After his reelection and the success of the Congress Party the Prime Minister would travel to Australia as the first foreign trip in his Second Administration. Over the past several years there had been an increase in tourism and investment from the continent and Australia was far enough from the country's borders to ally any fears of encroachment. While many in the government and press criticized the Australians over their foreign policy decisions or the behavior of some tourists, few could deny that India needed investment to improve the agricultural based sections of her economy and that tourism did bring in needed money.
The Prime Minister along with Indira would visit Australia from 1st August to the 8th, visiting Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra. The delegation would visit with Prime Minister Lang and tour the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). With a growing population that was becoming richer and more educated, Nehru would use India's economic potential to entice Australian businesses such as aircraft manufacturers, automakers and farm equipment to invest in India. Also Australian agronomists and agricultural scientists would work alongside their Indian counterparts to help develop the agriculture sector through the Colombo Plan Development Bank. Discussions regarding trade tariffs would lead to both sides deciding tariffs on particular goods on a case by case basis.
Nehru's administration would be criticized by right learning members of the Australian press as 'covert communism' but defended by the center and left as 'a growing democracy'. Nehru's British education along with Indira would win many supporters as both Australia and India shared some background as former British colonies. The love of Cricket would be a large factor in future visits between the countries..
The New Look Highlights of the Eisenhower Cabinet
Dwight. D Eisenhower was a man long accustomed to service and responsibility. Everyone knew his resume, and it needed no restating. Now in the highest office in the country, Ike intended to make his purpose known. Eisenhower was elected on a platform of anti-communist foreign policy while supporting the New Deal and public works domestically. Making broad promises to implement his agenda, the new President intended to be one of the few politicians who followed through with his campaign promises. Shortly after his inauguration on January 20th, 1957, Eisenhower submitted a surprisingly non-partisan, evenhanded selection of candidates for his administration. Eisenhower referred to himself as a "dynamic conservative," and his cabinet picks reflected that, though it mostly drew from big business, his cabinet was notable for the nomination of Frances P. Bolton as Ambassador to the United Nations, making her the first female member of a Republican Cabinet. In other minor positions within the Eisenhower Administration were Lewis Strauss as Chair of the Atomic Energy Commission and the third female Cabinet member in US history, Oveta Culp Hobby as Secretary of Education, Health and Welfare.
Richard Nixon, Vice President
Vice President Richard Nixon came into his role as nominee rather in doubt, as allegations swirled about an allegedly 'secret' campaign fund that the nominee was withholding from public knowledge. Nixon, a man who could not and would not commit a crime (this will hold up historically), gave an impassioned speech defending his fund and helped to carry California for Eisenhower in the elections. After his inauguration, Nixon quickly enjoyed significant privileges from the President and had more responsibility than his predecessors in the Martin and Truman administrations. Richard Milhouse Nixon was already building a solid reputation among the American public and the Republican party.
The Dulles Brothers, Allen (L) and John Foster (R)
John Foster and Allen Dulles had come to form the nucleus of the President's few foreign policy and national security policy programs, and with it came their ideology of fervent anti-communism. John Foster Dulles quickly remade the State Department in his anti-communist image, eager to take a firm stance against the "godless terrorism" of Marxism-Leninism. For his part, Eisenhower trusted John Foster Dulles as his new Secretary of State and took Dulles' advice when formulating his 'New Look' foreign policy that promised to depart from the failures of the Truman Administration. Allen Dulles, as Director of the CIA, encouraged covert operations and risky yet lucrative intelligence gathering in the fight against the Great Satan, the KGB. These two men held a tremendous amount of influence over American foreign policy, and in 1956, were some of the most powerful men in America.
Herbert Brownell Jr., Attorney General
The new chief lawman of the United States had a difficult task ahead of him. Herbert Brownell Jr. had been a longtime Republican but firmly believed in and idealized the abolitionist genesis of his party. Brownell saw the looming specter of civil rights and segregation as a severe challenge to Eisenhower's nascent Presidency. As one of the men who convinced Ike to run for office, he was unwilling to let his friend and political ally fall. Upon taking office as Attorney General, Brownell used his history of working in civil rights case law to begin drafting of a new bill, a modern Civil Rights Act that would supersede the last Civil Rights Act, which was passed in 1875. Of course, Brownell's name was already being spat on in the South, but as one of Eisenhower's strongest allies and a formidable lawyer in his own right, segregationist prattle meant nothing to him.
The First Real Hurdle The 1958 Italian Parliamentary Elections
The creation of the Second Italian Republic, inspired equally by De Gaulle and Aldo Moro's desire for a peaceful Italy, would face it's first true test in 1958. Whilst some might argue that the governance of Aldo since 1954 was the initial test, and one which he past thanks to an exceedingly low bar established since the March on Rome, they would be wrong. There is a fundamental difference in a democratic society between ruling with a majority and having the populace judge you based on how they approve of that majority. Especially since the Moro government was not a monolith creature born of a great man (as self-styled Moroists would actively shout on behalf of their humble figurehead). Rather it was a rickety mutant with three uneven legs. The Christian Democrats, the Italian Social Democratic Party, and the Italian Liberal Party (listed in order of exponential importance) were the ones who gave Moro the majority he needed to govern. Some might argue that President Luigi Einaudi would be the true leader of Italy, as head of state and recently empowered by the new constitution, but they would be wrong. Einaudi was much more interested opening universities, drinking coffee and wine in the elite business clubs of Milan and Rome, and travelling to Bonn and Paris to continue the European Project. He was of absolutely no help, even empowered. No Moro was on his own against his enemies.
The "Deadly Three", P. Togliatti (L), P. Nenni (C), and A. Michelini (R)
And enemies Moro had in spades. His most well known and persistent was the eminent communist Togliatti. A source of endless critique from the safety of Vienna, his was the shadow government of Italy. His power was such that that which he critiqued was actively improved by the government, putting Nenni and Michelini to shame. For the actual governmental opposition was an afterthought in comparison. A shadow to the Great Critiquer. Comparatively Nenni of the Italian Socialist Party was an egoist. A socialist speaking not from the politburo of Moscow but the slums of Rome, Nenni sought leadership of Italy in a separate but equal relationship. Close with the ideals of Yugoslavia, they saw themselves as the truly Italian marxist alternative for those within the Second Republic. Lastly, but perhaps most insidious, would be Michelini. A neo-fascist, his influence wormed it's way into the armed forces, Mafia, police, industrialists, and "national unions". His bank account rich from stolen wealth born of Mussolini's imperial desires, his was less a political party and more a political lobby for those that wanted a return of the good old days. Those days where Italian was spoken from Nice to Tirane, from Tripoli to Addis Ababa.
It was these three men who Moro jockeyed with for control of Italy. To which he, ever the reluctant figurehead of good governance, forcefully browbeat electoral strategism into the Moro Alliance. Those seats most at risk of being taken by the Marxists or Fascists would be contested by a single party, not a trio of democrats. Thanks to their status as largest party, the DC ensured they received large numbers of seats initially allocated to the PLI, deeming the Liberals as necessary but notably junior partners. Although understandably upset, the Liberals were forced to choose, leave the government and perhaps collapse the country, handing it to one form of marxism or another, or stay with Moro. His fingers crossed, Moro waited sweating years off his life awaiting the results to be returned.
It was not in the hands of him afterall. For Italy was a free and fair democracy. As Italian workers and managers, students and soldiers, marxists and fascists (although the latter was just a maybe given their electoral predilection) headed to the polls, it was in their hands who would form government, or wouldn't.
Mother India is a 1957 Indian epic drama film, directed by Mehboob Khan and starring Nargis, Sunil Dutt, Rajendra Kumar and Raaj Kumar. A remake of Khan's earlier film Aurat (1940), it is the story of a poverty-stricken village woman named Radha (Nargis), who in the absence of her husband, struggles to raise her sons and survive against a cunning money-lender amidst many troubles.
The title of the film was chosen to counter American author Katherine Mayo's 1927 polemical book Mother India, which vilified Indian culture. Mother India metaphorically represents India as a nation in the aftermath of its independence in 1947, and alludes to a strong sense of Indian nationalism and nation-building. Allusions to Hindu mythology are abundant in the film, and its lead character has been seen as a metonymic representation of an Indian woman who reflects high moral values and the concept of what it means to be a mother to society through self-sacrifice. While some authors treat Radha as the symbol of women's empowerment, others see her cast in female stereotypes. The film was shot in Mumbai's Mehboob Studios and in the villages of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh. The music by Naushad introduced global music, including Western classical music and orchestra, to Hindi cinema.
The film was one of the most expensive Indian (Bollywood) productions and earned the highest revenue for any Indian film at that time. Adjusted for inflation, Mother India still ranks among the all-time Indian box office hits. It was released in India amid fanfare in October 1957 and had several high-profile screenings, including one at the capital, New Delhi, attended by the country's president and prime minister. Mother India became a definitive cultural classic and is regarded as one of the best films in Indian cinema. The film won the All India Certificate of Merit for Best Feature Film, the Filmfare Best Film Award for 1957, and Nargis and Khan won the Best Actress and Best Director awards respectively. It was also nominated for the Academy Award for Best International Feature Film, becoming the first Indian film to be ever nominated.
Plot
In 1957, construction of an irrigation canal to the village is completed. Radha, considered to be the "mother" of the village, is asked to inaugurate the canal. She remembers her past when she was newly married.
The wedding between Radha and Shamu is paid for by Radha's mother-in-law, who borrows the money from the moneylender Sukhilala. The conditions of the loan are disputed, but the village elders decide in favour of the moneylender, after which Shamu and Radha are forced to pay three-quarters of their crop as interest on the loan of ₹500. While Shamu works to bring more of their rocky land into use, his arms are crushed by a boulder. Ashamed of his helplessness (being without arms), and humiliated by Sukhilala for living on the earnings of his wife, Shamu decides that he is of no use to his family and permanently leaves Radha and their three sons, walking to his own probable death by starvation. Soon after, Radha's youngest son and her mother-in-law die. A severe storm and the resulting flood destroys houses in the village and ruins the harvest. Sukhilala offers to save Radha and her sons if she trades her body to him for food. Radha vehemently refuses his offer but has to also lose her infant to the atrocities of the storm. Although the villagers begin initially to evacuate the village, they decide to stay and rebuild it, persuaded by Radha.
Several years later, Radha's two surviving children, Birju and Ramu are young men. Birju, embittered since childhood by the demands of Sukhilala, takes out his frustrations by pestering the village girls, especially Sukhilala's daughter, Rupa. Ramu, by contrast, has a calmer temperament and is married soon after. Birju's anger finally becomes dangerous and, after being provoked, he attacks Sukhilala and his daughter and steals Radha's kangan (marriage bracelets) that were pawned with Sukhilala. He is chased out of the village and becomes a bandit. Radha promises Sukhilala that she will not let Birju cause harm to Sukhilala's family. On Rupa's wedding day, Birju returns with his gang of bandits to exact his revenge. He kills Sukhilala and kidnaps Rupa. When he tries to flee the village on his horse, Radha, his mother, shoots him. He dies in her arms. In 1957, Radha opens the gate of the canal and its reddish water flows into the fields.
