Command: Modern Air & Naval Operations: Let's Play and Expansions

Eh, it's mentioned in one of my history books as being a rejoinder by Stalin, so it could be a joke. On the other hand, I can see him do it.
IIRC, part of their offensive doctrine against NATO was pretty much "Don't stop. Ever". The orders were to drive over minefields because stopping to clear them would give NATO forces time to regroup.
 
I have no idea how to clear a minefield in this game. Or even find one. I tell my helicopters to use their dipping sonar but I don't really get anything.

Here's a series we did on mine warfare before release:
Minelaying : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1681
Minesweeping : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1689
Minehunting : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1716

Countering mines in general is a tedious, iffy and protracted affair, and demands specialized equipment.

We did a lot of work to automate the AI handling it (you would hate our guts otherwise) but we still deliberately left the part where you think you're clear..... and then your HVU blows up because you've missed a few. It happens.
 
Here's a series we did on mine warfare before release:
Minelaying : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1681
Minesweeping : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1689
Minehunting : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1716

Countering mines in general is a tedious, iffy and protracted affair, and demands specialized equipment.
Cool, thanks.

We did a lot of work to automate the AI handling it (you would hate our guts otherwise) but we still deliberately left the part where you think you're clear..... and then your HVU blows up because you've missed a few. It happens.
Thanks. :mad:
 
People on foot won't set off anti-tank mines. Anti-personnel mines won't really damage a tank (might damage a track though).
Mind you, Poor Bloody Infantry can find AT mines fairly easily (especially if they're looking for them), and since they won't set them off unless they're command detonated (for which you need friendly infantry in proximity anyway), or rigged to prevent clearing (booby trapped - which can be a warcrime depending on how it's done), you want to cover AT-minefields with AP minefields or friendly infantry.
Preferably, of course, you cover AT mines with AP mines, machineguns, ATGMs (or AT-guns), plus snipers and forward observers, and AP mines with a small scattering of AT mines and the same defensive force.

Sea mines are ideally covered with coastal arty, AShM, AD, radar and visual sensors, but out at sea this is not always possible. For narrow passages and straits, you can however manage this, and might even set up command posts to command detonate mines in proximity of enemy ships, and replace detonated mines to ensure coverage, plus allow a few enemy ships to pass through unmolested before sinking a high value target, and other fun stuff.

Green Water is fun water.
 
There are a number of factors at play, including crew proficiency, terrain avoidance / terrain following capability (e.g. an F-16C with LANTIRN has an inherent advantage vis-a-vis an early F-16A), sea state (pilots automatically bump their minimum safe altitude a few meters if they see big waves), day / night visibility and a few other things.

Does anyone else think when Dimitris posts in this thread it's like God talking to you personally about a totally mundane subject?

"God where did I leave my car keys!?"
"In your other pants, they're in the hamper in the bathroom."

Here's a series we did on mine warfare before release:
Minelaying : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1681
Minesweeping : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1689
Minehunting : http://www.warfaresims.com/?p=1716

Countering mines in general is a tedious, iffy and protracted affair, and demands specialized equipment.

We did a lot of work to automate the AI handling it (you would hate our guts otherwise) but we still deliberately left the part where you think you're clear..... and then your HVU blows up because you've missed a few. It happens.

Are you still iterating on mine warfare? I ask because I was excited to try it out initially but a lot of the pieces weren't working so I put it on the back burner for a bit and enjoyed other aspects of the game.

Unrelated: Can you give use any hint on when real-time multi-player will come to CMANO?

Sea mines are ideally covered with coastal arty, AShM, AD, radar and visual sensors, but out at sea this is not always possible. For narrow passages and straits, you can however manage this, and might even set up command posts to command detonate mines in proximity of enemy ships, and replace detonated mines to ensure coverage, plus allow a few enemy ships to pass through unmolested before sinking a high value target, and other fun stuff.

Green Water is fun water.

This interests me greatly...makes me think of scenarios and stuff.

