even mapped.
Elysian geographers are like "The whomst?"
The map name is wrong, the text is right. Potawatomi, not Potawomack.