Journal of Emil Ilyich Shabayev
June 24, 2021
Something that frustrates many foreign observers is Russia's enduring hostility towards liberalism and the West, sentiments shared both by the regime and the populace. Many have argued that the Russian people have an inherent fondness for strongmen and a disdain for basic freedoms, something that has endured through tsarism and socialism alike. This is a gross oversimplification of Russian history, but that is not something I wish to delve further. No, I wish to instead explain the sordid history of liberalism in modern Russia, and how that lead to the current regime.
Many are no doubt familiar with the concept of the "end of history" following the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to many, this event heralded the final victory of liberal capitalism over any of its ideological competitors, with the only future political conflict being its spread to the remaining anti-liberal holdouts in the Third World. In the newly reformed Russia and across the rest of the Eastern Bloc, former party officials reinvented themselves as liberal reformers, who gave the people in their home countries a promise: that the fall of Soviet socialism would lead to a freer and more prosperous future.
That it was yet another lie did not cross our minds. These "reformers" soon set out to privatize all sectors of the formerly socialist economy, an action that drove many enterprises into bankruptcy and caused the kind of deindustrialization that took decades to progress in the West to occur in only a few years. Social services were also cut, as the American-based neoclassical economists had ordained the free market to be supreme. Millions were driven into destitution, something that is reflected in most statistics of the period: unemployment, alcoholism, excess deaths, and crime skyrocketed while disposable income and birth rates collapsed. From this perspective, the end of socialism was one of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes in post-World War 2 history. All the while, the leaders of this dismantlement made a tremendous profit, becoming the new private owners of capital and gaining a stranglehold over post-socialist society. Everyone calls them "oligarchs," and unlike the businessmen of the West, they cannot claim to posses even a veneer of legitimacy regarding their wealth.
In Russia, this "shock therapy" was helmed by its first President: Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, a former Party secretary turned "reformer" who cultivated a positive image of himself and his government to the West, having a rapport with President Clinton. Of course, the realities of his rule were far different. Yeltsin was incompetent at governance and, while not a true dictator, possessed authoritarian tendencies. In 1993, when the State Duma attempted to hold him accountable, he responded by shelling the building they were meeting in with tanks. By 1996, the tensions within Russian society had grown to the point where a motley alliance of Soviet nostalgiacs, chauvinistic nationalists, and dissident liberals had formed to challenge Yeltsin at the ballot box. In the end, the presidential election of 1996, contested between Yeltsin and Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov, was only narrowly won by the incumbent. It was close enough that many allege that the CIA, as a favor from Clinton, had interfered to ensure Yeltsin gained a second term. All through Yeltsin's tenure, the emerging class of oligarchs continued to amass power.
It is in this climate that our current President, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, rose to power. A KGB agent well-versed in the art of deception, he was a surprise choice for Yeltsin's hand-picked successor. Over the next few years, he managed to grow Russia's economy, raise living standards, and bring stability to the nation's chaotic politics. In his first two terms he was viewed positively by the West, with only the 2005-2006 Georgian War blemishing his reputation. If he had retired after his second term, many would have considered him to be an effective leader.
Of course, he emphatically refused to retire, and in the next few years, his carefully-crafted charade was exposed. Putin was no skillful administrator. He had instead constructed a political house of cards out of Russia's ruling class, establishing an uneasy balance of power with the oligarchs by building personal report with them and playing them off against each other. All the while, he rewarded his inner circle with vast influence over the Russian state, promoting siloviki to many positions of power. He and his associates not only turned a blind eye to corruption, but personally profited from it, and I suspect that he is likely one of the richest men on Earth. Central to his rule was the slow expansion of the security apparatus, a process that had begun under Yeltsin's second term but accelerated under Putin. Through this, he strangled Russia's civil society in its crib, not in the service of any ideology, but only in the name of power. Russia's economic growth was also a charade - most of it came from the expansion of the energy sector, while other industries were entirely neglected.
By 2012, following the global financial recession and resulting collapse in oil prices that had crippled Russia's economy, the Russian people had reached the end of their rope. Following a blatantly fraudulent election where Putin returned to the presidency after a four year term as prime minister, hundreds of thousands marched out onto the streets in protest against Putin. It appeared that he had outworn his welcome, but as always, he had a trick up his sleeve, and events in a neighboring country two years later would grant him an opportunity. Following the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine, Putin reinvented himself as a "national conservative," annexing Crimea, sparking a separatist uprising in Donbass, and intensifying a culture war against the West and social liberalism. Many were deceived by his actions, and his popularity skyrocketed, despite newly-instated Western sanctions objectively worsening the material conditions of lower-class Russians. However, in the past few years, this stunt has begun to lose its luster. Russia's economy is in a period of stagnation, our social issues remain unresolved, and the government has recently passed multiple unpopular entitlement reforms. Putin's popularity has continually sunk, and recent revelations on the extent to which corruption permeates Russia's ruling class has angered many. With the recent pandemic having only accelerated these trends, I feel that a deft politician could launch a campaign against the regime, with popular support.
Perhaps that deft politician will be me.
Besides the Putinist United Russia Party, Russia's political scene has a controlled opposition: a set of political parties with representation in the Duma that provides an electoral outlet for discontent, yet remains covertly loyal to Putin and rubber-stamps his initiatives.
The most prominent opposition party is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, an organization with a complex history. The average Leninist would be deeply confused by it. It is not a regimented vanguard party as it is a loose-knit coalition of different left-leaning interest groups who use "Communist" for brand value: reactionary Soviet nostalgiacs, Stalinists, youthful radicals, "democratic socialists," or even moderate social democrats who nonetheless do not have faith in the other opposition parties. Despite its radical appeal, the past two decades have made it clear that it is merely a controlled opposition party like all the rest. Its general-secretary, Gennady Zyuganov, is a regime stooge, and the leadership is married to blind idealization of the past with little vision for constructing a true socialism of the 21st, and not the 20th, century. However, in recent years many young, desperate activists have joined its ranks, and a confrontation with the leadership is quite possible. Perhaps the party's ideological incoherence could present an opportunity for someone to emerge and mold a new vision of left-wing politics in Russia.
The other two major opposition parties are seldom worth mentioning. The Liberal Democratic Party, chaired by the carnival showman Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is a ultranationalist populist party more known for absurd stunts than political activism, with most of its vote coming from disaffected citizens more interested in protesting the regime than promoting the party's ideology. "A Just Russia" is a toothless social democratic party covertly established by Putin to siphon left-liberal votes away from the Communist Party, and can't possibly amount to much.
It is clear that, despite its leadership, the Communist Party is the only viable vehicle for an opposition politician. Liberalism in Russia is fundamentally tainted, and the regime is quick to tar its enemies with allegations of being a Western-style liberal. It will be far more difficult for them to do so against one who drapes himself in the red banner of Marx and Lenin. Our only hope is that both Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky retire from politics in the next few years, and in doing so, create an opening for someone to fill.