Release and Box Office
The production team had planned to release Mother India to commemorate the tenth anniversary of India's independence on 15 August 1957, but the film was released over two months later. It premiered at the Liberty Cinema in Mumbai on 25 October 1957, during Diwali; it ran continuously at Liberty for over a year. It was released in Kolkata (then called Calcutta) the same day and in Delhi a week later. It had reached all regions of India by the end of November. Government ministers and other officials were invited to the premieres, and a special screening was held in Rashtrapati Bhavan (the presidential quarter) in New Delhi on 23 October 1957; the event was attended by President Rajendra Prasad, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi. Chief Minister of West Bengal Bidhan Chandra Roy and Governor Padmaja Naidu attended a screening in Kolkata. Impressed with the film's nationalistic message, Chief Minister of Bombay State Morarji Desai granted it an exemption from the entertainment tax in the state.
Mother India was dubbed in several European languages including Spanish, French and Russian; it did substantial business in Greece, Spain and Russia and was released in the Eastern Bloc countries. Technicolor arranged one screening of the film in Paris on 30 June 1958, under the name Les bracelets d'or ("The Gold Bracelets"). It did minimal business in Paris, but fared better in French colonies. It was successful in the Latin American countries of Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Mother India was also acclaimed across the Arab world, in the Middle East, parts of Southeast Asia, and North Africa and continued to be shown in countries such as Algeria at least ten years after its release.
The political landscape created in North Korea by the deposition of Kim Il-Sung possessed all the characteristics necessary to create a showdown between two currents of thought – free going reform or strict orthodoxy. In the dramatic days that followed the deposition of the father of the state, no concrete political solution could make itself found. The country persisted through its recovery period under the de-facto rule of two separate men, each trying to persistently outmanoeuvre one another. Before March 1957, no significant mention of North Korea could be found in Soviet politburo minutes, and Pyongyang did not ever make it to the list of urgent matters presented to Kaganovich upon his inauguration. North Korea existed as a fragmented and forgotten Kingdom, with even the Chinese now more focused on their economic recovery and the support of the new revolutionary fronts created in Burma.
This situation, while not ideal from the perspective of global prestige for North Koreas leadership, was largely a positive for the people of North Korea. Without the gaze of either Moscow or Beijing focused on their state, they could rebuild as they pleased, creating political systems from the ground up. Party membership had swelled to astronomical numbers, and an increasing number of regional political offices were handed out not by party grandees but decided by local committees and via the closest thing to a competitive election in the North Korean political landscape allowed. Many were naturally opposed to this line of thinking – they saw the weakening of the regime as poisonous to the idea of full reunification and saw it paving the way for the South and its imperial backers to invade and crush the worker's state. Many of them yearned for the years of Stalin and saw the anti-Kim coup and the Soviet leader's death as the two things that stopped the revolution in East Asia in its tracks. Khruschev rising to a seeming position of power only reinforced their apocalyptic line of thinking, but also allowed their reformist rivals to silence them at every step of the debate.
Doubters also existed within the armed forces. The KPA had been humbled during the conflict and had been doing its best to rebuild its regular formations. At every step, however, the Generals were frustrated by the whims of the dual leadership, which pushed repeatedly for more politically reliable but less disciplined irregular forces. The involvement of the army in the anti-Kim coup was clearly noted by Kim's successors, and despite their pandering towards the military (Pak Hon-yong continued to don a military tunic), they were deeply distrustful of the Generals. The army was however hesitant to secure power for itself outright, judging that neither Moscow nor Beijing would allow it. Letting the diminished KPA seize power in North Korea could be seen as a firing pistol for the comparatively infinitely stronger Red Army to break the deadlock in Moscow, and place one of its own popular men in charge. Any coup that did not come from within the party would most likely be unacceptable.
Pressure was however being applied. The very men that any potential coup would target left no doubt about their one common goal – reunification. Perhaps in the belief that a successful conflict, even if it did not fully unify the peninsula, would reinforce their political in the standing, they kept pushing, obliviously, towards war. A dramatic conference between the two leaders and the KPA in January of 1957 would state a horrifying goal – war by the end of the year. The military had continuously underlined the struggle that the re-armament programme was going through. Heavy munitions could not be purchased anywhere, and even small arms ammunition was at a worrying level. The Chinese and Soviets were far too focused on Burma to give North Korea any thought, and neither Beijing nor Moscow endorsed the North Korean regimes plans for war. The North Koreans, if they went to war, would go in with a far smaller army, with far less equipment, and would face a far tougher foe.
Despite its various overseas commitments, the South Korean army had managed to rebuild most of its strength to a level that exceeded its preparedness in the summer of 1950. Equipped with American tanks, jets and artillery, the South Korean army could most likely, as stated by the KPA staff, take Pyongyang, should the Chinese not intervene. Recent American reinforcements to South Korea had only made the matter worse. The KPA Staff had to contend with the idea of throwing its under-armed mixture of regular and irregular units at the most fortified border in the world, and all of this without the tacit endorsement of either of the backing powers. At the January Conference, the Generals made it clear – far from planning to invade South Korea, the two leaders should be hoping that South Korea would not reignite the war herself. The meeting culminated in an awkward stand off between the brass and the two leaders. Pak Hon-Yong paced the room repeatedly, offering suggestions such as rising enormous partisan armies, while Choe-Yong Gon made repeated remarks about a culture of defeatism. Army brass left the conference piecemeal, as each General made his excuses and hurriedly left the Pyongyang compound, driving past the still unhealed scars that the last war had left, acutely aware that most Southern artillery was a day's advance away from being firmly in range of bombarding the city.
The only hope for the KPA was the political situation in the Soviet Union changing. Both Pak Hon-Yong and Choe-Yong Gon had embraced reform, and had implicitly tied themselves to Khruschev, who's star was now falling. Furthermore, their aggressive anti-Southern doctrine, while technically in line with the states ongoing policies, reeked of Malenkovism. As Kaganovich rose, and the political situation in the Soviet Union grew more solid, the Korean People's Army evaluated the prospects of some sort of patriotic action to steer the country away from oblivion. While simply refusing to follow war, plans was one way to go about it, the KPA was scared that the two leaders would still go ahead with their plans by bypassing them and speaking to unreliable partisan units directly. The idea of a coup slowly grew in credibility across the winter of 1957, but the right leader had to be found.
Struck by a landmine in the opening stages of the Korean War, General Kang Kon had left the peninsula a grievously injured hero. His left leg deformed, and many of his vital organs pierced by shrapnel (he struggled to breathe, and one of his eyes had turned a darker colour), he could not get out of a hospital bed until the end of 1951. Transferred quietly to the Soviet Union under the pretence of being an observer, he was in fact rushed off to a state-of-the-art sanatorium on the black sea, where a cadre of Soviet doctors and KGB handlers kept a close eye on the war hero. Each letter that briefed him on the situation in North Korea went through the hands of the Soviet intelligence apparatus, though they did not censor too much. The General was mostly interested in mundane military matters and knew better than to comment on the political situation. In 1954, he would make his first visit back to North Korea, though it'd be very brief and kept private from the public. Him and his family would depart back to the Soviet Union shortly thereafter, where he would stay until late 1956. Arriving in China, he would observe several PLA exercises from the comfort of a car. His legs still did not allow movement without a cane, though his war-scarred face worked well in the pictures. In February of 1957, he would petition the Chinese government to let him visit home, as he missed his Comrades and his parents. The Chinese allowed him to go, though his family would stay at guest facilities in Beijing.
Kang Kon's political absence combined with his status as a war hero made him a good leadership candidate. The KPA
still retained nearly all of the decision making power, but Kang's popularity could work in his favour to establish him as more than just a puppet leader.
In Pyongyang, Kang Kon would be welcomed by Pak Hon-Yong. A terse exchange would follow, as the General kept insisting, he is only in the country to see ill members of his family. A secret meeting with the army brass would follow only two days later, forming as the culmination of four months of secretly coded letters. The army planned to crown Kang Kon, who was both a military hero and a figure largely detached from the last six years of North Korean politics, as a placeholder leader. Kang Kon himself played fully into this vision, seeing himself as a saviour, returning to the country to rectify its mistakes. He would frequently allude to meetings with Stalin and Kaganovich (of which, in the Soviet archives, there was no note) and other major figures and their de-facto endorsement of returning Korea to a righteous Communist path. As Kaganovich had come from obscurity to restore Stalinism and pride to the Soviet Union, Kang Kon would restore dignity to the forgotten Kingdom.
With that, the gamble begun. On pretences of army exercises and national security, the KPA begun to systematically delay major transport networks in and out of the capital. Many of the trains would be stopped for hours, their cargo searched and, in many cases, seized. At first, civilian leadership suspected nothing, as disruptions to railway traffic were not too out of the norm in the still shattered country. As food shortages crept in, and public resentment rose, Pak Hon-Yong pressed the army for explanations. Frustrating replies came back – if you want war by the end of the year, you will have to put up with temporary hunger. For three weeks, the situation continued, until a small number of Officers privy to the plot broke ranks and unveiled the plot in Pyongyang.
With no choice left to them, the army moved in. Elite formations would enter the capital, and the soldiers would put themselves on the side of the hungry people. Those elements that resisted would flee at the first whiff of gunpowder, as bloodshed could not be avoided. In the countryside, partisan formations would find themselves dissolved overnight, and most would shatter the perception of their loyalty, as they switched sides rather than fight their brothers when outgunned. The unpopular and split regime would fail to muster a response, as soldiers surrounded the capital and arrested who they could. Radio broadcasts would paint the coup as a corrective action taken in the wake of a Khruschevite-Malenkovist plot that had permeated the leadership. Not long after being introduced as temporary leader, Kang Kon (who resigned his commission from the army on the day of the coup) announced that martial law would sweep across North Korea.
Choe Yang-Gon would successfully flee the capital, reaching the Chinese shores on a smuggling vessel operated by the remnants by one of his loyalist paramilitaries. The former supreme leader of the army knew that handing himself over would more than likely mean death, as he had overstepped far too many of the Generals during his rise to power. Pak Hon-yong found himself cornered and elected to hand himself over and plead for clemency. Choe Yang-Gon's flight, if Beijing cooperated with the new regime, would hopefully mean that he could shift as much blame as possible away from himself.
With power secured domestically, the more challenging part would now come, as Kang Kon reached out to both Beijing and Moscow asking for recognition of the plot and for their cooperation. Across the country, many thousands would also wonder whether the political systems established since the end of the war would stand, or whether they would be swept away as the Workers Party of Korea re-established itself as the sole power in the land.
On behalf of the Italian government and the Honourable A. Moro, Prime Minister, I wish to inform you that We are once again formally petitioning for restitution for all victims of the Marocchinate. The actions of General Juin and the Goumier troops under his command in Italy are a travesty which has not been properly redressed by previous administrations. It is Our position that the findings of the Nuremberg Trials regarding the nullification of war crimes between allies to be a heinous oversight. We shall be using names associated with complaints submitted by individual Italian women, the British Army, and intergovernmental surveys in which to justify the name of each and every women presented in the below petition. Should your government continue to hold the position of immediate post-war governments and the position held by the Nuremberg Trials, We shall have no choice but question the beneficiality of the European Project.
Prime Minister Nehru admires one of President Eisenhower's Black Angus cows in Gettysburg, PA
Prime Minister Nehru visited the United States as a Guest of the President in 1957, arriving in Washington D.C. on October 11th. On the following morning, President Eisenhower met him at the Blair House and together they drove to Eisenhower's Gettysburg farm. Nehru's visit to the farm was the first of a foreign leader and was carefully fitted into the official itinerary. Together they spent that day and part of the next in some fourteen hours of conversation. During the visit, Nehru became the only world leader to stay overnight at the farm as part of his visit during the Eisenhower administration.
