The Able Archer War - A Timeline

One fascinating aspect of this timeline is how, in its own way, there's basically no other good time for the USSR in the 1980s to strike at NATO (conventionally or otherwise, intentional or preemption) than in the middle of ABLE ARCHER 83. You're basically never going to be able to inflict maximum confusion and hide conventional war preparations quite as well as when everybody in NATO is preoccupied with running a comprehensive exercise like that. After all, ABLE ARCHER 83 was only meant to be the end of AUTUMN FORGE 83; it wasn't a standalone exercise. The confusion caused by exiting the simulation mindset may very well be enough to delay any rash attempts to respond with full strategic nuclear exchange, and real troops were recently shuffled around in September. That has less of an impact, but having to rerun REFORGER for real a couple months after the REFORGER 83 exercise isn't going to help matters with the American war effort. There's no good time to try and punch out NATO in the 80s, but this is one of the least bad ones in some ways for the Soviets.
 
Following Andropov's directives, the Central Committees of all of the Soviet republics begin a huge anti-corruption crackdown. All suspected elements, especially those promoted and protected under Brezhnev, are rounded up and convicted in special tribunals. To provide a lesson to local party members, many of them are sent to gulags.
Is "gulag" here being used metaphorically to refer to other prison camps? Because the actual gulag system (that used the term in reference to itself) was abolished in 1960 following Stalin's death.
 
GKO and Stavka Decisions After the Third Week of War
Soviet Attitudes
(GKO and Stavka Decisions in the Third Week of the War)

The third week of war ends and no tactical nuclear warning has yet arrived in Moscow. The situation at the front is very fluid; detailed intelligence continues to flow to Moscow and no signs of imminent launch are detected. A blitz initiated specifically to prevent a suspected six-day NATO nuclear countdown is becoming a protracted non-nuclear conflict all over the world.

The Soviet Union is now entangled in numerous small confrontations around the globe and the risk of overstretching is now a regular debate in the GKO. The State Committee of Defense cannot admit a mistake. "The danger of a NATO surprise nuclear attack was real," as stated in the official version of events. If the nuclear war has not yet begun, this is due only to the prompt intervention against the imperialist powers that disrupted enemy preparations and prevented them from conducting a nuclear war. The surprise invasion of Western Europe is justified as a necessary preventive defense, and victory is proven by the absence of a nuclear attack.

In private, most members of the GKO are now convinced that there were no NATO nuclear preparations before November 9th. Not only Andrei Gromyko, but also Dmitri Ustinov and even Viktor Chebrikov are now certain that the war was launched due to a gross miscalculation. But Yuri Andropov is still convinced that a nuclear attack from NATO was highly probable, and the Soviet attack on Europe is the only thing that stopped it. He feels that the US are preparing extensively for an all-out nuclear confrontation, allowing a sudden strategic nuclear attack to be launched at any given moment. In the event of a tactical warning, the Soviet Union must be prepared to immediately launch both strategic and theater weapons.

The divided GKO produces a political stalemate. In this state of affairs, the Stavka assumes the real leadership in the crisis. By the third week of war there is really only one man in command: Nikolai Ogarkov, commander-in-chief of Soviet armed forces. He's not interested in politics and doesn't even fully grasp the causes of the war; he's just executing the plans. Ogarkov doesn't want to escalate to a nuclear confrontation, mainly for military reasons; military operations would become unmanageable. He keeps nuclear forces at their highest readiness in order to react quickly to any tactical warning, but a preventive attack (to unlock the stalemate or prevent a NATO launch) is out of the question.

Ogarkov knows that NATO is now fully mobilized and a breakthrough in the Rhineland will be much more difficult. Nature, also, is turning against the Soviets. They have been incredibly lucky until now, with clear, dry weather almost every day. But by the end of the third week of war, snow begins to fall all across Germany. Bad weather favors the defender, and NATO air forces are better equipped and trained to fly and fight in winter.

But Ogarkov is still committed to appearing optimistic, and declares that in the event of a protracted war of attrition, the Warsaw Pact will prevail. And there are a few reasons to be at least a little sanguine. Soviet logistical bases are closer to the front, while NATO will depend more and more on reserves from the US, an ocean away. Bridges, roads, and railways, even if bombed, can be repaired quickly- a week, possibly two.

To more readily affect the enemy, the sea lanes in the Atlantic will be interrupted with a more intensive submarine campaign, as well as air raids organized against European harbors. All intelligence provided by GRU agents speaks of very limited ammo and equipment stockpiles in NATO yards. Mountains of supplies have already been lost in central Germany or destroyed by Soviet bombs.

Moreover, the complete interdiction of the main oil route in the Gulf is considered not only feasible, but imminent, given that the US can deploy only a small expeditionary corps in Iran (terribly far from its bases), while the Soviets have the ability to send three entire armies against it.

Stavka releases a new report, estimating that a war in Europe will not last much longer- somewhere between one more week and one more month. Constant attrition will be enough to bring NATO to heel.

The real danger from Ogarkov's point of view- and heavily featured in the report- is from the East. China is mobilizing slowly but constantly, both its conventional and (primitive) nuclear forces. In the event of a Chinese attack on the Soviet Union- possibly coordinated with a US counter-attack in Korea, which could be launched in two to three weeks- the Soviet Union would be reduced to a position of weakness. Ogarkov hopes he has enough troops to contain the menace. The Far Eastern, Inner Mongolian, Siberian and Central Asian fronts are now mobilized and ready to repulse an opportunist China.
 
