Hey there folks. Below is an update on America which also covers some of what is going on with the international socialist movement.
Here's the plan of updates before we get to 1919, the most crucial year of this entire timeline. They'll come out in roughly in the order listed.
- A comprehensive update catching us up on France (should have it up in the next day or two.)
- A post on Soviet Russia, with a section on domestic politics and another on the Civil War (going significantly better for the Reds then IOTL, with huge knock-on effects.) Naturally, a good portion of this post will cover Germany's empire in the east and German-Soviet relations.
- A more general update on industrial mobilization from 1914-1918, focusing primarily but not solely on Germany and Britain.
- An entry on the international socialist movement and trade union activity in 1918, which will go into greater detail on the effects of the Russian revolution and the leftward turn of most social-democratic parties. There will be a section here to catch us up on British Labor, but I don't intend to devote another full post to the UK until 1919.
- A post covering what's been going on in the rest of the world, with a focus on China, India, and Japan.
- An update on the condition of the various armies, both physical and psychological. This will cover the growth of radicalism in the armed forces, as well as how the different army hierarchies are dealing with the task of suppressing dissent and resistance.
If anyone has questions about any personages or events that they're curious about, I am very happy to answer them. Cheers!
Hofstadter, Richard. 1952. "Bryan's Final Years: A New Account." American Historical Review.
…The past thirty years of historiography have treated the national chaos of Bryan's final three years as a consequence of the deterioration of the President's character. In this picture, economic recession, street-violence, and diplomatic isolation emerged, as if by some conjuring trick, out of the declining mental fitness of Bryan. It is not clear what precise chain of causality links these events, and a more principled defense of this common hypothesis would have the task of clarifying these matters.
Neither Bryan nor his closest advisors ever spoke of a marked cognitive decline. The most one can glean from the firsthand evidence is that the final three years of office placed enormous strains, both intellectual and emotional, on the man. The standard historical practice has been to understand Bryan's own political trajectory as evidence of a mental break, but in truth this reveals much more about the prejudices of the American scholarly class than it does about Bryan himself.
...In his final term of office, Bryan underwent an ideological evolution from a populist Jeffersonian Democrat to an Evangelical Christian socialist. Three events appeared to have radicalized him. The first was the assassination attempt in 1917, which inured him to the notion of a great conspiracy to overthrow his Presidency. Then, there was the sudden formation of a pro-British congressional coalition willing to stymie his efforts to keep America neutral in the Great War. Most decisively, there was the Trenton Conference of 1918.
Bryan had long sought some means of negotiating a European peace. The disinterest expressed in response to most of his diplomatic overtures frustrated him. When the European powers did engage American diplomacy, it was typically as a publicity stunt to signal a willingness to make peace to their domestic populations. The notion of hosting the next anti-war conference of European socialists appeared to come to Bryan from the exiled Irish humanitarian Roger Casement, who met with him privately in December 1917. The previous three conferences had achieved little success due to the absence of the main socialist parties in the Entente, but now both the French Socialists and British Labor might be willing to participate in such a venture. Casement thought that even the antiwar British liberals could be convinced to send a delegation as observers. It looked as if the German Social Democrats would be the most difficult party to wrangle in 1918; with their most prominent pacifist leaders under house arrest, it was thought unlikely that they would be permitted to travel. But perhaps Bryan could use what little leverage and political capital he had to whisk some of the former leadership to Trenton.
At this point, Bryan did not subscribe to any form of ideological socialism. But it is clear that he felt some sympathy for the antiwar protests of the social-democratic parties, and he also earnestly believed that such a conference might force the governments to finally make peace. In a speech in February 1918, Bryan announced - largely without the consultation of the socialist parties - that the city of Trenton, New Jersey, would be open to hosting the 4th antiwar conference, so long as matters were kept strictly to a discussion of "the quickest possible path for ending the present ruination of Europe". This proviso was intended to indicate to domestic audiences that the alliance between Bryan and the socialists was one of convenience rather than principle.