On October 14th, Nehru and Eisenhower returned to Washington. Nehru went to the White House the next morning and they continued private talks. In the end, President Eisenhower had made fourteen pages of notes on their conversations. Some of the topics discussed during the visit addressed India's neutrality, socialism, and the way the "third world" viewed the actions of the President of the United States. Prime Minister Nehru was considered an information conduit for President Eisenhower on how the "third world" nations viewed the West.
Popularly described as a "goodwill tour", Nehru spent three weeks touring the US. He met members of the House and the Senate and also made trips to metropolises such as Chicago and New York as well as places like Tennessee Valley and Illinois in the countryside. He interacted with businesspersons, artisans and academics alike. University of Southern California students would hear Prime Minister Nehru speak at Berkeley. The President, faculty, and students of Massachusetts Institute of Technology would also greet Prime Minister Nehru and he would speak with students of the Wellesley College for women. He would also tour the Harvard Library, International Harvester plant and National Gallery of Art.
In a letter to his Chief Ministers, Nehru's would write:
"I was interested in getting such help as was possible in the economic and technical sphere from the United States. I mentioned this, though rather casually. I realised that what was of more fundamental importance was the general reaction of the American people towards India and towards Asia. If that was friendly and cooperative, other things would follow. So, I concentrated on producing that friendly reaction…."
At 2+2 ministerial dialogue, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken made a reference to the first summit level meeting between the countries, when Nehru was Indian PM and Harry Truman was US President.
In 1957, the Lang government would make a concerted effort to secure stronger trade and cooperation relations with regional and cultural partners outside of the United Kingdom and the United States. Significant focus was placed on the agricultural sector where the Government was pushing forward with its policy of reduced tarriffs and subsidies. A key effort would be to bring other key agricultural exporters including Canada and New Zealand as well as closer cooperation with Argentina and Brazil to provide a stronger united block on the global stage. Lang would personally oversee a number of these deals making a trip from New Zealand to Indonesia, stopping by India then onwards to the United Kingdom for a brief visit to discuss the situation in Burma before returning via Canada.
Treaty of Auckland
Economic Cooperation
[*]The Australian and New Zealand Governments agree to establish a joint marketing and pricing board commission for the overseas marketing of common products, including agricultural products
[*]In the spirit of Commonwealth trade, the Australian and New Zealand government commit to the gradual disestablishment of tariffs and trade barriers between the two nations and the establishment of a unified foreign customs and competition policy
[*]The Australian and New Zealand governments commit to reducing the barriers of movements of goods and services. Unless otherwise exempted one good legally purchasable in another country will be legally purchasable in the other, and certifications issued in one country will be recognised in another.
[*]Explicitly the Australian Government agrees to allow access to the New Zealand dairy industry
[*]The New Zealand government will remove export incentives on products for the Australian market and quantitative restrictions on imports from Australia
[*]The Australian Government agrees to allow the New Zealand Government to access Australia's overseas balances and foreign reserves where necessary to maintain the health of New Zealand's finances.
[*]The parties agree to a five year implementation timeframe with a three year window for withdrawal.
Social Welfare Cooperation
[*]Subject to reasonable means testing and residency requirements, the Australian and New Zealand governments agree to support mutual access to welfare and social support programs to citizens of the other nation currently residing within their borders as if they were full citizens of the nation themselves.
Defence Cooperation
[*]The Australian and New Zealand Government commit to instituting a joint military-command structure between their armed forces to allow for close coordination in times of war. The Governments agree to outline a five year implementation timeframe with freedom of withdrawal for the full period.
[*]The Australian and New Zealand Government agree to the maintenance of a peacetime joint naval task force for patrol and protection of the pacific
[*]The Australian Government agrees to subsidise the defence of New Zealand up to a total combined expenditure of 4% New Zealand GDP on a 1:1 basis where the New Zealand government commits to an expenditure of at least 1.5%.
Jakarta Memorandum
The Australian and Indonesian Governments commit to the maintenance of friendly and cordial relations.
The Australian and Indonesian Governments agree to foster efforts to improve the volume of trade between the two countries especially in the agricultural and resources sectors
The Australian and Indonesian Governments agree to jointing consult on matters of national defence and security within their mutual domain including maritime affairs
The Australian and Indonesian Governments agree to hold regular discussions for more formal trade and defence arrangements in the future
Ottawa Agreement
The Australian Government and Canadian Government reiterate the bonds of friendship between the two nations embodied in the Commonwealth
The Australian Government and Canadian Government agree to encourage further trade between the two nations and discuss further arrangements for a closer trade agreement at a future date.
The two governments agree to collaborate on global agricultural policy in order to defend both nations interests as primary agricultural exporters
The two countries provisionally agree to foster collaboration between their aerospace industries in order to preserve their key sovereign capability. To this end the government will arrange for discussions over unifying or collaborating their ongoing R&D programs through DHA, CAC and Avro Canada.
India-Australia Agreement on Trade and Commerce
The Australian and Indian governments state their commitment to fostering collaboration and cooperation between their two nations through enhanced trade and knowledge sharing.
The Indian government agrees to support the export of australian motor vehicles to the Indian market including motorised farm equipment like tractors
The Australian government will support the work of australian agronomists and agricultural scientists to help develop the indian agriculture sector through the Colombo Plan Development Bank
The Australian government will help facilitate the upgrade of six of India's airports for jetliner operations. As partial payment the Indian Government agrees to the purchase of a number of DHA C102 Jetliners
The Indian government and De Havilland Australia (DHA) will establish a maintenance facility in India to be owned by DHA. DHA agrees to provide adequate training of staff.
The Australian Government agrees to allow the maintenance facility to be included in the Private Industry Sponsorship scheme for the Colombo Plan. Thus allowing exceptional employees to access study and work opportunities in Australia through the Colombo Plan and DHA's ongoing sponsorship.
Letter to the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea @DanBaque
25th of March, 1957
Dearest Comrades of the Korean People's Revolution
We must continue to praise the revolutionary effort and the commitment to the People's Revolution in Korea by the Korean Workers Party, and the support of the proletariat of Korea only makes this appraisal ever more clear.
We [the Politburo red.] have not been blind to the political developments of the Korean Revolution nor have we been blind to the military situation on the Korean Peninsula. While we certainly do not approve of the usage of military means to displace the civilian governance of the Korean Revolution, we also recognize that the material conditions of the Korean Revolution are different to ours in the People's Republic of China. We must also agree that corrective action was, to some extent, necessary to clean up the chaos that to some degree had permeated the leadership of the Korean Revolution.
We, and the Chinese people, welcome the great magnitude of the zeal and preparedness of the Korean People to commit to revolutionary action, and correcting past wrongs, but we must entreat the leaders of the Korean Revolution to restrain themselves in this endeavor. If the talks of direct action are brought to life, even if justified and supported, it will greatly endanger the safety and prosperity of the Korean Revolution, and the People's Republic of China cannot support such an action, and we must therefore warn greatly against it.
We praise the leaders of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's vision to commit to normalcy within the Korean People's Army and we can only promote the continued strengthening of the armies of the Korean Revolution, and we will also promote the discontinuation of irregular people's formations. While they have their uses and have shown their strength in certain situations, we must conclude that they are not fit for the current state of the International Revolution in Korea.
Do not waver in your Revolutionary Zeal, and remember that the Chinese People stand with the Korean People and the Korean People's Revolution
In comrade's salute Zhou Enlai Premier of the People's Republic of China
Minister of Foreign Affairs
The situation had looked increasingly grim for the NDUF in 1956. With the flow of Chinese supplies stemmed by a rate of equipment loss not seen since Korea, the victorious factions that made up the force had to abandon their pursuit of Mandalay. One blow came after another, as the Koreans, fanatically dedicated to stopping the spread of Communism throughout Asia, captured the Karen bastion. It seemed that with the consolidation of power under Ne Win, and the slow but ineveitable unification of the apparatus of government, the opportunity at victory was slipping away. The people were still angry, and the people still went to sleep hungry, but the anger was harder to transform into armed resistance when the images of Commonwealth power flew overhead.
In January, leading members of the NDUF met in the troubled province of Yunnan, for a conference on the continuation of the war. Somewhat cautiously, some of the members advanced to the body the untenable offers received from the Commonwealth – form a part of Burmese society under Ne Win. The offer was quickly rejected, as no one expected neither the General nor the British to keep their word, but it opened the floor for discussions on what the outcome could now be. The prospect of victory was dim – even among the most fervent fighters, those that had fought in the early day campaigns around the N-Mai river, hope was slowly being replaced by the vision of a long and ultimately unwinnable struggle. But to admit defeat was to lose everything. The spirit of the British could still be broken, the rebels believed, and the spirit of the Australians and Koreans would naturally follow.
Four days of deliberations followed. The conference was surprisingly insular – Mao's Generals offered only military advice, leaving the political decisions to the Burmese. The question of Chinese support would however hang in the air. As the province of Yunnan continued to deteriorate, and as incidents across it grew in frequency, the Chinese had to re-assess how much they could give. Their own five-year plans were now being affected, as they pitted their comparatively small economy against that of Britain and the United States.
The entire affair had also left the borderland open to infiltrations, which the Eisenhower administration pursued. Unlike Truman's policy of largely fighting back the attacks as they came, Eisenhower sought to seize the initiative. The movement of carriers towards the Burmese theatre could not be dismissed as a coincidence, as Soviet agents reported US troops from Italy being issued Malaria medication, as well as instructions on how to cope with common jungle afflictions. More worrying still was the grumbling of Mao's intelligence services in Formosa and in Yunnan, where activity was noted against figures previously involved in KMT 'resistance', or drug running operation, in Burma. Many still retained excellent connections to the criminal underworld that the NDUF never truly attempted to stamp out. The signs of US involvement were becoming clearer, and while Beijing had a shot at outlasting the British, Australians and Koreans, they would likely have no such luck when it came to the United States. Perhaps it was good for the Chinese helmsman's mental stability that he did not yet fully grasp the US capabilities he could find himself facing. In various staff rooms near Washington, American logisticians were preparing detailed plans that could in guarantee more bombs dropped on Burma in a period of two weeks than had already been dropped over the span of the entire conflict. Previously crippling political objections did not seemingly manage to tie Eisenhower down as they did Truman and his cabaret of successors.
In the light of what they knew, the NDUF council decided that an offensive now, before American involvement, and before Ne Win managed to consolidate power, was their best bet, even if ultimately militarily futile. Mao's advisors were not coy about the shortage of supplies but were eventually convinced by the NDUF to try and negotiate something with their superiors. The decision went up the chain, until Mao himself, reluctantly, agreed to provide one last burst of ammunition and equipment, theoretically enough for a three-month effort concentrated along specific points on the front line. Mao however stated that due to both the economic situation, and the uncertainty around Korea, he could only provide so much in 1957. The rebels had to use what they had as conservatively as they could.