Wait, why wouldn't they want this posted on AH.com? It's very well grounded Alternate history, which doesn't require any interventions of Alian Space Bats or ROB.

I was going to say, "It's in the preface," but you're right, it looks like I left it out. I guess I mentioned it in my earlier thread, asking permission to post, but not here. Basically, the original author, Giobasta, disappeared from the internet before I could get permission to write this fan fiction. Since my text is based very heavily on his original work, I was told it would be deemed plagiarism if posted on ah.com and I would be kicked at best, if I did it. Possibly banned, since I had a direct warning, now. So I didn't post, simple as that.

I get where they're coming from. Sight-unseen, it sounds like I'm copy/pasting (and the mods never actually looked at my work). I've had a lot of trouble myself deciding whether I've done enough to distinguish this work, and at the end of the day maybe the readers can help me with that decision. I've started thinking of this TL as more like a "remaster," after just spending $60 on the Mass Effect Legendary edition for a game I've already played, but just looks so much better now (if you'll permit me flattering my own editing chops). But I do think I've already altered the story to at least an *interesting* degree, added in a ton of extra detail, and clarified some muddy parts. And to reiterate, there are more major forks in the central narrative on the way (compared to Giobasta's story).

One fascinating aspect of this timeline is how, in its own way, there's basically no other good time for the USSR in the 1980s to strike at NATO (conventionally or otherwise, intentional or preemption) than in the middle of ABLE ARCHER 83. You're basically never going to be able to inflict maximum confusion and hide conventional war preparations quite as well as when everybody in NATO is preoccupied with running a comprehensive exercise like that. After all, ABLE ARCHER 83 was only meant to be the end of AUTUMN FORGE 83; it wasn't a standalone exercise. The confusion caused by exiting the simulation mindset may very well be enough to delay any rash attempts to respond with full strategic nuclear exchange, and real troops were recently shuffled around in September. That has less of an impact, but having to rerun REFORGER for real a couple months after the REFORGER 83 exercise isn't going to help matters with the American war effort. There's no good time to try and punch out NATO in the 80s, but this is one of the least bad ones in some ways for the Soviets.

This is an excellent point, and one I definitely could have hit on harder myself in those very early posts. If I was doing another rewrite, I'd probably emphasize this a lot more. It really did require a perfect storm to get the world to its current position, and you've tracked down a key part of the origin.

Is "gulag" here being used metaphorically to refer to other prison camps? Because the actual gulag system (that used the term in reference to itself) was abolished in 1960 following Stalin's death.

Yes, great question, excellent time for a point of clarification on this! I suppose I was using the word poetically to evoke the desired image- still a very accurate image of Soviet work camps, even in the 1980s. The word 'gulag' is still commonly used in English (certainly British and American English, at least) to denote the Soviet prison system in general. In that sense, I was using the word in its English definition, but also poetically (metaphorically) as well. I apologize for the confusion, and for writing in something close to idiom. It's a bad habit of mine- at least I consider it to be a bad habit here on the board, where we have an international community and shouldn't make assumptions that local or national tricks of speech are widely known.
 
The Asian front will be more brutal than the European front.

There is the potential for a lot of brutality in Asia. We could talk about the need to court world opinion (always lots more international journalism focused on Europe) or keep allies on-side (the East Germans would prefer to mass-murder specific West Germans, thank you). We could talk about military strategy (China's more likely to employ human waves). Or we could talk about racism, which doesn't really need a parenthetical. The potential is certainly there.
 
The Soviet Invasion of Finland, November 30th - December 11th
The Second Winter War
(The Soviet Invasion of Finland, November 30th - December 11th)

Soviet strategists are desperate to avoid opening another European front; all reserves are already needed in Germany. Negotiations with Finland continue from November 21st to the 29th, while the Soviet Tenth Army and the Seventh and Fifth Tank Armies continue their deployment along the Finnish border.

Gromyko proposes many compromise agreements to his Finnish counterparts. While the first proposal consists of the seizing of all air and naval bases by Soviet forces and total freedom of movement for ground troops, the latest proposal eliminates any reference to naval bases, limits the air concessions to the northernmost bases, and requires freedom of movement for ground troops only in Lapland. This last condition is the sticking point. It could open the gates to a possible Soviet invasion from the north. President Koivisto exercises his veto to this last compromise.

Meanwhile, secret negotiations between Finland, NATO, and even some elements of the Swedish government are taking place in Oslo and Helsinki. Publicly, Sweden retains a hard line on her neutrality. Premier Olof Palme has already mobilized his troops for any contingency, preparing to repulse attacks from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If NATO's cruise missiles cross Swedish airspace, its air force will attempt to shoot them down.

But while the Swedish government must remain publicly neutral, its army has some room to maneuver. Sweden's back-of-house establishment perfectly understands the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of all of Scandinavia, and are persuaded that it would not stop at the Swedish border. They're already actively deploying troops to counter a Soviet offensive aimed at seizing the Boden-Narvik line, as well as amphibious operations along the eastern coast, in the event that Finland falls.

Secretly, the Swedish Army begins to send weapons to their Finnish neighbors: an "oversupply" of Carl-Gustav anti-tank missiles, RBS-70 anti-aircraft shoulder missiles, as well as thousands of volunteers and instructors.

