Cold War: 1950

[Shynka]

​

The game begins on June 6th of 1950, just ahead of the monumental 1950 FIFA World Cup. The world is steadily marching into a new and uneasy order, dominated by two ideologically incompatible superpowers eyeing each other across the wastelands that remain following World War two. War between the two seems both inevitable and unacceptable – they are armed with weapons capable of levelling entire cities in minutes.

They are both surrounded by carefully picked, or carefully installed, allies. Some are more willing or capable than others, some still cling onto their own dreams of power, some labour secretly and diligently on plans that threaten to throw the world once again into flames.

Tension fills the air, and as the atom transforms the world and the empires of old die, it is up to you, the players, to carefully forge a new world. Reform or preserve the social and economic order of your countries, seek to avenge or forgive old resentments, forge new international bonds, and guarantee yourself a place in history without setting off a chain of events that unleashes powers that ultimately serve only to destroy civilisation as it is known today.

The Map


Nuclear Forces and Deployment Map
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Each icon - 10 bombs

OOC Thread​

The OOC thread and all of the games explanations can be found here: COLD WAR: 1950 OOC - Historic

Main Updates​

1950 June to December
1951 January to June

Mini Updates​

1950
Signals on the Water, June 25th 1950
Ongjin and Seoul, June 25th to June 29th, 1950
Brother Said, June 1950
Korean War, June 25th to August 21st, 1950

1951
Trouble on the Danube (Yugoslavia & Czechoslovakia)
Snakes Under The Grass - Indonesia
Peace on the Nile
Schemes Down Under
Korean War - Part 4 - 1951 January and February
Above Everything - Iran 1951
Silence at the Red River
Korea - Part 5 - March to May
Japan - 1951 Election
Trouble on the Danube - Part II
Suez Crisis
Brazil 1951
Korea - Part 6 - Summer of 51
Egypt 1951 Fall of the Monarchy

Flavour Updates​

June 6th, 1950 - The Most Beautiful Game

Estimated Nuclear Warheads as of 1951​

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United States
320-340
Soviet Union
10-12

Players List​

Alignments may not be accurate due to ongoing skullduggery and or interpretation.

Soviet Union - @Namaroff
Czechoslovakia - @Baltika9
People's Republic of China - @RobespierreLives
North Korea - @DanBaque
East Germany - @tyriet

United States - @Etranger
Republic of China- @Carol
United Kingdom - @Weygand
France - @99KingHigh
South Korea - @Skrevski
West Germany - @Nerdorama
Japan - @Shebe Zuu
Italy - @mcclay

Egypt - @Korona
Iran - @Noco
Indonesia - @Oxford
Yugoslavia - @XVG

CURRENT DATE: 6th of June, 1951​

 

[Shynka]

Key Events Summary​

This summary is intended to give people new to the game a quick overview of what has happened so far.

1950: ​

* The Malenkov Doctrine is published, drastically changing the Korean War and starting a wave of 'Red Fear'. Japan begins the first steps towards re-armament. North Korean forces come close to annexing South Korea altogether before being forced back to defensive lines south of Seoul.
* Red Fear causes a rise in right wing sentiment throughout Europe, Asia and the Americas. Pakistan commits forces to the UN, diverging from neutrality. Sweden, despite her earlier pledges of neutrality, diplomatically distances itself from the Soviet Union and joins the US lead UN embargo on the country.
* Tunisia achieves autonomy within France.

1951:​

* De Gaulle wins the French election with 190 seats to his name, laying down the groundwork for the end of the constitution and thus the fourth French Republic.
* Korean war continues; in May, UN forces recapture Seoul and push towards Pyongyang. The Chinese PVA takes on an increasingly important role in the conflict.
* Egypt's government collapses in the December 7th Revolution, as the Free Officers Movement grabs onto power and proclaims a Republic. British forces leave the Suez and a UN peace force enters the country.

1952:
* Ceasefire in Korea. Chinese and KPA collaborators remove Kim Il-Sung from the leadership, and he is shortly thereafter secretly sentenced to death. The North Korean state refuses to initially acknowledge his death. Korea is left in turmoil.
* Elections around the globe - the United States sees Truman secure a third term. De Gaulle reinforces his mandate and moves to a system of directly electing French leaders. Attlee manages to secure more than a six seat majority. Albert Einstein is elected President of the state of Israel. Menzies defeats Evans, and institutes the Australian National Health Service. President Chang Myon solidifies his hold in Korea in a historic election with notably low turnout.
* The Jakarta Crisis - struggles between the cash strapped government of Indonesia and the army lead to protests in which Sukarno goes missing, presumed dead. A tense stand off occurs, before rebel leader, General Nasution, accepts a deal that allows him to flee to Saudi Arabia.

1953:
* Wave of protests and strikes that rocks Europe throughout 1953 kicks off in January, as Italy falls into chaos due to gross financial mismanagment.

Person of the Year
1950 - Malenkov

1951 - Mossadegh

1952 - Nasser
​

 

[Shynka]

The Most Beautiful Game

​

Twelve long turbulent years had passed, and as George ran down the dockside, he heard an uneasy crack in each knee with every bound. Sweat built up underneath his thick linen shirt, and his hat, already ill fitting due to the mop of hair that had not seen scissors since England a month before, continued to slide off and need readjustment. Christ, he thought, this must be his last one in the field, as the Bolsey camera bounced around his side, its strap digging perilously into a neck also burdened with his travel bag.

"O navio! O navio!" He yelled to a group of pier-side workers, his frantic gallop slowing as his legs gave out. "Esta aqui navio!?" They gave him puzzled looks, a few hands pointing towards the row of ships bouncing up and down in the water nearby. Not that ship, he thought, and yet found himself utterly unable to clarify. A tall and broad one in the back stepped forward, gave him a long and somewhat disconcerting look, and then replied with a chain of words as likely to be insults as they were the answer to his poorly formulated question.

"Navio Americano. Navio Futebol." He said again, his left leg limply imitating a kick. They don't pay you the big money for not trying, he thought to himself, as he felt embarrassment creeping up to his face. Luckily for him, it was already too sunburnt to betray him by blushing. The ocean hurled a strong gust of wind towards the city, sweeping off his hat once and for all, and doubtless giving the workers he was now hedging his bets on a whiff of the alcohol that caused him to be this late in the first place.

"Novo Arsenal." Said the tall man, outstretching a tanned arm and pointing roughly north. He bent over to pick up the journalists hat, dusting it off against his tartan trousers. George found himself pathetically grateful and fumbled for a second in his pocket. Buttons, some change he couldn't really spare, a few pieces of rubbish. Was this all he, a fine journalist of the British Empire, had to spare? He cursed his luck, and when the worker handed him his hat, he had no choice but to reward him with a stamped metal badge of the 79th.

​

OOC:
Feel free to post about your grand dreams and aspirations. Sign ups are still going on in the background but if possible I'd like to request all players involved in a potential Korean struggle to send me a brief plan on that at which point we'll get out first actual mini-update. The tentative deadline for this is Wednesday, but I'll start writing the mini as soon as I get orders from the US, USSR, China and both involved Koreas.

 

[Carol]

A PRISONER IN FORMOSA
​

"The communists have turned China over to a Russian cabal. China is on the thresh-old of its greatest catastrophe throughout its five-thousand-year history."
Lichnoe delo Chan Kai-shi (Personal File of Chiang Kai-shek)
​

Few in the history of men reached the heights of Chiang Kai‐shek, born to a proprietor of a salt shop in Hsi-k'ou and to end up as master of China. Few in that illustrious company fell as far as he, to be relegated as the master of only Formosa and some of her outward islands. Gone were the days when he was feted in Cairo. In 1943, he was a freedom fighter, a shining beacon before the world's eye. His was the struggle against the implacable Japanese. Such abominable men they were—burning, raping, pillaging in the name of their unholy Mikado. The world saw what evil looked like. But a cleverer shadow lurked beneath the Japanese. Chiang knew the communists were a subtle disease on the body of the Chinese people. Janus-faced, they put forth the banner of liberation and yet themselves were the slaves of a foreign power; flea-like, they were deadlier than looks would suggest. They played the part of plucky revolutionaries, showering ignorant Americans with sights of their Potemkin villages. Now they were in place to put forth their murderous plans to the horror of China. How many died under the cruel hand of Joseph Stalin? How many would die under his student Mao Tse-tung? The horror, the horror.

And yet the mole-heads in Washington were resistant to seeing the truth of the matter. He was some tin-pot tyrant to Truman. The president was misled by Dean Acheson to not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces. His words on January 5, 1950 to this effect hurt deeply. It was a betrayal. Worse, despite the promise by the Americans not to involve themselves into the civil affairs of China, conspiracies to replace Chiang were plentiful. His opponents were a who's who of personalities: Chinese liberals in Hong Kong and their supporters in the army; Soong Tse-vung in his plush residence at 1133 Park Avenue and his list of fifty names to take power; Douglas MacArthur and his outpost in Japan. None had the wherewithal to take the helm. Not when Mao signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with Moscow. The dreams that Mao was the second Tito ended there and then.

Chiang returned to the presidency on March 1, 1950. He took back what was his after the interim of Li Tsung-jen. The former acting president refused to leave the United States and come to Formosa on "health" grounds. Compared to the timid display, Chiang was already ready to list out his basic program: "In the military field: to consolidate the base on Taiwan in preparation for the eventual recovery of the mainland. 2. In international relations: from self-reliance to the formation of an anticommunist alliance with the democratic countries. 3. In the economic field: to practice austerity, to increase productivity and to implement Dr. Sun's Principle of People's Livelihood. 4. In the political field: to protect fundamental human rights and the rule of law." The people responded to the news by assembling—100,000 strong—before the square in front of the Presidential Office Building. They delivered a big cheer for Chiang.

The regime's vitality on practical terms was still precarious, however. No number of public cheers could hide private doubts. In the spring of 1950, the government of China controlled the Tachens, located just south of Chusan, across from the city of Taichow in Chekiang province, the Matsu Islands, Quemoy, Penghu in the Formosa Strait, and Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The communists seized Hainan in May 1950, and the Chusan islands were likely to fall next, being only one nautical mile from the coast. A painful decision was made under advice from Charles M. Cooke Jr. to withdraw 150,000 officers and men from these islands. To not let this action serve as the precursor of complete collapse, Chiang declared that Taiwan would either repulse any invasion from the mainland or serve as his graveyard, having fallen either in battle or on his own sword.​

 

[Shynka]

​

Korean Mini, Part 0
June 25th, 1950

The river side irises bent under the strong and steady stream of his proletarian piss. He made sure that each of the broad purple crowns received at least a partial dosing, hoping that this would be the bunch that his boss choses the following morning. He'd been trying to win the heart of a girl doing paperwork on one of the local road projects, and despite holding no animosity for the girl herself, Min was happy to include her as collateral. He finished his business and turned around, away from the broad and wise Yalu, and begun climbing up the shore. The truck they were in was well hidden, no thanks to their lazy commander. Camouflage netting augmented by old rags stretched between the branches of two tall coniferous trees, offering a largely porous but visually effective roof to their enterprise. Around the truck itself they piled up two banks of river sand, ensuring that it had protection from any potential shrapnel while having a way out. Not that anyone would bomb them, Min thought, as he pulled back some of the netting and slid into the little burrow beside the truck. They'd picked up more and more traffic from the north, but the south was dead silent, and despite the paranoid orders that made them bother with all this camouflage, nothing else was coming. The summer was steadily flowing, and Min counted the days until he could go home.

"Check the antenna!" A thin and hateful face stuck out of the truck just before Min entered its stuffy confines, barking an order at him without making eye contact. Commander Huo. Min turned back on himself, put one of his mud covered shoes on the wheel of the Russian truck, heaving himself upwards. Debris from the camouflage netting rained gently into his hair, and he swore, grasping around, until his hands found the long metal rod slipping out of the canvas sheets and into the air.

"Nothing's wrong!" He yelled, knowing fully that Huo will make him double check. He started fiddling with the joint between the antenna and the station hidden just beneath the sheeting, but to his own chagrin, nothing was indeed wrong. The few times the station broke, they got to drive back into China proper and enjoy civilised life while the quartermasters found them a replacement. No one dared touch them or order them about at the base, especially not since they got their latest assignment. A good life. He lifted up the canvas sheet and looked down, making out the wires in the pale moonlight, but nothing was in fact wrong. He wasn't an electrical engineer, but by now he could tell with his fingers alone that all the connections on this end were fine. When something broke with the receiver, it was usually up here.

"Move it a bit! Come down! Hurry." He'd been moving it this whole time! The forest ignored Min's complaint and he dared not utter it to Huo, so he wiped his hands on the canvas sheeting. Some oil remained, and he could only hope that his earlier rendezvous with the irises at least ensured that Huo's hands would be dirty come the morning too. Petty acts of revenge unnoticed by the other party were all that were keeping him from the creeping madness of this electronic wave filled wilderness. He slid down the side of the truck, lifted up the canvas where it wasn't secured too well, and entered. Hot air filled with the stench of stale sweat, the smoke of cheap cigarettes and the offputting and un-natural metallic smell of the machinery hit him all at once. He persevered, letting his eyes readjust to the lightbulbs filling the station with red light. Everyone was at their station. Huo stood bent over in the middle, receiver in one hand, transmitter in the other, and for the first time since they came here, looked genuinely concerned. Zhong and Lim, the two people he was forced to call his only friends here, were pale like ghosts, headphones tightly clasped on their heads, eyes affixed on the cyrylic spattered panels in front of them.

"What's going on?" Min asked, and to his own concern, heard his voice crack. Was he scared? The team didn't look this focused even when they were practicing drills with the Russian air force forward observers. He sat down at his station. Dirt, pine needles and tiny bits of cheap tobacco were everywhere, filling the crevices of the Russian made interface. It suddenly hit him how messy it all was. He couldn't go to war like this, he thought, and found himself brushing all the debris into one hand. Huo shook his shoulder.

"Listen!" The Commander pressed the speaker of a headset against his ear. The noise was nauseating. A hundred sources, all clicking, vibrating and buzzing incessantly, a hive of hornets kicked into action. Voices in Chinese uttered either full sentences or sporadic and nonsensical mottos, but they were drowned out by the cacophony of jumbled and very distant Korean transmissions, which were in turn nothing compared to the random machine-made noises of what could only be armies on the move. How could they get all this, this far north?

"When did it start?" He asked. When he left for his break, the only thing they heard were standard transmissions from the 13th, busy with their manoeuvres, and the Russian woman's voice that every four hours, on the dot, uttered the Russian word 'chai', at least when the weather was clear. Out of boredom more than any sense of duty they located her voice to be coming from inside Korea, likely just a few dozen kilometres south of the river.

"Minutes ago." Zhong said, his voice stiff. He had been mocking Lim about his ill-fitting and provincial looking shoes when Min left, but none of that cheeriness was there anymore. All of them sounded ill at ease, even the invincible Huo. "We tried to write it down at first, but there's just too much. And it's coming from the South, most of it is coming from the South."

"Can we understand any of it?" The men here had been picked out for their knowledge of languages, and in Min's case, ciphers. It was an easier gig than most in the army if you had the brains for it, but required near constant moving, hiding, adjusting, and listening. The signals were either sharp and hurt your ears or calm, lethargic, prone to making you fall asleep and get your ass kicked by Huo come the morning. It still beat lugging around shells or pulling tanks out of the mud, however.

"Some scraps. Our own guys are speaking in codes we don't even recognize. The Koreans are far, so everything is a bit of a mess. Their signals are probably bouncing around and that's all we get. But there's so much of it. All of the signals are overlapping, some of it makes no sense. We've tried to change one of the 2K-2M's but it didn't do anything." Zhong passed him his notebook, but it didn't show much except a sharp uptick in communication a few minutes ago. Min put on his own headset and listened. The pencil in his hands felt useless, but he tried to at least determine patterns, write down the few words of Korean he could make out with any degree of certainty. All four of them sat there, unsure as to what to do. Huo tried periodically to alert command, but their own timid signal was just as likely to get lost in the wilderness out there. Time passed, uneasy.