How were they planning on replacing the detonated or cleared mines? Slip Visbys in and kick them off the back? Task aircraft with re-laying in a pre-planned pattern? How were they planning on keeping the assets close enough to take advantage of windows in the enemies surveillance? I'd try to look it up myself, but I don't trust any alphabet that has bull's eyes over the letter "A" (also I don't speak Swedish).
 
Are you still iterating on mine warfare? I ask because I was excited to try it out initially but a lot of the pieces weren't working so I put it on the back burner for a bit and enjoyed other aspects of the game.
It's been a while since we had to fix something on that.

There were some issues initially, stemming not from any fundamental mechanics flaw but from the sheer diversity of real-world MCM systems and having to model the distinct peculiarities of each (that's the work you cut out for yourself when your mission statement begins with "screw excessive/ridiculous abstractions, I'm gonna show it like it is in RL"). For example, some ROVs are tethered and therefore have unlimited "fuel" but cannot move outside a certain distance from the parent vessel, others are autonomous so you must model their fuel restrictions and also add AI clauses for retrieving them if they do run out of fuel/battery before they get back, still others are wire-guided but dropped from _helicopters_ so you have to keep the datalink even though they act almost like air-dropped torpedoes, some of the ROVs are purely hunters, others purely killers, some are dual-role, and you must also model the fact that most ROVs have a single-shot mine-disarm/destruction kit so they must get back to mothership when they do their job etc. etc.

Like I said we haven't seen something major for a while now so give it a try with the latest public version (v1.04 RC2 currently) and let us know if you stumble upon something; preferably on the tech support forum at Matrix so that we can track it more easily. Thanks!
 
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Are you still iterating on mine warfare? I ask because I was excited to try it out initially but a lot of the pieces weren't working so I put it on the back burner for a bit and enjoyed other aspects of the game.
It's been a while since we had to fix something on that.

There were some issues initially stemming not from any fundamental mechanics flaw but from...

"God, why did you make platypuses?"
"It's a complicated problem, my son..."
 
This interests me greatly...makes me think of scenarios and stuff.

How were they planning on replacing the detonated or cleared mines? Slip Visbys in and kick them off the back? Task aircraft with re-laying in a pre-planned pattern? How were they planning on keeping the assets close enough to take advantage of windows in the enemies surveillance? I'd try to look it up myself, but I don't trust any alphabet that has bull's eyes over the letter "A" (also I don't speak Swedish).
Specifically, this is for harbor defense, with the Swedish archipelagos during the cold war.
They were planning on using boats, or possibly rails to get more mines out of storage blown into the sides of the mined inlets.

Swedish Coastal Artillery was organized into Brigades which covered specific geographic areas, and contained a mixture of
1) Spärrbataljoner (Blocking Battalions) which were relatively immobile and blocked off access to ports/coast - each brigade contained at least one and usually more than one, depending on what their area contained, and consisted of:
1.1) Heavy Fixed coastal artillery batteries - f.ex. ERSTA, and predecessors.
1.2) Light fixed coastal artillery batteries - older guns, mostly with lighter firepower, closer to the coast/harbor.
1.3) Minspärrtropp (Mine Blocking Troops), which controlled sea mines in the approaches/inlets.
2) Mobile forces, primarily
2.1) Kustjägarkompanier (if you played Wargame: ALB, you know what this is).
2.2) Robotbatterier (AShM batteries) - well, okay, these mostly fielded heavy ATGM in the cold war - RBS 52 was the French SS.11M, but later real AShM in the form of the RBS 15KA (Swedish AShM) and more potent ATGM's in the form of RBS 17 (Hellfire SDS) were fielded (just before the Coastal Artillery was disbanded, as a matter of fact).
2.3) Mobile artillery batteries - these included older mobile artillery pieces, plus AA guns to cover them.
Additionally, the brigades also had some battalions from the Army, primarily a bicycle infantry battalion as a mobile reserve, a home guard battalion and several local defense units, which would include defense guns and turrets. Such units were composed according to their assigned mission and, as such, had no fixed organisation. They usually were formed up as the crew of a defense gun (which was an older artillery, naval or AA gun covering a specific objective) or defense turret (a turret from an obsolete tank, fixed on top of a bunker), plus some additional infantry to cover it. Just about every important harbor and airfield, and several other pieces of critical infrastructure in Sweden, had such a unit assigned.