Secret NATO-Finnish negotiations continue as well. NATO emissaries promise to strictly respect Finnish neutrality as long as the situation remains as it stands. In the event of war with the Soviet Union, NATO can intervene with air forces based in Norway. While the Finnish Army is equipped with Soviet-made tanks (T-55s and T-72s) and some armored carriers (BMPs and BTRs), Finnish intelligence has been passing along data- positions, deployment plans, and photographic material- to NATO officers for years to help them distinguish their armored units from the Soviet ones. US emissaries promise to immediately send forward Special Forces already deployed in Norway to support reservist units along the border and behind enemy lines. A major land intervention could be possible after a week of war in the form of the US NALMEB, which is completing its deployment in Trondheim and Bergen. While still needed for the liberation of northern Norway, the situation on that front is fluid. It is possible they might be redirected to cut off Soviet troops by passing through Finnish Lapland in a flanking maneuver (basically the Soviet plan in reverse).

On November 30th, Soviet-Finnish negotiations break down and war commences within two hours. Soviet Su-24s, Bears, and Backfires begin to drop their bombs on Helsinki and Turku, along with all Finnish air bases and the regional headquarters of Finnish land forces across the country. The Fifth, Seventh and Tenth Armies cross the border. It's the anniversary of the Winter War and Molotov- the Molotov- is again a member of the Soviet Politburo. It's a dramatic déjà-vu of 1939, and the Finns immediately christen the new conflict the Second Winter War.

On the northern front in Lapland, the already-mobilized Finnish Jaeger Brigade seizes the initiative against the weak Soviet reserves cautiously entering the region. They are all Category C units and appear frozen in place after three days of intense fighting. The Jaegers are supported by ten independent battalions- similar to Soviet Category B troops, made up of relatively local veterans- as well as numerous small irregular units from the immediate area, out to defend their homes.

Meanwhile in the south of Lapland, the Pohjolan Brigade, Kainuu Brigade, and 20 independent battalions conduct a fighting retreat against the advance of the Soviet Tenth Army. The Soviets try to push quickly towards Rovaniemi, hoping speed will awe the enemy into retreat. They are forced to rely on National Road 82, a single secondary road that local defense forces have mined extensively.

Not wanting to spread out into the trackless forest and advance along a broad front, the Soviets are left in a long line back to the border, their advance slowed by constant mine-clearing operations, bad weather, and minor Finnish counterattacks. That bad weather also prevents the far superior Soviet air forces from intervening, and the Finns inflict stinging losses on the very narrow front of the advancing enemy. Finnish resistance begins to consolidate east of Kemijarvi, and the Soviet advance halts on December 11th, to allow supplies to catch up and, bowing to the inevitable, to advance more broadly into the surrounding woods. Behind Soviet lines, Finnish local defense troops (supported and sometimes coordinated by US Special Forces) begin to conduct ambushes and sabotage against the Soviet rears.

In the central front, the Soviet Seventh Army conducts a bold advance, heading to Oulu to cut off the northernmost Finnish forces. There is only one Finnish brigade immediately available- the Pori Brigade, coming from Sakila- and roughly 50 independent battalions, with the Armored Brigade on its way from Helsinki. The Soviet advance is slowed by a thin line of local Finnish defense forces and NATO special forces, which conduct guerrilla operations on Soviet flanks. The Pori Brigade arrives on the scene and manages to consolidate the defense east of Kontiomäki, about half way from the border to Oulu. By December 11th, the Soviet advance has run out of steam, mainly thanks to the disruption of their logistical lines from air and guerrilla attacks.

The southern front is the center of gravity of both the Soviet advance and the Finnish defense. The Soviets attack that sector with the best equipped and largest of their armies: the Fifth Tank Army, comprised of Category A units and modern equipment. Pressed hard by the armored units, the Finns have to abandon Lappeenranta and withdraw to a new defensive line centered on Kouvola. The battlefield is a thin land strip between the lakes and the coast, and three Finnish brigades (the Savon, the Karjalan, and the Nylands), supported later by the Guards Jaeger Regiment (expanded to brigade-strength with recent veterans) from Helsinki, successfully stop the Soviet advance. Over 100 of the nation's independent battalions are here, being fed into the lines as space is grimly made available.

Operations in Norway are very sporadic in this same period. Heavy snowfalls and perennial darkness prevent major operations there. The Allied line runs north of Narvik, from the sea to the Swedish border. Tromso, still defended by the bulk of the Norwegian Northern Division, is besieged by two Soviet divisions.

NATO air forces, better equipped and trained for winter operations, intervene with sporadic missions on both sectors of the Scandinavian front. Land-based Harriers and Tornados, escorted by Norwegian F-16s squadrons, conduct many sorties in northern Finland, where they are supported by the remaining Finnish Drakkens. Air operations in northern Norway are covered mainly by naval aviation, provided by the USS Nimitz, the USS America, and the French carrier Clemenceau. Because the northern area of the Atlantic and the Barents are still considered off limits (due to Soviet submarines and air bases in Kola Peninsula), the three carriers remain close to the GIUK gap.

Though hobbled by the weather, the Soviets maintain their numerical superiority and completely interdict any incursion into Soviet airspace.

By December 11th, the Soviet advance in Finland has suffered some setbacks, and the supply situation can be classified as intermittent. But there is steady progress towards Helsinki, the heart of the country and the King on the chessboard. The Soviets pause their advance and gather their strength for the next push.
 
Operations in Central Europe, November 30th – December 11th
War of Attrition
(Operations in Central Europe, November 30th – December 11th)

Heavy snowfall across Germany hampers all major operations in Central Europe in this phase of the conflict. Close air support operations are prohibitively costly, and the units along the front line have to fight mainly with artillery support and large rocket barrages. Movement of troops and supplies is slowed by accumulation. In this difficult context, the Soviets keep the pressure on the NATO lines in an effort to exhaust ammunition stockpiles.

