Does good and evil exist?

[Susano]

Does monetary value exist? Do constitutional boundaries exist? Do adoptions exist?

You can call all those things unreal fiction. That we give gold the value of "36,600 Euro per kg" is not prescribed by laws of physics or anything. Everyone just agrees that this is the way it is. Person A agrees to exchange what is for many a year's income for that kg, and Person B agrees, and thus they just create that fact. Constitutions are even worse. They are just ink on a page! Not even the best written constitution could defend itself. They only work because people follow them - i.e., ultimately, people follow them because people follow them. It is another socially created fact. As are adoptions, of course - we have people simply saying "This is my son" or "This is my daughter", with society agreeing to it after a series of legal rituals. Everyone accepts it as fact then.

So it is clear that when it comes to abstract matters pertaining their lives and societies, people create their own reality. Some things are true simply by dint of the fact that we have declared them to be true. And in this case, the universally created reality is ethics. As was noted in this thread, people these days are wary to use the actual terms "good" and "evil" - but of course people still condemn some actions morally, and laud other actions morally. That is, essentially, the same as "evil" and "good".

So, yes, evil and good exists, because we, humans, have created ethics, just like we have created a whole lot of other things simply by declaring them. Doesn't make them unreal; simply makes them abstract concepts.

For that matter, I wished people would get over their complexes regarding the word "evil". Evil is what (or whom!) is to be morally condemned. That's it. There is no supernatural or metaphysical component needed, and some thing, and yes, also some people, clearly are evil.

 

[changeling]

Good and evil aren't useful as descriptors of people, I don't think. Not because they can't apply to people, but because we are terrible at making such judgments, and even an accurate judgment doesn't provide us with much insight as to their future behavior; just as you suggest.

But I think they are useful as descriptions of actions. I think the terms bother some people because they are tinged with fantastical notions of Good and Evil as quasi-physical forces from fiction, or with notions of immutable rules lists which are true regardless of circumstances. But I think most of us would admit some actions which make things better and which produce value and others which do the opposite. I think "good" and "evil" make perfectly fine descriptors for those actions, even without allowing any reality beyond our universe. (Though I do in fact believe in such a reality.)

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We agree on almost everything. "good" and "evil" as shorthands and efficient way to communicate value judgment of action are expected and understandable (sense of "fairness" appears to be at least partially innate and natural languages obey Zipf's law).

It's when one try to propose universal rules or claim to get revelation of "perfect" moral guidelines, things get hairy. But that would turn the discussion into rehash of ethics 101 through infinity, so let's not do that.

 

[RoboRenee]

You will never find a single atom of goodness or a speck of evil. In any physical sense, they certainly do not exist.

There doesn't seem to be any solid metaphysical argument either - good does not always triumph, nor does evil. People don't always get 'what they deserve' in the end. These aren't even things that happen most of the time, nor is there any solid guarantee of judgement postmortem. We don't even all agree on what's what - everyone is the hero of their own story after all, even as they commit atrocities.


Even so... there is no value in discarding the concepts altogether. In saying they don't exist and therefore don't matter. Societally, shared rules and expectations are vital on a macro level. Nothing becomes better if we throw out the concept of moral judgement altogether.

 

[Susano]

You will never find a single atom of goodness or a speck of evil. In any physical sense, they certainly do not exist.

There doesn't seem to be any solid metaphysical argument either - good does not always triumph, nor does evil. People don't always get 'what they deserve' in the end. These aren't even things that happen most of the time, nor is there any solid guarantee of judgement postmortem. We don't even all agree on what's what - everyone is the hero of their own story after all, even as they commit atrocities.

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This seems a bit silly to me. You won't find a single atom of democracy, of childhood, of free market dynamics of, hell, just of the colour red, either - but all those things exist. You won't get everybody agree on what 'democratic' even means, yet democracy exists. And the supernatural connotations you conjure up here are not necessary. Good doesn't always triumph. Soooo...?