As the supplies were being stockpiled, and the NDUF readied its premier brigades, a series of mishaps would afflict the province of Yunnan, and the Chinese were quick to point out possible US interference. The CIA was in fact operating in the province through its KMT-related proxies, utilising them to conduct militarily negligible but politically significant acts of sabotage. While the Chinese quickly recovered operations at the few warehouses and railway lines that were disrupted, the acts themselves revealed the weakness of Mao's southern flank for infiltration. With thousands of Burmese and Chinese citizens crossing the ill-defined border back and forth, it was easy to slip in one or two effective agents. Greater controls would both be expensive and hard to implement. Whether or not Mao formally accused the Americans, or the Taiwanese of interference was not clear, nor was his ability to retaliate in other sectors clear either. Having jovially bullied his way around the region the last 7 years, Mao was now stretched thin, forced to face the consequences.
The Burmese offensive started in the third week of January. In quiet sectors, largely occupied by British troops expecting to soon be withdrawn, the guns sounded once again. Ambushes and infantry assaults followed, as nighttime fighting made the front line too confusing for the meaningful deployment of air support. Around the banks of the Irrawaddy as it turned east, towards Bhamo, the fighting was the most intense. Despite the supremacy of British-operated riverine vessels, the rebels were able to sneak supplies and squadrons of fighters on small fishing vessels. After six days, the British and loyalist Burmese forces were forced to impose a curfew on the traffic on the river, greatly impacting economic activity and the public perception of the troops.
A series of battles would also unfold north-east of Mandalay. Here, rebel units attacked from the thickly forested hills into the valleys, pinning down British units wherever they could. Loyalist Burmese and Australian units were, in comparison, left alone. Many of them in fact noted that things were calmer in their sectors, signalling that the NDUF offensive was politically targeted at disrupting the fragile political situation in London.
Ne Win's troops wouldn't be entirely left alone, however. Near Karen state, where the fiercest fighting took place, they would experience a series of calamitous defeats that put into doubt the plan to offload the remainder of the fighting to local troops. Ne Win himself would use the defeats to further his political agenda, as he continued to establish himself as an autocrat. Many figures around U Nu would now find themselves harassed, and the ex-leader himself expressed doubt as to whether he would remain a free man for long. Many now urged him to seek refuge with either the British or Australians, unsure whether Ne Win would respect the coalitions wishes for peace behind the lines.
In Karen state, the South Koreans would be pressed particularly hard. Having extended their zone of influence deep into previously fervently loyalist NDUF territory, they were now finding themselves confined to their bases. The fighting would take on a new tone in the province, as instead of challenging the Koreans directly, the NDUF sought to bypass and contain them, and strike when the odds were sufficient to do real damage. In the six weeks of the offensive, nearly eight hundred South Korean troops had to be evacuated due to injuries and illness, and as many as two hundred bodies were returned to grieving families. While the Koreans killed plenty of NDUF fighters, their long-term prospects were not looking good – the supply of rebel manpower in the state would be very hard to exhaust, no matter what calibre of troops or equipment would be deployed. Whereas other sectors of the frontline calmed down in February, the fighting in Karen state only grew more intensive in direct correlation to the tension building up on the Korean peninsula in the weeks leading up to Kang Kon's coup.
Overall, the NDUF offensive achieved very little militarily – the rebels, all things told, lost territory. Manpower and equipment losses were also very high, with many long standing NDUF formations depleted in the frantic action against entrenched positions. On the coalition side, the losses were the highest among the South Koreans and the British, though they numbered at most in the hundreds for both. The offensives would primarily affect the political landscape. First and foremost, it would eviscerate any hope for a transition to a purely Burmese-ran government or military effort, showing that British troops would have to remain on the line until replaced by another interested power. Secondly, the offensive, and the losses it caused, would incur an enormous overreaction from the British press, which harangued the Prime Minister for his seeming mismanagement and early pull out. In military circles, the truth would be different –British troops had managed to attrite the NDUF to an enormous degree at what was considered a low cost. Despite this, and the interviews given by British commanders, the vast bulk of the press would continue to proselytize doom, urging the Prime Minister to act immediately. The opposition benches in the House of Common would do their best to fan the flames, calling, in effect, for the second coming of Churchill. The term 'Chinese appeasement' became popular, as the Attlee mission to China was now painted as a second Munich. Despite the urging of his military advisors to stay the current course, Gaitskell would now have to decide whether he would react. This catastrophic mood would also spill over to Australia, where the press urged Lang to 'do more', even though the two months of the offensive signified a low in the number of Australian casualties suffered.
The offensive failed to capture any significant amount of territory outside of Karen State.
Hard decisions would also have to be made in Beijing. Despite the political success of the offensive, it was clear that with firm US backing, the plan to collapse the British economy via the means of Burma had somewhat backfired. It was now China that would have to likely seek out aid from the Soviets. The vision of a second Korean war in the jungles of Burma was quickly fading, as Mao instructed the rebels to move towards a 'people's war', waged predominantly with small arms, not tanks and artillery. While a Burmese air force continued to train in China, many of their planes had to moved away from Yunnan to lessen the burden on Chinese supply networks. In order to help deliver aid to Burma without impacting the struggling Yunnan, engineers had to be re-routed from across the country to help build alternative routes through the harsh terrain. The signs of CIA sabotage were also in many ways becoming too loud to ignore, as Mao had to prepare himself for the very real eventuality of the Americans conducting strikes on Chinese soil.
FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL On the status of the ongoing Egyptian blockade against Israeli shipping
In spite of overtures and signs of good will, and a readiness to engage in mutually beneficial binational negotiations on behalf of the State of Israel to the Republic of Egypt, the Egyptian Government has refused to lift the ongoing blockade of Israeli shipping passing through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran. The blockade constitutes an unmistakable breach of maritime and diplomatic norms. The State of Israel firmly condemns the Republic of Egypt's egregious acts of aggression, which not only violate international law but also pose a direct threat to the peace and security of Israel, and to the region at large.
Israel has consistently upheld its commitment to peaceful coexistence and regional stability. However, the Republic of Egypt's unwarranted actions compel us to address this threat to our national security. Especially so as we have repeatedly witnessed violations of our territorial integrity by Egyptian forces and endured attacks on both military and civilian targets by terrorists operating from within Egypt's borders. In light of these blatant provocations, and in defence of our sovereign rights, the State of Israel finds itself compelled to take necessary and proportionate measures to safeguard the well-being of our citizens and ensure the security of our nation. Our response will be swift and focused, with the sole objective of removing the immediate threat posed by the Republic of Egypt towards the State of Israel, through an elimination of its military presence on the Sinai Peninsula, and targeted strikes against any other Egyptian military installations which may be used to support or launch an attack against personnel of the IDF, or Israeli citizens.
These operations will continue until such a time as the threat posed by the Republic of Egypt has been removed, or until the Egyptian Government returns to the table of negotiation, vowing to cease its hostile actions towards the State of Israel and its people.
On behalf of the Italian government and the Honourable A. Moro, Prime Minister, I wish to inform you that Italy stands with your state and the illegal blockade it is under. Italy will proudly continue trade through this blockade, standing tall with our friends in the Levant.
Tito and entourage reading newspapers aboard the Galeb.
The Era of Reorientation
The domestic and foreign policy changes in FPR Yugoslavia during the second half of 1950s would come to be known as an Era of Reorientation. The term itself was coined by Tito at a speech at the inauguration of the TOMOS factory of Koper in 1956 and was later repeated by other prominent communist politicians and the party organs such as Borba and state news agency Tanjug. It became a catchall term for the economic and diplomatic turns that Tito carefully managed, checking the economic, diplomatic, and political effects of each move carefully before making another. Events on their own might not have seemed so drastic, but overall Yugoslavia in 1957 was a very different country compared to just ten years prior in 1947. Economy was booming and modernizing, albeit still riddled with a plenty of shortcomings, Tito had secured an understanding with the West over Trieste, and the fears of the Soviet dagger striking Belgrade in vengeance were largely undone following the death of Stalin. Even a military alliance, by proxy, had been reached with the Atlantic pact thanks to the Yugoslav agreements with Turkey. In the domestic sphere, the SKJ itself had changed as well and not just in name, with more and more younger cadres rising in the ranks. In addition to the partisan fighters whose ideology had been hardened in the struggle against the fascist occupiers, technocrats whose party career had only started after the war entered the ranks of the low-level party organs and regional bureaucracy. It seemed as if only one thing remained unchanged, namely the status of Tito and the reforming and reorientating yet still unyielding SKJ as the sole exercisers of state power.
Economic reforms in Yugoslavia had begun in early 1950s as a necessity to control the fallout of the breaking of ties with the Soviets, as a heavy top-down state planning apparatus focused solely on heavy industries was quickly in trouble failing to secure important imports from the East and failing to export anything of note there either. A Yugoslav brand of socialism geared for trade with non-socialist markets was needed. Liberalization had occurred in agriculture, small companies and businesses, and also in the management of state enterprises with the onset of the workers self-management, an unique and defining factor of the Yugoslav socialist system. This alone had attracted Western investments and enabled Tito to secure loans for continued investment to heavy industries under the five-year plans. Yet, the competitiveness of Yugoslav exports remained low, and to bolster domestic economic activity and foreign investments, the Federal Executive Council had reopened the Belgrade Stock Exchange in 1956. Albeit a rarity in socialist countries, the exchange was drastically different from those of Western Europe, with only a limited number of listed companies, a strong government oversight, and commitment to the management also including the ultimate decisionmakers as per Yugoslav communist doctrine; the workers. The experimentation with the special economic zones of the Slovene littoral and Niš, focused on high-quality export products requiring more investment and high level of technology was another experiment started in 1956, the results of which would only be known later.
In terms of foreign policy the Yugoslav goal had been for years to contain the spread of Soviet influence in the Balkans, and to align Yugoslavia with the Western powers, namely the United Kingdom and the United States. The experiences of the war against fascism made this something that even the staunchest communist cadres could support. Afterall, the US and the UK had both been allies of the Partisans and Tito and aided them greatly in material and political support. One tyrant had changed for another in Yugoslav propaganda, but with Stalin gone, the SKJ started to reconsider its position in this regard as well. Tito, however, refrained from anything too drastic until he could be sure that the succession game in Moscow had reached its finale. Likewise, a complete turnaround in Yugoslav policy was simply an impossibility after years of distrust and thinly veiled hostility. However, here too Tito and Yugoslav statesmen involved in foreign policy expected economic necessities to result in a détente that could open some Eastern markets again to Yugoslav exports and impots. Trieste and Italy had been a source of possible contention with the West but also with the Soviets. Regarding Trieste, the agreement reached over it with the Americans seemed to be enough for now, and in the long term Tito didn't consider the ideological war with Moscow over the course of Italian socialism to be in Yugoslav interests. The Yugoslav leadership, which had been very adamant and strongworded in its opposition to the previous right-wing Italian government who they had considered enables of fascism, was starting to reconsider a rapprochement with the Moro government. Trieste would likely remain a source of contention, but Tito and especially Kardelj believed that economic factors could help the drive towards an eventual more complete formalization of Yugoslav control.