Aside from that, the Coastal Artillery also fielded mobile artillery battalions, most notably (from the 1980s) equipped with the Coastal Artillery version of the FH77 - 12/80 "KARIN" (a FH 77 bored only to 120 mm), which had a high rate of fire, and which was being motorized/mechanized when the Coastal Artillery was disbanded, the prototype for the "KARELIN" served as an inspirational testbed of what eventually became the Archer artillery system.
There were also Amphibious Battalions with Kustjägare, which were where the RBS 17 ended up - one amphibious battalion survived when the Coastal Artillery was disbanded and is now AmfBat, still with RBS 17.

As an example of a blocking battalion, the Femöre battery which was part of the battalion covering Oxelösund harbor is preserved as a museum - it's a light battery (one of two, later three, in its battalion), with three 75 mm guns with a range of 13 km. The battalion it was part of would also include a missile battery. As it was a fairly low priority area, it had no mining troops (mining by minelayer would still be done, of course).

In contrast, the Naval base of Muskö was surrounded by blocking battalions with mining troops - all part of KAB 3 (Coastal Artillery Brigade 3) with staff on Järflotta, which also covered the area south of Stockholm - Ornö, Mellsten, Askö housed blocking battalion staffs (Askö technically on Torö) with heavy and light coastal artillery batteries (including a 12/70 ERSTA battery on Landsort) and between them had six mine blocking troops (two Ornö, three Mellsten, one Askö). Additionally, the brigade had a defense area group staff type B, three bicycle infantry battalions, an engineer company, logistics company, and a number of defense companies all from the army.
Heavy batteries in general had two to four 12 cm guns (though, it varied depending on type) with ranges of about 20 km, ERSTA batteries had three guns with 25-37 km range depending on ammo, light batteries had 75 mm guns with 10+ km range, missile batteries were RBS 52 with 3 km range (wire guided), or RBS 17 with 7 km range (laser guided).
Aside from KAB 3, KAB 1 and 2 were also in the Stockholm area (north and east approaches respectively), as well the 2. KA battalion 12/80 (8 guns). Three amphibious battalions were also part of the organization.
In the Stockholm area was also the 3. Mobile Blocking Battalion which had a battery of three 75 mm m/65 guns (10 km range) - which had such a short range, they had an armored booth you could put on the gun after deploying to protect the crew, and had to be deployed on the beach/coast they were defending - a light robot battery and a mine blocking troop.
N.B. All that is the 1984 organization.

It's certainly not capable of contesting the ocean, but try sending troopships to unload in the harbor!
(That said, air defenses were... Mostly 20 and 40 mm autocannons, a few RBS 69 and 70, maybe RBS 77 and whatever air units were available - take the time to suppress the defenses thoroughly and you can probably get into the harbor unmolested, but by then the Swedish army will have mobilized.)
 
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Any sources on this? Not saying it didn't happen, just want to read up on it/how prevalent it was.

AFAIK, most of the "human wave" talk of the Iran-Iraq War was greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes. The Iranians used (and became skilled at) Korean War-styled infantry infiltration attacks, and most of the sources I've found (Pollack, others), have infantry attacks being used as diversions for said infiltration. Politics and increasing Iraqi defenses did make their infantry attacks costly, which is why I'm convinced that it was a combination of spinning infantry offensives that were not accomplishing much into martyrdom on the Iranian side and a mixture of "Look at those dumb (insert insulting term towards Iranians) just charging like crazy" propaganda and a naturally exaggerated "SHIT I WAS ALMOST OVERRUN THERE HAD TO BE A THOUSAND OF THEM!" take from people on the ground on the Iraqi side.
 