The main Soviet attack continues in the North German Plain against the flanks of the newly-opened NATO salient in Hannover, held by the US Third Corps and the British First Corps. Warsaw Pact units- not used for frontline operations until now- bear the brunt of the new offensive, while the front-line Soviet units (already exhausted by their three-week advance) conduct only support operations.

The schwerpunkt against NATO lines is in the British sector, from Osnabrück to Hannover. It is conducted mainly by the First Polish Army and the Fifth DDR Army, supported by the Soviet Fourteenth Army. The four British divisions hold the line through two weeks of assaults, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy but suffering heavy casualties in exchange. Protected by foxholes and fortified buildings in a highly urbanized area, hiding in railway and highway galleries, the British forces keep the enemy from breaking through, sometimes retreating, sometimes launching very limited counter-attacks.

On the eastern flank of the NATO salient, the DDR Third Army supported by the Soviet Third Shock Army attacks Göttingen, the juncture between the US Third Corps and the Belgian First (one of the weakest NATO units in terms of ammo, supplies, and reserves). While the attack initially achieves some success, taking the city and repulsing two Belgian divisions, a sudden counterattack conducted by the US 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the US 1st Cavalry Division stops the DDR advance. Between November 30th and December 11th, the Soviets fail to achieve a breakthrough in this sector, as the US troops pull back in good order to the south and west.

In all other sectors of Germany, the Soviets and their allies do little more than keep pressure on the NATO lines, firing barrages of artillery shells and rockets on NATO positions every day (and taking their own licks in turn).

Soviet air operations are hampered in this phase of war by terrible weather. Long range bombers continue to launch high altitude air raids against NATO supply lines on the Rhine, as well as NATO main harbors in the Channel and the southern North Sea. Despite the fact that they are escorted by large numbers of MIG-27s and even MIG-29s (for high-priority operations only), the Soviets experience unsustainable losses. In some operations with more distant targets, fewer than 25% return. Given the thick wall of clouds covering all targets, the Soviet pilots can't accurately find their targets, leading to a staggering drop in successful hits.

On the NATO side, better electronic equipment allows the Allied pilots to aim with accuracy even through heavy clouds. E-3 Sentry planes continue to coordinate massive air operations all over Germany. SAS units inserted behind enemy lines are employed extensively to paint targets, allowing laser-guided bombs to obliterate enemy assets. Main air operations are concentrated over western Germany, where NATO's F-111s, Tornadoes, Harriers, Intruders, and Mirage 4s conduct their daily bombing sorties against railway and highway nodes, choke points and bridges on the Elbe, the Weser, the Leine, and the Upper Basin of the Danube, slowing the flow of WP reserves. Missions deeper inside WP airspace are still monopolized by the night raids of the F-117s, which hit Soviet stockpiles and oil reserves, bridges on the Oder and Vistula rivers, airfields, and (wherever possible) fortified command centers.

The WP have not yet achieved a breakthrough, but fresh units are advancing from the east. In the northern sector, the First Guard Army (from the Moscow Military District) and the Twelfth and Nineteenth Armies (from the Kiev Military District) are en-route, while the southwestern sector will be reinforced by the First Romanian Army. Threatened with direct military intervention, the Romanian dictator Ceausescu is "persuaded" to intervene in the war in Europe.

While not as critical as in the first few days of the war, the supply situation does worsen for NATO forces. The home fronts are doing yeoman's work to ramp up production, but even with streamlining the logistics chain is long and full of potential snags. Any major operation on the front eats up ammunition and supplies faster than they can be replaced. While more is being done every day to increase the breadth of the supply chain, in the eyes of SACEUR they can't do enough.
 
Already noted that MiG-27 is a ground attack plane, you are confounding it with the MiG-23. Also, the Mirage IV (not 4), is one of the French vectors for nuclear attack, which I doubt is used in tactical operations at this time.
 
Just waiting for the second coming of Simo Hayha...

Yeah, that was a missed opportunity. I think that since he's so old he's probably not actually out there fighting. He lived close to the Russian border, and I can see the government asking him to move when the emergency started. His capture or death would be a blow to morale. (I won't speculate on his feelings on the matter.) It seems like the man seemed pretty hale, based on photos and an (albiet translated) interview from a little earlier. And considering he lived into the 2000s...

It seems reasonable that he's at the sniper school in some capacity, perhaps teaching, perhaps just assisting, or maybe even as more of a morale-builder.
 
Operations in Italy, November 30th – December 11th
The Balkanization of Italy
(Operations in Italy, November 30th – December 11th)

Italy is still divided in three: a Soviet occupied zone in northern Italy; the islands of Sicily and Sardinia aligned with NATO; and the peninsular Neutral Zone, governed by a Popular Front of democratic parties from the center to the left.

The most stable component of this new order is the NATO-controlled area. The provisional government (formed by a centrist coalition Christian Democrats, Liberals, Republicans, and eventually Social Democrats) is led by Liberal former partisan Edgardo Sogno, and chooses Palermo as a temporary capital. They do not recognize the official Italian government in Rome, and pledge to liberate the north from Soviet occupation.