Then, there was Austria, a problem Kardelj characterized as even more complex than the Italian file. Tito didn't shy away from showing his disappointment over the failure of the UN General Assembly vote to hasten a Soviet withdrawal of occupational forces. While the West seemed ready to acknowledge a neutral and unoccupied Austrian state, Yugoslav UN ambassador Brilej and foreign minister Popović quickly observed that it seemed to lack the resolve to push the Soviet out, either with diplomatic or more old-fashioned pressure. In public Tito remained calm and diplomatic over the matter, but the private meetings in Belgrade had a much darker tone. Tito felt that the West was on the verge of letting him face the Soviets over Austria alone, leading the Yugoslav leadership to recalculate the odds and stakes involved, especially after increased conflict between the undercover UDBA operations and the Soviets. Considering the European geopolitical theater an abysmally dangerous swamp created partly intentionally by the two superpowers, a swamp in which unaligned Yugoslavia couldn't and shouldn't involve itself too much without facing enormous risks, Tito found further justification for reorientation. Yugoslavia began to consolidate its diplomatic and economic reach towards the developing countries of Asia and the crumbling colonial empires of Africa. Here, the reinvigorated anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist tones echoed after the Brijuni meeting could potentially set the Yugoslav foreign policy outside Europe on a collision course with at least those Western powers still clinging to their colonial holdings.
As 1957 began, Tito started preparations for his largest series of foreign trips so far, intending to take his yacht, the "peace ship" Galeb, on a long cruise to Asia. India, whose leader Nehru Tito had hosted at Brijuni along Nasser and separately at Belgrade, was amongst the main destinations, with Indonesia, Thailand, and others also on the long list. A large Yugoslav diplomatic and economic entourage travelled to New Delhi beforehand, drafting agreements on collaboration in shipbuilding and light automotive industry. TOMOS and shipyards of Kraljevica and Uljanik had already become brands and companies that the Indian side was very much interested in. After embarking on the voyage, Tito also announced that Yugoslavia was to sent humanitarian aid to the famine-stricken and crisis-riddled DPRK, the first engagement of Yugoslavia with the main socialist bloc since the Tito-Stalin split. Tito was keen on showing the solidarist credentials of Yugoslav socialism to Asian countries, but also hoped small acts of goodwill like this could hopefully attract the attention of those factions in Moscow interested in détente. Egypt was to be one of the voyage points on the travel back to Adriatic, with Tito especially hoping to meet with Nasser, whom he had great respect for as a popular revolutionary leader. However, a thunderstorm had started to gather over the Suez by the time Tito was to travel back from Asia.
The United Arab Kingdoms strongly condemn any military action by the so-called State of Israel towards Egypt. It is clear that the Israeli regime has barely begun to utilise any diplomatic measures, let alone exhausted them, before reaching for the gun.
We call on Israel to immediately halt their illegal military operations, and we appeal to the UN Security Council for formal intervention.
The 1953 Italian elections were one of the pivotal moments for the post-war settlement in Europe. The great Socialist hope dashed by the crude and unashamed interference of foreign intelligence simultaneously launched a generation of anti-American sceptics in the west, destroyed any hope at creating the conditions for peace in a neutral central Europe, and sowed the seeds for the revival of far-right politics. They lead directly to the drastic escalation of Soviet action in Czechoslovakia and later to extension of its influence throughout Burma, allowing Moscow to move away from the stigma of the Malenkov doctrine. Every time the Italian electoral process begun in earnest (the faux elections orchestrated after 1953 hardly counted), a void opened somewhere in Europe, and spewed chaos into the world. With bated breath, the world watched the Italian election.
Moro had a difficult decision to make. His policies had been popular, and his fight for democracy, against corruption and the resulting attempted assassinations had enshrined him as almost a cult hero for many Italians, who saw him as the great reconstructor. Eisenhower's decision to move troops away from Italy in late 1956 and early 1957 had little to do with Italian politics, but Moro could paint it as a victory – he didn't need to say anything, but he could easily imply that he was now putting pressure on the Americans, who while allied to Italy, would be expected to behave themselves. This strongman image helped him return much of the popularity lost to the fascist movements during 1954, 1955 and 1956. Moro had to however decide whether the 'exiled' contingent of Communists would be allowed to run, and whether the state would apologise for its actions from the period.
The key factor in Moro's decision would be his coalition. His party, itself a multi-lateral bloc of various outcasts from the previous government, had managed to attract both the remnants of the Partito Liberale and the Partito Socialisto Democratico to its cause in exchange for a range of promises that Moro would have to work very hard to deliver if elected. The alliance with the Socialist Democrats was a coup that gave Moro the confidence to allow the PCI to return from exile. Efforts had to be undertaken, however, to divide their loyalties. The Soviets had worked hard to unite Nenni and Togliatti under one banner, and work had to be quickly done to break this strong bloc apart. Here, Moro, would find himself unknowingly allied with one of his primary enemies. Tito's UDBA, keenly involved in Austria (where the logistical apparatus of the Italian Communists and Socialists still largely resided, uncertain about Moro's intentions), was able to funnel money to the Socialists, and direct the Slovenes to try and pry them away from Togliatti. Soviet efforts in Burma and the chaos at the top of Moscow politics would further damage unity among the Italian leftists, who would eventually enter the election as two separate entities, albeit still technically in a worker's coalition that sought to redress the betrayal of 1953. One of the key issues fracturing the bloc was the issue of Trieste – Togliatti, much like Moro, was happy to make the Yugoslav annexations and power plays there the number one issue of the election, while Nenni worked hard to focus on the continued issues of unemployment and crime. It was no secret to the Italian intelligence agencies that Yugoslav agents were actively blackmailing certain members of the PCI – Moro instructed them to stand away and let the infighting develop.
While Togliatti returned to Italy to loud public acclamation, his shine was diminished by the ongoing political machinations in Moscow.
Many speculated Moro moved the election from 1958 to 1957 to ensure it was held while Kaganovich still worked to cement his rule.
Togliatti's popularity peaked a solid two months before the election. Returning from Austria after a period of effective banishment, he was able to organise fetes for himself all throughout Italy. Nenni, standing in his shadow, only grew more resentful. His outlook on cooperation with the Soviets was changing by the day, as more news of Kaganoviches rumoured restoration of Stalinist power weakened the bond between the PCI and PSI. It would also act against Togliatti. Despite Moro's moves to establish Italian sovereignty, many still feared that if Togliatti won, the same barbaric repercussions would fall upon Italy all over again. Moro had also done well to undermine Togliatti's support among the unions, using the Social Democrats to try and build a bridge with those somewhat amenable to working with his 'clean' government. Moro's financially crippling decision to continue Italy's megaproject linking the mainland to Sicily also helped him paint himself as a friend of the workers. He didn't have to convince them all, he was advised, but merely fool enough to kick the can of Communism down the road.
Despite Tito's wishes and UDBA machinations, the issue of Trieste would be one of the central issues of the election. The MSI advocated for nothing short of war, clamouring for a restoration of the Italian army and for the annexation of Trieste into Italy. While this message would be extremist in 1953, by 1957 it was one of their most popular speaking points, and both Moro and Togliatti found themselves uneasily shifting towards the same viewpoint. While neither advocated for war, they both now advocated for the creation of 'credible deterrence' against Yugoslavia, forcing it to reinstate the status quo. A 'stab in the back' narrative also grew throughout the right-wing press, to the point where Moro had to acknowledge that the purported American and British dealings with Yugoslavia over the issue worked to create instability in the region. The Prime Minister had to stop himself one step short of calling it treason.
The election would be more peaceful than those that took place in 1953 or the years thereafter but would not be entirely devoid of violence. Followers of the MSI used their still plentiful influence to try and repress the PCI and PSI in the South, with the MSI-staffed Police often turning their gaze away from the excesses that unfolded. In Sicily itself, Italian internal organs would secretly collate 395 killings that could be directly attributed to Political violence. In the north, a series of strikes in support of the PCI rocked the factories, troubling Moro's carefully rebuilt but still fragile economy.
Much of the campaigning took place in the streets. Supporters of the PCI and PSI felt justified
in 'correcting wrongs', while the supporters of the MSI strove to maintain their God given monopoly on wanton political violence.
The election would return a result that hurt Moro but crippled many of his rivals. His coalition managed to secure 280 seats, 18 shy of a majority. The PCI (143 seats) came in second, followed by the PSI, at 106. The leftist coalition, however, stood alone – 49 votes shy, they would not be able to form a government even if they managed to convince the Social Democrats to switch sides. The MSI and the monarchists secured 63 seats total, with the majority coming from the MSI. The agglomerated Monarchist bloc won 22 seats, and was theoretically a potential coalition partner for Moro, despite its far-right trend. Many of the monarchists were before the polarizing effects of 1953 not too far off from the Christian Democrats, from which many Moro's current supporters hailed. The far-right baggage was however there, and if Moro made a deal with the monarchists, he would have to accept that roughly half the movement was close to insane, and that much of it clamoured for not only war with Yugoslavia, but the restoration of 'Italian glory', whatever doomed wars that meant declaring.
Moro Coalition
Democratic League
236
Italian Democratic Socialist Party
23
Italian Liberal Party
21
TOTAL:
280
Left Wing
Italian Communist Party
143
Italian Socialist Party
106
TOTAL:
249
Far Right
Monarchist Party of Italy
22
Italian Social Movement
41
TOTAL:
63
Others
South Tyrolean's People's Party
3
Italian Slovenian Popular Front
1
As most of the world watched Rome, and news coverage in America grasped to cover the finale to 'Truman's shame', few would turn their eyes to Austria, where leftist protests had been raging throughout the Soviet sector and throughout Vienna. On May 19th, just a week after the results came in, the Bundeswehr's medical division would silently and cautiously start stocking up field hospitals along Germany's southern border. In Slovenia, columns of Yugoslav tankers were treated to a supper of meat and three shots of Slivovica. The Soviets were closing checkpoints all throughout Eastern Austria, and something very worrying was happening.
"I wish to thank all my supporters, and the supporters of responsible government, for electing the Liberal Coalition to a plurality of the seats. I will not disappoint you, nor will I be weakening good governance by leading parliament with a minority. Our new Republic calls for strength of will and action, not the chaos of yesteryear....
... I promise you this. I will not. Cannot. Work with the monarchists, fascists, nor communists. With Moscow and Belgrade rattling sabres in recent days, peace can only be attained through competent operation. Today is not the delay for a dialogue with idealogues....
... I will be reaching across the aisle and speaking with the Nenni. No matter our personal differences, together we made be able to navigate a path in which Italy does not return to the dark days of '53 or '43."
FROM: Col. Gen. Ljubo Vučković, Chief of the General Staff, JNA
TO: HQ, Ljubljana Military District
Combat readiness 23rd Corps. Reconstitute 10th Operational Group command. Deployment 20th Tank Div. authorized. Assume command and deploy: 26h Tank Div., Skopje to Maribor. Prepare Cerklje airbase.
I have given the order for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and the Allied Command Operations to enter into a state of combat readiness effective immediately. [...]
[...]
Know that the coming months may be hard. It may be difficult. But as an alliance, and as a nation, we will ensure liberty prevails over tyranny. God bless you.
"Sir, the Jugoslavians, Americans, Nazis, and Stalinists are all mobilising."
"I swear by Mary if these men kill us all over the birthplace of Hitler I'm going to lose my mind. We can't have the end of the world, the bridge hasn't been completed yet."
The Second Engine Driver of the Soviet Union The End of the Red Pentarchy and the Rise of Comrade Lazar Kaganovich
In July 1935, Comrade Lazar Kaganovich - then People's Commissar of Communication Routes - remarked to a reception of railway workers at the Kremlin that Comrade Joseph Stalin was the 'first engine driver of the Soviet Union' and the 'great locomotive driver of history'. These extravagant encomiums represented more than just praise for Stalin, but also an analogy for Kaganovich's view of the USSR: it was a well-oiled machine, constantly moving towards progress and the socialist dream, and in order to run smoothly it needed a strong set of hands to guide it.