AFAIK, most of the "human wave" talk of the Iran-Iraq War was greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes. The Iranians used (and became skilled at) Korean War-styled infantry infiltration attacks, and most of the sources I've found (Pollack, others), have infantry attacks being used as diversions for said infiltration. Politics and increasing Iraqi defenses did make their infantry attacks costly, which is why I'm convinced that it was a combination of spinning infantry offensives that were not accomplishing much into martyrdom on the Iranian side and a mixture of "Look at those dumb (insert insulting term towards Iranians) just charging like crazy" propaganda and a naturally exaggerated "SHIT I WAS ALMOST OVERRUN THERE HAD TO BE A THOUSAND OF THEM!" take from people on the ground on the Iraqi side.

Another point here, though, is also the makeup of the Iranian army during the war. A large part of the Iranian army's manpower came from the basij militias, which were each organized by their respective mosque and sent to the front. They were squads of twenty-two men, each group assigned a specific objective to complete and sent forward, and they attacked in a broad front to maximize frontage and dispersion. They were used alongside or in conjunction with the regular army troops and the Revolutionary Guard, (Pasdaran brigades) who generally had heavier equipment and better training. (although the Pasdaran suffered from the same lack of training and basic experience as the basij in the early years of the war)

In Operation "Undeniable Victory," for instance, the Iranian regulars landed in Chinooks behind Iraqi lines and wreaked havoc while the Basij and Pasdaran brigades attacked enemy defenses head-on; the basiji and Revolutionary Guards took heavy losses, but succeeded in overrunning the enemy. Similarly, in Operation Jerusalem Way, the untrained basij attacked entrenched Iraqi positions while the regular army flanked and eventually overran them. (by literally building a road through the desert too, IIRC) The Iranians' high morale and large manpower reserves, coupled with their use of night assaults from multiple directions (to minimize Iraqi advantages in air and artillery firepower) and focus of attacks against the Iraqi "Popular Army" Sunni troops, were key in ensuring their success despite high casualties. I don't know what the Guards command did with basiji units rendered combat-ineffective by casualties, (reshuffle the survivors as cadre for green units? Create new teams from survivors of other units? Send them back home and slot in another 22-man team?) but I suspect the latter given the kind of manpower they had available to call on and their general focus on regime stability, which would presumably exacerbate the issue of inexperience.

The key tactical points to note here are the lack of training on the part of the basij, and the lack of a large officer and senior enlisted corps able to command them. The Iranian army was 250,000 strong prior to the war, but much of its strength was lost during the purges, especially of the officer corps itself. This meant a loss of the NCOs and junior officers able to effectively ride herd on the troops in the field, and of cadre to train the newcomers. The Iranians kept the basiji and Pasdaran separate from the army due to political reasons, fearing another coup, (there were street battles in Tehran between the Revolutionary Guards and left-wing groups in 1981, after all) and although I don't know how much cross-training actually occurred, the political infighting between the regular army and the Revolutionary Guards suggests that there wasn't a lot of cooperation. Several analysts of the war, notably the Egyptian field marshal Abu Ghazalah, noted that Guards and regular army forces would often operate completely independently during the first three to four years of the war. Perhaps the worst example of this was in 1981, when then-president Abdulhassan Banisadr ordered a frontal armored assault by the regular army over marshy terrain sans any meaningful support, with predictably disastrous consequences. His downfall meant the relative supremacy of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) in Iranian strategic and tactical command. These political struggles continued throughout the whole war, and had obvious negative effects on the caliber of the deployed troops.

In other words, this implies that the quality of the deployed militia would've been extremely uneven, along with their junior commanders. I don't know the specifics, since I only incidentally paid attention to the history of the Iran-Iraq War, but I'd argue that the success of their prior attacks helps explain the Revolutionary Guards' willingness, at all levels, to prosecute close-range infantry assaults even in the face of heavy Iraqi defenses. Despite high casualties brought on from inexperienced troops pressing ineffective attacks at times, they still achieved strategic success, which minimized their mistakes. They understood "success" and "failure" perfectly well, and acted to maximize the one and minimize the other, but the inexperience of the newly-formed Revolutionary Guards and the sidelining of the regular army meant that they were slow to incorporate lessons learned into practiced doctrine. Broad-front infantry attacks worked very effectively for them during the 1982 offenses, and it wasn't until the Dawn operations in 1983 and '84 that they began to fail despite using the same tactics that'd worked before.