"Good" and "evil" are not merely useful concepts. More than that, they exist as much as any other abstract concept does, most of which we don't question the existence of at all.

 

[mesonoxian]

You will never find a single atom of goodness or a speck of evil. In any physical sense, they certainly do not exist.

There doesn't seem to be any solid metaphysical argument either - good does not always triumph, nor does evil. People don't always get 'what they deserve' in the end. These aren't even things that happen most of the time, nor is there any solid guarantee of judgement postmortem. We don't even all agree on what's what - everyone is the hero of their own story after all, even as they commit atrocities.


Even so... there is no value in discarding the concepts altogether. In saying they don't exist and therefore don't matter. Societally, shared rules and expectations are vital on a macro level. Nothing becomes better if we throw out the concept of moral judgement altogether.

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Just because something doesn't exist as as a particle doesn't mean it doesn't exist. You won't find a particle of music, or sorrow, or heat.

Metaphysical existence doesn't mean some supernatural reality. Just something which is beyond the purely physical facts of the situation. "Don Quixote is an old story" includes an implicit metaphysical claim because it posits the existence of stories and of Don Quixote.

 

[RoboRenee]

This seems a bit silly to me. You won't find a single atom of democracy, of childhood, of free market dynamics of, hell, just of the colour red, either - but all those things exist. You won't get everybody agree on what 'democratic' even means, yet democracy exists. And the supernatural connotations you conjure up here are not necessary. Good doesn't always triumph. Soooo...?

"Good" and "evil" are not merely useful concepts. More than that, they exist as much as any other abstract concept does, most of which we don't question the existence of at all.

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Well, I mean, I'd argue a lot of abstract concepts don't technically exist.

Nonetheless, that final paragraph you didn't quote was a couple sentences about how there's no point in discarding the concepts. They don't technically exist. But that doesn't really matter, does it? Lots of shit doesn't exist and is still important. Because acting as if it does is more beneficial than doing otherwise.

 

[Susano]

Nonetheless, that final paragraph you didn't quote was a couple sentences about how there's no point in discarding the concepts. They don't technically exist. But that doesn't really matter, does it? Lots of shit doesn't exist and is still important. Because acting as if it does is more beneficial than doing otherwise.

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I cut it out to fit better with where I started my reply, but I did cover it in my own final paragraph: You asserted that those concepts are useful. I agree, but your post basically implied they are only useful. My counter-assertion was that more than that, they are real en par with a bunch of other things we'd never question the reality of. Even believing you do, that would then hardly be the majority position.

 

[Tasrill]

Good and evil are as real as numbers. So they are things humans made up to communicate things with other humans.



p.s. take that Platonic Realists.

 

[SITB]

There really should be a word for things that don't actually exist, yet because people treat them as real they come into existence.

 

[Threnodist]

There really should be a word for things that don't actually exist, yet because people treat them as real they come into existence.

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Thats essentially what a social construct is

 

[Shadell]

Good and evil are as real as numbers. So they are things humans made up to communicate things with other humans.



p.s. take that Platonic Realists.

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Numbers are an interesting case.

We can, and I believe should, argue that they lack ontology. "4" does not exist in a sense absent human interpretation. At the same time, this can be consistent with the observation that numbers, despite not being real things, can still tell us truth about the relations of things.

In this sense, they're arguably not real in any ontological fashion, but are real in the fashion that statements about numbers carry properties of truth.

Something like Shapiro's version of structuralism seems to apply rather oddly to notions of good and evil, but perhaps this isn't what you intend?

Are you arguing for fictionalism?

Not agreeing with Plato is a very wide interesting space for ontology.

 

[dhasenan]

In the Abrahamic and Zoroastrian religion, it is said that their is a never ending cosmic battle between good and evil.

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I would be quite hesitant about lumping all the Abrahamic religions together. Islam has a lot of similarities with Christianity, but the two diverge a lot from Judaism. Judaism doesn't really have a cosmic battle of any sort, as far as I'm aware — more like arguments between humans and G*d, and G*d isn't guaranteed to win by any means.