They sat in stupor for an hour, before the signals started to die down again, receding like the remnants of an angry tide. The voices from the north stopped entirely, and those in the South were now growing quieter and more distant too, replaced only by the rhythmic pinging of the language of the machines, with its growls, sharp tones, and occasional metallic melodies. At four, Huo ordered Lim to start packing up, and then sent Zhong out too. The air waves grew increasingly devoid of the voices of humanity, save for one exception. Chai, announced the Russian woman, her usually calm voice now polluted by traces of human emotion, chai, she said again, chai. Zhong pulled back the camouflage netting and the sky and it's vastness penetrated into the truck through a hole in the canvas sheet. All clear, with streaks of sunlight chasing the hazy blue darkness away from the east. The Russian woman stopped, and the air was for an ever so brief moment left clear of signals, save for the steady clicking of an American-made station they'd been sent here to locate.

 

[Etranger]

"The United States hereby requests an emergency meeting of the Security Council to discuss the developing situation in Korea and to formulate an appropriate response to the aggression of the North Korean forces."

- Warren Austin, US Ambassador to the United Nations

"On my order, deploy the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait and begin mobilizing our forces in Japan. Brief the leaders of Congress; I want their full support before we stick our dicks into an Asian meatgrinder. Christ, what a shitshow."

- Harry S. Truman, President of the United States

 

[Korona]

The Rotten Kingdom​

The dynasty of Muhammad Ali, by 1950, had lost virtually all of the prestige and glory that it's eponymous founder had won. Far from being the lone state that stood against Ottoman aggression in the 19th century, Egypt had been twisted and maimed into a parody of Western monarchies. Abandoning all pretenses of sovereignty in the 1920s, Egypt became little more than a battleground for a British-backed King to spar with milquetoast liberal nationalists, all the while the Egyptian economy continued to be dominated by landlords (foreign and domestic) who kept the Egyptian economy based on cotton production with highly unequal wealth distribution. This is not to speak to the protectorate status that Egypt was in, as its foreign policy became essentially dictated by the Foreign Secretary in London. Even more abominable, Egypt had fundamentally failed in protecting the territorial integrity of Palestine, as the expulsion of Arab Palestinians and subsequent division of Palestine between Jordan and Israel were seen as the single greatest failure of Egyptian foreign policy since the Anglo-Egyptian War of 1882.

Mostafa el-Nahas had come to power within the Wafd Party through a mixture of bribes, scheming, and proto-populism. He and his wife were known for their incredible corruption within Egyptian political circles, and he himself was especially unsuited to the overly aristocratic social norms of Egyptian politics in 1950. Yet despite this, the Wafd had won an overwhelming majority in the Egyptian Parliament earlier in the year, securing a commanding majority and mandate for el-Nahas to use in his fight against the King.

A note on Farouk. By 1950, the young, handsome, and charismatic King that was coronated in the 1930s was long gone, replaced by an obese monarch who spent more money than the Kingdom had in its coffers. He lived in so much luxury and grandeur that by 1950, he was one of the world's richest men. Yet it was all for naught, as the Egyptian people starved while Farouk lounged with his harem of actresses and Albanians. Instead of growing food, the Egyptian landlord class grew cotton. Instead of feeding his people, the King fed his menagerie of tigers and lions. In response to the growing inequality and corruption of the Egyptian elite, Egyptian society began to coalesce around the Wafd, who had long been pillars of Egyptian nationalism, and the growing Muslim Brotherhood. Despite Hassan al-Banna's assassination in 1950, the Ikhwan al-Muslimun only continued to grow in popularity, spurred by the alleged occupation of Palestine by Israel and the corruption of the unIslamic King. Yet the Muslim Brotherhood continued to be harshly persecuted by the monarchy, who saw the Brotherhood as the main opposition to the monarchy within Egypt.

While this public battle between Wafd, the Monarchy, and the Muslim Brotherhood raged, a clique of young officers within the Royal Egyptian Army began to coalesce. Lead internally by the young hero of the Palestine War, Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, these officers despised the Egyptian elite, the British, Israel, and imperialism. Unwilling to accept further humiliation, Nasser and his allies, chief among them Mohammad Naguib, Anwar Sadat, Abdel Hakim Amer, and Zakaria Mohieddin, formed the Free Officers Movement. The plan was simple. Restore dignity to Egypt, through whatever means. A Modern Kingdom, like the Egypt of old, would be born anew.

 

[Weygand]

The Grand Old Party
​

The spirit of 1945 had swept the Labour Party to a landslide electoral victory - in no uncertain terms, a landslide toppled the monumental figure of Churchill and the Conservative Party from power after two decades controlling the highest office in the land. In their place was a modest but ambitious man - risen to the leadership of the Labour Party by a fluke of chance: Clement Attlee.

In the furnace of the Second World War, the British economy had been decimated: already saddled with prodigious debt by the previous conflict, an overreliance on American finance was compounded by a supply chain crisis, Imperial disintegration and a balance sheet that was submerged in the red. Upon coming to power, Attlee - ever the driven social democrat - was told he would have to shelve the Labour Party's 'New Jerusalem' interventionist economic agenda, and instead pursue vicious cuts to steady the ship.

But Attlee was not deterred: his was a precarious balancing act, as a man positioned near evenly between the Trade Unionist right and the parliamentary left of the Labour Party. He lacked the political capital or warm royal relations of a man like Ramsay MacDonald, who had also abandoned his economic commitments in wake of a financial crisis. Instead, Attlee resolved, he would implement his agenda: on borrowed time, and borrowed capital. The common precept of foreign debt proved true when Attlee's Foreign Secretary, that hegemon of the Labour Right, Ernest Bevin, went to Washington with the economist John Maynard Keynes: "If you owe the bank $100 that's your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem."

American capital formed a solid hedge against the tumbling budget. However, it came with predictable preconditions: among them, that the pound sterling would be made convertible to the American dollar by 1947. That deadline became a ticking bomb under the Labour government's feet: and many on the left, such as Health Minister Nye Bevan, resented becoming wage slaves to capitalist America. However, these criticisms were muted when Attlee set about implementing an agenda he could now afford.

Sweeping nationalisations of coal and steel, the tearing down of the draconian Poor Law system and the establishment of a proper welfare state, the establishment of new towns and the beginnings of a construction boom in social housing were all among his principle achievements. His proudest, and perhaps his most enduring, however, was the establishment of the National Health Service: the brainchild of Bevan, its trust system was incorporated across the country, and everything from dental to end of life care was brought under the state at the point of use.

All of this was compounded by a contentious foreign policy. The appointment of Bevin already signified Attlee's continuing commitment to wartime Conservative loyalty to the so-called 'special relationship': under American pressure, and seeking to alleviate the massive economic burden of Empire, he began an extensive programme of decolonisation which dissolved the British mandates in Palestine and Jordan, partitioned and granted independence to India and Burma, as well as beginning the process of disentangling Britain from the Far East generally outside of a crisis in Malay. Increasingly, this also manifested as Anti-Communism: Attlee supported the nationalists against the communists in Greece, and extended sanctions onto North Korea. Attlee abandoned his own personal sentiments toward maintaining warm relations with the Soviets under Bevin's urging: becoming a key founder of NATO, and having suppressed a Communist-led dock strike in London in 1949 with the use of the armed forces.

Perhaps most unspeakable of Attlee's commitments were the establishment of the British nuclear programme. Kept as a strict secret from the rest of the cabinet, sizeable expenditures were disguised in order to emulate the American bomb: tests had yielded promising results by 1950, but nobody was yet confident in 'going public' with the bomb. Indeed, it was possible Attlee himself sensed that doing so would begin to make the hairline fractures between his right and left become all-consuming gulfs, and plunge Labour - along with his leadership - into a crisis it could ill afford.

Amidst all of this success, Britain remained a landscape of contrasts: rationing persisted past 1945 and into the 50s, and even as the apparatus of support sprung up around them, currency crises resulting from the American loan, along with an additional balance of payments crisis in 1949, led to a devaluation of the pound which hung like an albatross along the government's neck. Labour still triumphed in the election of 1950, but its majority was reduced to an impossibly thin 5 seats: worse, many of Attlee's ministers, men who had served extensively through the wartime coalition government with Churchill and into the crisis-riddled post-war years, were beginning to suffer collapses of their health.

Teetering like a tightrope artist from crisis to crisis, the improbable Mr. Attlee remained at the helm of the British state by the skin of his teeth: never a dynamic man, the softly-spoken Prime Minister would have to find some way to set his house in order if there was to be any rallying of his political fortunes.

 

[99KingHigh]

The Ecstasy and Failure of Reform

​

The most radical tradition in France is that of perennial disappointment. Bourbon ultras gave way not to Jacobinism but to the doctrinaire haute-bourgeoisie; the démoc-socs of 48 found themselves mutilated by the electoral force of peasant Bonapartism; les communards were trampled down by Thiers, who heralded the conservative republic; the aspirations for the Popular Front disappointed by parliamentary arithmetic. Already by 1950 the mythology of the extreme Left had added to Blum's impotence in the 1930s another fixture to their venerable list of "missed opportunities." This time it was Thorez and the Communists who evoked high exasperation. Surely in the ecstatic condition of Liberation the working class had been ready to assume power, only to be once again denied such a revolutionary consummation by the excessive etiquette of their leaders. In fact between 1945 and 1947 a true reconfiguration had been accomplished, the contours of the state and the market subjected to such a radical transformation that De Gaulle slipped into the Vicheyite rhetoric of "reorganization" to divert from its revolutionary implications. Still, the dismay of the revolutionaries was not without its causes, for even in advancing the new social regime the left-wing parties hesitated from proletariat millennialism and instead took great pains to stress the practical limitations of what could be achieved. The main program, advanced initially by executive ordinance of the provisional conseil national de la résistance (CNR) and then by the unicameral constituent assembly of October 1945, owed much to the influence of the CGT's social plan of the 1930s and the propitiation of a new economic regime by the Socialists and the Christian democrats. Here the absence of the Communists was at first conspicuous, for on the whole they abhorred such accommodation with the 'bourgeois state,' relenting only when they discovered nationalization was a popular weapon to bludgeon the collaborating elements of high industry. On the whole, however, the Socialists and the CGT occupied the vanguard of the reformist wedge, flanked by the Communists and the Christian democrats of the mouvement républicain populaire (MRP). The program thrived by the absence of yet-formulated representative institutions, thereby skirting the very obstructions that had damned the Popular Front's policy to the dustheap of senatorial conservatism.

In proclaiming its intentions, the charter of the liberators called for nothing less than the "establishment of a true economic and social democracy." At a bustling pace the politicians moved to seize the commanding heights. The first state-owned coalfields were organized in December 1944 with the trade unions allotted a third of the seats on the consultative committee, while the rest were placed under state direction by an unopposed vote of April 1946. Despite the exertions of hard-core conservatives the banks endured a similar fate in December 1945—the Banque de France and the four largest clearing banks, the Credit Lyonnaise, the Societe Generale, the Comptoir National d'Escompte, and the Banque Nationale pour le Commerce et l'Industrie were subjected to a compensated nationalization. Few such voices were exercised in defense of Louis Renault's industrial empire, which had supplied the Germans with armored and other vehicles, and accordingly fell under state management without compensation. Wartime state control of the air industries was established on a permanent basis with the assumption of SNECMA, Air France, and Air Bleau in the summer of 1945, which added to the state's transportive role following its acquisition of the merchant shipping fleet in December 1944. Trade-union pressure augmented this étatist flavor by insisting on the municipalization of the Paris metro system (RATP). Elsewhere the radicals were held at bay. The legislators voted against an assumption of the insurance companies in April 1945, and thwarted a combined attempt from the Left to nationalize the two leading merchant banks, the Banque de Paris and the Banque de l'Union Parisienne. Adjacent to the offensive of public ownership, the establishment of the social and health security system constituted the second thrust of the reorganization program. Most sections of the population were brought under state-coverage by May 1946, depriving only a moderate demographic of non-salaried persons of the benefit. Far more contentious was the matter of control. While the MRP and the industrialists clamored against them, the Left delegated jurisdiction over the social security funds to the elected representatives of the trade unions. To avenge this proletarian complexion, the MRP succeeded in withholding control over the prized family allowance and the unemployment benefit from the trade-union caisses. Employers therefore took some satisfaction in their acknowledgement that unemployment benefits would not be at the discretion of the trade-unions in a dispute over strike pay. Victories for capital followed on the question of employee participation in the economy. An ordinance of February 1945 had established committees in all firms employing over a hundred workers, meeting twice a month on topics of welfare, working conditions, and firm accounts. Nevertheless these were relegated to a consultative role, and many firms succeeded in ignoring their impressions, thereby draining the substance from the CNR charter's claim to include "workers in the ordering of the economy."

​

Anchoring these extraordinary advances was the provisional conviviality of the Resistance parties. On the whole the Communists (PCF) were well behaved. With his gaze fixed on Germany and Eastern Europe Stalin had no desire to provoke unnecessary hostility by inciting Communist take-overs in the West. A resort to a seizure of power was never seriously considered by the PCF, despite exasperated claims to the contrary from true-believers that a golden opportunity had slipped. Instead the Communists ran successfully on their war record without recourse to instigating quarrels with the Socialists, and held it preferable to infiltrate the administrative apparatus under the ministries delegated to their power. Where it was profitable for them to drive wedges between the Socialists and the MRP, the Communists resurrected the clerical and constitutional issues at hand. Any prospect of unification with the Socialists, however, died with the martyrdom of Eastern Europe, and the hero Blum made clear to his colleagues that no unified "workers party" would be forthcoming. The Socialists nevertheless exalted interparty cooperation and heartily espoused the Resistance idealism which defined the reform programme. Still there was suspicion in abundance, not least of the MRP. Though Christian, progressive, and statist, the left-wing leadership of the MRP attracted the Right to its ranks as the "least offensive" of the Resistance parties. Such an influx inevitably induced tension between the pluralist leadership and their new conservative adherents, who prized above all else the defense of the Church and the sanctity of private enterprise. With the emergence of 'true' conservative parties after 1946, the leadership shifted rightward in pursuit of consolidation. This was not enough for De Gaulle, who in due course charged the MRP leadership as "dangerously incapable," and produced the Gaullist RPF in 1947 to challenge their monopoly over the Right.

The constitutional dispute between the Communists and the General that engineered De Gaulle's departure from politics presaged the tripartiste waltz which was to become so characteristic of the Fourth Republic. Under the presumed threat of a cessation of American aid should the Communists occupy the premiership, the MRP and the Socialists drew together to sustain a Socialist chief minister, but on the question of constitutional design the combined Left engineered a unicameral legislature in April 1946. In turn, the French public made its own unease apparent and threw back the purported constitution for fear of Communist control over a single Assembly. Encouraged by this apparent repudiation, De Gaulle retorted with his own recommendations in a famous speech at Bayeux. Rene Capitant then established the Union Gaulliste to ensure such precepts were given a political force. For the trilaterals this intrusion was much resented, and the three parties rapidly closed ranks. In order to procure the establishment of a countervailing upper-house, the MRP abandoned its proposals for a strong executive. The final product, approved by the Assembly and then by popular referendum, bore a dispiriting resemblance to the old constitution of the Third Constitution. In due course the Senate resumed its traditional legislative conservatism, and the President his partial exercise of appropriate executive power. Then, in designing the electoral system, a matter of extra-constitutional consideration, the trilaterals reinforced their supremacy by a departemental average of proportional representation. As a consequence the most savage electoral battles were often disputed by those of the most similar disposition, and the Fourth Republic began to witness a violent jostling between Communists and Socialists for the working-class vote, and Gaullists and MRP for the Catholic electorate. Even in the constitutional arrangement of government there were dark portents in its procedures. While the constitution sought to afford the government sufficient powers to assert its majority, in fact changes of ministry occurred virtually every six months. When premiers failed to get legislation, or feared impending defeat, they conventionally chose to resign rather than risk a ritual humiliation in the National Assembly according to constitutional procedure. By this tactic a politician was performing a great service to his own longevity and future prospects, if at the exorbitant expense of regime instability.