EDIT: While it's tempting to compare the 1980-1984 Iranian light infantry assaults to the Chinese attacks during the Korean War - both were made up of highly-motivated light infantry attacking dug-in enemy forces at close range with minimal support at night, after all - there are a lot of functional differences. The Chinese troops, for instance, were very experienced light infantry and had plenty of personal and institutional experience owing to the Communists' experience against the Nationalists and Japanese during the '30s and '40s. They were limited by the rough terrain and had very few supplies available to sustain their momentum, and were facing much stronger enemy resistance. Conversely, the Iranian basiji were often more-or-less completely untrained, and the Iranian armed ground forces consisted of a "high-low" mix of effective but politically-unreliable army regulars and the light infantry of the Pasdaran and basiji brigades, and also had the logistics and equipment available to effectively concentrate armor and airpower for limited mechanized offensives. (compared to the Chinese lack of air superiority and effective logistical capability to field large armored forces during 1950-52) Although both the Chinese and early-war Iranians overcame their disadvantages in firepower through similar tactics, namely through night attacks by dispersed light infantry over a wide area against pre-identified enemy weak points, the Chinese light-infantry assaults were intended to overrun the enemy while the Iranian basiji attacks fixed the Iraqis in place to allow the Iranian Army regulars did the decisive work. (theoretically, of course; the reality was often driven far more by internal politicking than by sound tactical doctrine) Their tactics were similar, but their force composition and overall objectives were radically different, not to mention the differences in terrain and capabilities of the enemy.

The Iraqi response to Iranian tactics, (multiple lines of static defenses, plus nerve gas and overwhelming air and artillery firepower against enemy assaults) and the ever-present logistics issues of fielding such a force in Iraqi territory, were likely some of the most important reasons behind their switch from the popular army (in both senses of the word) of 1982 to the experienced light infantry of 1985-88. However, yes there is plenty of evidence for the Iranians using infantry-centric "human wave" attacks against prepared defenses in the early stages of the war.

We now return you to your regular thread. :V
 
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And to get back on topic after Nuts!' useful history clarification, I tried experimenting with minimum altitudes over water, after seeing Dimitris' post.

In the daytime, 24 meters seemed to be the minimum height. Proficiency settings didn't seem to make that much of a difference. At night, it was 30 meters for more modern planes and 91 for older ones. HH-60 helicopters had a floor of 9 meters at night.
 
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Sorry, wasn't able to reply earlier.

Any sources on this? Not saying it didn't happen, just want to read up on it/how prevalent it was.

AFAIK, most of the "human wave" talk of the Iran-Iraq War was greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes. The Iranians used (and became skilled at) Korean War-styled infantry infiltration attacks, and most of the sources I've found (Pollack, others), have infantry attacks being used as diversions for said infiltration. Politics and increasing Iraqi defenses did make their infantry attacks costly, which is why I'm convinced that it was a combination of spinning infantry offensives that were not accomplishing much into martyrdom on the Iranian side and a mixture of "Look at those dumb (insert insulting term towards Iranians) just charging like crazy" propaganda and a naturally exaggerated "SHIT I WAS ALMOST OVERRUN THERE HAD TO BE A THOUSAND OF THEM!" take from people on the ground on the Iraqi side.

I think I originally heard it mentioned in an SB/SV War Room thread, and as it turns out the veracity of the accounts have been debated. However, while there is certainly cause for skepticism, Iran was sufficiently desperate during the war (especially the latter stages) that the incidents described remain within the realm of possibility.
 
And to get back on topic after Nuts!' useful history clarification, I tried experimenting with minimum altitudes over water, after seeing Dimitris' post.

In the daytime, 24 meters seemed to be the minimum height. Proficiency settings didn't seem to make that much of a difference. At night, it was 30 meters for more modern planes and 91 for older ones. HH-60 helicopters had a floor of 9 meters at night.