The other religions feature a possibly finite battle between people — not necessarily humans, but beings that think somewhat like humans — some of whom champion or define or embody the concepts of good or evil. This doesn't require "good" and "evil" to be quasi-physical things, and it doesn't necessarily require them to be objective aspects of reality instead of the arbitrary whims of a powerful being. There are plenty of Christians who believe that good things are good because God said so, and if God changed his mind on a whim, that would change what counts as good and evil. But there are others that believe that God's nature is toward good (and good is defined separately), or that his nature defines good (and he could, but would not, change his nature to be evil).

 

[Tasrill]

Numbers are an interesting case.

We can, and I believe should, argue that they lack ontology. "4" does not exist in a sense absent human interpretation. At the same time, this can be consistent with the observation that numbers despite not being real things can still tell us truth about the relations of things.

In this sense, they're arguably not real in any ontological fashion, but are real in the fashion that statements about numbers carry properties of truth.

Something like Shapiro's version of structuralism seems to apply rather oddly to notions of good and evil, but perhaps this isn't what you intend?

Are you arguing for fictionalism?

Not agreeing with Plato is a very wide interesting space for ontology.

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My view on numbers falls under the fictionalism banner. More specifically I think of math as a language, or more accurately a conlang, that is very useful just like language itself is but is no more 'real' than language. Though I am definitely not well read on the subject.

 

[Desdendelle]

Hasn't this debate been around for centuries upon centuries without any answer whatsoever?

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Yeah - with the caveat that by "no answer" you mean "no consensus" - but that does not mean there is no answer.

56.4% of philosophers lean towards a belief in moral realism - so I think objective good & evil probably do exist. I'd be the first to admit that I don't fully understand the arguments for it, but I think it's a bit more complicated and unsettled then must of us would believe.

Preliminary Survey results | PhilPapers Surveys

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Surveying philosophers is a terrible way to answer philosophical questions. You simply cannot discount any number of reasons (e.g. shit work, gut feelings, opinions, not-actually-specialised-in-this, etc) that could horribly skew your data or make the answer not-count.

Anyway, to answer @Spacehillbilly... that really depends on what you mean by "exist", "good" and "evil". Does "exist" mean "present and available to us via our senses"? "Is a defined concept"? "Has an effect on something else"? Something else entirely? Which (meta-)ethical theory are you using to define good and evil? Christianity's? Bentham's? Kant's? Aristotle's? Mine? Yours?

 

[Chloe Sullivan]

I'm just going to preemptively post the inevitable:



Because we all know that's as far as we're getting.

 

[Ruaire]

I think most people are moral realists in practice.

There is a famous epistemological argument called "Here is one hand". It's an argument against philosophical skepticism, but it expresses a principle that is relevant here. It goes like this:

• Here is one hand,
• And here is another.
• There are at least two external objects in the world.
• Therefore, an external world exists.

Now the skeptics have some problems with this argument, but they'll say that then then live their lives as though they knew they had hands. It gets to an important point: what is more plausible? That external world skepticism is correct, or that I have 2 hands? Sometimes an argument can look correct but just not be convincing because we don't and shouldn't approach the world as agents who must justify all beliefs from first principles via logical propositions. We can accept that we already know things.

I approach moral theory in a similar manner. For example if I accept that morality is actually socially constructed then it would imply that, say, slavery was actually good in the confederacy.

I must ask myself: what is more plausible? That the confederacy was good, or that slavery was actually wrong?

Now obviously I can amend my theory of social constructed morality such that slavery was actually wrong, but it's clear that the reason I'm doing so is because it seems obvious that any moral theory which actually justifies slavery is obviously wrong and not because I've actually found a flaw. So I say why not cut out the middleman? I accept that morality is real because it obviously is. Slavery is obviously wrong if you actually think about it. Torture is obviously wrong. And so on.