The backlash that followed from this announcement was fierce and sustained. Some British historians have argued that the media frenzy which followed was a precursor of the first red panic, though in our view this is ahistorical. Unlike the red panic, the forces mobilized against Bryan in early 1918 were of a primarily elite character; it was Senators and Congressmen, not housewives and shop owners, who rallied to try to prevent the planned conference.
From the limited perspective of political gamesmanship, it is true that Bryan's decision to ride out the criticism likely cost him the opportunity to pass his landmark antitrust legislation. In the standard story, the political inflexibility of the President arose from a moralism which had unduly metastasized. Bryan either was too blinded by conviction to assess the harm which following through with the conference would have on his legislative agenda, or in such a romance with the European socialists that he prioritized the quixotic conference over his own presidency.
Neither of these explanations is borne out by the historical evidence. Bryan was aware that moving forward with the conference would lead to a scuttling of the antitrust legislation; he wrote privately that he would be "martyred for such an act", and would "find his presidency at an effective end". In the same entry, he explained his logic for proceeding with the conference: "if matters continue as they do in Europe, we shall see either the Bolshevization of the Continent or its descent into a darkness even graver and less imaginable. The violence that traumatizes Europe now shall traumatize our ancestors too if it is not halted in due haste." Bryan's talk of bolshevization here should warn us against assuming that Bryan presently saw the socialists as ideological allies in addition to practical ones.
The Trenton Conference began in the second week of July. Delegates from over a dozen socialist parties gathered to discuss the best means of ending the war. There was something undoubtedly surreal about the whole affair; one of the keynote speakers, Henry Ford, was a prominent industrialist and union-buster, while Bryan himself defied a house censure and made a brief appearance to praise the efforts of the socialists while counseling them to avoid "revolutionary activism and agitation". Also in attendance were a number of dissident British liberals from the party's most radical antiwar faction, who had made their way to the conference against the explicit instruction of their own government and party. The staid, aristocratic gentleman looked somewhat out of place at the socialist conference.
Perhaps the most important delegation came from Jean Jaures' SFIO, which had refused to participate in previous meetings. Growing tensions between Labor and the French government meant that Jaures felt bound to send representatives from the party's left to the peace conference to avoid a revolt of the ranks. Something similar went for the Social Democrats of Germany; while having no intention to make peace until final victory was achieved, Ludendorff wanted to give the appearance that the Social Democrats were operating with a degree of autonomy, and he therefore released Eduard Bernstein and a number of his sympathizers from house arrest, sending them off to America.
Several circumstances conspired to make it difficult for the conference to place real pressure on the warring governments. Firstly, Bernstein, the representative of the Social Democrats, had little real power within his party. Even while he was in the leadership he lacked a close relation with the unions or nascent council movement, which were the largest forces in Germany that could browbeat the Ludendorff regime. Secondly, the delegation from the British Labor Party was not granted permission to speak on behalf of the organization as a whole; it was sent, like the French delegation, to placate an increasingly restless left-wing, but it was given even less authority. Finally, divisions between centrists and radicals over the Russian question meant that it was difficult to devise a comprehensive plan for peace in the east.
In a highly unusual move, a half-dozen diplomats from the American state department also attended the conference, ostensibly as neutral observers but in reality as active participants who attempted to steer the results of the conference in a palatable direction. This interference perturbed several of the socialist delegates, but there was little real opportunity to eject their hosts from the closed-door meetings. In any event, the diplomats often acted more as mediators than anything else; Bryan wanted the conference to be successful.
The composition of the delegates meant that Trenton had a more centrist, parliamentary slant than the previous conferences. This was partially tempered by the fact that many of the reformist socialists were themselves now more open to radical, antiwar action, but it nonetheless remained true that the control of the conference by the moderates presented unique opportunities for Bryan. The document we now know as the "Trenton Resolution" was drafted by a committee on the postwar order which was dominated by these figures; in attendance were not only British liberals and the centrist German delegation, but also American diplomats, the educational reformer John Dewey, and the humanitarian democrat Roger Casement, who contributed to its anticolonial clauses. This resolution still had to be approved by the majority of the seated delegates, though it is likely that few could have anticipated its importance. At the time, it was but one of many documents which together composed the "plan for peace".