​

The tenuous foundations of tripartism, already disturbed by the palpable enmity between the MRP and the Communists, broke open in May 1947. Prime Minister Paul Ramadier, remembered by the Communists as the only Socialist to vote against their expulsion in 1940, now felt the pressure to placate the Americans. When Blum had visited Washington in May 1946 he was received by hints that greater largesse might be dispensed to France if the Communists were excluded from the ministry. The costs of irritating Stalin had precipitously evaporated as well. Soviet support for French claims to the Sarre had been abandoned after the Four Powers Conference, and Moscow was already fuming with resentment over the Anglo-French alliance treaty of 4 March 1947. When the PCF performed a volte-face and declared support for an ongoing strike against the Socialists' austere incomes policy, Ramadier staged his motion as a matter of confidence. The Communists duly opposed the motion, including the PCF ministers, and were ejected from the cabinet. The enduring significance of the maneuver was then a matter of pure speculation and few conjectured that Tripartism had come to its definitive conclusion. Certainly the PCF believed that the eventual fall of Ramadier would produce their return in whatever cabinet succeeded him. Regardless of Washington's involvement, the happy result was the Marshall Plan, announced in June 1947, of which 20 percent was earmarked for the Fourth Republic. The PCF could thus lament they were wading into political exile under the aegis of Marshall Aid. Ramadier himself was not long for power, and in November 1947 he resigned after a blistering attack from Guy Mollet and his associate Socialists.

De Gaulle's response to the paralytic infighting of the trilaterals was to hasten the creation of a new Gaullist party, rassemblement du peuple francaise (RPF). In the Assembly, however, they struggled to attract members, for both the MRP and the Socialists had prohibited their deputies from joining the Gaullist "intergroup." This left to the new Gaullist faction a dispiriting mixture of conservatives, miscellaneous Radicals, and irritated MRP back-benchers. If lacking in organic parliamentary sympathy, the RPF showed itself capable enough of rallying mass support. It scored impressive gains in the 1947 municipal election and marshaled over 38 percent of the vote. Somewhat embarrassed by the influx of ex-Vichyites, the RPF nevertheless managed to procure supreme dividends from its resolute anti-communism, and by the end of 1947 it was suggested that the Gaullists had amassed a million active adherents. Still, opposition was forceful. The Left reacted with unanimous fury to a speech by De Gaulle in October 1947 that seemed to elicit all the memories of fascism. Worse yet, there were still many years before the next election. De Gaulle's calculation that general discontent would eventually force a dissolution compelled his parliamentary supporters to join in an unholy dissolutionary alliance with the Communists, producing repeated and inflexible voting against incumbent governments. These attempts all faltered, and in the absence of an electoral reprieve the Gaullist movement began to wither. But if the Gaullists were ill-suited to the moment, the two-legged stool of Tripartism found itself similarly imperiled. The MRP and the Socialists were 65 seats short of an absolute majority with only the Radicals and independent conservatives as prospective supplements. The mathematics of such a reliance on the 'center force' in defense of the constitutional status quo ensured that it was now the Socialists' turn to be deprived of executive authority. Although they held an average of five portfolios in each succeeding cabinet, the Socialists had to give way to the MRP and the Radicals in the premiership. The collective energy of the Socialists now slipped into lengthy rearguard actions in an uncongenial attempt to arrest a rightward government shift. With the PCF in resolute opposition, all hopes for further social legislation vanished.

The prospects for rapprochement between the Socialists and the Communists entered terminal decline. Facing an unrelenting tide of criticism for its Soviet allegiance, the Communists were acutely embarrassed by the Prague coup, Tito's condemnation, the Rajk affair in Hungary, the Kostov affair in Bulgaria, and the attack on Gumulka in Poland. All of these flashpoints made ridicule of the PCF's claims that Communism was a liberating force. Even in the CGT, where Communist influence was potent, foreboding concern from the leadership and the rank-and-file mounted around the PCF's escalating attacks on the Socialists and working-class "solidarity." They were not enough to prevent a blistering CGT/PCF-supported strike action in November 1947 when Ramadier abolished the coal subsidy in an abrupt display of financial orthodoxy. When the industrial action veered into violence, the CGT retreated and called off the strike, while the new government under the MRP's Robert Schuman prepared stern penalties for militant picketing after a violent debate that featured physical altercations within the legislative chamber. The exasperated Socialists made their own response by seceding from the CGT under the banner of a splinter organization, Force Ouvrière. Despite the obviousness of their defeat, the Communists and the CGT continued to foment industrial unrest through the following year that only poisoned their reputation among the industrial class, and particularly the miners, who egregiously suffered from the action. Vicious tests of loyalty proceeded apace, not least when David Rousset denounced Soviet labor camps to the severe chagrin, and indeed the explicit denial, of the PCF.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t__FpDDWGRM​

The odious performance of the Communists did little to mollify the alliance between the Socialists and the MRP. In the summer of 1948 the MRP attempted to outmaneuver the Gaullists by advancing financial support to educate needy students (controversially including the private schools) amid a stinging period of high inflation, which in turn drew contempt from the Socialist ministers already uneasy with the MRP's emphasis on financial orthodoxy. Schuman's ministry collapsed, technically over military spending, but with the rift of the education decree at the heart of the dissension. The division highlighted the widening split between the MRP's progressive wing, desperate to maintain amicable terms with the Socialists, and the influx of MRP conservatives around Georges-Augustin Bidault. By 1949 the latter was already imploring MRP sympathizers to find common ground with the Gaullists, but on the whole the party mass remained apathetic to such a combination. On colonial issues, as well, the MRP felt the pangs of division. Many MRP backbenchers were anxious to emulate the Socialist preference for conciliation in North Africa and Indochina against the hardline colonial ministers, Coste-Floret and Letourneau. Even so, the MRP demonstrated a remarkable capacity for self-adhesion, and it was this internal cohesion that the Socialists deplored when they criticized the government for its perpetual conservatism. Indeed the new tenor of power lurched ever right-ward.

Under the ministry of the Radical, Andre Marie (July-August 1948), conservative financial interests successfully buried the proactivity of further state intervention. Though destroyed by the Socialists, it was replaced by another Radical conservative of the Third Republic, Henri Queueille, who did neither hesitate to restore the Senate to its traditional appellation and power nor to resist strike action with police power. Queueille gave to the Republic a brief respite of permanence, reversing a particularly serious period wage-price spirals with a "housekeeping budget" of cuts and adroitly navigated the concerns of the dirigistes and free-marketers. As prices stabilized, Queueille was able to unfreeze the price of several common goods, including milk and textiles, and thereby diminish the black market that had long afflicted the war-time regime of price control. With the right-wing Maurice Petsche in the finance ministry, exchange control was next abolished (and devaluation thus achieved), state-investment was restricted to the banks and Marshall Aid, and protection for unproductive sectors abolished so as to resume competitive mechanisms. But even this lull of tranquility was bound to be noticed, and in October 1949 the Socialists turned him out on a higher demand for wages and collective wage-bargaining. Queueille's successor, after a wrenching and demoralizing process of selection, was none other than Bidault. Here again the Socialists protested, walking out of the ministry on 7 February 1950 when the ministers pushed through a free collective-bargaining law. The system of political self-mutilation, despite the momentary prosperity, seemed to invite only further instability for the diseased Fourth Republic. In a vacuum of international tranquility, such a blight may have been permanently weathered. But elsewhere in the empire the cracks were beginning to widen…

 

[Shynka]

​

Battle of Ongjin

At 4am, June 25th, the North Koreans unleashed their war on the Ongjin axis. The peninsula, cut off from the mainland of South Korea, was in a perilous position. Despite some suspicions among South Korean forward observers, the Northern Attack on the 25th had achieved an element of surprise which dazzled and stunned the South Korean 17th Independent Regiment of the ROK tasked with defending the peninsula.

Like in other areas of the front, the North Koreans prepared the battlefield with fierce and concentrated artillery fire, unleashing salvo after salvo of various calibres at known and suspected enemy emplacements and key communication junctions. The South Koreans, possessing only the 7th artillery battalion, were unable to retaliate in kind, and had no choice but to sit out the initial barrage for thirty minutes, as columns of North Korean tanks of the 6th division, 14th regiment, and 3rd Guards Brigade left their camouflaged jumping off positions and struck a fierce blow at midnight.

The Korean 17th, outnumbered, shell shocked and caught by surprise, reeled backwards, their anti-tank weapons largely ineffective against the Northern columns of armour. The battlefield was further complicated by damage done to communication links, and by the damage done to key ROK personnel; commander of the 1st Battalion, Major Kim Hee-tae, was killed early in the fighting, as were many other staff positions of the 17th. As the 25th of June progressed, direct fire from North Korean units that had managed to penetrate deep behind the lines also had a heavy toll on ROK logistics.

The situation looked dire. North Korean artillery was able to saturate defensive positions with near impunity, and their advantage in both manpower and equipment was impossible to overcome by patriotic zeal alone. The situation was further complicated by confused orders from a similarly shelled Seoul that stated that the defenders should now try and hold the peninsula, which ran contrary to the pre-war directive as outlined under 'Operation 3' of the instructions issued by the headquarters. This mismatch was likely the result of a lack of knowledge in the Capital as to the status of the fighting, as well as perhaps wishful thinking from key ROK commanders.

The North Koreans continued pushing, sensing that victory was close. Fast moving North Korean troops won victories at the Taetan approach and at Yangwon and Gangnyeong, mostly by threatening the flanks of the outnumbered South Koreans and forcing withdrawals. The South Korean forces that were earlier defeated on the Teaetan-Ongjin approach were multiple times threatened with being completely overran but managed to rally by the evening of the 25th, putting up a stiff resistance and enabling other units to reorganize briefly. The night of the 25th to 26th was not an easy one; the South Korean 7th artillery battalion, initially suppressed and forced to fall back, had managed to send some ordnance back towards the invader, but the balance was still heavily skewed towards the North Koreans. With an absence of any communication link to Seoul, a decision was made at 1am on the 26th of June to completely withdraw the forces from the Ongjin via the sea. With the 2nd battalion covering the withdrawal with a brief counterattack, the 7th artillery battalion and all remaining parts of the 17th regiment withdrew to the ports of Bupo and Sagot and began boarding ships. The withdrawal was largely completed by 8am in the morning.

Overall, the 17th put up a valiant, if brief, fight. Due to the decision to try and hold the peninsula and the confusion as communications broke down with Seoul, the formations of the 17th were heavily bruised but managed to escape being entirely swallowed by the heaving mass of North Korean armour. One third of all heavy equipment had to be abandoned, and 20 percent of the regiment's men were left on Ongjin, either wounded, missing, or killed.

Push to Seoul

The aims of the invading North Korean forces were clear; dash to Seoul, using the momentum of their tanks to brush aside any opposition, capture the city, and decapitate the Southern government. These plans, as ambitious as they were, were well supported – the North had local absolute superiority in artillery, manpower, and most crucially, mechanized assets. This allowed the North to open the war up with a thunderous artillery barrage that shook the city of Seoul itself, before pushing across resistance at Kaesong, crossing the Imjin River with near impunity and racing towards Seoul.

The South, expectedly, was deeply shaken by the scale of the invasion and the tenacity of their adversary. Initially the situation looked bleak, as the night sky rained with missiles and shells that in many cases severed key communication links. Despite paying a heavy price in some localities and being briefly held up at Kaesong, North Korean units had already penetrated three to five kilometres into Southern territory as dawn broke, their tank columns passing villages and settlements torn apart by vicious artillery barrages. Overhead, Soviet made aircraft made first attack runs against Seoul, their bombing runs enabled by the clear weather but hampered by black out conditions quickly put in place by the Southern government and by the smoke and dust kicked up in the daylight. Nevertheless, the sound of attack runs, and the dull thrum of aircraft engines had an outsized effect on the morale of both citizens and soldiers, as the roads around Seoul rapidly filled with a flood of refugees, injured soldiers and vehicles making their way further south.

Much like at Ongjin, initial setbacks did not deter the South from putting up stiff resistance. Commanders on the ground re-established communication by either pre-emplaced field telephone lines or, in many cases, human messengers. A total of three divisions were to form the initial bulkhead of resistance against the North Korean torrent: the 1st, 2nd, and Capital Divisions. This force, despite heavy shelling, was in good spirits, and was instructed to attempt and hold the capital at all costs. Holding the enemy at the Kaesong or the Imjin was abandoned as a strategy, and instead, a number of defence in depth positions were hastily prepared north of Seoul, with the idea that the remnant of the force protecting the capital (the 3rd and 8th divisions as well as the Marine Regiment) could rotate and fend off attacks where needed.

The plan worked well initially and provided several local victories or stalemates, but like in other sectors, the South Koreans found themselves rapidly bogged down by an enemy superior in equipment and numbers. Threatened by being outflanked and constantly under intense barrage, the South Koreans had to commit the 8th and the Marines earlier than expected, and soon later, remnants of the 17th Regiment that arrived from Ongjin. On the 26th and 27th, the idea of holding the enemy at bay was completely untenable due to very high losses, and a fighting retreat towards the city was ordered. The Korean People's Army 1st Corps continued their relentless drive south, now increasingly relying on both artillery barrage and aerial bombing to destroy defensive positions as the Northern logistical train struggled to support the large number of tanks. By the morning of the 28th, first Northern units had reorganized after their dash south and entered the periphery of the city, pushing the exhausted defenders back steadily and pinning many of them against the Han River. The KPA could have perhaps at this moment crushed the ROK decisively, but it suffered its own deficiencies, primarily in its communications, with each Northern division acting increasingly independently due to both communication failures and the disconnect between the army command and the chaotic situation on the ground.

The battle on the Han was a key moment for the South Koreans. With Rhee and his government still lingering in the city, it became clear that the army had to achieve the somewhat conflicting goals of not letting the North pass the river, while at the same time preserving their own forces and not allowing for any of them to be cut off. A decision was made on the afternoon of the 28th to blow the bridges across the river and then evacuate whatever units possible via watercraft, but this, minutes later, was counter commanded by the HQ, which wished to preserve as many fighting troops as possible. The 3rd division of the ROK was finally committed to the fighting, winning just enough time for both the other troops present and the government to flee, in many cases driving rapidly past enormous columns of refugees. In many cases, the army had to in fact temporarily clear the bridges of civilians to evacuate key military assets, leading to an unsurmountable number of casualties as the North shelled the remaining crowded bridgeheads. On the 29th, the North Koreans celebrated the seizure of the city, their tanks, trucks, and jubilant troops moving across largely intact bridges, streaming past columns of destroyed civilian vehicles and rows of bodies not captured by the cameras of the victor.

Despite the fall of the city, it was clear that the war would continue. Rhee had stayed in the city until the last possible moment, his presence somewhat rallying the defenders and those South Koreans listening in what parts of the country remained in his grasp. The ROK, despite being heavily bruised, also survived. Leaving the Hangang bridge intact allowed the South Koreans to evacuate nearly all of their formations from the city, but at the same time gave the North Koreans a better line of supply to push the fight further South.

