Why has my fanfic thread turned into a general military thread? -_-;
The F-35's 100 million cost only looks bad if you compare it to legacy aircraft without sensors - the Rafale and Typhoon are in similar ballparks, as is the F-15K, which is basically a fairly straightforward upgraded F-15E.
A lot of the cost in the F-35 goes into its onboard sensors - an F-16 or an F-15 kitted out on similar mission parameters would need to carry FLIR pods, targeting pods, ECM pods, drop tanks and then weapons - the former three cut into stores stations. Meanwhile an F-35 just needs to carry weapons since its targeting sensors and ECM are built in and it has a massive internal fuel store - the F-35 on internal fuel has more range than an F-16 with CFTs and drop tanks.
Which WAS my point. "A significant fraction of the price difference..." And when you factor in limited stealth and increased range... well. I wasn't _saying the AF_ was wrong to keep pushing the F-35. That's a key. I was _arguing_ in FAVOR of the Air Force's choice here.
Yes and no. The baseline LCS is a corvette, doing corvette things. It's the later ships in the program have been redesignated as frigates and are IIRC supposed to use LCS ASuW module as their baseline and then get beefed up. I myself am not entirely convinced that's the way to use LCS, or move to a new frigate instead of a clean sheet design, or even if the USN actually needs frigates, what with the Burkeswarm going on (currently there are 62 Burkes in-service with another 10 planned, not counting the Flight III ships that are going to be built). The point of LCS was to use a cheap ship on tasks that Burkes are overkill and wasted on, like chasing pirates off Somalia in CTF 150 - that is hilarious overkill - thus freeing up more Burkes to go back to the fleet to do fleet things.
It's still a corvette in design and build, is the problem. See below.
While this is all interesting enough, it's also goalpost shifting. You asserted that "MANPAD (or shoulder fired SAM's, whatever) don't kill A-10's. Iraq tried. Failed miserably." 6 kills by IR SAMs say otherwise.
And I referenced the AF report, which argues the GAO report was wrong. Out of the 22 that came back with major damage, only 1 was that way from pure MANPADS, most had gunfire OR heavier SAMS. (I know, the AF defending the A-10, amazing). On the 2 that were written off (I got to my copy): one was confirmed NOT to be taken out by ANY SAM, but several hits of 57mm fire, by the AF. The other, wasn't. They're still trying to figure out what. GAO's methodology seems to be to assume that the Iraqis only used MANPADS, or they were the only effective weapon at that environment. (There's also a hint that they went: "Okay, X was shot at by a missile, but heard no radar lock on, so, MANPADs are pure IR...")
The 4 A-10's we completely lost, the AF designated as "unknown", and didn't contest the GAO's report on. But... take a look, and see what damage the A-10 _took_ and still came home, and ask yourself: "Can a MANPAD do that?"
So, yes, I'm saying what I'm saying: "GAO is wrong." Not the first, not the last. Even the AF (which would LOVE an actual reason to get rid of the A-10) disagrees with the report. So, yes, out of the number of missions flown, the Iraqis failed to kill the A-10 miserably. The fact 4 didn't come home (I belive I'd have to check) doesn't prove the GAO right.
To be fair, the AF report was a year POST the GAO report.
Even if we discount two of the 6 losses attributed to MANPADS as A-10s damaged by AAA fire that safely made it back to base to be written off (I've read of those birds but I was pretty sure they weren't among the 6 attributed to MANPADS, but the 11 or so damaged by AAA), the fact is that yes, MANPADS can kill A-10s.
AF's own report says they didn't, except in the 4 that _didn't_ come home. And the AF says: Casues unknown.
On this, I do happen to know at least for a FACT, one of the A-10's was tasked to take out a ZSU-23. Take that for what you will.
And of course speed cannot substitute armor for tanks, not at the ranges that tanks fight. The Leopard 1 sacrificed armor because the Germans were of the opinion that HEAT made armor useless (and to an extent they were right until ceramic laminate armor and Chobham and Burlington and Dorchester and ERA became things), modern MBTs on all sides have now gone to armor because it's good to have, and the nations that use light tanks use them because 1) they cannot afford proper MBTs and 2) any tank is better than no tank and 3) Scorpion 90 aside, I'd argue that to infantry there's little effective difference between a light tank and a tank, you'll need AT weapons to fight both. (Except the Scorpion. For god's sake you can pen it with GPMG. Why. Damnit Alvis.)
As for the Scopion: NO idea what they were thinking. Nary a clue. Wait, no, maybe they missed the Hellcat TD... As for a light tank or MBT: Meh, realistically, we were always taught to go for the side, then use the popup feature of our missiles, if we had them.