Civil liberties are not entirely suppressed, but are strictly controlled. The Communist Party and the communist-led Trade Union CGIL, the peace movement (both catholic and communist), and all autonomous trade-unions are banned by the government. At NATO's request, the post-fascist MSI movement is also banned, and its prominent members arrested. Repression is mainly political. Other aspects of civil life remain nominally free, although there are severe limitations imposed by the state of war: curfews, rationing, compulsory exercises for nuclear war, and some control over information (both the media and private mail).

The USAF and two-thirds of the Italian AM continue operations from Sardinia and Sicily. All Soviet and Hungarian military targets in occupied Italy are assigned to the Italians, in order to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties (or at least to keep the Americans from being blamed for them). The USAF concentrates on long range operations against WP targets elsewhere in Europe. Soviet air attacks against Sicily and Sardinia are difficult and sporadic due to NATO air superiority in the area of the Tyrrhenian Sea.

The Italian Neutral Zone is in turmoil, faced with three would-be governments. The official government consists of the centrist-communist coalition. It is led by the Christian Democrat and former partisan Giuseppe Dossetti as premier, with Eurocommunist leader Enrico Berlinguer as vice-premier. The constitution and all pre-war laws are preserved, on paper.

There are two other "shadow governments," which operate beyond Rome's anemic reach. There is a clandestine communist government, supported by the Soviets and large components of the official Communist Party, which operates in Tuscany, Umbria, and Emilia Romagna. It builds its own clandestine militias, holds its own "popular tribunals," and conducts local administration without input from other parties. They incite pro-Soviet marches in exchange for aid from the north, commit several destabilizing kidnappings of rival politicians and trade unionists, and prepare for insurrection in case of a NATO-led coup.

On the other side, the southern regions of Calabria and Campania are under the influence of a right-wing shadow government formed by elements of local mafias ('NDrangheta and Camorra) and the MSI movement (which is officially banned in the Neutral Zone). These gentlemen are building their own private armies, directly administer most southern cities, and conduct frequent acts of indiscriminate terror in order to inflame the situation and create more opportunities for them to take control. Some in this faction wish to precipitate a direct NATO intervention in southern Italy; others think Rome is weak enough to fall on its own.

All WP and NATO forces are officially banned from the Italian Neutral Zone, but infiltrations are constant on both sides. NATO intelligence agents (not in short supply before the war) can be found all over the neutral zone, making contacts, and even funneling resources to a few paramilitary organizations willing to cooperate with them. Meanwhile, Spetsnaz regularly cross the Po to train and organize communist militias in the Emilia and Tuscany regions.

The Esercito Italiano loyal to the neutral government is still trying to consolidate around Rome. Their situation is not helped by the actions of the government, which votes to partially demobilize forces on December 6th. Officially, this move is done in the name of de-escalation. Unofficially, many politicians are worried about a coup. The army has a tacit order to not intervene against Soviet infiltration forces, in order to avoid a possible military invasion of neutral Italy. They are encouraged to go after the fascists to the south, but just keeping the rail and road corridor from Rome to Naples stable is taxing the army's current resources.

Dossetti and Berlinguer justify the partition of Italy as a temporary necessity dictated by the wartime emergency. The vast majority of the Italian population accepts this logic: it's better to lose the islands and Italia settentrionale than to be nuked. A nuclear escalation is still considered inevitable in the popular imagination: nukes will fly, maybe tomorrow, maybe in a month. To live in the neutral zone is sometimes seen as a life insurance policy. Emigration from the islands to the neutral zone is tremendous: nearly one million people, mainly from Sicily, cross the straits to find a safer life in continental Italy. Emigration from Northern Italy is also high in the first week of the partition, but once the Warsaw Pact establishes control over the area, the movements of the people are strictly controlled. The river Po becomes a militarized area, not unlike the pre-war Inner-German Border.

In the Vatican, the pope prays daily in St. Peter's Square, personally conducting public mass and delivering homilies on peace. He is known to support the efforts of the Roman government to avoid war. While seeking to avoid direct political statements, he has specifically condemned aggression several times, a swipe at the Soviets. The oppression of Catholicism and priests in the Eastern Bloc does come up, as do the increasing attacks on Catholic communities and priests in Central America. This is as much as he is willing to veer his attention from his central message of peace and love.

The Vatican more broadly is trying to increase its aid efforts around the globe. They do what they can for those in war zones, but the general conflagration has upended supply chains everywhere. Each day the war goes on, the rate of food scarcity increases to include millions of new people. Both the First and Second Worlds have almost entirely stopped exporting medical supplies, creating possibly an even bigger catastrophe. The church makes the decision to direct as many resources as possible to these two areas.

Diplomatically, the Vatican's nuncios serve as a secondary network of unofficial communication between neutral nations and NATO. They hope to use this diplomatic pressure to bring an end to the war, or at least ease the humanitarian crisis; but no significant opportunities have presented themselves.

WP-occupied Italy is basically a Soviet-style military regime. In the first week of the occupation, the First Hungarian Army and the Soviet Eighteenth Army establish direct military rule over the whole region.

Local militias begin to purge any politically-suspect elements (as well as all common criminals), soon with the assistance of arriving KGB troops. The purge grows in intensity and scale, going on for weeks. The official name for it is "The Anti-Golpe Campaign," justified by the spectre of a NATO-led right-wing coup. The KGB and the militias harass, arrest, and eventually execute all significant non-communist and anti-communist elements they can get their hands on in the fields of politics, organized labor, social associations, and the media. Euro-communists are not immune, either; accused of being "pro-NATO social-democrats," or, more directly, "socialist traitors," they are purged in large numbers. It is no exaggeration when the Northern Italians start secretly calling this the New Reign of Terror.