The war was not kind on the civilian population. The enormous scale of bombardment and its indiscriminate nature left settlements in ruins. As South Korean units retreated and dug lines of defence through villages and the neighbourhoods of Seoul, shells fell freely among civilians. Hundreds of thousands that attempted to flee were brushed aside from the roads, either by fleeing ROK units, or by the advancing spearheads of the North, which could not afford any delays to its plans. Both accidental and calculated roadside massacres of refugee columns were common, and the intense fighting at night also lead to any incident of misidentification have deadly consequences. The city of Seoul itself suffered greatly. Hit by a barrage of Northern munitions for 4 days straight, it was then immediately counter-shelled by the retreating ROK. Entire blocks were levelled by heavy weaponry, and street to street fighting on the 29th was often augmented by the use of flamethrowers and incendiary munitions. The terror of war saw both civilians die and large numbers of ROK troops desert, many of them convinced that the fight was unwinnable.

 

[Etranger]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 82

​

The Security Council,

Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government having effective control and jurisdiction over that Part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission, and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

Mindful of the concern expressed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 and 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 about the consequences which might follow unless Member States refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about the complete independence and unity of Korea; and the concern expressed that the situation described by the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military conflict there,

Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace; and

I​

Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;

Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;

II​

Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:
(a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
(b) To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel;
(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution:

III​

Calls upon all Member States to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

 

[Noco]

AN UNPRINCIPLED ADVENTURER
- The Rise of Hadji Ali Razmara Amidst the Oil Crisis - ​

In Tehran, violence was in the air and in the streets. Political turmoil was present across the Iranian nation, but it was in the capital, the seat of the Majiles and the Shah and much of the vocal malcontents that the greatest tension held. The National Movement was a generational struggle, but into the 1930s, 1940s, and now into 1950, a fever point had been reached, to the sound of street demonstrations and political assassinations.

Iran had suffered much from its ancient glories - insults and injury and invasion - but the gripping crisis now seemed explosive. And naturally its propellant was oil.

The British exploitation of Iranian oil had, since its inception, been a sore point for nationalists. Efforts had been made as early as the 1920s to renegotiate the oil concession, but time and time again, the British proved triumphant. And the Shah bore the blame as well, the Royal Government increasingly the target of nationalist attack. These attacks troubled Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as well as the Western Powers, as such sentiments were echoed across the imperialized globe.

For this reason, Britain offered slightly capitulation in 1949 with the Supplemental Oil Agreement. The new terms guaranteed a minimum of four-million British pounds as royalty payments to Iran; nationalists countered that estimated royalties would never realistically dip below that number. Assurances were made to limit the drilling area promised by past agreements; those areas still remaining under the Supplemental Agreement still comprised the entirety of productive oil deposits. And lastly, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company pledged to increase the training and employment of native Iranian workers; this was undercut by the Company history of discrimination against local workers.

Altogether, the situation established suggested a clear divide between both sides. What the British offered was firmly denied by a growing coalition of nationalist leaders: Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani, Mozaffar Baqa'i, and Khalil Maleki to name the notables. And what the nationalists desired greatly perturbed the West.

In this environment, an ambitious officer arose. Hadji Ali Razmara had made a firm impression on Reza Shah during the Anglo-Soviet invasion in 1941 as a brave military-thinker, a scholar and serious character. Soonafter Razmara became one of the youngest generals and held the chair of the Chief Joints of Staff three times by 1950. In some ways, he quite resembled the meterioc rise of Reza Shah himself, a fact which deeply concerned Mohammad Reza.

More concerning than his military career, however, was the increasingly open ambition of the young officer. Having purposefully curated inroads into Iranian journalism, Razmara boasted friends in key positions in public opinion. And he intentionally utilized these contacts, selectively leaking information to stifle rivals and promote his planned political journey. One such ally was Bahram Sharogh, a radio celebrity in Tehran who had at one point been a major promoter of Nazi ideology; in time, and with Razmara's encouragement, Sharogh's broadcasts turned slavishly in favor of the British Empire.

For these reasons it was perhaps why the British and Americans deeply mistrusted Razmara. Various diplomats had until 1950, characterized Razmara as an "unprincipled adventurer", "a great intriguer", and indeed a possible Soviet agitator. The lattermost rumor was by and large the most burdensome on Razmara's reputation, most especially in light of his clear goal to obtain the post of Prime Minister. The Shah and his Western backers would never risk a Red Iran.

Yet despite all this, Razmara was increasingly seen as the best hope for Western interests. Razmara knew this, having cultivated the image himself, and into 1950 had begun meeting in secret with both the British and American ambassadors. On June 10, Razmara conducted multiple meetings, throughout which he laid bare his desire for national power, even if it took compromise or even conspiracy. In short, Razmara promised the moderate terms of the Supplemental Oil Agreement and a foreign policy in support of the West and against provocation. And in supposed goodwill, he offered his immediate resignation from military matters once confirmed as prime minister.

In return, Razama sought a handful of concessions. Firstly, that an arrangement be made to provide revised royalty payments for six months, a time period Razmara insinuated would see his necessary reordering of Iran. Secondly, that he be loaned one-hundred million U.S. dollars for the purpose of financing his government. And lastly, that the British use their influence upon the Shah to shore up the Razmara Ministry, dissuading further agitation from the nationalist wings.

Ultimately supportive, the West needed only the Shah's word to empower their newest pawn. Mohammad Reza was reluctant to approve Razmara, a man who had not only conspired with foreign powers, but was in an affair with his sister and a threat to royal authority. Openly, the Shah declared "I will never agree to General Razmara becoming Prime Minister."

Weeks later, however, the Shah did just that.

On June 26, Hadji Ali Razmara became Prime Minister of Iran. The British regarded him as "happy as a schoolboy," and perhaps bore new optimism for the Iranian future. But in Iran itself, Razmara's appointment only inflamed the National Movement. The coming years would prove pivotal to the geopolitical arc of the Iranian state.

 

[Shynka]

​

The downtown of Cairo was picturesque imported modernity. The streets were filled with a varied cornucopia of vehicles; old men pulled along in wooden carts by exhausted donkeys were overtaken by cars and limousines, the finest products of the west, aerodynamic metal exteriors scalding to the touch. Tramways cut through the middle, their bells chiming meekly in the hubbub of the street, their freshly painted bulky frames cutting through the ever-present crowds that spilled onto the road. The June air of Egypt's busy capital brimmed with heat, absorbed readily and hungrily by the tall concrete monoliths on each side of the street. People hung out of the windows, passing time by observing the flow of a molasses-like crowd, yelling into the street and to each other. Vendors and their stalls, wherever still legal, formed islands among the crowd, doing their best to be recognized, to stand out, their voices hoarse from shouting into the passing and ignorant wave.

A black limousine, sleek yet imposing, cut through the crowd, one of the many trying to make its way without collision. It's windows were down, and its occupants looked anxious, just like those of any other car caught in this heat and traffic. The driver wore sunglasses, thinly rimmed with gold, sweat rolling down his face as he creeped the vehicle forward, inch by inch. The three passengers wore trendy European suits, not made for this weather, but very much in line with the status imposed by their vehicle. The car got midway through the street, before suddenly and sharply turning right, its front now pointing at the seven story Al-Demerdachiyya, perpendicular to the crowd. Outrage followed among the crowd, but the passengers were unmoved, and the people had no choice but to circle around, leaving a small unfilled gap of clear asphalt to the car's left side. No one dared say anything or take any action, the occupants of the car very clearly people of high status. A police officer, alerted to the noise, begun to make his way against the crowd, not letting his bias get in the way of doing his job.

The back doors of the car opened. Two people leapt out, their sudden hurry and purpose not at all blending in with the general mood of the heat battered street. One disappeared immediately into the crowd, heading towards the doors of a small but trendy restaurant a few paces from the car. The second ran towards the police officer, his hand in his pocket, eager to slow the angry officiant down. Money appeared and then disappeared, but the Police officer remained strong in his conviction, yelling, and gesturing angrily at the car. A few people stopped to watch but ultimately moved on, carried by the unbreakable torrent of the crowd. Minutes passed as the two men argued, the Police officer clearly too angry in the heat to even consider the bribe. The remaining passenger in the car leaned out of the window, cupped his hands around his mouth, and yelled. A faint crack broke its way through the noise of the street. Then another. And another, louder this time. Gunshots. The doors of the cinema slammed open, as the crowd, terrified, began to scatter, some of them going so far as leaping over the car, seeking the safety of the alleyways. Four more shots followed, this time sharper and clearer, clearly taking place in the street itself, as the Policeman, still confused, fell limply onto the asphalt. The black limousine began to move, picking up its last passenger, speeding up into the gap it created with its awkward positioning. A woman, covered in blood, emerged from the cinema, calling for help.

*** ​

On the evening of the 30th of June, the quiet CIA office located in a Cairo suburb received news that Said Ramadan, a key person of interest and possible friend to the agency, was gunned down while attending a meeting in the back room of a local eatery. His bodyguard, unable to get his gun out, was severely wounded. A police officer was also shot but miraculously survived. Despite his injuries, he was already eagerly providing testimony. The search for suspects started immediately; Said was brother-in-law to the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and had many enemies. People looked at both the monarchy and the Wafd, but the suspects list included also included a key and up and coming name: Gamal Nasser.

Despite the killing being ultimately successful, many of the details pointed to the bad nature of its planning; it took place in a crowded street with hundreds of witnesses, and the car just about managed to escape. As the crowds ahead of the murder turned back to see what the commotion was, instead of fleeing, they formed a block, and the limousine had to scrape its way through, at one point colliding with a fruit stand. In fact, a mere day after the act, the scratched limousine was found a mere kilometer away from the scene, its engine killed by the heat. While not stupid enough to leave anything obviously identifiable in the car, the assassins were greedy enough to come back to stake out the vehicle four days later. Despite their best attempts to remain inconspicuous, some of them could not resist wearing gold brimmed sunglasses, and as a result, both were quickly arrested by Officers told to watch the car while the Police figured out what to do with it.

A quick investigation, aided by enhanced methods of questioning, revealed that Nasser did in fact have nothing to do with the murder. In fact, early reports gathered by both the CIA and Egyptian authorities suggested that he was furious with the real perpetrator, who conducted the killing completely unsanctioned. The two caught assassins gave up their accomplices, and all four were quickly found guilty, the amount of evidence and witnesses overwhelming. Despite days of torture, not one of them named Nasser, and in fact, not one of them likely knew him. The Egyptian government, not wanting to cause any further violence and happy with the perpetrators presented, did not release the names of its remaining suspects and forbade the press from reporting anything else about the killing. The identity of the mastermind remained an open secret in Cairo high society – his only punishment for the botched operation was being seen as unapproachable by his former friends and allies. Despite the prospects of an arrest being nonexistent, the prospect of retaliation from the Muslim Brotherhood remained high, and Abdel Hakim Amer disappeared two weeks after the killing.

The assassination increased tensions in the capital dramatically. Despite his non-involvement and distancing himself from Abdel, Nasser's reputation was now tainted. His efforts to recruit more liberal members of the Egyptian officer's corps faltered, and many, fearing government persecution, cut off contact entirely despite an earlier expression of interest. At the same time, those opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, saw Nasser as a man capable of drastic decisions and action, and flocked to his banner. His acts even won him some support from figures previously aligned to the Wafd and the Monarchy, who saw the assassination (which, once again, he did not sanction nor want) as a just and necessary blow, and asked that it be expanded upon. The Brotherhood itself was now also beating the war drum, and previously neutral Islamist figures begun to take on an increasingly belligerent tone, seeing themselves as besieged from all sides.

The assassination helped accelerate an existing split in Egyptian society, one that Farouk was precariously positioned over. The Officers around Nasser were now raised to prominence, very much against their will, and the other feuding blocks saw them as a new force in the equation. The question remained whether the others were to court them or seek to put them down, lest they disturb the already teetering balance.

 

[XVG]

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1950

​

At the start of the new decade, the communist movement of Yugoslavia, the Communist Part (KPJ), was in a state of transformation. The rift that had broken between the two respective strongmen of their communist states, Tito and Stalin, was a fundamental accelerator in such a change. Yugoslavs aspired to create their own movement, their own path, their own communism, free of the imposed system of the states falling properly behind the Iron Curtain. While some of the changes have already occurred or are underway, the early 1950s are expected to fundamentally change the KPJ and effectively distinguish it from the communist movement of the Soviet bloc.

The Fifth Party Congress of 1948

The breakdown in relations between Belgrade and Moscow had happened over time, but had finally culminated in an open conflict following Stalin's letters and withdrawal of Soviet advisers in early 1948. The expulsion of the KPJ from Cominform finally occurred on the 28th of June 1948, following an outright Yugoslav refusal to attend the Bucharest meeting despite successive invitations. Soon afterwards from 21st to 28th of July, the KPJ held its Fifth Congress in Belgrade House of the Guard, the first such meeting after the culmination of the War. The main theme of the Congress was rallying support for the Yugoslav leadership resisting Cominform, so basically Stalin's influence, in the so called "Resolution of the Informbiro", the name derived from the attempted organ initiated by Stalin that had played the penultimate role in collapsing the Soviet-Yugoslav brotherhood.

While the aforementioned Resolution and the rally for "independence" while still pledging to avoid conflict could be considered the main item of the Congress, the KPJ also showed resilience in the face of Soviet pressure by adopting the updated Party Statute at the same meeting. Interestingly, it was largely a copy of the statute of the Soviet communists, perhaps due to the speed at which the final deterioration of relations had occurred. Thus, preparations were already at hand for a new Statute to already be adopted at the next Party Congress, anticipated to occur in a year or two. In addition to the resolutions, at the end of the 5th Congress, a new Central Committee consisting of 63 members, and a new Politburo consisting of 9 members, were elected.

The Changing Role of the Party

While the KPJ made sure to show strength following the 1948 events, it shouldn't be understated that a sort of crisis was plaguing it, not just political but also psychological. The Yugoslavs were stunned at first, not knowing what kind of path to take now that they were free to pursue one without being dictated from Moscow. By 1949 a new line had been formulated, fundamentally by Moša Pijade, Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj, emphasizing that the criticism of Soviet theories of methods wasn't just permitted but encourage. The trio, with the addition of Vladimir Bakarić started to work on a new economic policy of an independent Yugoslavia, the worker's self-management.

Thus, advertently or not, the whole concept of an infallible Marxism-Leninism and Party had been called into question when permitting criticism of the Soviets. The desire of an individual's unswerving faith in the Party, and an aspiration to control all sections of Yugoslav society were likewise rightfully questioned. Tito himself called the effects of the change the "spiritual demoralization" of the communists. In the fall of 1950 the Central Committee decided to eliminate material privileges related to rations and housing rights for KPJ members. While seemingly minor, the decision could be considered an important milestone in the transformation of the Yugoslav communist state. As described by an observing reporter, "A Communist state has abolished the line of demarcation separating the rulers from the people."

In 1950 the next steps of the KPJ were still shrouded in mystery, as reforms towards this "equalitarianism" were expected to occur slowly over time. What was sure was that there was no going back, no desire to embrace Stalin and his puppets. The Yugoslav people knew very well the perils of the threat of Moscow encroaching on their country, and like they had fought the tyrant of Berlin, they were ready to defend Yugoslavia's independence under the leadership of the KPJ. And the loyalty of the masses, that could only be won with reform. There was still confusion on whether the KPJ would aspire to retain its dictatorship simultaneously while "democracy" and "decentralization" had entered wider public debate. There were indeed hints that Tito and his colleagues wanted to develop the Yugoslav Socialism by popular support and participation rather than top down from the party office. However for the planned program of decentralization to succeed, both in economy and governance, the KPJ would have to keep the support and control of other organizations.

The People's Front, the Sindikat, and the Army

When the KPJ needed support from the masses, it could rely on the People's Front. While the KPJ in December of 1949 had 530,000 members, the People's Front in 1948 just after the split had more than seven million. The strength showed by KPJ in the People's Front was an irritant to some and in a struggle against Soviet attempts of undermining the independence of Yugoslavia, a mobilization of the broader masses and decentralization of support was needed. Thus, changes in the status of the People's Front were also to be expected. In the March 26th parliamentary elections of 1950, the People's Front, the sole organization to contest, received over 90 % of the vote. Some of the main components of the Front, after the KPJ, included the Antifascist Front of Women (AFŽ), the Croatian Peasant Party, the Social-Democratic Party, trade unions (JSRIN) and youth associations (USAOJ).

