- Location
- Lake Wobegon
- Pronouns
- He/Him/His
[x][Priorities] Demand the Ukrainian Heartland
[x][Priorities] Request German industrial aid and capital goods
[x][Priorities] Reduce Reparations Payments
Narva is most valuable right where it is, as a buboe on the German empire in the east and as a possible entrepot into the German zone for red revolutionaries. If taken, it would at best be a very secondary port to Petrograd. Keeping it where it is is worth giving up Murmansk, in my view; the rail line to it was only completed last year, is likely of inferior quality, and is even more likely to have been sabotaged; so it would need repair even if it didn't need upgrading (which it does). We would likely not see major economic returns from Murmansk for at least a decade.
German guarantees in the Caucasus aren't worth the paper they're written on. Without German occupation of eastern Ukraine, and with the Porte reeling from the British occupation of Constantinople, the Germans have no real means of exerting influence in the area. At best they can act through Enver's Army of Islam, but again: Porte, reeling. What's more, I don't think the Bolshevik government would speak in terms of spheres of influence; they'd speak in terms of national self-determination (which in this case means supporting totally-indigenous-you-guys Red governments in the Caucasus republics, never mind the Red Army columns).
For the same reason, the only territorial demand I feel comfortable making is in western Ukraine, because east Ukraine's Red government is fairly well-established and all the German attempts at propping up right-wing governments in the west have gotten them nowhere. It doesn't hurt that the RSFSR would not be demanding territory for itself, but on behalf of its friends.
Rather than war-blasted territory, the best thing Russia can secure for itself is capital goods to strengthen its industrial productivity and as much control over such commodities as it produces as possible.
[x][Offers] Crimea, with an offensive
[x][Offers] Oil Rights in Baku
I'm most comfortable offering things we don't have, since it means we don't have to start giving them unless and until we get them. Crimea is a particularly easy giveaway, since the Germans have no means of garrisoning it without either passing through Ukraine or setting up a convoy from Varna (liable to get interdicted by the British). For exactly the same reason, it gives Germany no real strategic benefit; Germany can't get big ships into the Black Sea without forcing the British out of Constantinople, a thing of which it is not capable. A German Crimea would be as much a testicle we could squeeze as West Berlin was for Khrushchev. As for Baku oil, Donbas coal is a more important industrial fuel at the moment, and the Caucasus are in less of a position to make political headaches of themselves than Ukraine.
[x][America] Request formal recognition and the resumption of normal trade relations
What have we got to lose by trying? Bryan won't be around forever regardless, as all men must die.
[x][China] Remain uncommitted for now
On the other hand, China offers us little except perhaps a speculative market, and unlike Germany its right-wing government doesn't have us sufficiently over a barrel to demand concessions. Trotsky's not even operating in the Baikal region yet. We can afford to hold our cards close to our chests.
[x][LeftComs] Let them speak
I've given my view on this above.
[x][Agenda] First Soviet Census
[x][Agenda] Agricultural Potential Survey
I anticipate voting against the Firat Soviet census if it makes it onto the agenda, since we are far from controlling a lot of important population centers (everywhere in Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Transbaikalia, et al) and it will thus likely omit important information. We do, however, control most of the important agricultural lands either ourselves or through our alliance with the Ukrainians, and knowing what their productivity is is the first step towards rationalizing it. That said, I view this as basically seconding a motion, and both items are worthy of debate at least.
[x][Priorities] Request German industrial aid and capital goods
[x][Priorities] Reduce Reparations Payments
Narva is most valuable right where it is, as a buboe on the German empire in the east and as a possible entrepot into the German zone for red revolutionaries. If taken, it would at best be a very secondary port to Petrograd. Keeping it where it is is worth giving up Murmansk, in my view; the rail line to it was only completed last year, is likely of inferior quality, and is even more likely to have been sabotaged; so it would need repair even if it didn't need upgrading (which it does). We would likely not see major economic returns from Murmansk for at least a decade.
German guarantees in the Caucasus aren't worth the paper they're written on. Without German occupation of eastern Ukraine, and with the Porte reeling from the British occupation of Constantinople, the Germans have no real means of exerting influence in the area. At best they can act through Enver's Army of Islam, but again: Porte, reeling. What's more, I don't think the Bolshevik government would speak in terms of spheres of influence; they'd speak in terms of national self-determination (which in this case means supporting totally-indigenous-you-guys Red governments in the Caucasus republics, never mind the Red Army columns).
For the same reason, the only territorial demand I feel comfortable making is in western Ukraine, because east Ukraine's Red government is fairly well-established and all the German attempts at propping up right-wing governments in the west have gotten them nowhere. It doesn't hurt that the RSFSR would not be demanding territory for itself, but on behalf of its friends.
Rather than war-blasted territory, the best thing Russia can secure for itself is capital goods to strengthen its industrial productivity and as much control over such commodities as it produces as possible.
[x][Offers] Crimea, with an offensive
[x][Offers] Oil Rights in Baku
I'm most comfortable offering things we don't have, since it means we don't have to start giving them unless and until we get them. Crimea is a particularly easy giveaway, since the Germans have no means of garrisoning it without either passing through Ukraine or setting up a convoy from Varna (liable to get interdicted by the British). For exactly the same reason, it gives Germany no real strategic benefit; Germany can't get big ships into the Black Sea without forcing the British out of Constantinople, a thing of which it is not capable. A German Crimea would be as much a testicle we could squeeze as West Berlin was for Khrushchev. As for Baku oil, Donbas coal is a more important industrial fuel at the moment, and the Caucasus are in less of a position to make political headaches of themselves than Ukraine.
[x][America] Request formal recognition and the resumption of normal trade relations
What have we got to lose by trying? Bryan won't be around forever regardless, as all men must die.
[x][China] Remain uncommitted for now
On the other hand, China offers us little except perhaps a speculative market, and unlike Germany its right-wing government doesn't have us sufficiently over a barrel to demand concessions. Trotsky's not even operating in the Baikal region yet. We can afford to hold our cards close to our chests.
[x][LeftComs] Let them speak
I've given my view on this above.
[x][Agenda] First Soviet Census
[x][Agenda] Agricultural Potential Survey
I anticipate voting against the Firat Soviet census if it makes it onto the agenda, since we are far from controlling a lot of important population centers (everywhere in Central Asia, Transcaucasia, Transbaikalia, et al) and it will thus likely omit important information. We do, however, control most of the important agricultural lands either ourselves or through our alliance with the Ukrainians, and knowing what their productivity is is the first step towards rationalizing it. That said, I view this as basically seconding a motion, and both items are worthy of debate at least.
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