Comrades Kaganovich and Stalin
After Stalin's death in June 1953, Kaganovich - a deputy chairman in the Council of Ministers since 1938 - was content to participate in matters of state, but leave the leadership to Comrade Vyacheslav Molotov who had succeeded Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Molotov's position as leader in the USSR was by no means secure however, and powerful figures such as Nikita Khrushchev - First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers since Malenkov's fall from grace - and Anastas Mikoyan - Minister of Foreign Affairs - had built their own powerbases and challenged his authority. If these three men had managed to work together as a collective, and had Khrushchev not pushed a policy line that was decidedly 'anti-Stalin', Kaganovich would have likely remained content; but the continued dysfunction, infighting and factionalism between 1953 and 1956 had, in his view, "weakened both the Party and the Union, internally and on the international stage".
Disgruntled with Molotov, and spurred to action, Kaganovich employed his boundless energy towards consolidating the 'Centre' - the Stalinists, party apparatchiks and unaligned figures - in order to preserve the 'status quo' and combat Khrushchev's growing criticism of Stalin and his legacy. Whilst Molotov still viewed himself as the leader, he and Kliment Voroshilov - the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet - welcomed Kaganovich's efforts, and actively worked alongside him.
Kaganovich would move openly against Khrushchev at a plenum of the Central Committee in late 1956, attacking Khrushchev's right-hand Aleksey Kirichenko - the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine - of "nationalism, fabrications against Comrade Stalin and of being a Western spy". Pushed on the backfoot by these accusations, Khrushchev could only watch hopelessly as Kirichenko was stripped of his roles in the Party, leaving the Bureau of the Presidium with four members and Khrushchev dangerously isolated. In his desperation, Khrushchev managed to garner the support of the 'neutral' Mikoyan, who aided in blocking Kaganovich's own elevation to the Bureau. It was not all in vein for Kaganovich however, as the plenum did elevate him to lead the General Department of the Central Committee.
Kaganovich and Khrushchev: once mentor and protégé, now enemies
Although frustrated from achieving ascension to the top, it was a gift in disguise for Kaganovich: Khrushchev's political capital remained weakened, Mikoyan had tied himself to Khrushchev, and although he did not sit on the Bureau, Kaganovich had attained a role behind-the-scenes that was perhaps more powerful: as Head of the General Department, he played a direct hand in the day-to-day management of the Party, and had oversight over the flow of information. Kaganovich's fierce temper and domineering mannerisms also ensured that his subordinates in the General Department were largely powerless to stop him, and he quickly came to it as a tool against the Centre's enemies.
Also overlooked by Kaganovich's opponents was the General Department's influence over local party organizations ahead of the Party Congress, with the CPSU's first congress since 1952 set to be monumental in several ways: the first without Stalin's leadership since 1927, and the likely battleground between the 'Centre' and 'Right Opposition' (as the Stalinists had started labelling them). It was clear to both sides that one had to triumph over the other, and that the final battle was to be fought - it was now just a matter of who would triumph, and how.
Several setbacks - including with Sputnik - had weakened Khrushchev surprisingly, with Molotov and the Centre avoiding much of the blame through veiled attacks aimed at Khrushchev and his 'factionalism'. Nostalgia for the 'successes of Stalin' also played a powerful role, and Khrushchev found himself on the backfoot going into 1957. Khrushchev's growing worry was not unfounded either: in an overt move of intimidation, Molotov had manufactured Konstantin Rokossovsky's return from Poland in early January 1957, with Rokossovsky restored as a Marshal of the Soviet Union and, most importantly, named Head of Moscow's Military District.
The message was clear to all, and Khrushchev was forced into action: although the 20th Party Congress had been scheduled for May 1957 (to coincide with May Day celebrations), Khrushchev felt that by then he may not have enough support or strength to resist the Stalinists at all, and so used much of his political capital to move the Congress forward to late February. In truth, it backfired: the move looked self-serving and weakened Khrushchev's fading star even further.
It was also in vain: Kaganovich's influence continued to grow, and in the weeks preceding the meeting, Mikoyan - sensing his own precarious position - met privately with Kaganovich and "bent the knee"; Kaganovich was satisfied by Mikoyan's humbling and promised to save his position in return for his support at the upcoming Congress. Mikoyan's abrupt change of loyalties also allowed for Kaganovich's elevation to the Secretariat at the last plenum of the Central Committee ahead of the Party Congress.
Despite his precarious position, Khrushchev would open the Party Congress on the 20th of February with the 'Report of the CPSU Central Committee' - it was a rather timid and toned affair, far from his fiery speeches of the past, with it being obvious to all present that the mood had decisively turned against him. Moskatov would follow with his 'Report of the Central Audit Commission of the CPSU', and then Molotov with the 'Report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan' and Mikoyan with the 'Report on the USSR's Foreign Policy' - both of the latter using this opportunity to highlight the fall in the Union's position since the passing of Stalin, highlighting a causal effect and further cementing a positive view of Stalin's legacy.
Kaganovich was entrusted with the most important role of all: oversight over the election of the central bodies of the Communist Party. With the Centre dominating proceedings, it was largely to be a foregone conclusion, but Kaganovich used this opportunity to plunge the first dagger: he proposed the abolition of the Bureau of the Presidium, arguing it was 'counter to the ideals of collective leadership as established by Comrade Lenin'. Khrushchev was ambushed with this proposal, and although he attempted to protest he was silenced by the proposal's support from Molotov, Voroshilov and - surprisingly to him - Mikoyan.
The proposal's success effectively routed Khrushchev and his allies, and in the subsequent elections to the Central Committee, Khrushchev's allies were diminished and he found himself humiliated with exclusion from the Presidium of the Central Committee. Kaganovich stayed true to his word to Mikoyan, and lent his vocal support to the Foreign Minister, allowing Mikoyan to stave off further humiliation and exclusion from the Presidium.
On the final day of the Congress, Kaganovich delivered a final report on the "unity of the party and collective leadership" which extolled on the leadership of both Lenin and Stalin, and on the need for a strong front against the West and the growing tide of fascism, and most importantly, a rebuke of 'factionalism' and the need for a 'unified collective leadership'. It was interpreted as both a show of strength from Kaganovich, and a rebuke to his enemies both internal and external.
Comrade Kaganovich speaking on the Party's unity
Although he had not been further elevated in position and Khrushchev had survived on the Central Committee, it was evident to all within the Soviet political structure that Kaganovich had emerged triumphant and as the 'primus inter pares' among his colleagues at the very least. Even Molotov had accepted in the immediate aftermath of the Party Congress that his chance at leading the Union had slipped from his grasp, and made peace with his role underneath Kaganovich rather than alongside him.
Of course, "Iron Lazar" was not yet done: the first plenum of the Central Committee would be called on 2 March as per established procedure, and here - away from the public spectacle - the real governance of the Party and Union would be hashed out. With his hand firmly on the wheel, Kaganovich had used the 1st of March to meet with allies and his growing court of sycophants to map out the new order of things. It was thus no surprise when it was proposed that the role of General Secretary be revived, and that "Comrade Kaganovich assume the role in guiding in the Party as Comrade Stalin once had" - although he feigned refusal at first, Kaganovich eventually gave his assent to such a proposal in 'service to the Party', and it was carried unanimously (Khrushchev already was neutered and perhaps hoped to save himself through compliance).
General Secretary L. M. Kaganovich
The Council of Ministers remained entrusted to Molotov, although there was little doubt on who truly managed state affairs. Mikoyan also managed to retain his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he assumed Khrushchev's place as one of the First Deputy Chairmen (serving alongside Bulganin and Kruglov). Khrushchev for his part was assigned the 'important' role of First Secretary of the Yaroslavl City Committee, and given strong "state protection" to ensure his safety in carrying out these new duties. Other roles were thus divided as agreed the day before, and many of Stalin's proteges, cronies and allies found themselves fully restored to power and prominence.
At a reception in the Kremlin a few weeks following the Party Congress and Central Committee plenum, Comrade Aristov would praise Kaganovich, labelling him the "second engine driver of the Soviet Union" - the succession had been secured.
Nasser's 'decolonisation' plan for the Suez Canal gave Israel a trickle of hope for a normalisation in relations. Done under the umbrella of the UN and relying heavily on the authority provided by the backing of the United States, the departure of French and British troops begun a process that Israel hoped would make the Suez neutral and international, even if under Egyptian stewardship.
Nasser, locked in a power struggle and maintaining his power with the slimmest of margins, saw no need to open the canal up to the Israelis, and feared the reaction of his citizenry if he did so. The subsequent Levon affair buried any remaining chance there was for a rapprochement in 1955, a year prior to the canal's nationalisation. The 'provocative' troop movements conducted by Israel since the blast, and the cooling in Israeli American relations caused by the split would in fact cause Nasser to seriously consider waging war against the Israelis in 1955, while public opinion was heavily in his favour. A myriad of factors would figure into the decision not to launch any attack, with Egyptian military unreadiness being one of them. Despite Nasser's attempts at reform, the Egyptian military was split into several competing factions, with only a small core of professional and, at least theoretically, non-political Officers being judged as capable enough to wage war against Israel. The likelihood of direct British intervention also weighed heavily against the hawks in Nasser's coalition. In the end, despite manoeuvres from both sides, peace would prevail.
The experience of 1955 would largely be eclipsed in Egypt by the enormous feeling of national joy from the canal's nationalisation in 1956. Israel, on the other hand, was deeply shaken by just how weak its position had been – IDF analysis in early 1956 suggested that had war occurred, an Arab coalition could have overwhelmed the state. Many of these reports were what contributed heavily to the Mapai's electoral defeat and Begin entered office convinced that war was in store, and that delaying it would only allow the Arab states around Israel to grow stronger. The continued reluctance to open the canal to Israel continued to harm the economy, and many in Israel feared that they would be outpaced by the Iraqis (who now controlled Jordan) and the Egyptians, who underwent difficult but beneficial land reform. The frequent summits between Damascus and Cairo only added to the feeling of encirclement, as the Israeli's felt encircled by consolidating hostile states.
Begin's 1957 war rested heavily on the support of the United Kingdom. The British, who had committed some minor errors with their aviation industry, were now using Israel as the dumping ground of their aviation industry. Gaitskell could sell the Israeli's heavily subsidized aircraft and armaments, keeping his arms industry going while domestic orders dried up in multiple sectors. Keeping the factories open for the purpose of Israel served the dual purpose of furthering British influence in the Middle East but also maintaining high production rates, and shells could easily be switched from Israel to Burma. Begin also secretly courted Washington, finding Eisenhower more amenable to help than Truman. While the United States continued to tread carefully in the region, Eisenhower allowed the CIA to heavily help the Israelis, providing them key intelligence that allowed Begin to finally decide on launching the war.
While diplomatic attempts continued to be made (Begin would pester Cairo monthly, through whatever channels possible), the IDF begun to prepare for its offensive. Forty thousand IDF troops would be stationed on the Jordanian border, making as much noise as they could realistically get away with. This move was intended primarily to deceive the Egyptians into believing the Israelis would instead attack the Iraq-lead Arab United Arab Kingdom, perhaps in an attempt to extricate them the West Bank, which posed a much bigger threat to the Israeli heartland than the Egypt-aligned Gaza.