Another organ, more directly linked to the KPJ and even more under its thumb, was the Sindikat. A trade union with 1,7 million members, all its officials were members of the KPJ, cementing the control of the Workers' Councils keeping the Yugoslav industry running. The Sindikat also had roles in education and as an advisory to different levels of government. While being affiliated with the People's Front, the top of the Sindikat had straight contacts with the party, ensuring that despite of decentralization and possible delegation of power to the People's Front, the KPJ had a direct way of influencing the industry.

Tito likely wouldn't have been able to take such a stern course against the Soviet attempts of meddling in 1948 without the support of the Yugoslav Army, an organization that was battle-hardened and ideologically motivated following the costly and bloody struggle for independence against the German fascist occupiers. Tito even called the Army the "chief pillar of support of our peoples for preserving independence." While many of the officers had been trained in the Soviet Union, just a few were suspected of having actual sympathies towards Moscow. Nevertheless late 1940s had seen purges of possible Stalinist stooges especially in the Air Force. Army membership of the party in 1950 was evaluated to be somewhere around 100,000 to 140,000.

 

[99KingHigh]

A French Union?

​

A more unsuitable system of government could hardly have been found to meet the crisis of empire. And indeed there were crises in excess—in North Africa, in Indochina, in the Indian Ocean. The danger was all the more acute for a defeated power made hypersensitive by its sense of prestige. France could not yet conceive of abandoning her dependencies. Even on the Left, where proposals for colonial reconciliation occasionally filtrated, an independence program was regarded by suspicion, if not outright contempt. On the whole the political establishment might prefer to expand colonial assemblies and their representation in the Assembly. But even these conciliations were scarcely delivered, whether neutralized by the intrusions of colonial blancs or abandoned in the hectic shuffle of ministerial turnover. Where political measures failed, force inevitably followed. Colonial authorities filled the vacuum left by governmental impermanence by reverting to the default regime of repression and retrenchment. The colonial groups themselves, though represented in the National Assembly, comprised only 12 percent of the legislature's membership, and found themselves too divided by space and interest to formulate a coherent bloc.

Within the "French Union" itself there were obvious contrasts in the general direction of colonial policy. For Central and Western Africa the guiding program had been delineated in 1944 at the Brazzaville conference, which declared that "the object of civilizing work accomplished by France in these colonies excludes any idea of evolution out of the French empire." Here self-government was thought inappropriate for the indigenous. Consequently the reforming purview of colonial administrators remained restricted to improving the material condition of the natives. But elsewhere the French showed a greater proclivity for self-rule, if still defined by an imperious notion of supremacist French influence. Laos and Cambodia were granted nominal independence under the French Union in 1949 and similar hopes were entertained for neighboring Vietnam.

In contrast, North Africa presented an altogether less accommodating picture of French imperialism. This was in no small part due to the political hegemony of European settlers dispersed across the French Mediterranean. Algeria, the oldest of the North African colonies, boasted a permanent European presence of over a million settlers. Though only a ninth of the population, the Algerian blancs maintained control of one-third of the arable land, which they exploited expertly with modern farming techniques. For the indigenous this entailed severe unemployment and a paltry standard of living relative to their European compatriots. And yet the balance of forces was moving against the Europeans as demographics favored an ever enlarged Muslim population. Not only would this threaten Algeria's standard of living, but the political equilibrium as well. The day might come, should the promise of the franchise trickle down to the Algerians, that the dominant voice in French politics would become African. At first the authorities appeared willfully ignorant of such dangers. In March 1944 the first political concessions were given to the Algerian Muslims with the opening of civil service posts and the universalization of the suffrage for local assemblies, though their collective representation in these bodies was capped at 40 percent. Rather than elicit sympathy for French beneficence the political result was an alliance of nationalist parties under the moderate Ferhart Abbas and the radical Messali Hadj. When Hajd's party demonstrated on VE Day, clashes with the police spilled into a particularly savage bout of native violence against the settlers. Over a hundred blancs were murdered, often with unspeakable mutilations, and many more were raped. Outraged, the Europeans exacted a terrible vengeance. Over the next several days, Algerian villages were indiscriminately bombed and thousands subjected to impromptu lynchings. At least as many as six thousand were killed, and possibly over thirty thousand. Rather than subdue the Algerians the "Setif massacre" inundated the nationalists with fresh adherents and recruits, including many veterans of the world war.

The French response to the crisis of Algerian governance only emerged early in 1947 with the premiership of the Socialist, Ramadier. A new legislature of 120 members was established to preside over Algerian matters, but again the mechanisms were far from universal. Half of the elected seats went directly to French citizens and "deserving" Muslims (civil servants, graduates, veterans, etc), while the rest were elected by the 1.5 million Muslims then entitled to vote. But even this latter expression was twisted by vote-rigging, so much so that only seventeen of those 60 seats were allotted to nationalist critics in the first elections of April 1948. Such blatant coercion did very little to endear moderate Muslim opinion to French overrule. Neither did the results of the European electors display much room for compromise; most votes went to the intransigent Union Algerienne, then in coalition with the Gaullist RPF. With all national legislation directed at Algeria requiring a two-thirds majority for ratification in the Algerian legislature (a device successfully invented by colon deputies in 1947), the system ensured that any liberal measures passed by the National Assembly would be blocked by the Algiers assembly. Consequently several provisions passed in Paris, including full local rights for the communes mixtes (the assemblies), female suffrage, and educational/agricultural reforms were thwarted by the Algerian assembly and its sixty pro-French legislators. For the moment, reform in Algeria was dead on arrival.

Nearby, French policy in Tunisia and Morocco served principally to defend the imperial position in Algeria. Independence was considered appropriate only if close military and diplomatic cooperation could be preserved. Even so the colonial programs in these territories were highly conditioned by the political character of the senior administrators—while Algeria was Radical, Tunisia was largely Gaullist, and Morocco mostly Vichyite. In Tunisia, where French settlers numbered only 150,000 in a population of 3,000,000, the authorities generally recognized that neither Vichy nor the Algiers government had much to boast about in the quality of their administration. In May 1943 the government overthrew the Bey, Moncef, for showing excessive political independence from Algiers. Although his replacement was altogether more docile, the same could not be said of the freed Neo-Destour leader, Habib Bourguiba, who quickly became a focus for nationalist sentiment. Unlike other nationalist leaders, Bourguiba mobilized forces beyond the middle class and sought instead to incite the workers through a highly effective trade union strategy. In the international arena he showed himself abundantly capable—before the Arab League and the United Nations he thundered against French rule to great acclaim. In a rare demonstration of statesmanship the French foreign ministry under Robert Schumann inaugurated an optimistic period of negotiation beginning in 1949 with Bourguiba and the Bey. Schumann pressed eagerly for an "Indochinese solution" of independence within the French Union, only to arouse the bitterest resentments of the French settlers and right-wing sentiment in the Metropole.

As in Tunisia, the French presence in Morocco was similarly limited. Perhaps a quarter of a million Europeans lived in the country, representing no more than 3 percent of the population. But unlike Tunisia, new European interests were at hand. French business investments had poured into Morocco during the intense period of mainland nationalization in search of returns and fresh assets. In concert the colonial and commercial lobby warned French authorities that the nationalist faction, Istiqal, would be overcome by warlordism and ethnic dissension should the French attempt a strategy of "independence and union." Istiqal responded by amplifying its calls for the termination of the French protectorate, a stratagem that resulted in the detention of its leadership and the evaporation of a moderate course. The delicate status quo was further disturbed in April 1947 when the Sultan praised the Arab League. The official response was to force the recall of the liberal-minded Resident-Governor and the installation in his place of General Alphonse Juin, who repeatedly threatened the Sultan with deposition.

The crisis of the Maghreb did not go unnoticed by the politicians and intellectuals. Catholic opinion showed preliminary signs of division with the episcopate airing unease around the sustainability of the French position. The MRP mirrored these fissures with its left-wing urging reconciliation, while others stayed loyal to the leadership and its admittedly inept management of overseas governance. The Socialists showed a greater capacity for empirical distinction, insisting on independence for Tunisia (noted for its 'modern nationalism' and close links to the metropolitan Socialist trade union, Force Ouvriere), while acknowledging the obstacle of warlordism in Morocco. As for the Radicals—growing ever more powerful in the arithmetic of government following the expulsion of the Communists— the colonial lobby had in them a potent vehicle for preserving their African interests. Nevertheless, it was the absence of explicit Communism in the expressions of Maghreb nationalism that arrested the ideological potency of the French position. Elsewhere it was very different.

Indochina was preserved in French power by a series of accidents in the shambolic scramble of 1945. Roosevelt's death deprived the Viet Minh insurgents of an encouraging advocate, while the KMT was bribed into acquiescence by the surrender of French concessions in China. With British assistance, De Gaulle sent to Indochina his trusted colleague, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, a highly capable commander but an obdurate administrator. At first French opinion acknowledged the popular appeal of Ho Chi Minh, who by then had succeed in affecting a range of social reforms and demonstrated his support in a January 1946 election in North Vietnam. Parisian emissaries negotiated an initial agreement in March 1946 with Ho that envisioned nominal independence for Vietnam under the French Union. But this agreement, opposed by French commercial interests and the right-wing, faltered on d'Argenlieu's insistence that Cochin-China be excluded from the agreement. Instead, the Admiral established a pliant republican regime in the South with the express approval of the conservative Prime Minister, Georges Bidault. When the Viet Minh subsequently complained that French customs officials were operating in violation of the March agreement, Minh attempted to negotiate a fresh settlement with the new Socialist premier, Leon Blum. The premier was sympathetic to independence but his ministerial colleagues in the MRP and the Radical Party showed little such inclination, while the Socialists and the Communists held an ambiguous silence. The colonial authorities resolved to delay the conveyance of the telegram until the Viet Minh's intransigent faction, led by Giap, launched an attack on Hanoi. Blum was forced into the sordid position of insisting on a delay of negotiations until the restoration of order.

Beginning in 1947, the French military began to clear away resistance along the main towns and thoroughfares of Vietnam. Relative success in this operation blinded the French to the Viet Minh's power in the countryside. As a result colonial officials repeatedly refused Ho's attempts to procure a truce, even at the price of abandoning Giap. The French government followed by seeking a long-term solution in the figure of Bao Dai, who though abdicated, still maintained a following among anti-Viet Minh groups (the "National Union Front"). A far more astute figure than often credited, Bao Dai was well aware that his survival depended on extracting better terms from the French than the Viet Minh could hope to secure. To the chagrin of Ho and the colonial "die-hards," Bao Dai obtained from France a recognition of independence in return for Indo-Chinese adherence to the French Union and supplementary concessions to French interests in June 1948. Attempts to strengthen this credibility, however, were periodically undermined by the strong-arming of Bao Dai by the new High Commissioner, Leon Pignon, another MRP disciple. Such bullying allowed the Viet Minh to pose as the authentic representatives of an independent Vietnam.

The dilemma of Vietnam was further aggravated by an influx of French racketeers. In Indochina they could practice what m had ceased to be possible in the metropole: currency manipulation, license trading, and opium trafficking. Meanwhile the Socialists and the MRP jockeyed for patronage over Indochinese administrative posts as escalating accusations of corruption wracked French politics in 1949-50. If there was any silver-lining to the official French position it was in the growing interest of the Americans in Vietnam. In January 1950, Communist China and the Soviet Union recognized the Viet Minh as the legitimate government of Vietnam. Alarm bells were rung in Washington. By the late spring of 1950, the Americans were openly subsidizing the French military operation in Vietnam to the tune of hundreds of millions of francs every year...

 

[Shynka]

​

As terror descended on Seoul on the 25th of June, commanders in the central and eastern sectors of Korea listened to the partially jammed radio transmissions in horror. Their own spectacle would begin soon after; at 3am, North Korean forces launched fierce artillery barrages, and the mountains and hills lit up with non-stop blasts. The situation was not as bad as it was in the West; the North, in its aim to advance rapidly and cut off Seoul, dedicated less forces to the Centre and East of the peninsula, but still held the advantage. The ROKA commanders here could only do their best to use their slightly more favourable terrain and less dire manpower ratios to delay their own routing for as long as possible.

Despite the mountains and soon later, US naval intervention helping prop up these theatres, the local ROK commanders quickly found themselves cut off from the government – the decision to rapidly coalesce the units of the sector under the 2nd Corps under the leadership of Brigadier General Yu Jae Hung was an attempt to create a local centralised power structure. Equipped with the 5th, 6th, and 7th divisions, Yu Jae Hung despite his best intention was faced with the tasks of stopping two entire corps of the KPA, armed with weapons he could not reliably counter.

The first battle that put the 2nd to the test would take place at Wonju. Here, the South Koreans decided to make a stand in the early days of July. Despite the fall of Seoul a few days earlier, Yu Jae Hung was certain that a successful defence at the city could stop the western flank of the North Korean offensive from progressing any further south for fear of being cut off. Theoretically this was a good plan, as it would force the North to perform a time-costly change in direction, but the fluidity with which the Northern armies were able to operate threw the ROKA off. The North was armed with logistical support from the USSR, which handed over hundreds of its own vehicles, in a move that initially eluded even US intelligence. The KPA was able to simultaneously continue its rapid advance South and to throw an entire army towards the east. Not wanting to be cut off at Wonju, the 2nd itself retreated, badly mauled. Despite the defeat, its actions in temporarily stopping the central North Korean thrust gave both the ROKA and the arriving US eight army living proof that the North could be stopped.

As the 2nd retreated, Yu Jae Hung ordered for partisan operations to be prepared in rear areas. Many in his staff saw this as the General saving face, but nonetheless, went along with the plan. Hideouts and partisan cells were hurriedly put in place, but the sheer pace of the Northern offensive meant that many of these would be almost immediately liquidated or would simply desert once witnessing the wave of armour they were tasked with delaying. Some notable hits were however achieved against KPA logistics, particularly in the East, where the arriving US Navy assisted with deploying squadrons of saboteurs behind the lines. The overall support of the US Navy, augmented by some forces of the British, would delay Northern progress on the coast, and despite operating with only one division on this flank, the battered 5th, the ROKA managed to perform a fighting retreat all the way to Daegu, with holding actions occurring at various towns and cities, the most notable of these taking place in Andong by the 6th and 7th divisions.

American troops sent to the Korean theatre would primarily be directed west, to try and stave off the disaster at Taejon, but some would be sent to hold the line in the East. A perimeter was setup, relying on the northern Nakdgong river and the key city of Daegu. Here the American formations, like their brothers currently deploying further west, would be shocked by first exposure to the scale of North Korean mechanized warfare. Their initiation, as harsh as it was, would be made slightly easier than it otherwise would be by the nature of the operating theatre – the Nakdgong provided a barrier that even the logistically-augmented North Koreans couldn't cross at will, and the urban terrain around Daegu allowed the Americans to destroy and disrupt North Korean armoured formations from closer range.

The US Air Force and Navy were both key to preventing disaster in the sector. Any potential bridgeheads the North established were immediately fiercely bombed, and the near impunity of the US Air Force in the first two weeks of July bolstered morale of both US and remaining Korean troops on the ground. As US air superiority waned temporarily in the middle of July, the Americans were forced to withdraw from Daegu entirely, falling back steadily towards the city of Pusan.