Meanwhile, society is quickly transformed along Soviet lines. Large industries are nationalized immediately (without compensation) as strategic assets for the war effort. It is much more difficult to expropriate the majority of smaller industries and private commercial activity dispersed across Northern Italy.

The military government decides to order a general plan of evacuation and relocation against the danger of a nuclear war. Private real estate is nationalized in order to host thousands of refugees; shops and businesses have to be abandoned because of the evacuation orders. Millions of private homes are also abandoned, especially in large cities. In the country, farms and large estates are transformed into collective shelters where entire villages are obliged to cohabitate. In Milan, where there are two active metro lines, the stations and galleries are transformed into large collective shelters, where half a million people are forcibly relocated and re-organized into a sort of large commune. Almost as a side effect, North Italian society undergoes near complete Stalinization- there is no political opposition, private property, or freedom of movement. The nuclear scare works very well to justify the collectivization to ordinary people as a necessary tool for survival in extreme circumstances. It's even welcomed, at first. NATO bombing campaigns on Soviet targets (inevitably resulting in civilian casualties) persuade many people that the danger of war, even nuclear war, is real.

But by the first week of December, when the political purge begins to reach epidemic levels and the expropriation campaign is biting nearly every family, dissent finally begins to spread.

On the military side, there are daily artillery exchanges along the French-Italian and Swiss-Italian Alpine borders, but no major operations due to the impassable terrain and bad weather (heavy snow falls almost every day from Mont Blanc to the sea). Soviet air and land bases are bombed by the AM. NATO's Stay Behind units are well hidden in the Alps, especially in the Veneto, Friuli, and Trentino, and are coordinated directly by NATO command in Brussels. Sanctuaries are established in Switzerland, where many Italian political refugees manage to escape. They are ordered not to act against Soviet Italy yet, fearing a reprisal campaign against civilians, but they maintain high readiness. By the second week in December, they are ready to launch an all-out guerrilla offensive in the event of a NATO counter-attack.
 
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I wonder what happens when the first casualty reports hit the Warsaw Pact members.

Here's some research I did not do: did the Warsaw Pact do casualty reports? I guess I've made some assumptions in this area. I was assuming that news (and mail) from the front would be censored. In terms of specifically naming the dead, the fact that logistics probably are fairly strained in reality wouldn't help that news travel very fast. The relocation of so many people at home would make it even worse (at least as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, if not the rest of the WP).

But two things: First, not telling people news leaves the scale of the losses up to their imagination. Second, bits of info and clues will get out. Not to mention those listening to Radio Free Europe in secret. So yes, certainly I think those who want to be aware of losses will be generally aware of them. As to what happens? Since we're talking about casualties in general and not, like, "the death of my brother," the reaction is going to be to the scale of the loss. How people react to that probably says more about their preconceived notions of the war and the state in general. Those with misgivings are going to use it as proof to reinforce their worldview. Those with a more positive view of society, or who have started leaning on patriotism/ideological zeal in dark times are going to find a way to glorify the sacrifice. They'll think about the scale of loss in WWII, and incorporate that into their model for how this process is meant to unfold.

So while I don't think casualties are going to change many minds, those inclined to act in opposition to the state (for a very very broad range of definitions of "opposition") to take some action.
 
So whats JP2 doing with all this insanity? Hes in the middle of it in Rome.
Great question. I don't spend enough time with him, though he comes up later. Actually, it's a good enough question that I think I need to add in a paragraph or two. Check the post again in about 20 minutes...

Edit: wow, hit it exactly on the 20-minute mark!
 
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Great question. I don't spend enough time with him, though he comes up later. Actually, it's a good enough question that I think I need to add in a paragraph or two. Check the post again in about 20 minutes...
JP2 and the Church are probably pushing for a ceasefire, humanitarian treatment of POWs and civilians along with assist refugees. While publicly he cant say anything who knows where the Catholic aid goes in places like Italy, Poland and what all. I figure the various intelligence services and secret police are busying maintaining logistics and intelligence gathering than watching every church and priest.
 
Industrial and Military Mobilization in the First Month of the War
The Line Between Order and Disorder
(Industrial and Military Mobilization in the First Month of the War)

Mobilization & Industry

As the conflict in Europe reaches the end of its first month, massive production and mobilization plans in both superpowers reach new heights.

In the USA, all National Guard and Reserve units are mobilized and begin to be sent to the various fronts.

The 4th, 38th, and 47th Infantry Divisions, and the 49th and 50th Armored divisions are deployed in northern Germany, attached to the Third Corps.

The newly-formed 35th Mechanized Division, the 107th and 278th Armored Cavalry Regiments, and three independent brigades (the 58th, 197th, and 256th) are also in Germany, attached to the Fifth Corps in Frankfurt and the Fulda Gap.

The 24th Mechanized Division and the 9th, 28th, and 42nd Infantry Divisions are sent to the Gulf to reinforce the Rapid Deployment Force in Iran.

The 26th and 40th Infantry Divisions, the 116th and 163rd Armored Cavalry Regiments, the 32nd Mechanized Brigade, and the 172nd and 205th Infantry Brigades are sent to Korea to reinforce the Eighth Army. The Hawaiian National Guard's famed 100th Infantry Battalion is also allowed to jump the deployment queue and heads to Korea.

The 4th Marine Division is mobilized and ready to be deployed in Europe. Its exact deployment location is kept variable for the time being.