The 23rd of May ultimatum posed by Israel would be viewed as particularly duplicitous by the Arab nations. No sooner had the Iraqi condemnation reached Tel Aviv than had Israel already launched its offensives, with an artillery bombardment blanketing Egyptian positions that the Mossad and the Army Intelligence had carefully mapped out over the last few months. In the air, formations of Israeli aircraft would immediately launch an air offensive that aimed at destroying the most immediately threatening Egyptian asset, its small but threatening fleet of modern Soviet jets. In many ways superior to anything handed over by the British, these aircraft would be a powerful weapon somewhat hamstrung in its capabilities by the lack of a supporting infrastructure. The lack of adequate early warning radar did in fact allow the Israelis an early edge, as their planes pummelled runways and hangars. Most of Egypt's conventional air force (relying on older models) would never get a chance to fire a shot back. Soviet intelligence, which came at the last minute and was only tacitly trusted in Cairo, would however enable the Egyptians to move a large portion of their jets west, sparing them the fate. Within three hours of the opening of hostilities, Israeli pilots would clash with Egyptian jets over the Suez, and the first day goal of achieving aerial supremacy would slip out of Israeli hands.
The failure to achieve complete air dominance had repercussions on the ground, as the planned Israeli air offensive against the strategically vital Mitla pass (which lay only 40 or so kilometres from the Suez Canal) called off by its commander, Rafael Eitan, on the first day of fighting. Sharon, who wanted to lead the remnants of the brigade to link up with forces under Eitan, had until the last minute planned to carry out the operation no matter what, but stray radio transmissions from IDF pilots facing resistance would demotivate the 202nd brigade, and Eitan convinced him to the futility of the operation. The brigade would instead be used to land on the Western approaches to Sharm el-Sheikh, causing the eventual fall of the strategically important town on the third day of hostilities.
The Israeli air force would experience some of its first losses in the evening, and a decision was hastily made to limit the scope of aerial operations to just the Eastern Sinai until the threat of jet aircraft hit-and-run attacks from Western Egypt could be neutralised. Under the umbrella protective umbrella of their aircraft, the Israelis would advance, initially meeting token resistance. Fighting would favour the IDF all along the gulf of Aqaba, where the use of airpower in tandem with airborne landing forces would panic the second-rate Egyptian forces stationed there.
Israeli forces in the centre of the Sinai would advance as soon as hostilities begun, reaching the important town of Nakla by the evening of May 23rd. Despite an initial hope of capturing the town immediately, reinforcements through the uncaptured Mitla pass would throw the overstretched Israelis back, allowing Egypt to stage a fighting withdrawal from the town over the next two days. Overall, the anticipated crumbling of the Egyptian army did not happen in this sector – many of the brigades were staffed by Nasser's young crop of Officers, and they performed valiantly in the line of duty. The decision to delay the Israelis at Nakla allowed the partial evacuation of the Southern Sinai and prevented the Israelis from outflanking the forces still holding up in the North. The cost, for the Egyptians, was a high rate of casualties among its best and brightest formations.
In the North, the Israelis would bypass Gaza to launch a ferocious set of attacks against Abu Ageila, which served as a crucial road junction. The town would be captured by the IDF on the 24th but would come under attacks by elements of the Egyptian 4th armoured division by the 25th, buying time for Egypt's northern group of forces, which retreated after a failed attempt to stop the Israelis at Abu Uwayulah. This battle would show the residual shortcomings of the Egyptian army, which despite Nassers attempt, found itself politically splintered along the three major currents of Egypt's political thought. Forces loyal to the HMJ totalling around 2000 men would find themselves left behind in Gaza, as they refused to be put under the command of the retreating Haditu-aligned fighters. Accusations would quickly fly both ways over Nassers head, as the leadership of the HMJ accused the Communists of leaving the HMJ-aligned brigade for political reasons. The Communists would in turn declare that the brigade got itself encircled solely out of its stubbornness and refusal to cooperate.
As the politicians squabbled, Nasser was quickly trying to work with what he had to patch up the front. Despite their exhausted state, many of the brigades from Nakla were moved around the front, allowing the Egyptians to stem the Israeli tide somewhat by the third day of hostilities. The Egyptian navy would furthermore attempt to avenge the capture of Sharm el-Sheikh with the naval bombing of Haifa, which stopped only once Israeli aircraft forced the Egyptian destroyer to retreat during the night of May 26th.
The Ibrahim el-Awal would return to port despite damage from Israeli aircraft.
The crew would be afforded a day of respite, and the Captain of the vessel was slated to meet Nasser himself until Mikoyan threw a wrench in the works of the planned conference.
As fighting went on the in the west, tensions would brew in the East, as the Arab world called for retaliation. Israel's offensive would be far from clean – a massacre would slay close to three hundred innocents at Khan Yunis, and an unrelated massacre would take place in the village of Kafr Qasim, situated on the green line. The latter massacre would incense feelings in Baghdad and Amman, where many took to the streets to call for the replacement of 'strong condemnations' with direct military action. Rumours begun to swirl as to the causes of the inaction of the Baghdad government, with many suspecting Westminster of having a leading role in suppressing potential intervention from the Arab Kingdom. May 28th would see disgruntled oil workers at many key sites refuse to work unless the government immediately aided the Egyptians. The Jordanian Army would be put on full alert on the same day, but despite limited skirmishing between rogue units, no major fighting would take place on the heavily militarised border.
Smaller demonstrations would take place in Syria (which would mobilise most of its forces on May 26th due to nationalist pressure and call for Israel to immediately withdraw) and the rest of the Arab world. In Iran, enormous public demonstrations would play well into Kashani's planned series of 'conferences', though the talks themselves would quickly be seen as irrelevant in the grand scale of things. The Movement of Vanguard Missions would rapidly demand for Kashani to support their Egyptian component with the arms and funding necessary for armed resistance, and many called for an immediate declaration of war on Israel. Allies of the hunted down Muslim Brotherhood, the movement urged remaining Fedayeen cells in Egypt to cautiously come out of hiding and to fight side by side with government troops.
In the West, many in the opposition benches would use the war to splinter Gaitskells base of support, driving a wedge between the pacifists and the pro-Zionist lobbies of the Labour party. The British press would demand intervention, and would clamour that the war was an ineveitable consequence of Attlee's 'shoddy deal' on the Suez. De Gaulle would paradoxically find the war boosting his fledgling popularity - his strong statements on the Suez would be reprinted, turned from embarassing to prophetic. Many in France openly questioned whether or not the entire affair would have happened in the French tricolour had remained flying over the Canal as promised.
By May 26th, the situation in the Sinai was still highly dynamic, albeit the lines were becoming clearer as Egyptian forces retreated mostly in good order. In the air, the numerically superior Israelis were slowly whittling away what jets the Egyptians possessed, though at heavy cost. The Israeli campaign to suppress Egyptian air defence had proved largely unnecessary, and by day 3 of operations, Israeli aircraft were instead dedicated primarily to the interdiction of communications (Israeli P51's would cut telegraph wires with their wings) and supplies to Egypt's retreating group of forces. Despite the overall retreat, Egyptian morale would be bolstered by the victory at Nakla, which was quickly propagandized far beyond what it was. Nasser, despite the multitude of risk the decision brought on, had instructed his troops to resist, and the policy seemed to be working. It would however remain to be seen for how long the Egyptians could maintain cohesion as the Israelis slowly but methodically built aerial dominance.
Egypts 4th armoured division would perform valiantly but incur heavy losses. underscoring the need for further reform within the armed forces.
One of the most peculiar and yet geopolitically important episodes of the struggle would also unfold on May 26th, as a plane carrying Anastas Mikoyan touched down in Cairo to public fanfare and worldwide press coverage. Originally meant to depart on a mission to build goodwill throughout the middle East in June, Mikoyan was meant to reach Syria first, but would instead find his schedule cleared and the plane would depart a week early. While the risk of a shoot down was present, it was mitigated by the path taken by the aircraft, which came in from the West. Mikoyan would give the Egyptian people his full support, though he carefully ensured that he did not promise any armed intervention. The mission had two purposes - distract the international press from the currently unfolding Soviet operation in Austria (which would largely backfire, as Austria would if anything end up taking the attention of the press away from Egypt) and paint the Soviets as allies of the Arab world. Mikoyan's visit would elicit a warm response from Nasser, who would now be pushed by members of his coalition towards more cooperation with the Soviets. In many ways, the Communists in Nassers coalition grumbled about his poor judgement - his courting of the United States had seemingly led only to betrayal.
Dwight D. Eisenhower addresses the nation on the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East
ALL AMERICANS have been following with deep concern the latest developments in the Near East. The recent outbreak of hostilities has led to a sharp increase in tensions. These events inevitably slow our search for world peace. Insecurity in one region is bound to affect the world as a whole.
While we continue willing to consider request for arms needed for legitimate self-defense, we do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East because we do not think such a race would be in the true interest of any of the participants. The policy which we believed would best promote the interests and the security of the peoples of the area was expressed in the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. This still remains our policy.
I stated last year that our goal in the Near East as elsewhere is a just peace. Nothing has taken place since which invalidates our fundamental policies, policies based on friendship for all of the peoples of the area.
We believe that true security must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement. The Secretary of State outlined on May 26th the economic and security contributions which this country was prepared to make towards such a solution. On that occasion I authorized Mr. Dulles to state that, given a solution of the other related problems, I would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Recent developments have made it all the more imperative that a settlement be found. The United States will continue to play its full part and will support firmly the United Nations which has already contributed so markedly to minimize violence in the area. I hope that other nations of the world will cooperate in this endeavor, thereby contributing significantly to world peace.
The events of 1953 had placed Austria in the deceptively calm eye of the European storm. A brutal Soviet crackdown took place to the north, filling the country with refugees from the National Front. Simultaneously, an equally brutal American crackdown destroyed Italy's fledgling democracy, sending a wave of Socialists and Communists fleeing north. Vienna, divided between four nations and two competing ideologies, would temporarily swing to the Soviet side with the election of a Socialist government after significant covert Soviet intervention. The government however failed to secure the one thing the people of Austria desperately wanted – unity. The Soviets seemed utterly disinterested in the idea, convinced that a neutral Austria would soon become a Capitalist one. This viewpoint would be reinforced in 1956, when the Socialists lost out to the pro-Western Austrian People's Party.
The election of the OVP, combined with continued Yugoslav clamouring (the Yugoslav UDBA was the first agency to raise the possibility of a Soviet takeover in Austria) had provided further momentum to the Unification movement. A UN referendum on the country's future was put forward by Belgrade in 1956, urging the allied powers to dissolve the occupation zones. It received support from the West and hostility from the East, as the Soviets voted against. One notable voice of dissent was Romania, which was in the early stages of the daring process of trying to use Soviet chaos in government to rid itself of its own cohort of Red Army troops. As such, they abstained.
The referendum, despite swimming through the General Assembly on a wave of support, was ignored by the Soviets. Moscow would at first fail to provide real reasoning – they claimed that the time was simply not right. In the halls of the Kremlin, however, no plans to allow Austria reunification existed – Stalin's policy, informally dictated to his circle during the last weeks of his life, held sway. To open Austria up to neutrality was to send it down the same path as Italy and open a vulnerability on the Soviet Union's most turbulent flank. The line of thinking passed through Molotov, then through the Gang of Five (of which only Khruschev was amenable to some sort of Austria solution) and finally down to Kaganovich, who sought to take the issue to its logical and Stalinist conclusion.