Here's a question: If (the Leo 2 was built on Speed is Life) it didn't work for tanks, why would it work for 3000 ton ships easily 100 times longer, wider, and up against missiles that self guide, and attack from several angles?
I have no problem with a fast ship. I have no real problem thinking speed IS a component of defense. IT's when you're using that as primary, you have problems. (Now, admittedly, if they mounted 3-4 CIWS, and the capability to spit out lots of intercept missiles, 50 knots would be a VERY nice addition)
NOW: To be _totally_ fair, the ability to turn as tight as the LCS, and accel/decal as fast as it can? Okay, THAT's dammed useful. (If you stated that? No quibble. Being nimble is as good as armor.)
But a speed addition of 15-20 knots over a Burke, is not a significant enough edge, to praise it for. You might generate one, two misses, but snap all stop or sharp turns would do the same. (And no front line torpedo is slower than the ships... so.)
And note: This is what I'm being told by _actual Naval officers_ I know. Some retired, some non SurWar, some SurWar who won't serve on those ships
@Hazard The A-10's CAS paradigm of low and slow just doesn't work outside of uncontested airspace. I'm gonna just quote myself since I've argued about this before:
tl;dr, you want to go low and slow, use attack helicopters. Otherwise, high and fast with an F-35 works out better given that the F-35 is going to have superior sensors to the A-10, stealth to make itself a harder target, it can drop PGMs where you want it to, and if it is threatened by AA weapons it has room and energy to maneuver.[/QUOTE]
yet, the Army who OPERATES AH-64... really wants to keep the A-10 in service. Ponder that.
As for the F-35's capability as a pure CAS... I don't know offhand it's stall speed, but I do know it's total load is less than the A10, and it doesn't carry that monster GAU-8, nor is it as rugged. I'm not sure What Marine featherheads (the masters of CAS in the US), think, at least those out, but it'd be interesting to find out.
These days, that's not really true of US Navy practice. Basically, ever since the late 50s, the US Navy's doctrine has been that active defenses (both hard-kill like SAMs and CIWS, and soft-kill like decoys and electronic warfare) would prevent surface combatants from taking hits in the first place, and thus preventing the need for them to take hits. Really, this is more a case of the Navy creating a doctrine to justify eliminating passive protection from new construction for other reasons--the Long Beach's nuclear power plant was too heavy to allow her to keep even light cruiser armor while being able to exceed 30 knots, and many missile fire control systems would be disabled by shock/blast effects from any kind of hit, essentially making the ship combat-ineffective regardless of armor--but, in my opinion, it's now spiraled into the sort of situation that happened with the Space Shuttle, where cost constraints forced the abandonment of a number of backup safety systems (like, say, a launch abort system), which was then retroactively justified by the claim that the Shuttle could be made so reliable that said systems were unnecessary, because nothing would ever go wrong.
To be fair, _I_ should have said take a hit and be repairable. Ala Roberts III, or several DDG's that took a hit and came home. The view _I_ hear, is the LCS can't do that. (Though, to be fair, we DON'T know this, and Roberts even surprised her builders! Much less the Navy, who's book on her is 2 comparments+keel: Why did she surive at all?)
About the only warships left in the US designed to take hits and keep fighting are the carriers; just about everything else is expected to be crippled or sunk by even one hit from any weapon of significant size.
Crippled, maybe (though at least 2 of our damaged DDG's over the 30 or so previous years, would NOT have been rendered mission killed).
Destroyed? Mmm... Let's just say my uncle's classmates disagree with you, and be done here.
As for a carrier, it really depends on where it's hit. And by what. Destroyed, no. Agreed they're intended to take several hits and keep afloat.
Fighting? Well, if it takes one AShM to the arrestor gear, it's out of business. And that's from an Naval aviator himself. IT's DC"s nightmare.
The Tomcat was dead the moment that the Navy was forced to retire the AIM-54C because of cracked fuel castings in the motor (which caused a number to explode immediately upon launch in the annual test-firings, heavily damaging the launch aircraft); it was very large, very heavy, very expensive to operate, very hard to maintain, and suboptimal in anything but an interceptor role, with only the capability of the extreme-long-range AIM-54 giving it an advantage over the Hornet. Once the AIM-54 went away, the F-14 no longer had any real capabilities that the F-18 couldn't fill at a lower cost and taking up less space on the ship.
Eh, the F-14A? Agreed. Even factoring in it's nifty camera and longer range, the only real use that the F-18 couldn't do as well (F-14A only had Fleet Defense and as an bouns, recon) was recon, and in the age of eyes in the Sky? Not enough. You do miss the F-14D, with it's bombing capability, improved radar, improved engines, et al. Or some of the upgrades Grumman wanted to do. I will admit, I do have a fondness for it, but my real issue: With the retirement of the last F-14 D's, we didn't replace it's capability at all. A CAG's range shrank, it's total payload shrank.