That isn't to say I have a strong positive arguments for why the skeptic should accept morality. But similarly none of the arguments against moral realism pass the sniff test to me. I run up against "if you're correct than that means that torturing little kids is perfectly fine" and conclude that the most likely answer is there is some flaw in the argument I haven't found yet. I conclude I do in fact have 2 hands.

 

[Threnodist]

Surveying philosophers is a terrible way to answer philosophical questions. You simply cannot discount any number of reasons (e.g. shit work, gut feelings, opinions, not-actually-specialised-in-this, etc) that could horribly skew your data or make the answer not-count.

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I never said that this is how we should answer philosophical questions - merely that it should inform the discussion so people don't rush to the easy answer of moral skepticism, as people in the thread seemed to be doing.

Though I do think it's a bit ridiculous to not even evaluate the opinions of people who have had the most engagement with these ideas, even if not all of them are specialized in ethics.

 

[Desdendelle]

I think most people are moral realists in practice.

There is a famous epistemological argument called "Here is one hand". It's an argument against philosophical skepticism, but it expresses a principle that is relevant here. It goes like this:

• Here is one hand,
• And here is another.
• There are at least two external objects in the world.
• Therefore, an external world exists.

Now the skeptics have some problems with this argument, but they'll say that then then live their lives as though they knew they had hands. It gets to an important point: what is more plausible? That external world skepticism is correct, or that I have 2 hands? Sometimes an argument can look correct but just not be convincing because we don't and shouldn't approach the world as agents who must justify all beliefs from first principles via logical propositions. We can accept that we already know things.

I approach moral theory in a similar manner. For example if I accept that morality is actually socially constructed then it would imply that, say, slavery was actually good in the confederacy.

I must ask myself: what is more plausible? That the confederacy was good, or that slavery was actually wrong?

Now obviously I can amend my theory of social constructed morality such that slavery was actually wrong, but it's clear that the reason I'm doing so is because it seems obvious that any moral theory which actually justifies slavery is obviously wrong and not because I've actually found a flaw. So I say why not cut out the middleman? I accept that morality is real because it obviously is. Slavery is obviously wrong if you actually think about it. Torture is obviously wrong. And so on.

That isn't to say I have a strong positive arguments for why the skeptic should accept morality. But similarly none of the arguments against moral realism pass the sniff test to me. I run up against "if you're correct than that means that torturing little kids is perfectly fine" and conclude that the most likely answer is there is some flaw in the argument I haven't found yet. I conclude I do in fact have 2 hands.

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As far as I know, the way most philosophers deal with scepticism about fundamental things (knowledge, not-being-a-brain-in-a-vat, and so on) is not by trying to convince the sceptic that he's wrong, but by showing that the sceptic cannot force us to accept a sceptical conclusion from our own postulates. Indeed, the scary (so to speak) thing about good sceptics is that they use our own postulates and show us that we have to accept rather unwanted conclusions because of them.
That aside - at least in philosophy, arguing that something is this and not that because it is obviously so (or because it is intuitive) is considered extremely weak, because it is not universal. Consider, for example, the famous trolley problem: after mentioning it while discussing utilitarian ethics, my Intro to Ethics lecturer asked the class whether one should kill one to save five or do nothing and let the five die, and the intuitions of the class (around one hundred people) were by no means uniform: some said that one should be killed to save five, and some said that you should do nothing. In both cases - "which is the correct solution to the trolley problem?" and "are ethics objective?" - an answer consisting of "it's obvious that so-and-so" is simply not enough.
(It should be noted that I am not a moral relativist; I have not seen any convincing argument toward moral relativism and the position is fraught with problems. As far as I can tell, if there is no objective ethics it's because there's no ethics, period. I don't have a good grasp of the matter to have a firm opinion either way.)

I never said that this is how we should answer philosophical questions - merely that it should inform the discussion so people don't rush to the easy answer of moral skepticism, as people in the thread seemed to be doing.