The 7th Light Infantry Division remains temporarily in Latin America. The unit has been trained for that specific region, and guerrilla activity in Central America, and increasingly Colombia, requires the presence of a major American formation. They are joined in the first week of December by the 92nd Infantry Brigade (from Puerto Rico) deploying in Central America, and elements of the 193rd Infantry Brigade (stationed in Panama) deploying in Colombia. These units begin to take the brunt of the operation by the end of the month, and the 7th is airlifted to Korea in the new year.

Of the nation's 19 remaining independent brigades, five are held as an emergency reserve and used to maintain security during the evacuation and resettlement of the cities. Nine are deployed to rearward sectors in Europe to help with security and to plug gaps as they appear in the front. And the remaining five are similarly deployed to Japan and quiet sectors of South Korea. All deployed brigades will see service on the front before the end of the war. Smaller National Guard formations are used for domestic security and to serve as replacements within larger formations.

Training facilities are straining under the weight of volunteers, and millions have to be turned away. Luckily, the military spent most of FY '83 prepping for this exact scenario. Temporary shelters for expanded boot camps are available in abundance, mothballed training sites are ready with minimal prep time, and a list of thousands of reservists detailed to training is already prepared. Before the end of the year, the military has the largest number of personnel undergoing basic training since World War II.

These reinforcements are desperately needed to replace largely weakened units in Central Europe. While the losses in Norway are sustainable (US forces are mostly acting in support there), the story in Germany is very different. The 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions and the 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions have lost more than 40% of their personnel and more than 60% of their tanks and personnel carriers. The USAF has lost 30% of all deployed aircraft around the globe.

Along with the mobilization of reserves and National Guard units, war production also ramps up. Shortages of weapons and war materials threaten to become an acute problem for some fronts, but military industries (and a growing number of converted automotive, electronic, chemical, and mechanical industries working under license) begin to overcome the problem by the fourth week of the war. As December progresses, replacements for most types of equipment begin to arrive about as fast as the Russians can destroy them. Stockpiles remain small, but stable.

Less specialized light industrial workshops and other factories formerly focused on consumer goods begin to produce individual equipment, from first aid kits to uniforms, from food rations to helmets, from autoinjectors to MOPP gear. And not just for American forces; US manufacturing is aiming to supply 75% of the gear to its allies as well. Every workspace that can be easily converted to the war effort, is. More lengthy conversions are under way within the first 48 hours of the war.

Military equipment and support becomes a primary economic activity in the USA. A growing secondary sector is production related to civil defense: batteries and backup electric devices to protect against EMPs, non-perishable food, survival kits, manuals, and basic building materials, among other things. These sectors see an 800% expansion of production in just one month.

An even larger effort of mobilization is undertaken by the Soviet Union. All Category C units (made of reservists and conscripts) are mobilized and on their way to their various destinations by November 15th. Rotation at the frontline is very frequent. After each week of fighting, the Soviets send back one in three frontal divisions (which have mostly lost their combat capability due to high attrition) and replace them with reservists. By the end of the first month of war, one rotation through all divisions is almost complete. Fresh units are poured in, but they are mostly reservists or older veterans. These units are ill-equipped and suffer from morale issues even before they reach the front. The best of the Soviet Army is already gone.

But materiel and equipment are less of a problem, at least; the Warsaw Pact has enough reserves for 60 days of intense fighting. While air raids (especially F-117 night raids) begin systematically destroying factories, depots, and railway lines in Warsaw Pact countries, fresh supplies continue pouring out of the untouched Soviet Union. The Soviet defense industry- which in wartime amounts to 80% of all Soviet industry- is fully mobilized and working hard to provide new tanks, tactical ballistic missiles, rockets, guns, and millions of small arms rounds.

Once the strategic reserve armies have completed their mobilization, they are sent to Europe to fill the gaps opened through attrition. The Urals Front Army Group is deployed to the Scandinavian theater of operations in Finland and Norway. The Moscow Front Army Group (with most of the remaining fresh Category A units) is sent to Germany as a third echelon force, along with the Volga Front Army Group. And the North Caucasus Front Army Group is sent to Italy. Asian units remain in place, ready to counter any moves from China.

Missile Defense & Communications

On the American homefront, the administration seeks to buttress domestic ABM weapons and technologies, as well as civil defense assets. Reagan and the JCS don't know if and when the war will go nuclear, but they always consider nuclear escalation to be imminent. Thus, ABM systems are immediately deployed once produced and declared battle-ready. General Vessey (Chairman of the JCS) is a strong advocate of missile defense, declaring it better to protect citizens than avenge them. He's also a realist and knows that Reagan's dream of a non-nuclear ABM defense is not feasible. Extant ABM systems are simply not sophisticated enough to be hermetic. They are a damage-reduction tool, relying on tactical nuclear explosions to protect industrial targets, command centers, ICBM silos, and main air bases. Nothing else is currently possible.

ABM production is focused on orbital space mines (capable of both a first-strike and ABM defense) and Sprint missiles, their neutron warheads, and launcher vehicles (adapted Honest Johns). Deployment of nuclear tipped Nike Hercules around air bases and preparations for the dust defense for missile silos reaches its peak in this period. The aerospace industry can now produce 10 Sprint missiles per week, which are rolled out directly to their new batteries in large cities chosen as protected areas. Launchers and missiles are carefully camouflaged and hidden around cities in protected parking lots, moved only during the night and when the sky is completely overcast. The Soviets are never able to detect them. Another secret effort is made to assemble the old Safeguard program's MSR radar systems for missile guidance. They are likewise mounted on large trucks and hidden in safe places.