Speaking of testing, this is the result me upscaling my tactic to actual CVBGs/SAG:


The missiles are too accurate, too fast to fire, and there are too many ships. 90% time they shoot down my aircraft before they can drop their bombs (even when I do things like increase the number of attacking aircraft to 24, and use the longer ranged LJDAMs with 12nmi range as opposed to the 4nmi of the LGBs). There is no counter-tactic to it really, I have to attack with so many aircraft that they don't have time to ripple fire missiles and make my aircraft go defensive before they're in range and drop.

This of course inspired a different track for this post:
What does it take to overwhelm an un-alerted (no fighters airborne) CVBG? To answer this question I turn to a close friend....

The H-6G bomber of the Chinese PLAN.
Capable of carrying offensive jammers, subsonic C-803K and supersonic YJ-12 AShMs it was perfect for testing so that I could mess around with the attacker's capabilities. Unfortunately a bug prevents me from actually testing the C-803K configuration (reported), but I have the setup prepared anyway.

The targets are two CVBGs with qualitative differences; the Groupe Aéronaval and the Queen Elizabeth CVBG. The supporting cast for both were pulled from French and British doctrine along with a cursory comparison with the Order of Battle from the Libyan Civil War. Unremarkable enough, they are actually remarkably similar. One advanced AAW ship, backed by three "Second Rates". I advanced the date a bit because I already have these groups premade and wanted to save on *effort*.

  • R08 Queen Elizabeth
  • D36 Defender
  • F236 Montrose
  • F231 Argyll
  • F234 Iron Duke

  • R91 Charles de Gaulle
  • D615 Jean Bart
  • D621 Chevalier Paul
  • D652 Provence
  • D654 Auvergne

These two groups represent an interesting dichotomy, one force has jammers (GAN), and the other does not. On the other hand, a significant portion of the GAN's missile inventory can't be used against supersonic missiles. The 72 Mistrals may as well not exist against the YJ-12.

Let's start with the QE2CVBG:
Without jammers my aircraft are detected at the Defender's maximum range (215nmi) and detect the CVBG at their maximum range (175nmi) allowing them to launch uncontested. The missiles are detected but not tracked as they drop below the horizon. A total of 80 are launched (10 on each escort, 40 on the CV; which is kind of weird because I haven't ID'ed anything yet*), in real life this would be a pretty ridiculous attack. In fact I think such a large attack would actually be impossible but I digress.

The missiles sunk the Defender and Queen Elizabeth, but left the frigates unmolested. This is not an optimal outcome. A follow up strike would finish them easily enough and their job was to protect the carrier.

Ok, now let's see if the jammers the GAN has can make a difference for the GAN:
My aircraft were once again detected at 215nmi, but this time I am denied a fix on the surface ships at my bomber's maximum range...interesting. At 150nmi I got a single transient contact, but nothing else until ~120nmi, at which point I get 5 contacts but can't lock down exact locations so I can attack. At about 55nmi I still haven't locked down exact locations and am forced to take a snap shot because the GAN's Aster 30s are coming in. I manage to get 66/80 missiles off and ultimately lost 12/20 bombers. The outcome however remained the same for the ships. The CdG is sunk, along with the Jean Bart but at least I extracted a few kills for them. Ultimately the French fleet was betrayed by their relatively small missile inventory.


Alright now let's see how jammers improve my own strike. I'll sacrifice 8 missiles to have 4 bombers equipped with jammers.
YET AGAIN, my bombers are detected at 215nmi BUT this time they aren't tracked. The range estimates are all jacked up (to the point of being useless, the estimates are up to 415nmi). CVBG spotted on radar right at 174nmi and being tracked solidly. I can launch now...SO I WILL! The QE's ships still don't have a fix on my bombers because of my jamming. I'm having my bombers RTB while the jammers support the engagement with their ECM pods and radars.

The 72 missiles are now within the radar horizon of my ships (30nmi) and still haven't been detected. They finally picked them up at 21nmi, leaving the ships a little less than 1 minute to engage them.


LOL the jammers are jamming the Asters too. It's not effecting their performance at all, but it did fill my screen with the word "JAMMING". That being said, once again the QE was sunk, although this time Defender was spared. Eight fewer missiles seems to have made most of the difference. Reset.