It was Bryan's very public promotion of the resolution which gave it a broader audience and allowed it to exert substantial influence on anticolonial politics. Self-determination and social rights would both become some of the most frequently invoked concepts of the postwar era. Their use amongst reforming liberals, anticolonial activists, and ethnic nationalists attest to their broad appeal and enduring salience. There might appear to be an irony that a document drafted and written by socialists had an enduring influence primarily in the capitalist world. Yet this is readily explained by the affinities between the moderate socialism of prewar Europe (A tradition still alive in 1918) and radical liberalism, a topic which is just now beginning to be explored.
The General Proposal for a Postwar Order, Aka, The Trenton Resolution
- All states shall commit to the formation of an international body which will serve as a forum to adjudicate diplomatic disputes, coordinate trade and tariff policy, and ensure the general maintenance of peace. This body will be known as the Fellowship of Nations.
- The Fellowship of Nations will establish a committee that will be tasked with ensuring the freedom of navigation in times both of peace and of war; general blockade and the targeting of neutral vessels shall both be considered prohibited acts.
- All nations will commit to ending unjust and exploitative trade practices which violate the principle of equality; the terms of trade shall be determined by diplomacy and not force, and ought to tend toward a recognition of the equality of all nations.
- Citizens have an inviolable right to participation in their government. Since no citizen may be denied this right on an arbitrary basis, all participating members of the Fellowship of Nations will commit to the establishment of equal and universal suffrage.
- As the exercise of the individual's freedom necessarily includes the securing of those material and social conditions necessary for the full exercise of autonomy, the world's governments shall recognize and commit to fulfilling the social rights of education, food, housing, medical care, and the provision of aid in old age, sickness, and disability.
- All peoples have the right to self-determination; their national aspirations must be respected and fulfilled, whether through the establishment of an independent state or the vouchsafing of collective autonomy within existing ones.
- On the matter of European peace, the delegates at the Trenton Conference recommend the following specific measures, in addition to the more general outline for a postwar order enumerated above.
- In keeping with the right of self-determination, we support the creation of a Polish state. The peoples of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire ought to determine their fate through democratic means, whether that result in the creation of a confederation of Danubian nations or their continued association in a federation.
- The matter of Alsace-Lorraine shall be settled by plebiscite, to allow its peoples to themselves determine which nation they wish to be affiliated with.
- Germany shall evacuate Belgian territory and it will be restored forthwith to full sovereignty and independence. A commitment from all nations to respect the rights of neutral countries in times of war.
- A just settlement of colonial claims through international arbitration concerned principally with the interests and rights of the involved populations.
- In accord with the right to self-determination, the conversion of existing colonies into temporary mandates, to be governed over a set period until the native peoples are equipped for self-rule. The creation of representative democratic institutions in the mandates to foster this capacity and ensure a stable transition to independence.
- The settlement of the division of territories in the Balkans through plebiscites conducted by the Fellowship of Nations.
- Turkey to remain an independent state, with the territories in the Levant and the east (from Iraq to Armenia) to be granted independence.
- The territories claimed by Italy to have their fate determined through plebiscite.
- The United States of America expresses its support for the foregoing provisions, and offers its support in seeing them secured.
In contrast to the status quo peace offers proffered by the Entente, which envisioned a restoration of the prewar European order, the Trenton Resolution called for the thoroughgoing transformation of both European and Colonial affairs. Peace would be tied to a broad programme of democratization and egalitarian welfarism carried out by left-liberal and social-democratic political parties. Though it went mostly unstated, America was meant to act as a backstop to this entire system, offering the loans and consumer markets necessary to fund the expansion of state capacity that was envisioned.