As the Koreans retreated, bruised, from Seoul, the North was emboldened to continue its rapid offensive. The bridges on the Han captured intact, the KPA was able to push south rapidly, into the tail of the retreating and reforming ROKA 1st Corps. Bolstered by the semi-covert presence of Soviet logistical units taking supplies as far as Seoul and the border, the North was able to practically trample many Southern formations into the dirt. At the towns of Suwon and Gwangju, far reaching Northern elements managed to take as many as 2000 prisoners in one day on the 3rd of July.

On the 4th, the Americans would have their Christening by fire. Alerted to the scale of the disaster by the ROKA, the Americans pushed through a rapid UN Resolution and then a legitimization of the war in Congress. Truman ordered forces from Japan, mostly detached from the 24th infantry division, to begin deploying by Sea. The Americans did not manage to deploy whole formations, but managed to send 600 troops to Osan, where they offered resistance to the KPA. Despite the air support available to them, the 600 at Osan did not manage to fare much better against the North than the ROKA; most of their crewed anti-tank weapons were still far behind them, and as such, they had few ways to deal with Northern tanks. The Americans, too, had to pull back. Their resistance bought just enough time for the ROKA to ready for the standoff at Taejon.

The 1st Korean Corps was instructed to hold Taejon no matter the cost. As the Americans still got through the paperwork of war and organised their troops for shipment from Japan, the Koreans needed to buy as much time as possible for them to deploy. Taejon was chosen as the site of battle; laying on the Kum River, it offered a decent defensive position to the ROK. The city was also bolstered by the rest of the American 24th division, which now formed the western spearhead of the deploying 8th Army. The Korean 1st Corps was also under the threat of disintegrating entirely should its retreat continue – on the 9th of July, many of the commanders reported that the men could march South no more, and that morale was critically low, with as many as 1/3rd of the troops missing, casualty figures that would normally render any other formation judged as incapable of combat operations.

The North, encouraged by Soviet logistical support and the support of a new Soviet Air Army that trickled in throughout late July, chose to not let itself be delayed any further – the KPA 1st Corps was told to capture Taejon, or failing that, isolate and reduce it. As the armoured formations smashed into the city from the north, west and east, the stalwart defenders managed to put up enough of an effort for the Northerners to judge the effort futile – the city would be bypassed. Two armoured formations continued South, and as the US 24th division realised what was unfolding, it fought a breakout action on the 16th. The Koreans inside the city were not as lucky – too tired and too deprived of equipment to continue, most of the regiments constituting the heroic 1st, 2nd and 8th divisions were trapped in the city, put under a brutal siege, their only supplies now coming from the air.

With the ROKA largely eliminated as a fighting force in the West, the US had to pick up the Slack. Truman, furious at the increase in Soviet support, authorised a sharp increase in US involvement, deploying more troops to bolster the 8th Army and deploying large amounts of special operatives into North Korean rear areas. The Army also underwent organisational changes – General Ridgway was promoted to the overall command of the 8th in July, while his superior, Walker, was granted temporary command over American operations in Korea. Walker took to his duty dutifully, despite a near miss with death when his car was shot up by a Soviet Mig-17 in Korean make up.

Forced to leave the Korean 1st trapped at Taejon, the Americans fell back East, towards the defensive line formed by the Nakdong West of Pusan. As the Soviet air intervention threw the Americans off ever so briefly, the KPA managed to successfully create and exploit a number of bridgeheads, culminating in the dangerous breakthrough at Changnyeong. An all or nothing offensive, the leadership of the KPA passed down orders from Kim Il-Sung himself to push to Pusan. A force totalling three armoured brigades pushed past the protective US perimeter, advancing along the left bank of the Nakdong towards the sea, catching rear guard US units off guard. At 7 in the morning, July 26th, just over a month after the war began, Northern tanks fired into Pusan itself.

Their triumph was short lived. Despite Soviet intervention briefly tipping the scales by sheer surprise alone, the US stood firm in the air, and as the weather cleared, the bombs fell on the exposed KPA formations. Their logistical tail now nearly 30 kilometres behind them, the tanks had no choice but to attempt retreat, leaving behind small formations of partisans and saboteurs to try and ensure another offensive could take place. Only one of the tank brigades made it back, welcomed as heroes and promised the vanguard position in a renewed offensive that nonetheless would not come any time soon. The Americans tightened the ring as July ended, with the KPA now largely confined to the city of Changnyeong, with only one bridgehead connecting them to the West.



As the invasion on the ground raged, a ferocious fight broke out in the sky. The North Koreans, with their large but outdated air force, were able to get the jump on the few South Korean units present and ready to fight early on; while not exactly the newest and most advanced plane, the La-7's and other associated WW2-era propeller aircraft followed good tactical dogma and attacked in odds that guaranteed them victory over their scattered Southern brothers.

Victory over the Americans was far, far harder to guarantee. As early as June 28th, while the city of Seoul was still seeing columns of refugees pour out, the United States command in the area ordered the US aircraft present in the country under the 8th fighter wing to scramble and take on as much of the North Korean air force as possible. Battles at Suwon, over Seoul and even as far as over Pyongyang rapidly demonstrated the technical superiority of the American aircraft and of the excellent training of their pilots; North Korean La 7's suffered untenable casualties and had to pull back from bombing units crossing the Han River.

The 8th Fighter Wing did however have to reduce its involvement temporarily as the week unfolded – while the US sought a commander for Korea, reinforcements from Japan were temporarily delayed. MacArthur, a strong character to say the least and a posturing diva to say slightly more, was upset at being kept back in Japan, and his antics created enough organizational chaos to delay air reinforcements ever so slightly. Nevertheless, as Truman increased his involvement and pushed more and more, MacArthur's antics became muted, and planes took off for Korea in large numbers, while others from around the pacific concentrated in Japan. Stratemayer, the USAAF commander in the region, finalised the transfer of 250 aircraft by June 31st, and had the pleasure of watching a sortie unfold himself.

The two weeks that followed the fall of Seoul were dominated by the screaming jets of the USAAF. Fighters and fighter bombers were primarily selected to conduct rapid raids both against North Korean airbases and against key troop concentrations, with the jet powered machines being particularly difficult to shoot down for increasingly overworked North Korean AA gunners. B26 aircraft taking off from Japan worked in tandem with these Korean based strike groups, bringing havoc to airfields and infrastructure in Korea, destroying sizeable portions of the logistical tail that Stalin committed to his ally.

Two British naval air squadrons were also included in the fight, as well as squadron 77 of the Australian Air Force, which flew the first non-American foreign skirmish in the area. The Australians swiftly balanced this accolade out with a friendly fire incident, but all in all, the inclusion of both British and Australian forces was a morale boost for the Americans and South Koreans. Despite their minor numbers in comparison to the overwhelming American fleet in the area, the aircraft were a welcome sight above retreating and shattered ROK armies slowly making their way south.

The situation begun to shift slightly after the 15th. Perhaps worried by the situation in the air not quite matching the successes of the units on the ground, Stalin let himself be swayed by promises of a quick victory should reinforcements be provided. Vershinin arrived at Pyongyang by train but intended very much to leave it, hopefully for Seoul or Pusan, by plane. With him he brought
a Soviet Air Army that the North Koreans desperately needed to fight off the American air armada, which now included almost one thousand available aircraft. With no time to train North Korean pilots, a basic attempt at deception was made, as each aircraft was repainted on the tarmac and sent to North Korean airports. Some of the Soviet aircraft were so needed in the sky that they came back from their first sortie with half the fresh paint peeled off from the airspeed alone.

The first clashes between the Russians and Americans occurred soon after. The inclusion of modern Soviet jets was a sharp surprise for Americans far too used to preying on propeller powered relics. The fact that Russians were killing Americans and Americans were killing Russians became apparent to personnel on the ground in Korea soon enough, as several Russian-speaking and Russian-looking North Korean pilots were pulled out of the wrecks of their aircraft without much knowledge of the local language or customs. Many of these prisoners of war were immediately and clandestinely sent back to US bases in Japan for questioning, as the story was concealed from the press while Truman decided what to do. The British and Australians, due to only being involved in the air, would duel the Soviet pilots with their own suspicions in mind, but not come across any prisoners of war. MacArthur, still eager to get involved but bypassed by Washington, would first alert his Australian counterparts in the area when he spoke to the command of the 77th, with which he was on good terms. News would then quickly travel to London, where the Prime Minister was also given the unfortunate task of reacting to what could potentially lead to a wholesale reignition of war in Europe.

Despite the piecemeal inclusion of the Soviet air army, the Americans continued to enjoy costly air superiority in the South of the country. The new Russian aircraft, such as the capable and cutting edge Mig-17, sent dozens American aircraft spiralling down, and soon enough, raids over places like Pyongyang had to be temporarily stopped, with less risky targets selected. The blatant inclusion of Soviet aircraft in the conflict, while not largely known in the US until the end of July, allowed Truman to justify pushing more American planes and resources into the conflict, ironically enough allowing him to stabilise the situation on the ground with the dispatch of more advisors, troops and war materiel than originally planned, preventing total disaster near Pusan.

As news finally broke of the inclusion of direct Russian air assets in the war, Truman had to make a choice in how much he would seek to publicise and politically weaponize the matter. While war in Europe over Korea was an unimaginable prospect, Truman now had the political cards to increase US participation in East Asia greatly. There was however ingrained risk – pushing back too hard might lead Stalin to commit fully. The inclusion of one Soviet Air Army perturbed American dominance in the air slightly, but certainly didn't have the same impact that the inclusion of Soviet troops would.

Stalin, meanwhile, had to assess his policy carefully. While his aircraft helped stave off disaster and helped the North Koreans win key engagements that might have been otherwise made too costly by relentless and unchecked US bombing, they were quickly dwindling in numbers. Their introduction to Korea meant they had to be rebased, or else all pretence about them being Korean aircraft would be dead in the water from the get-go. Flying from North Korean bases was initially tricky, as the infrastructure, mechanics and fuelling facilities had to be quickly brought forward, in many cases to bases that had been heavily damaged by the USAAF only days prior. Before the Soviets could establish an air umbrella for their own units, they lost as many as forty modern jets and planes to US bombing on the ground. Stalin had to decide - he could either keep his air army in Korea on its own, or gamble for temporary air parity by reinforcing it and risking a far broader and deadlier conflict.



The war took the world by surprise. The United States public had to taste bitter defeat – the army, somewhat underfunded during the period since World War 2, had to deploy rapidly and in a chaotic fashion. The outsized scale of Soviet support, in particular in the air, left US armies badly mauled but Truman himself reinvigorated, with public support for the war on Communism reaching new heights. Despite the shock therapy it underwent, the US 8th Army was slowly reconstituting itself, and the defeat of the North Koreans at the gates of Pusan and the valiant (if futile) continuing stand at Taejon bolstered morale both among the soldiers and Korean citizens still under Rhee's supervision.

The ROKA was now a barely functional organisation, down to as little as one fifth of its pre-war strength. It's bravery and delaying actions early in the war cost it dearly, albeit it can be argued that had the South not effectively sacrificed the 1st Corps, the North Koreans could have reached Pusan in time to prevent US reinforcement. The logistical and materiel support offered to the North Koreans, as well as the inclusion of the Soviet air army under Korean colours, allowed for a pace of warfare that disoriented the ROKA and US Army both. Despite reinstated US air superiority in the South, the North Koreans remain a dangerous force, with potential for another offensive still lingering, depending on Truman's willingness to match Stalin in escalating the conflict.

Despite their rapid progress, the North still fundamentally lacked confidence; the KPA spent precious time and resources setting up multiple resistance cells in the event of a counterattack, instead of dedicating all possible troops and logistical vehicles to pressing the war effort forward. A lot of the logistical support garnered from Stalin was also utilised on fighting a campaign of hearts and minds, as the North, perhaps itself terrified by the scale of the human disaster that was Seoul, sought to feed the millions of refugees now under their control. At the same time, the North wasted no time in propaganda efforts aimed at widely publishing both US and Southern war crimes. Many of these were fictitious – Rhee, despite his earlier fury and eagerness to deal swiftly with traitors, vacillated between ordering and not ordering strongly affirmative action against harmful groups. In the end, the ROKA was far too busy attempting to fight a delay action to organise these massacres, and the KPA garnered many new recruits that were awaiting their own liberation behind South Korean lines.

The world watched. The Chinese, at first elated by the prospect of total victory in Korea, were bitterly disappointed by the defeat at Pusan. Mao had from the beginning ordered the preparation of the 13th Army Corps for deployment into Korea. Unlike Stalin he however did not want to play his hand just yet, and the Chinese prepared north of the Yalu. Mao did however deploy a whole contingent of intelligence gathering agents to the conflict, feeding his army back at home key findings from the victories and defeats of the Koreans. In other countries, an atmosphere of fear set in. Stalin's decision to put Russians and Americans directly at odds despite a UN resolution aimed against the North lead to a panic spreading throughout the world, in particular the capitalist countries. Many now believed that it would only be a matter of time before the Soviets waged a similar conflict in Germany or Japan.

The war had a huge impact on the civilian population of Korea. The widescale use of air assets and artillery by both sides destroyed untold lives, as those lucky enough to evade death and injury now had to relocate their entire lives or rebuild villages ruined by the passage of war. After the massacres that formed the grizzly background of the early fighting at Seoul, both sides attempted to reign in their troops; Rhee, in the end, ordered no large-scale massacres, and the North, keen to establish a good image in its newly liberated provinces, distributed aid and did it's best to retain discipline among its frontline troops. Despite all this, casualties climbed into the hundreds of thousands, with the cities of Daegu and Taejon left as near wastelands by a mere few weeks of fighting. As perhaps the bloodiest month of its history ended, unparalleled even by Japanese atrocities, Korea faced a continued struggle for not only the ideology of its government, but for the very soul of her broken people.

​

 

[DanBaque]

STATEMENT FROM THE FOREIGN BUREAU @Etranger @Skrevski
The People's Democracy of Korea replies to the ongoing accusations against its free and democratic state and rejects them in the firmest terms. Korea is a peaceful nation, with no aggressive intentions. The collapse of the fascist running-stooge nation in the south of the Korean peninsula against the natural rising of its workers and peasants endangered the stability of this same territory, and necessitated intervention. Remnant Japanese imperialist-fascist bandits have attempted to hinder our efforts to support the people, accompanied by confused, it is believed, American forces. We hold no ill-will against these latter elements, and wish for only peace with them.

We repeat that the supposed 'Republic of Korea' has proven itself a failed state, has collapsed irrevocably as a state, and that our intervention is fully welcomed by the population of the Korean peninsula and is necessary to provide for stability in this time of global reconstruction.

 

[Etranger]

"My fellow Americans, good evening.

It is time that I update you about the situation that is ongoing in the Korean peninsula. As you know, our ally, the Republic of Korea, a small but determined young democracy, is under attack from the north by the forces of totalitarian Communism. This you should all be aware of.

What has not been known publicly until now is that the North Korean invasion is not being conducted alone. In the course of defending Korea against Communist aggression, the brave airmen of the United Nations, including our own United States pilots, have downed not just one but multiple planes belonging to the Soviet Union, each crewed by Soviet pilots. We have both prisoners and wreckage attesting to the truth of this.

The Soviets have, therefore, chosen to stand against the United Nations and the free peoples of the world in favor of backing an unprovoked, unwarranted invasion of a sovereign state. They have done so openly and in direct contravention of multiple resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. This act is not just aggressive, it is criminal.

Therefore, I have asked Ambassador Austin to place before the General Assembly a resolution calling upon the nations of the world to censure the Soviets for their actions and to cease all economic traffic with the Soviet Union and her allies until such time as they fully repudiate and cease their support for the invading North Korean forces. I have also asked the leaders of Congress to formulate matching legislation, so that we might suit deeds to words. We cannot continue regular commerce and intercourse with any nation which openly defies the will of the civilized world in such a blatant manner.

With the nations of the world united in support of the Republic of Korea, we will continue to stand fast against Communist aggression and thereby prevent the armed conquest of democracy by the forces of authoritarianism. Together, we will push back the red tide and preserve the free world for its peoples and their right to self-determination.