We didn't have that happen with the retirement of the A-6, thanks to the F-14D. Note: I agree that the F-14(even D models) was pushing the obvious age of it's desgin. But where's it's replacement?
Would I have called it's replacement by an equal capability bird (range, payload, ability to do strike missions) good: Yep. Even the proposed F-21 would have been a nice replacement, over the short term. The problem is, as I note above: The F-18 is an A-7/light fighter replacement, not an A-6/medium fighter replacement. (Side note: It's not helping that we're cutting F-18 squadrons ethier!)
By the same logic, the AF shouldn't have any F-15's or F-22's. (note, if that wasn't your intent...)
F-35... Well, there's a lot of debate there.[/quote]
Don't get me started, but my opinion is that if the F-35 had just been a common F-16/F-18 replacement and not attempted to fold the AV-8B and A-10 into the mix, we'd have ended up with a much better airplane, in less time and at a lower cost; a joint AF/Marine AV-8B/A-10 replacement could have then taken up the CAS role.
[/quote]
I agree. As an F-16, and F-18 replacement? I think the F-35 is a VERY nice improvement. (Note my point above, about how in reality, the costs aren't THAT much lower, for an F-16 that matches in electronics, the F-35. Add in a few other features? Yep, yep.
As an Harrier or A-10 replacement? ... yeah. You'd think the military didn't learn from the F-111... (I also bet, the F-35 would be here and most of the bugs worked out, by now.)
I don't put it as much on the designers so much as on "mission creep" and "creeping featurism" in the specifications, combined with a political environment that makes the original concept a non-starter. Remember, the original LCS concept was a true corvette, in the 1500-2500 ton class, intended for coastal fighting, built cheap and expendable so that we could just churn 'em out and not worry about losses too much. Unfortunately, in the current US political environment, there is no such thing as "acceptable losses" any more; if we ever lost a warship in anything short of full-fledged all-out war with Russia or China, the press would go berserk and whip the public into such an anti-war frenzy that, in essence, losing a single LCS means that's it, the war's over, other guys win.
If it was 2k, and as cheap as it should have been, yes. (Side note, you just hit upon the problem with a LOT of Navy decisions, in my view: They keep mission creeping., meaning the day of "Hey, we need this to do this, and getting it!" is over, and really screws up those on the sharp end)
Faced with that reality, the designers had to put in survivability features that drove the size of the ship up into the 3000-5000 ton class... which then, when people saw such a relatively-large ship had so little equipment, resulted in a drive by management to put some more stuff (sensors, weapons, etc) on there to justify the size; meanwhile, the Navy, seeing that the Perry-class FFGs were rapidly wearing out and needing a replacement, but facing a budget that wouldn't allow for building a new purpose-built frigate, started demanding additional missions of the LCS that would allow it to replace the FFGs, forcing the designers to cram even more capabilities into the hull... and taking away the survivability that the extra size provided in the first place.
Your points makes some sense, except:
1: Not built and degsined by _traditional_ shipbuilders. How much you want to bet if Bath or like desgined/built these ladies, they'd be a lot better off? Expereince does matter. As well, as small ships != fragile, or does the WW2 destroyer track record mean anything?
2: By going with an ultra small crew, DC is ... not the best.
3: I have no solid proof of this, but there's some grumbling, again that scaling them up wasn't part of their design specs.
4: Going back to point one for 3, if true, more 'traditional' builders would likey have done a better job.
The irony is that, had it not been for the beancounters deciding that we had to use the LCS platform for the FFG replacement, a similarly-sized ship could have enough capabilities to replace the FFGs and have survivability in the same size hull... but because the LCS is required to have such high speed, you've ended up with an unbalanced ship again--fast, fairly powerful, but a glass cannon. Similar to the conundrum of the battlecruiser, actually...
... and you just proved my basic point: Whatever the Navy _says_, they design/want ships that can take a hit.
Now, to be _fair_, the basic design of the ships (spc' the tri) were for small, nimble (good there!) ships of a small draft. Aka, a Littoral platform
But, that's not the design you want for a FRIGATE. The fact that they could come close to one, IS a credit to Lockheed and GD. The fact the Navy didn't regonize and think of a FFG replacement before it became an issue, is the problem.
It's also something that I've been pondering. With the incoming laser weapons, for CIWS replacement, better, smaller, faster anti missile missiles, not a single real replacement for a long ranged AShm, (and honeslty, are they viable in the near future?)
Why are we still focusing on missiles? With RAP, and similar, gun ranges are well beyond Harpoon, costs are less. There's a hint in the Zumwalt (and if true, good for the navy here, though it's likey done to replace the lost capatblity of the BB's) that the Navy is thinking this way, but there's no real proof of this.