Though I do think it's a bit ridiculous to not even evaluate the opinions of people who have had the most engagement with these ideas, even if not all of them are specialized in ethics.

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Philosophy is my area. I'm studying it, I'm living it, I'm meeting with and learning from philosophers, and I say with full confidence: some philosophers are full of crap (sometimes or always).
That aside, my problem isn't with "let's ask philosophers what they think about this" - this is only sensible - it's with "let's not also append their arguments and explanations to their opinions", because without knowing why they're moral realists you can't tell if they're saying anything worthwhile or not.

 

[blast flame]

I don't believe there's an objective good or evil built into the laws of the universe. But at the same time I do believe strongly in my personal sense of good and evil.

 

[Threnodist]

As
Philosophy is my area. I'm studying it, I'm living it, I'm meeting with and learning from philosophers, and I say with full confidence: some philosophers are full of crap (sometimes or always).
That aside, my problem isn't with "let's ask philosophers what they think about this" - this is only sensible - it's with "let's not also append their arguments and explanations to their opinions", because without knowing why they're moral realists you can't tell if they're saying anything worthwhile or not.

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Okay so I guess you just misinterpreted me then?

 

[Ruaire]

As far as I know, the way most philosophers deal with scepticism about fundamental things (knowledge, not-being-a-brain-in-a-vat, and so on) is not by trying to convince the sceptic that he's wrong, but by showing that the sceptic cannot force us to accept a sceptical conclusion from our own postulates. Indeed, the scary (so to speak) thing about good sceptics is that they use our own postulates and show us that we have to accept rather unwanted conclusions because of them.
That aside - at least in philosophy, arguing that something is this and not that because it is obviously so (or because it is intuitive) is considered extremely weak, because it is not universal. Consider, for example, the famous trolley problem: after mentioning it while discussing utilitarian ethics, my Intro to Ethics lecturer asked the class whether one should kill one to save five or do nothing and let the five die, and the intuitions of the class (around one hundred people) were by no means uniform: some said that one should be killed to save five, and some said that you should do nothing. In both cases - "which is the correct solution to the trolley problem?" and "are ethics objective?" - an answer consisting of "it's obvious that so-and-so" is simply not enough.
(It should be noted that I am not a moral relativist; I have not seen any convincing argument toward moral relativism and the position is fraught with problems. As far as I can tell, if there is no objective ethics it's because there's no ethics, period. I don't have a good grasp of the matter to have a firm opinion either way.)


Philosophy is my area. I'm studying it, I'm living it, I'm meeting with and learning from philosophers, and I say with full confidence: some philosophers are full of crap (sometimes or always).
That aside, my problem isn't with "let's ask philosophers what they think about this" - this is only sensible - it's with "let's not also append their arguments and explanations to their opinions", because without knowing why they're moral realists you can't tell if they're saying anything worthwhile or not.

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I agree that something being "obvious" isn't a great argument, but my post was a simplified account for a web forum so I'm not too bothered.

If I had to give a explanation more grounded in the literature I would say the positions I find most convincing are in line with Huemer's ethical intuitionism and Cuneo's partner's in crime argument. I'm at work so I'll summarize from memory (philosophy is your area, so perhaps more for the benefit of everyone else in the thread):

Huemer: It is rational to primae facie to trust the way things appear to us until we have good reason not too. Denying this leads to epistemic self defeat. This also implies we should trust primae facie the intuitions that imply moral realism, and that if they remain undefeated we should believe moral realism to be true. Huemer argues that this primae facie justification for moral realism remain undefeated.

Cuneo: Moral normative facts are the same sort of thing as epistemic normative facts. This implies that any objectionable qualities that moral normative facts exhibit which would convince us to discount them would also apply to epistemic normative facts. This leads to general skepticism and is self defeating. Thus moral normative facts exist.