Soviet ABM efforts are no less extensive during this same period. The aerospace industry is working night and day, producing new Gorgon missiles to be deployed in the Moscow ABM site and in the new batteries around Leningrad. The Soviet's answer to the Spring is the new short-range Gazelle missile, which is successfully tested (without a nuclear warhead) and immediately enters the mass production phase. New missile-guiding radar is deployed in Leningrad, Odessa, Murmansk, and, with difficulty, Vladivostok; the four main corridors of a possible ICBM or SLBM attack.

Survivable tools for communications are also strengthened. The Soviets successfully test the new ERCS (Emergency Rocket Communication System) in case the ICBM comm network ("Signal") collapses under EMP or direct nuclear attacks. The ERCS is a ballistic missile, which carries a small communication satellite able to disseminate launch orders to both ICBM bases and submarines. The ERCS could be launched directly by the Stavka or automatically in case of the destruction of Stavka HQ.

The US reinforces its own radio net of ground-wave communications, able to persist in a nuclear environment. ARPANET is also upgraded and expanded in order to multiply the number of communication crossroads and avoid the decapitation of the entire system after a possible nuclear strike.

Both superpowers are fighting a non-nuclear war, while extensively preparing for a nuclear one.
 
Mt. Cheyenne and Mt. Yamantau will become even more fortified at this rate.
It's possible! I'm not sure (and by that I really mean I'm not sure) whether it's a good idea to be blasting into bedrock when you really need your command center. Is that fine? It's probably fine. Heh, if this was two years later when the ERCS had evolved into a true dead-hand switch, I'm just imagining some idiot trying to make space for, I dunno, the general's sauna or something, blasting into the ground, setting off the seismic detectors, and killing us all.
 
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War in the Atlantic, November 15th – December 11th
Vital Sea Lanes
(War in the Atlantic, November 15th – December 11th)

After the defeat of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Northern Fleet is bottled in its bastion in the Barents and White seas. Svalbard, occupied by the Soviets since the first days of the war, becomes a forward air and naval base, heavily protected by SA-5 anti-aircraft batteries.

Far northern Norway has been occupied by Soviet troops since the first days of war and not yet liberated. Thus, the strategic corridor to the Northern Bastion is completely blocked by the Soviets. They fill it with dozens of Tango, Foxtrot, and Kilo diesel propelled submarines, minefields in low waters, air-dropped sensor buoys, and reconnaissance trawlers. The inner defense of the Bastion is provided by more submarines and by ASW surface units, led by the Kirov and Frunze battlecruisers and their surface action groups.

Despite this huge defense system, the very silent USS Los Angeles class submarines are able to penetrate the Spitsbergen-North Cape gap. They conduct some successful hunter-killer operations against Soviet missile submarines, sinking one Oscar, two Yankees, and two Delta IIs, along with ten Foxtrot, Kilo, and Tango diesel attack submarines.

The most powerful and modern Soviet attack submarines try to cross the GIUK gap to enter the North Atlantic and attack NATO convoys. But the SOSUS net is a formidable barrier: all four Alpha class nuclear submarines, running fast and loud, are immediately detected by the net and sunk by Viking ASW aircraft. 15 Victor class submarines are also detected and sunk along the GIUK gap, straying too far from their bastion.

Several Victor IIIs were at-large when the war began. One of them, K-324, was damaged in a pre-war incident on October 31st and then sunk on November 10th by a US Corsair II bomber in Cienfuegos, Cuba. Two Victor IIIs were off the west coast of the US. During the first week of conflict, they sink eleven merchant ships before being intercepted and sunk by ASW frigates. Five more Victor IIIs escort the Delta III Soviet missile submarines off the north Canadian coast where two of them are detected and sunk by US frigates (along with their escorted boats).

The Allies establish a regular convoy system by the second week of the conflict. Escorted by ASW surface units from the US, Canadian, British, and French navies, the convoys are constantly covered by air. In the first segment of their route, the northern convoys are covered by Goose Bay AFB; in the central segment by Keflavik AFB; and in the final approach to French harbors by numerous RAF and USAF bases in Great Britain. The southern convoys, assembled in the Gulf of Mexico, receive air cover from USAF bases in Florida and Puerto Rico for the first segment of their route, by Lajes air base (in the Azores) in the middle of their route, and by Spanish and Portuguese air bases in their final approach to French harbors.

Since the bulk of Soviet submarines are intercepted and sunk along the GIUK, the escorting surface ASW air and naval units have little work to do. They intercept and sink two Victor IIs and one Victor III. In this period, sinking merchant vessels in protected convoys becomes nearly impossible for Soviet submariners. Only two freighters are sunk, with both aggressors immediately tracked and destroyed.

By the end of November, the Atlantic convoys have carried all the hardware of the Third Corps and then begin to unload all the heavy weapons and equipment of the National Guard units airlifted to Central Europe.

Attacking US, French, or British aircraft carriers also becomes a suicide mission best not attempted. After the sinking of the Kitty Hawk in the Pacific on the first night of war, NATO navies increase carrier task forces and station them in areas closer to air bases in the British Isles. All five Victor class submarines that try an attack against the task forces are detected and sunk by Vikings.
 
Very bad news for the Soviets. If they can't prevent American soldiers and supplies from reaching the front, they've essentially already lost.
They should probable focus on occupying the Middle East to starve the West from oil, but that's a massive front to control and it will take time to be fully effective.
 
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