The Trenton Resolution did not represent any form of nascent Bolshevism, even if Bryan was charged with colluding with the red enemy. In practice, the creation of a welfarist, democratic Europe and the gradual decolonization of Britain and France would have served the interests of American capitalism quite well. This did not prevent the opposition from attacking a perceived vulnerability. Yet all available evidence indicates that, rather than inspiring conviction or disgust, the charge that Bryan consorted with socialists initially had little effect on voters. His supporters received the Trenton Resolution rather tepidly; though many had sympathy with its objectives, there was little belief that it had any real chance of being implemented, and there was still a sizable isolationist strand of his base which was skeptical of any American involvement in European affairs. Among Bryan's opponents, who fervently believed that America ought to join the war on Britain's side, there was initially little real panic stirred up by his affiliation with the socialists - they already knew that he was in favor of peace, and the domestic reforms he had already embarked upon were indistinguishable from many of those advocated in the resolution.
Once again, the real site of discontent was in congress, where Bryan faced an outright revolt from the southern democrats, who feared that the talk of egalitarianism and self-determination represented a threat to the Jim Crow racial order. The house quickly decided to move forward with another censure measure, and some began talking of impeachment. The Vice President Woodrow Wilson began to secretly rally opposition against the President. With the southern democrats stonewalling, there was little chance for Bryan to pass legislation.
Bryan's margin for maneuver was being constrained in other ways, too. By 1918, the economic boom that began with Bryan's presidency had turned into a recession. Fears of a fiscal liquidity crisis in the event of British or French default led to a marked reduction in direct investment, as did uncertainty about international politics. The German submarine campaign also began to curtail exports to Britain and France, depressing the prices of key industrial goods and reducing corporate profitability. Financial anxieties reached a climax in July, when Bryan refused to reissue loans to Britain, putting them on course to permanently leave the gold standard; the stock market fell around 7%, before rallying in August when it became clear that Britain's transition off the gold standard would not have the dire fiscal effects predicted. Still, all across the American economy, there was a small though marked contraction of production, contributing to conflicts between labor and capital.
The massive offensives of 1918 and the potential for Chinese entry into the war as a Central Power convinced congress of the need for another army expansion. This time, Bryan himself was sanguine about the notion; he knew that earning America a larger place in global affairs would require the ability to project force. Despite the looming threat of impeachment, the congressional leaders and Bryan were able to agree on a plan to expand the army in return for the passage of an expansion to the social security scheme in the unemployment relief act. The spending in the bill also allowed for American munition plants to continue operating at full capacity even as Entente orders steadily dwindled, averting a more drastic economic slowdown.
Meanwhile, even as the impeachment effort faced continued difficulties in determining a proper pretext, the public was beginning to turn against Bryan. A wave of strike action throughout the summer slowed down industry and heightened middle-class fears of domestic bolshevism. Arbitration efforts eventually managed to return the most essential workers back to the factories in return for wage concessions, but the pervasive nature of the labor activity led many to conclude that Bryan himself was behind it. The dysfunction in DC and the legislative gridlock in Congress were also largely blamed on the president.
Yet despite all this, there were also signs that Bryan's core support amongst industrial laborers, poor farmers, and ethnic whites was holding steady. The growth of the American leagues and pacifist societies had continued following the antiwar protests of 1917, and both organizations now had closer links to the generally antiwar labor unions. The spectacular rise of John I. Lewis' Confederated Industrial Unions (CIU),
de facto headed by the United Mine Workers, provided Bryan with a key ally with vast powers of mobilization. Soaring union membership acted as an important counterweight to middle-class skepticism.
The midterm elections made this picture clear. Against an energized and concerted Republican campaign, the Democrats managed to hold onto the Senate by a thread after emerging victorious in a razor-thin election in Illinois. They nonetheless lost 4 senate seats, and were reduced to a two-vote majority. The Republicans finally won the house after a decade in the minority, though here only narrowly: democratic strength in the Great Lakes area acted to offset a Republican surge in the Great Plains and Mountain West, allowing the Democrats to preserve a sizable contingent of northern progressives.
Republican capture of congress paved the way for impeachment. The following year, shortly after the new representatives were sworn in, a very real case of corruption was found involving German influence peddling in Washington. Bryan stood down the barrel of a hostile congress determined to end his political career. Neither he nor his supporters would go quietly.