Now time for the match up everyone has been waiting for, jammer on jammer. Can I save my jammers with ECM? Will the CdG survive if given 8 fewer missiles to shoot down (along with preserving their missile inventories by being denied bombers to shoot down; there is a logical failure here, I leave it to you to find).

Passive sensors located my bombers even further out than radar (240nmi), but they can't actually track them, so I'm fine (sort of). My bombers got sporadic contacts at 120nmi, I really don't want to take a bad shot though so I'm holding out for solid fixes on their positions. At 60nmi the IR and CCD cameras ID'ed the bombers as hostile (they were ID'ed as bombers at 100nmi), and they started firing on them. I still don't have a fix so this a conundrum...eh I better just fire before I start losing missiles for nothing.

My missiles worked even better this time because of the jamming on the GAN's illuminators, 3 of the escorts were hit and sunk outright, the CdG was hit as well, but WAS NOT SUNK! It's merely heavily damaged flooding and on fire. I'm seeing now if it'll live...Nope. They got the fires out then the flooding got it. They didn't even kill any bombers this time either.

Anyway, lessons learned jammers work well. Defensive missiles work well, too well. To the point that the only way to pull off attacks is to completely empty defender's missile magazines or sending in such a massive number of missiles that the 95% Pk is buried under a flood of 5% leakers. That being said, the UK need jammers, and France needs more than 16 SAMs. At least in the C:MANO world.

I have a part 3 to this.

*It's either the game accidentally acting on information it shouldn't (specific information about the skunk) or is acting on information that isn't presented to the player (size of the radar return or other signature allowing size of the contact to be determined).
 
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  • R91 Charles de Gaulle
  • D615 Jean Bart
  • D621 Chevalier Paul
  • D652 Provence
  • D654 Auvergne

These two groups represent an interesting dichotomy, one force has jammers (GAN), and the other does not. On the other hand, a significant portion of the GAN's missile inventory can't be used against supersonic missiles. The 72 Mistrals may as well not exist against the YJ-12.
Can you clarify something for me, please? You're talking about a large portion of Mistral in the GAN forces, but given the OOB you're providing, I'm seeing here the CdG, the old Jean Bart, which has, indeed, Mistrals, and the rest of them are all armed with Aster missiles (D621 is a full AA destroyer and both D652 and D654 are fitted with 16 Aster missiles, given that they are the model for ASW warfare and not the AA model with 32 Aster). Where are the other Mistral coming from? [Sincere curiosity]

Also, according to the French Wiki, there is an option for FREMM frigates, like D652 and D654, to add some VL-MICA canisters, in addition to the existing Aster cells, up to 24 additional short-range missiles (10 km range, 9 km max altitude) per frig. Do you think that option could be a game-changer for such a scenario?
 
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Can you clarify something for me, please? You're talking about a large portion of Mistral in the GAN forces, but given the OOB you're providing, I'm seeing here the CdG, the old Jean Bart, which has, indeed, Mistrals, and the rest of them are all armed with Aster missiles (D621 is a full AA destroyer and both D652 and D654 are fitted with 16 Aster missiles, given that they are the model for ASW warfare and not the AA model with 32 Aster). Where are the other Mistral coming from? [Sincere curiosity]

Also, according to the French Wiki, there is an option for FREMM frigates, like D652 and D654, to add some VL-MICA canisters, in addition to the existing Aster cells, up to 24 additional short-range missiles (10 km range, 9 km max altitude) per frig. Do you think that option could be a game-changer for such a scenario?

It's only those two ships, the other one is the CdG itself, but they each have 36 Mistrals. So 72 total out of the total GAN missile count of 223. Which includes the slow as all get out SM-1 launcher on the Jean Bart. All the rest have Asters, which act like, well Asters and blow away everything hostile at the cyclic rate (not even joking).

Adding VL-MICA to the frigates is absolutely beneficial as the magazines aren't completely dry when AShMs start hitting, because the number of shooters drop off once the two FREMM exhaust their anemic supply of missiles (16 each) and the SM-1 on the Jean Bart intercepts missiles like old people fuck. Once that happens the GAN starts falling behind really quickly and without the Mistrals to play point defense it all falls apart.