One of the critical mistakes in the West was the viewing of Austria as an isolated element of Soviet policy. In both Moscow and Belgrade, Austria was the corner stone to Balkan and Italian regional control. This was exemplified by the Soviet quartering of the Italian Communist movement in Vienna instead of Moscow or Prague – the city was a fulcrum from which power could be applied to the West, onto Italy and onto the antagonistic Yugoslavia. Moscow could not give up this bridge easily, and especially not to an openly pro-Western government. The fate of Austria, however, would ultimately be decided not by the Austrians themselves, but by the voters of Italy.
Kaganovich, eager to showcase his power both internally and among the nations that believed the Soviet Union to be in decline, needed to send a strong message. Setbacks in Burma and the ineffectiveness of the campaign in Iran (which fizzled out among the many transitions of power) had cast doubts about Soviet power. Molotov's leadership had been ineffective and divided, inviting in criticism from within the party and giving an optimistic few the hope of reform under Khruschev. Having crushed the optimists, Kaganovich now needed to send a message to the West, and in his mind, both Italy and Austria presented a nearly equally tempting opportunity. He had decided, at a session of the Politburo, that the election in Italy would determine the course of action in Austria. If the Soviets won Rome, or at least assured it was on a path towards neutrality, they could let Austria be, driving a wedge into NATO from the Alps to Sicily. The Soviet Union could allow for its near decade long plans on Austria to be altered if it meant far bigger success in Italy.
If the electoral push was to fail, however, Kaganovich could not leave with his hands empty. Plans first established under Stalin had guaranteed a strong KGB presence in Austria, both in the Soviet zone and those around it. Plans for a possible occupation dated back to 1953, and by 1955 their execution awaited only word from Moscow. The scenarios had been thoroughly war gamed – the Soviets, even in their most cautious estimates, did not preclude that shutting out their own sector of Austria would lead to wider scale war. Even if it did, however, plans were made for any conflict to be localised, with the harsh terrain hopefully enabling the Red Army to sweep over local opposition and then retort to holding several mountain strongpoints if needed. If needed, the Alps would form a natural buffer against any counter offensive, and the Soviets could wait out any retaliation while hopefully not provoking war on the northern European plain. The dedication of US resources to Burma further reinforced this viewpoint – Kaganovich and his Generals believed the British to be tired, the French to be tied up and the Americans disinterested. Washington's pre-Eisenhower lack of interest in Austrian affairs reinforced this viewpoint, with the Americans and British both frequently ignoring Tito's clamouring about Soviet influence on the Danube.
As the tense Italian election unfolded, Moscow received early warning from many of its agents – the people had simply not turned out. The massive leftist movement that Togliatti was meant to inspire was muted by a combination of general economic wellbeing and a confusing split between the Socialists and Communists. Before the polls in Italy even opened, Kaganovich had already greenlit the deployment of eight divisions to the surroundings of Vienna. Their movement, rapidly picked up by National Front agents in Czechoslovakia, would set off alarm bells in Western capitals. Adenauer's government felt the most exposed, but quickly came to the conclusion that the lack of East German movements to the border could only mean that the troops were destined elsewhere. Cautiously, not to provoke any unforgotten nor unforgiven sentiments, German troops would begin mobilising around the Sudetenland, though the Bundeswehr could at best provide two brigades on short order. American forces would be put on high alert too, at first in Germany, and later in Italy, once the election had concluded. Moro, more concerned about the outcome of the election, elected to let Italian troops stay as they were, unwilling to give any ammunitions to those that would surely call the election illegitimate.
As the West slowly mobilised, the Soviets would continue to rapidly surge troops in Czechoslovakia, deploying more soldiers to the vicinity of Vienna than the West German army had in its ranks. Alarmed but not surprised, Belgrade would quickly put into action plans for its own mobilisation among the small and thin border between Yugoslavia and the Soviet zone at the Burgenland. Further mobilisations would take place throughout the country, as Tito refused to exclude the possibility of a wider Soviet invasion. The Yugoslavs would also begin to brief Slovenians inhabiting Austria, cautiously advising them to stockpile necessities such as food and ammunition. Belgrade would also issue stern warnings to Washington and London about Vienna, stating that if Soviet plans to seize control succeeded, a British zone could find itself cut off from the rest of the potentially encircled city.
As the West deliberated, and Eisenhower issued commands to General Gruenther to enter combat readiness, Soviet propaganda operations were sparked into action. Groups of protesters, arranged and kept waiting for years, would flood Vienna, in what was meant to look like a genuine outpouring of workers grief. While the end effect ended up somewhere between farcical and outright comical (many of the 'handmade' placards held by completely diverse and unaffiliated groups of protesters were identical, and some of the protesters spoke no German when questioned by the press), it gave Kaganovich enough to plot a tale of a fascist coup in Italy being followed up by an attempted fascist coup in Austria. The Austrian election of 1956 was very much a done deal in the eye of the Austrian public, and they were far more concerned about achieving an end to occupation than they were about events in Italy. As the groups of protesters were met with quizzical looks in Vienna, Soviet troops continued to surround the city and to flood the Soviet zone. Checkpoints would be rapidly established throughout major transport arteries, effectively cutting Vienna off. The schedule would also be rapidly altered – the Soviets had initially hoped for a longer period of build up (to allow their propaganda campaign to develop) but decided to quickly push things ahead in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Egypt.
Moscow kept its cards close to its chest. Kaganovich intended to gauge the Western reaction to the conflict, and while Yugoslavia's mobilisation was somewhat unnerving, it was not military threatening. States of alert being raised in Germany and Italy were also not of pivotal concern, as it was all very much anticipated in Soviet planning. What did however throw Moscow out of its pre-planned and 'scientifically established' loop was the reaction from Ankara. The Turks, perhaps being a tad too alarmist about the possibilities of war, raised their own alarms. Not bordering the Soviet Austria zone since 1683, the Turks were not necessarily expected to take the steps they did. With war waging in the Middle East, the Soviets were scared about the vital straits of Bosphorus being shut and thus cutting off a lot of their leverage, not to mention the economic effects. Kaganovich would quickly summon an emergency session, at which it was ultimately decided to proceed with the normal course of action while quietly restationing several air wings to Crimea. Troop movements in Bulgaria, while tempting as a source of leverage, were ultimately rejected, as Moscow hoped to achieve its establishment of a satellite in Austria without escalating tensions throughout the Balkans.
The pace and scale of Soviet deployments in Austria would terrify many Western military planners. Despite the edge in nuclear arms and in the air, undersized Western armies would be unlikely to stop the Soviets in Europe using conventional measures.
On May 27th, Kaganovich would proclaim the establishment of an emergency workers government in Austria. The announcement was carefully construed – the Soviets wanted to paint it as a continuation of the previous government, which they hoped to bring back into a grand leftist coalition. These hopes would be quite quickly frustrated, as despite being sour on losing power, most of the Austrian Socialists refused to act, instead seeing how things unfolded. Words of support towards the formation of a 'brotherly state' would come from East Germany, as Ulbricht offered his support and guidance, as well as issuing a stern rebuke to NATO 'warmongering' in Western Austria.
The western warmongering itself was a partially successful effort. While the Americans leapt to action, the French and British were decidedly delayed. France had her priorities split, and mostly followed the Americans. The bigger concern were the British – Gaitskell's government was sent into freefall by the events in Austria, as many saw the event as a British failure in playing the intelligence game in their own zone. Gaitskell's tardiness would be criticized in Eisenhower in a leaked report, causing outrage among the Conservatives and many of Labour's MPs. Paralysed by his tiny majority, and unwilling to deal decisively with another crisis, Gaitskell would be buried by press reports of 'encircled British troops' in Vienna. Here the crisis was somewhat overblown – while the Soviets seized their own sectors in Vienna, they did not move into the central international zone, which connected the British area in Simmering to the rest of the Western-aligned zones. Whether or not the Soviets would pursue a Berlin like situation was also unclear – for now civilian traffic throughout the Soviet zone was effectively halted, but it was unclear whether Kaganovich would hold American, French, and British troops in the city hostage. None of this cold analysis made it to the front pages of British tabloids, however, and in due time, Gaitskell's government would suffer several resignations from which it could likely not recover.
The occupation zones in Vienna. Whether the city would be completely locked down was still unclear.
After two weeks of tensions, the Soviet proclamation of an Austrian People's Republic would come on June 16th, four years after Stalin's death. In the West, many now warned of a Soviet effort to topple of all Europe, as another wave of red fear spread its tendrils throughout the free world. The new Austrian state, though ill defined (no leadership was clear yet), would immediately receive recognition from the various states of the Warsaw Pact.
Borders of the newly proclaimed Austrian People's Republic.
The Romanian Foreign Ministry, in light of the settlement of the Austrian situation, recognising the necessity for the deployment of liberatory Red Army troops to threatened zones further West, formally requests the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Romania.
In the spirit of international cooperation, Romania offers to take up the mantle of its defence wholly on itself while remaining under brotherly Soviet guidance. Romania would also like to take on the responsibility of defending Soviet supply lines to the newly established Austrian People's Republic, allowing the Soviet Red Army to instead focus on dealing with American and Yugoslav provocations in the region.
Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU addressed to the Central Committee of the RWP
On International Cooperation, Defence and Party Relations
Moscow
08 June 1957
To the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party,
To Comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej,
First Secretary of the C.C. of the RWP
Dear Comrades,
The Presidium of the C.C. of the CPSU has examined your request dated from earlier this month with regards to the redeployment of Soviet Armed Forces currently stationed in the Romanian People's Republic.
The C.C. of the CPSU has received the report of the Presidium, and taken into consideration your offer to support efforts in the newly-established Austrian People's Republic; this altogether in the spirit of brotherly cooperation, and in easing any burdens faced by the Soviet Armed Forces.
We thank you for your generous considerations, and your support for our brotherly interests, and for the cause and struggle of the worker on the international stage. These are indeed fraught and difficult times, and we recognize this wholly.
As such, whilst the C.C. of the CPSU does recognize the well-intentions of your request, we cannot in this difficult time reorganize our established defensive positions and vital bases, made further dangerous by the tense situation in the Bosporus and Black Sea. We therefore commit that the forces already deployed in the Romanian People's Republic shall remain in place - and we have no doubt in the spirit of brotherly cooperation that you will continue to support and accommodate them.
We will review in due course, once tensions have settled, and consider any requests or alternative defensive arrangements.
We would, in the spirit of further cooperation and relations between our parties, invite Cdes. Gheorghiu Dej, Apostol, Maurer, and Stoica, and other selected members of the C.C. of the RWP, to a meeting with the Presidium of the C.C. of the CPSU; so that the ties between our parties and people's may be further strengthened.
With communist salutations,
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The United States of America is deeply dismayed and concerned by the Soviet Union's unilateral declaration of a new government in Austria. During the long fight against Nazism in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on a "a free and independent Austria and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring States which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace".
The recent actions of the Soviet Union are a blatant repudiation of the Third Moscow Conference, and the United States is deeply disappointed that the Soviet Union has chosen this aggressive, illegal path to pursue hegemony in Europe. The United States was fully prepared for the creation of a neutral, stable, and secure Austria that was non-aligned. However, the Soviet Union has chosen otherwise.
The United States of America reaffirms its dedication to ensuring freedom, security, and a long-lasting peace. America will not compromise on this, and the United States will continue to support and advocate for long-term peace, stability, and freedom in Europe.
