Actually, no, not really.
Strategic bombing in the Second World War was more about revenge and slaughtering the enemy's civilians than any valid strategic military purpose. After the British bombed Lübeck in 1941 (because they thought they could hit it and create a firestorm to kill a lot of people), Hitler basically decided to declare open season on British civilians with the bombing of London. In response, Air Marshall Harris was ordered to pursue a 'dehousing' policy in order to break morale. He wasn't ordered to bomb factories, he was ordered to deliberately target the homes of factory workers to destroy them and force those families out into the cold (if he couldn't simply kill them all). Factories were only bombed by accident. Harris notes always go into detail about the morale, the number of civilians killed, bombardment of factories comes off like an afterthought.
In fact, that was something the Germans were really thankful for. Pre-Haris the RAF had come really close to hitting their only important ball-bearing factory which could've done severe damage to Germany's war machine (by the time the RAF refocused on it the Germans had diversified). Even at the time, operational research proved that the strategy was bunk and it had been explicitly opposed by various generals and admirals. It was only after the Dehousing Paper (something scientifically debunked) was submitted to Parliament and they forced the RAF to do it that it was actually done. Given how ineffective the Blitz was on London, they knew first hand why this was an ineffective idea. After the war, the Germans credited strategic bombing as a major hamper, but all of the operational research at the time indicated only minimal effect.
No one (except the Americans) tried to even research the effects of strategic bombing on the enemy after they executed the strategy, they merely took it for granted. From what we know now it wasn't until well into 1943 that bombing had an effect on the course of the war. German production still increased until the very end, because as soon as strategic bombing had an effect, Bomber Harris decided that they needed to focus on killing more civilians and promptly wasted time attacking Berlin and other non-industrial or too well defended targets. Everything that was done to improve the actual effectiveness of bombing was done over the objections of the chief Air Marshall, Harris.
Strategic bombing of industrial cities didn't stop German production from increasing throughout the war. In fact, there's some suggestion that strategic bombing increased industrial production in and of itself. With the city destroyed, more workers could be devoted to war production, innovation was forced to be made, culling ineffective workers, etc. People were angry and they were willing to work far harder to hurt their enemy.
For reference, the US bombed waterways and virtually crippled German supply lines and eliminated their access to coal with far fewer casualties. The Soviet strikes against oil fields and depots simultaneously ground Germany's access to fuel to a halt and was what actually killed the country in the end. Only strikes against waterways, oil fields and oil depots had a proven negative effect on the German war machine. Attacks against industrial cities, ports, etc. were noted to have only minimal effect.
Some wanted strategic bombing to focus on industrial sabotage, but the guy they put in charge of it was opposed to every single measure that could make strategic bombing more effective. He was the one that was heavily invested in the breaking the morale narrative and he was the one that the government ended up putting officially in charge. Strategic bombing was effective despite the focus on civilian casualties, not because of it.