I also believe there exists literature to support my "basic facts are more plausible" approach more generally, though I can't recall any off the top of my head

I'll readily admit however that I doubt any of my philosophical beliefs could stand up to rigorous examination. You're someone actually working in the field, and I'm a guy who took a few classes in undergrad half a decade ago. But I stand by my claim that I haven't found any of the arguments against ethical realism convincing enough to actually abandon my moral beliefs.

 

[NonSequtur]

I'd argue that moral statements aren't interested in being real or true. It's not coherent to ask if a question or command is true*, and good and evil are closer to that than they are to statements.

*Arguable, but so is everything.

some philosophers are full of crap

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the best part is every philosopher believes this

i know i do

 

[Fourthspartan56]

I approach moral theory in a similar manner. For example if I accept that morality is actually socially constructed then it would imply that, say, slavery was actually good in the confederacy.

I must ask myself: what is more plausible? That the confederacy was good, or that slavery was actually wrong?

Now obviously I can amend my theory of social constructed morality such that slavery was actually wrong, but it's clear that the reason I'm doing so is because it seems obvious that any moral theory which actually justifies slavery is obviously wrong and not because I've actually found a flaw. So I say why not cut out the middleman? I accept that morality is real because it obviously is. Slavery is obviously wrong if you actually think about it. Torture is obviously wrong. And so on.

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This doesn't really make sense to me.

We have many people who currently support torture and historically massive numbers of people who have supported slavery, they no doubt viewed and currently view their positions as obviously right.

So why is their view of obvious rightness less real than your view of obvious wrongness? It's just arbitrary to suggest that your certainty is a more rightful arbitrator of what is right and wrong than their certainty.

Not to mention that this argument only works if we're talking about moral values that literally everyone engaging in the conversation agrees on, when talking about less clear-cut things like military intervention or capitalism whether they're "obviously wrong" is not so clear.

That isn't to say I have a strong positive arguments for why the skeptic should accept morality. But similarly none of the arguments against moral realism pass the sniff test to me. I run up against "if you're correct than that means that torturing little kids is perfectly fine" and conclude that the most likely answer is there is some flaw in the argument I haven't found yet. I conclude I do in fact have 2 hands.

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Just because something is unattractive to you personally does not make it false, I think it's safe to say that existence is full of things that are offensive or horrifying. Thus, just because the implications of moral relativism are unnerving to you does not mean that it is any less or more likely to false.

Furthermore, I seriously question the logic that just because morality is not objective means that we should tolerate all things, the use of morality is that it ascribes common values of right and wrong thus just because our morals are subjective does not mean we should not care about them. The universe has no opinion about the rightness or wrongness of torturing a small child, but that doesn't mean that I can't oppose it. So I do not find that to be a particularly sound reason to reject the idea of subjective morality.

 

[mesonoxian]

This doesn't really make sense to me.

We have many people who currently support torture and historically massive numbers of people who have supported slavery, they no doubt viewed and currently view their positions as obviously right.

So why is their view of obvious rightness less real than your view of obvious wrongness? It's just arbitrary to suggest that your certainty is a more rightful arbitrator of what is right and wrong than their certainty.

Not to mention that this argument only works if we're talking about moral values that literally everyone engaging in the conversation agrees on, when talking about less clear-cut things like military intervention or capitalism whether they're "obviously wrong" is not so clear.

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That could mean morality is purely subjective, or it could mean that some people are wrong about morality some times. I believe the latter. The slaver who thinks they are morally just is simply mistaken about the facts of the matter.

 

[Avernus]

This doesn't really make sense to me.

We have many people who currently support torture and historically massive numbers of people who have supported slavery, they no doubt viewed and currently view their positions as obviously right.

So why is their view of obvious rightness less real than your view of obvious wrongness?

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For one because many of them didn't look at it as moral, they just looked at as "necessary" or profitable.

And second, the fact that such people create so many excuses and lies to support their positions demonstrates how much they were/are in the wrong. And that on some level they know it, even if they refuse to outright acknowledge it even to themselves. People don't create things like the entire elaborate racist mythology used to justify American slavery just because they are making an honest mistake.