I would just put the VL-MICA on them and test it if I wasn't so bored of setting that up and retesting over and over again made worse by the fact that I'm dumb and did QE w/o jammers like 3 times, and once launched 100 bombers at it without paying attention instead of 20 (yeah that time I all the British ships).
 
I would just put the VL-MICA on them and test it if I wasn't so bored of setting that up and retesting over and over again made worse by the fact that I'm dumb and did QE w/o jammers like 3 times, and once launched 100 bombers at it without paying attention instead of 20 (yeah that time I all the British ships).
Meh, don't worry, these were only British ships. :p

Thx for the answer, though. :)
 
Speaking of testing, this is the result me upscaling my tactic to actual CVBGs/SAG:


The missiles are too accurate, too fast to fire, and there are too many ships. 90% time they shoot down my aircraft before they can drop their bombs (even when I do things like increase the number of attacking aircraft to 24, and use the longer ranged LJDAMs with 12nmi range as opposed to the 4nmi of the LGBs). There is no counter-tactic to it really, I have to attack with so many aircraft that they don't have time to ripple fire missiles and make my aircraft go defensive before they're in range and drop.

A critical factor that has not been mentioned in these posts is the doctrine setting "engage non-hostiles" (aka "shoot first, ask questions later"). This drastically alters the ranges at which the defender (or also the attacker, depending on the circumstances of the engagement and the presence of other scout/surveillance units) can actually begin to employ its weapons.

In the Type 052D example, from the description I understand that the destroyer had this setting set to NO, thus its hands were tied in terms of engaging incomings before they were identified as hostile. This explains why the F-16s were not engaged early with HQ-9s even through they were detected and tracked quite early. If the destroyer had been given a free hand at shooting suspect incomings, either with this doctrine setting or via other means (e.g. establishing a forbidden zone anchored to it and configuring it so that violators are marked as hostile, or having a forward picket visually ID the unknowns as bandits) then I seriously doubt any of the F-16s would have managed to close to release distance. (If you've kept a copy of that scen file, set that doctrine option to YES for the destroyer and observe how the flow of the engagement changes.)

For a demonstration of what happens when the defender has free reign in shooting early, see the very first video of CMANO we ever published:


On paper, the Turkish attack force (8 F-4Es with 2x AGM-65G each) is much stronger than the Type 052D attack setup, and the defences of the Greek convoy are much weaker (the only decent SAMs are the Hydra's ESSMs). However, the Greek force has pre-emptively marked the bogeys as hostile, and begins shooting as early as possible. This makes all the difference.

(It is both funny and frustrating at the same time, how many folks still think of Command as a strictly hardware-contest simulator when in fact we've gone to great lengths to include a myriad of "soft" factors like proficiency levels, RoEs, doctrine options, fire discipline etc. etc. You _can_ equalize these factors if you want to reduce an engagement to a steel-on-steel thing [this is a particularly popular sport on battleship enthusiast forums apparently], but RL conflicts and their representation in Command are usually much more complex than that.)
 
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*It's either the game accidentally acting on information it shouldn't (specific information about the skunk) or is acting on information that isn't presented to the player (size of the radar return or other signature allowing size of the contact to be determined).

The latter. Their radar screens show a few small/medium blips clustered around a big-ass blip, and in the absence of any more refined ID information they run with that.
 
(It is both funny and frustrating at the same time, how many folks still think of Command as a strictly hardware-contest simulator when in fact we've gone to great lengths to include a myriad of "soft" factors like proficiency levels, RoEs, doctrine options, fire discipline etc. etc. You _can_ equalize these factors if you want to reduce an engagement to steel-on-steel thing, but RL conflicts and their representation in Command are usually much more complex than that.)
Of course we're not perceiving it as a hardware-contest simulator!

When will you implement Captain Kirk's Enterprise and Imperial Star Destroyers, BTW? We need to settle some debate in the VS section once and for all.


[/Hypocrisy]
 
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