Thank you all, and may God continue to bless the United States of America."

- Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, via radio

 

[Skrevski]

President Rhee addressing troops outside Busan, August 1st, 1950

"People of the Republic of Korea, I stand before you and among our American allies to tell you that our nation, while under an illegal and unjust invasion by our northern brothers stands strong. Our brave military forces have fought tooth and nail to hold back the brutal northern invades, allowing American and Britsh aid to arrive and help us in our most just cause. We must band together and defend our land, our people, our freedom against the barbarians of the North."

"The North sends banter and falsities that we were the cause of this unjust invasion when it was them that crossed the border repetitively before this invasion. It was them that send Fifth Columnists to destabilize our great nation. We defeated their attempts, we will defeat this barbaric invasion. They call us to be colluding with "fascist" yet we fought against them in the Second Great War, we held together with our freedom loving friends of the United States, Great Britain, France, and many others that continue to fight against these unfathomable allegations. Would these great nations who fought in a world war that saw the very fall of fascism continue to support them? We stand in the right in this invasion and will continue to fight to the end!"

"I call on all freedom loving people of not just Korea but the world to band together to stop this travesty that has seen hundreds of thousands of Korean torn from their homes and thousands killed in senseless fighting stand with us! Let the free world stand together once more and drive back the hordes that wish to see light turned to darkness! Long live Freedom! Long Live the rightful Republic of Korea!" ​

 

[Shebe Zuu]

The National Police Reserve
​

The outbreak of the Korean War was received with great dismay in Japan, but the degree to which the Soviet Union had backed the North's brutal invasion turned that dismay into a near panic within the government. With American forces rapidly being shipped from their bases in the home islands to fight in the widening conflict, defense of Japan might well be untenable in the face of Soviet aggression, now seen as a distinct possibility. With the permission of GHQ, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida sought the formation of a 120,000 man force under the name of the National Police Reserve. Though nominally a police force (hence the name) it was little secret that the NPR was paramilitary if not indeed outright military in nature and plans were already being made to expand its capabilities beyond merely light infantry and garrison duties. Many also saw the hand of General MacArthur in the grand schemes being drawn up for Japan's rearmament, as he chafed at the refusal to send him to Korea, and this new force would be under his direct command. Recruitment began swiftly, with the first units entering training in October of 1950 under the joint efforts of Generals Courtney Whitney and Whitfield P. Shepard.

​

The swiftness of the NPR's formation did not belie the issues involved in the assembly of such a force from what had been up until that point an almost entirely demobilized population. Though only a fraction of the size of the IJA at its' height, many veterans of which were still present in Japanese society, concerns over lingering anti-American sentiment (especially amongst former officers) meant that in the eyes of GHQ their suitability was questionable. As a result the majority of men recruited into the NPR had no prior military experience, and only about some 4% had prior training as officers. These men were largely equipped with weapons supplied from US Army surpluses, particularly lighter weapons such as the M1 carbine and the now obsolete M1903 Springfield rifle. Small numbers of heavier weapons like the Bazooka and a number of Jeeps and other unarmored vehicles were also provided, with a view towards acquiring more capable weapons as the force came to mature.

 

[Noco]

AN OFFENSIVE FROM TWO SIDES
- Mossadegh and Kashani Denounce the Razmara Ministry - ​

The National Front was a peculiar alliance. Formed in 1949 following a sit-in forcing the Shah's support for new elections, the coalition was one of associations, not individuals, and its unity of purpose was in opposition to policies nebulously against the people of Iran. Its affiliates were as disparate as one might expect: the social-democratic Iran Party, the socialist Toilers and Third Force activists, and the Islamic-socialist Movement of God-Worshipping Socialists and Nation Party. Likewise in support were associations of bazaari merchants and Shi'a radicals, such as Ayatollah Kashani.

That lattermost ally, the Ayatollah Kashani, had only recently returned to Iran in 1950. Some historians postulate that his arrival was permitted by the Shah to hinder Razmara, however it was noted that the Shah similarly mistrusted the ambitious cleric himself. Whereas Mossadegh and Kashani were men largely apart, throughout 1950 and especially with the introduction of the Razmara Government, the two aligned quickly with one another. Both were seated members of the Majilis and both utilized this platform, among others, to immediately move against both Razmara and his renewed defense of the Supplemental Oil Agreement.

Where the two nationalists differed proved to be in their most effective deliveries: Mossadegh in the mindfulness of parliament, Kashani in the hearts of the streets.

---

DOCTOR MOHAMMAD MOSSADEGH
A Criticism of the Supplemental Oil Agreement​

I repeat it again: the moral aspect of oil nationalization is more important than its economic aspect.

The Prime Minister has seen fit to establish for this Majilis a Technical Commission, which purports itself to be a body that will at last settle the crisis of our national sovereignty. Its agenda is filled with many variables and numbers, economic particulars that seek the data necessary to justify the abrogation of our nationhood. Prime Minister Razmara seeks to ask what price is worth that of our bondage to Western oil interests: we respond firmly that no such price can be paid for our natural rights.

Razamara still maintains that the Supplemental Oil Agreement may yet be passed. We would be pleased to see what talents our Prime Minister possesses, that he may convince us yet his deal is different than the deal from one year ago, or ten years ago, or a hundred. For every time we tell him this, the Prime Minister responds that he might still convince his masters at the oil company that another part of a percentage of Iranians may receive some degree of pay increase. Yet of these increases, we are forbidden from auditing the books to see its fairness. Or Razmara says that the drilling sites may be shrank another digit. Yet in every draft, the oil company still receives the entirety our productive oil fields. We should be so grateful that we are afforded land on which there is no oil, nor arable soil, nor much use of anything, in exchange for this deal.

There is no political or moral yardstick which one can measure the cost of this proposed capitulation to the foreign world. For all the promises of royalties and investment, we are simultaneously selling one-hundred times more Iranians into the yoke of slavery, a contracted servitude to the political, moral, and economic interests of the likes of Britain. Where does that leave the Iranian people, except at the mercy of those who have throughout history abused our nation?

If Razmara is to enforce the Agreement, he would leave for himself a disgrace that he could never wash away.

---

AYATOLLAH ABOL-QASEM KASHANI
A Fatwa Against the Foreign Exploitation of Iranian Oil​

Bismillah Ta'alla
In the Name of the Exalted Allah

It has been asked of me, why is it that I trouble myself. Why is it that I concern myself with politics as they are today. This speaker, he began to say this and so many things, that the state of affairs in Iran was beneath the grandeur of an Ayatollah.

To him I said: you are a donkey!

If I do not interfere, if the learned clerics and religious authorities of Iran do not interfere, we in that sense condone what is happening today. If not us, then who?

Take into consideration the national right of Iranian oil, that issue which I have spoken about numerous times. When I am asked: is it the right of Iran to reap the rewards of its own oil, it is so often in terms of legal issue. But truthfully, when I am asked of this affair, it should be in the view of a comprehensive question, one that clarifies the good and evil away from any confusion, which must be removed.

It is with necessity that the legality of this issue must be consistent with the Islamic laws and so I answer it one and the same.

I would like to relate a story that occurred in the Holy Prophet's time:

A man died and left many servants and slaves. But before he died, he set all his slaves free. When he has been already buried, the Holy Prophet became aware of the man's will. So he was dejected, and said: "If I was there before he was buried, I wouldn't agree to let him be buried in the Muslims' cemetery!" When the Holy Prophet was asked about the reason, he replied: "Because he left His family without provision!"​

Now, if the Holy Prophet is to ask about the national wealth, the oil of this nation, seeing that the incomings are being plundered by the foreigners, in the same time when fourteen million citizens are in meagre living and threatened with starvation, he would certainly be angry, since that does not need a high degree of cleverness. It is treachery to be silent on this matter as the Holy Prophet says: "Whosoever enters upon morning without showing care towards the Muslims, he is absolutely not Muslim nor a believer."

Is there any criterion which can be regarded as more accurate that this?

Is it legal that we a just and jealous Mujtahid address this issue when a great many seek to look on instead?

I myself do not legalize any excuse to do so. Nor do I permit the burying of any in a Muslims' cemetery that would rob Iran of its provision.

 

[Carol]

ABSOLUTION
​

The recent war in Korea had taken its pound of flesh from the participants in it. Despite reliable statistics being hard to come by, the withdrawal from Seoul already cost more than a thousand lives due to relentless Soviet-provided barrage. Peace—the beloved commodity—was snatched away by communist greed. Their convincing need to extend the bondage of servitude influenced Kim Il Sung, the Kremlin's Manchurian candidate, to plunge the international community into chaos. It was then a godsend to Chiang Kai-shek. Here was the proof to substantiate his dire warnings of a global conspiracy.

Washington stopped giving him the cold shoulder like before. No longer was it practical to discuss Chiang as a piece on the board to be exchanged for a pliant Mao Tse-tung. Instead, the island of Formosa was at the front lines of a new struggle with totalitarianism. Such was the importance placed on the point that the Seventh Fleet patrolled the strait around it. The buffer zone thwarted any invasion of Formosa that would not result in the conflict escalating into the mainland. Reinvigorated after the recent turn of events, Chiang went before an international audience to delineate the Soviet stratagem:

In order to achieve their inordinate scheme for world conquest, the Russian Communists chose the absolute forms of unlimited war. In their war against the free world, as the newest front in Korea shows, they are limited by neither time nor space. They can switch from one battlefield to another as from one form of warfare to another. They can carry out infiltration, propaganda, organization, political intrigue, subversion, and even armed uprising against their enemy on the inside, in coordination with their frontal attacks—economic, diplomatic, cultural, political, and psychological—on the outside. Every one of their moves is for the purpose of the decisive battle, and every advance is to be evaluated for its effect on the final outcome. They keep on advancing toward the target, namely, the final battle, unceasingly and without limitations in full expectation of attaining the ultimate objective. Only a vigorous defense on absolute terms by the free world can they be stopped [...]​

 

[Oxford]

THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE
Part 1: The National Awakening (1908-45)​

The emergence of modern and organized nationalism in early-20th century Indonesia—often called the Indonesian National Awakening—is thought to have begun with the formation of Budi Utomo ("Noble Endeavor") in 1908. The organization's founder, Wahidin Sudirohusodo, was a retired Javanese doctor who sought to improve public welfare by promoting the study of Western knowledge alongside his own cultural heritage. His efforts were supported by Dutch-educated Javanese civil servants and students, and later by Javanese aristocrats and priyayi (elite). Even the colonial government was tolerant of his organization's activities, believing they would be conducive to their own Ethical Policy, a pet program of Dutch liberals which sought to promote the welfare of indigenous Indonesians.

As a Javanese cultural organization, Budi Utomo grew rapidly and boasted 10,000 members by the end of 1909. While it focused on improving educational opportunities for Indonesians, it also aimed to encourage agriculture, trade, and humanistic thought. However, despite its emphasis on Javanese culture, Budi Utomo was founded upon the belief that progress entailed adopting Western social and political institutions. The group's conservative leadership was staunchly opposed to political activity. Still, as time went on, they were challenged on this policy by younger members who favoured direct action against the West.

Although Budi Utomo played an instrumental in developing Indonesian nationalism in the 20th century, it was soon eclipsed by more assertive political movements. The same lack of mass appeal which led the Dutch to consider the organization harmless also prevented it from growing beyond its origins in elite society.

Wahidin Sudirohusodo was a doctor, education reformer, and co-founder of the Javanese self-improvement society Budi Utomo. He is onsidered an early figure in the Indonesian National Awakening.​

The first challenger to arrive on the scene was the Indies Party (Indische Partij), founded in 1910 by Indonesian-Dutch nationalist and Boer War veteran E.F.E. Douwes Dekker (later known as Dandirja Setyabuddhi). Dekker and his Javanese associates criticized the Ethical Policy of the Netherlands as unacceptably conservative. They advocated self-government for the islands as the only moral solution. In 1913, they established the Native Committee in Bandung and planned to petition the Dutch crown for an Indies parliament. Their subversive activities eventually led them into exile in the Netherlands, where they worked with liberal Dutchmen and Indonesian students.

The most significant successor to Budi Utomo came from the Islamic community, whose religion was adhered to by the vast majority of Indonesians. In 1909, Muslim merchants formed the Islamic Traders' Association, which three years later became Sarekat Islam ("Islamic Association") under the leadership of former civil servant Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto. The organization aimed to promote Islamic teachings and community economic prosperity, though it also appealed to anti-Chinese sentiment and traditional Javanese beliefs about the return of a "Just King." Tjokroaminoto was seen as charismatic and advocated for self-government in the Indies, causing some anxiety for the Dutch. In early 1914, Sarekat Islam's membership had rapidly swelled to 360,000, and by 1916, the organization had some 80 branches on both Java and the Outer Islands.

Meanwhile, the modernist Islamic group Muhammadiyah ("Followers of Muhammad"), established in 1912, represented a reformist trend in Islam. It particularly appealed to the Minangkabau, an ethnic group native to West Sumatra, and many modernist schools were established there. Later, in 1926, the Islamic organization Nahdatul Ulama ("Revival of the Ulama") would be organized as a conservative counterbalance to Tjokroaminoto's syncretism and modernist ideas. The importance of Muhammadiyah is reflected in the fact that Minangkabau was second in numbers only to Javanese among the leadership of the Indonesian revolution.

Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto was an Indonesian nationalist. He became one of the leaders of the Islamic Traders' Association, which became Sarekat Islam, an early and influential nationalist political organization with wide popular support.​

In 1914, Dutchman Hendricus Sneevliet established the Indies Social Democratic Association (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging; ISDV), the Dutch members of which introduced anticapitalist ideas to educated Indonesians looking for ways to oppose colonial rule. After learning of the October Revolution in Russia, they became inspired to attempt a similar uprising in Indonesia. The organization gained momentum among Dutch settlers in the archipelago, began forming Red Guards, and numbered 3,000 members within three months.

In late 1917, soldiers and sailors at the Surabaya naval base revolted and established soviets, but these were suppressed by the colonial government, and most of the Dutch members of the party (including Sneevliet) were deported to the Netherlands. Native Indonesians stepped in to fill the power vacuum in the organization. By 1920 they had become a communist party; three years later, they renamed it the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia; PKI). Backed by the Communist International (Comintern) in Moscow, the PKI became active among trade unionists and rural villagers.

By 1918, many nationalist organizations had emerged in Indonesia, each with different tactics and goals related to independence. However, at the time, there was more cooperation than competition between these groups. In fact, it was common for individuals to belong to multiple organizations simultaneously. The ranks of Sarekat Islam included conservative Islamic thinkers as well as Muslim communists, the latter group taking inspiration from the teachings of both Marx and the Koran. Though they had their disagreement, all were united in their opposition to foreign domination and support for independence. The Communist International later formulated a cooperation strategy with such anti-imperialist "bourgeois" parties, as they sensed it was not time for communist parties to take independent leadership of colonial nationalism.

A meeting of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1925.​

Following World War I, the government of the Dutch East Indies created a People's Council called the Volksraad in an attempt to make their promise of closer association with the Indonesian community more credible. The council included appointed and elected representatives of the three racial divisions defined by the government: Dutch, Indonesian, and "foreign Asiatic," but it lacked real control over policy. Nevertheless, some nationalist leaders accepted seats in the assembly, while others refused, believing that concessions could only be obtained through an uncompromising struggle.

In 1921, mounting tensions between Sarekat Islam's conservative leaders and the communist members of the organization came to a head over a discipline resolution forbidding members from belonging to other parties. After the communists were effectively expelled, they waged a fierce struggle for control over the grassroots membership, dealing a mortal blow to the organization. The PKI then moved toward a policy of independent and unilateral opposition to the colonial regime, launching failed revolts in Java and western Sumatra in 1926 and 1927. They did this despite advice from Tan Malaka, a Comintern agent from Sumatra, and received no support from their comrades abroad. The government imprisoned some communist leaders while others, like Tan Malaka, fled into exile. Their total defeat effectively ended communist activity for the rest of the colonial period, and the PKI ceased to function as an important political actor for over a decade.

In the aftermath of the unsuccessful communist revolts and the decline of Sarekat Islam, a new nationalist organization emerged in 1926: a "general study club" founded in Bandung, led by a newly graduated engineer named Sukarno. In a conscious attempt to avoid the failures of the Islamic and communist movements, this club advocated for a simplified nationalism that focused solely on the struggle for independence, which could unite people of different ideologies and appeal to Indonesia's emerging urban elite. This idea was supported by Indonesian students in the Netherlands, whose organization, Perhimpunan Indonesia ("Indonesian Association"), became a prominent center of radical nationalist thought. In the mid-1920s, students returning from the Netherlands joined forces with like-minded groups at home.

Leaders of the Indonesian Association (Perhimpoenan Indonesia), ca. 1926-1930. Left to right: Gunawan Mangunkusumo, Mohammad Hatta, Iwa Kusumasumantri, Sastro Mulyono, and R.M. Sartono.​

In 1927, Sukarno led the formation of the Indonesian Nationalist Association, later the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia; PNI), which stressed noncooperation with the government of the East Indies and the ultimate goal of independence. The organization sought to cultivate mass support among the Indonesian population but was also open to working with more moderate leaders. Though there were challenges to such an approach, the party was moderately successful in creating a broad (albeit fragile) association of nationalist organizations.

By the late 1920s, nationalist sentiment was bubbling up in every sector of Indonesian society and on thousands of islands across the far-flung archipelago. In 1928, representatives of various youth organizations issued the historic Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda), which declared that they would recognize only one Indonesian motherland, people, and language. It was landmark events like this, however, which led the Dutch colonial government to finally register the new attitudes of their native subjects. They promptly hardened their attitudes to Indonesian nationalism, responding with a harsh crackdown on any and all demands for independence. Such brutal methods of repression marked a radical shift from the prior idealistic commitments of the Ethical Policy.

At the same time, by virtue of his charisma, skillful oration, and forceful personality, Sukarno had risen to a position of prominence at a rapid pace. This made him a dangerous man and an all-too-tempting target for the Dutch. In 1929, Sukarno and many of his associates were arrested, tried, and sentenced to four years in prison. His sidelining coincided with the disintegration of the nationalist movement he helped create.

Sukarno with fellow defendants and attorneys during his trial in Bandung in 1930.​

By the time Sukarno was released in 1931, the political landscape had changed substantially. The PNI had dissolved itself and reformed as the Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia; Partindo), while several other groups came together to form the Indonesian National Education Club, which became known as the New PNI. While Partindo aimed to be a mass party in the tradition of the old PNI, the New PNI was different.

Under the leadership of Minangkabau intellectuals Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, the organization focused on training cadres who could maintain leadership continuity in the movement in the case of future arrests. Graduates of Dutch universities, Hatta and Sjahrir, were social democrats in outlook and more rational in their political style than Sukarno, whom they criticized for his romanticism and preoccupation with rousing the masses. Hatta, in particular, favoured a gradualist education process as the optimal means of expanding political consciousness.

Sukarno was arrested and exiled again in 1933, an event which was followed by similar repressive actions against other party leaders, including Hatta and Sjahrir. For a time, the remaining members of Partindo maintained their calls for independence, but without their leaders and under significant government pressure, the party dissolved itself in 1936. Many moderate nationalists felt compelled to cooperate with the Dutch and join the People's Council, viewing it as a venue to make incremental gains in the absence of a radical alternative. Due to the relentless machinations of their colonial masters, the fortunes of Indonesian nationalists arguably reached their nadir in the mid-to-late 1930s.

A session of the People's Council (Volksraad) in Batavia (now Jakarta) in 1930.​

When World War II first broke out in 1939, it was not immediately apparent that it could offer new hope for the Indonesian independence movement. In fact, the conflict initially seemed like it might actively distract from the struggle, as seen by the fact that members of some nationalist parties (like Gerindo, formed in 1937) prioritized supporting the Netherlands against Nazism over their anticolonial ambitions.

In May 1940, Governor-General Alidius Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer declared martial law in the Dutch East Indies after the Netherlands fell under German occupation. This made it even easier for the colonial government to act against the few nationalist dissidents who refused to cooperate with them and remained at large. The prospects for extracting guarantees of self-government - or even a modicum of regional autonomy - from the Dutch colonial government appeared grim.

But as it turned out, events in the early 1940s would set Indonesia on the road to independence, creating the necessary conditions for its future leaders to win their long and hard-fought struggle for national liberation. Though few could have known in 1941, time was nearly up for the Netherlands East Indies. All Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, and their exiled and imprisoned compatriots had to do was set their watches, look to the horizon, and wait for the rising sun.

 

[ChaoticGenius]

"Blood may be thicker than water, but oil is thickest of all"​

A tale of Venezuela at the dawn of the Cold War​

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In the peak summer days of 1950, as humidity and heat blanketed the capital of Caracas, an outsider might be forgiven for the illusion that Venezuela was the torch-holder for the future of the Americas. Imagine the sight of an American engineer, taking those first few steps off of the state-owned Aeropostal's Lockheed Constellation, only one of two making the rounds between New York and the Grano de Oro International Airport in Maracaibo: modern buildings, services and amenities, whether by a Sears-Roebuck department store that his wife might be shopping at home, cars that one might see driving down Main Street, the beginnings of a prefab town in the suburbs of the capital city, not unlike those in the new suburbs back stateside. A burgeoning export economy based on the rise of oil extraction, most of which is found in Lake Maracaibo in the northwest, an incredibly fast-paced urbanization of its population that derives a strong influence from the post-war United States, and steps towards democratization and liberalization, albeit incredibly shaky and unstable, seem to present the birthplace of El Libertador, Simon Bolivar, as a victory of democracy and even capitalism over the competing ideologies of the communists and various caudillos that populate governments south of the equator.

Unfortunately for many Venezuelans, the modern façade that most outsiders dared not to penetrate concealed the truth, that the country is only a few careless steps away from being yet another failed experiment in nationhood. Some Venezuelans, many of whom were leftists punished by the state, made the proposition that it already is. After all, for them, as of June 1950, the United States of Venezuela is currently being led by a triunvirato of military officers from the Venezuelan army, which overthrew the elected Accion Democratica (AD) government of President Romulo Gallegos in a coup in November 1948. This revolt, coming only three years after the previous one, ended an experiment in fledgling, honest democracy, culminating at the confluence of several issues, namely intense political polarization between right and left, lack of broad public benefits from the economic rise, and in a more subtle but just as important way, the (direct or indirect) involvement of los Yanquis.

Part I: The Era of the Tachirenses and the October Revolution (1941-1945)​

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Perhaps democracy could have persisted beyond the brief, few years that it did, especially seeing as it wasn't always the case that the social democrats of the AD and the more conservative Union Patriotica Militar (UPM) (an association of military members, mostly junior officers) found themselves in opposition to one another. In fact, they had cooperated to coup the government in the aforementioned October Revolution of 1945. It didn't start off that way.

The history of Venezuela's rulers since the turn of the century had long been dominated by the tachirenses, a term referring to a region of the country where the Venezuelan Andes cut through, where most leaders, usually military or puppets of the military, originated from. President Isaias Medina Angarita, the Minister of War of his predecessor's cabinet, was expected to be yet another president to continue the line, and in fact was indirectly elected in 1941 by the National Congress (most members of which were appointed by the his predecessor) by 120 votes over his main competitor's 13 for that purpose.

A photo of President Isaias Medina Angarita.​

Despite his decidedly undemocratic means of accession to power, President Medina would quickly become one of the most influential leaders in the next steps of the ongoing political evolution of Venezuela that had begun since the death of President Juan Vicente Gomez in 1936. Despite his professed sympathies to the Italian dictator Mussolini and being a foil to his predecessor (acts of state repression during the President Contreras administration were often reported as being Medina's fault, and reform efforts of Contreras were often reported as being in spite of Medina's objections), he would lead Venezuela to be an important supplier of oil to the Allied war effort during the Second World War, joining the United Nations at its founding, and traveling to foster better relations among American nations, becoming the first sitting Venezuelan president to visit the United States.

Domestically, the bald-headed president surprised even his detractors for his willingness to open the political culture of Venezuela by legalizing political parties and encouraging a climate of relatively free political expression, beginning the era of true mass politics for the nation. Economically, President Medina proved just as proactive: recognizing new and old organized labor unions, inducing improved labor laws for worker quality of life, overhauling infrastructure for rapid urbanization, developing literacy and higher education, reforming the tax system into a progressive one, and, perhaps most notably, expanding the rules and regulations against which the oil industry could operate in Venezuela.

Needless to say, by all accounts, the administration of President Medina should have been a successful one, reinforced by the victory of the Partido Democrático Venezolano (PDV) in the 1944 congressional elections, so what worries would he possibly have of a coup at all? Initially, the answer was none. Even the adecos, who had been Medina's primary opposition in the 1941 and 1944 elections, were prepared to support the tachirense line of succession, especially after the president picked Diogenes Escalante, the Venezuelan ambassador to Washington, D.C., a civilian who was certain to expound upon Medina's political reforms where Medina himself could not, out of an obligation to the recalcitrant military.

A photo of President Medina (left) standing with Venezuala's Ambassador to the U.S., Diogenes Escalante (right).; A photo of Ambassador Escalante signing the founding Charter of the United Nations.​

By October 1945, however, the situation was drastically different. Factions had begun to form, encouraging rumors of an expected civil war: lopecistas on the right backed Medina's predecessor, former President Eleazar Lopez Contreras, for the presidency, believing that Medina had done wrong by backing a liberal civilian to carry on the tachirense era. Medinistas, of course, being loyalists to Medina and his choice. Later in the month, things got worse. Escalante had lost his mental faculties by that time of the year, and Medina was forced to choose another successor at the last minute, opting for a bland candidate in his Minister for Agriculture and Livestock, Dr. Ángel Biaggini. It was at this point that the AD, which was initially supportive of Medina's first choice and until then had been rebuffing plots by non-commissioned officers, quickly changed sides in an act of no confidence, and joined the UPM to launch a joint civic-military coup on October 18th, 1945.

In truth, President Medina had been informed of the intention for a coup to occur the day before, on October 17th, the same day that the AD planned a rally at the Nuevo Circo grounds in Caracas. Once made aware of the implications of what was essentially a call for revolution, orders went out for the immediate arrest of the three known military leaders behind the plan to coup, Lt. Colonel Marcos Perez Jimenez chief among them. For the UPM, this was tantamount to the Medina government firing the first shot, and in the morning hours of October 18th, La Planicie Military School in Caracas fell to an internal revolt, followed shortly thereafter by various barracks throughout the capital, and then the Maracay garrison. The government swiftly moved to recapture at least one of the barracks, and gunfire was exchanged between pro- and anti-government forces on the city streets. Such an exchange of bullets continued far into that night, where President Medina was given the option to order an attack on the La Planicie Military School, where the leadership of the revolt had holed up. Despairing causing the death of the cadets, many of whom had been his own students just years before, he relented, and upon hearing the next morning on October 19th that the air force, Maracay Plaza, and previously recaptured barracks were under rebel control, he surrendered.

A photo of Nuevo Circo in Caracas at full attendance (top left).; A photo La Planicie Military School (top right).; A photo of Maracay Plaza's inauguration in December 1930 (bottom middle).​

Years later, upon reflection, some national historians assert that Medina could have acted stronger to defend himself, to resist the coup, and ultimately, to defeat it. While the UPM had significant military support, he still had some supporters, and the Caracas Police Department was loyal to him. For President Medina however, his choice to peacefully surrender indicates that he decided to accept his downfall rather than bloodily be forced into it, lest his country succumb to bloodshed. And with that noble intention, the era of the tachirenses ignobly came to a close.

 

[gorganhound]

Advance Australia Fair
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Australia's post-war order was a nation of dichotomy. Entering the Second World War as a loyal British subject, the aggression of Japan had resulted in an Australia that had increasingly asserted her independence. While much aggrandisement had been made that the First World War led to the birth of an Australian identity (overlooking the precursor sentiments seen in the second Boer War), the second truly saw the beginnings of an independent Australian outlook.

Bombs fell on Darwin, Submarines plied the East coast, even daring to slip into the grand natural edifices of Port Jackson. War in Australia was no longer a colonial or European affair, but one whose prospects could very well end on Australian shores. Fundamentally, Australia had been forced to grow up. A nation whose motor industries mostly consisted of importing aircraft and building the frames around foreign cars had ended the war with an established ship-building industry, a large independent aircraft manufacturer and an expanded industrial capacity. No longer just a British dominion but now a middle pacific power it would fall to the next government to chart the course of Australia's post-war boom.

Ben Chifley was perhaps not the person who was immediately fated for this particular role. A NSW Labor figure. Chifley's political career had been almost wiped out during the Great Depression with him only returning to Parliament in 1940. Appointed as Treasurer in 1941, he would steer Australia's finances through the war centralising income tax, enforcing price controls and pushing surplus personal income into savings and war loans. Following the death of Curtin and the end of the war in 1945, Chifley would find himself not just Prime Minister of Australia, but one free from the large debts that had saddled it following the Great War.

Chifley set about establishing his "shining light on the hill" pushing for a raft of social welfare reforms with a reinvigorated mandate following a successful referendum in 1946. Pharmaceutical subsidies, dental assistance, child care, pensions and mental health funding reforms would all be pushed through, while progress towards establishment of a full national health service would be blocked in the high courts. Elsewhere reforms pushed for improved access to employment and unlocking federal funding for public housing.

Science as well would feel the long reach of Chifley's arm. The CSIRO was reorganised and expanded, The Australian National University was established in Canberra and the Australian Acoustic laboratories established.

Despite this boom and expansion, here the dichotomy was still evident as wartime economic policy, partially driven by fear of inflation, partly to help Britain was maintained long beyond the war's immediate end.

This boom also touched on another flagstone of Australian policy. With a growing and expanding economy the question of who was to work became prominent. Generous support schemes for returning servicemen would only go so far and the wartime experience had convinced many that Australia must populate or perish. Seemingly at odds initially with the White Australia policy, the government oversaw mass migration from the war-torn british isles, which later expanded to areas of europe traditionally outside the purview of that program. Maltese, Greeks, Italians, Yugoslavs would be the most prominent communities to land on Australian shores but by no means the only one, and the government quick to reject any notion of increased 'asiatic' immigration.

Chifley's regime was overseen by other affairs, viewing air travel as a public service he nationalised QANTAS, established Trans-Australian Airlines and was only prevented from stamping out private corporations by the intervention of the high courts. This would not be the last of his run-ins with the legal system. Chifley sought to fulfil a long-term policy belief and continue the establishment of the national commonwealth bank in 1945, with the 1947 banking act which would nationalise all banking in Australia. A stand-off ensued when the High Court rejected the bill, but Chifley refused to repeal it anyway.

As the Cold War heated up, Chifley increasingly found himself wedged on the issue of anti-communism, fears of being usurped by the communists on the left, and portrayed as a sympathiser on the right Chifley would use increasingly draconian measures. A 1948 Queensland rail strike saw workers denied unemployment benefits, and a prolonged coal strike initiated by the communist party's infiltration of unions in 1949 was broken with 13,000 army troops. Despite this and further measures such as the establishment of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), refusal to support Britain in the Malayan Emergency Chifley's government was seen increasingly as arrogant and weak on communism.

In 1949 Chifley would lose government to Menzies and the Liberal Party, as the Korean war fortuitously brought the cold war to its hottest temperature yet, the new government would promise an auspicious turn of policy…