AHC: A World without WW1

You could potentially have an interesting situation happen where Willhelm II fucks up Agadir (ie he provokes France too much and has to backpeddle rather than get Neu Kamerun), then when Saverne in 1913 rolls around the military and conservative portion of his cabinet along with Willhelm II himself panic because they think that between Agadir and Saverne the monarchy is facing a critical loss of face. So they try to escalate and dig their heels in on Saverne and when the SPD trigger mass protests there's an incident where they open fire on protestors - and the public by and large turns against the monarchy and the government collapses because if they don't there could be a general strike. Thus Germany becomes embroiled in an insular political scandal and becomes diplomatically FUBAR for the next few years with the Kaiser out of commission.

I dig it - I was actually idly speculating that you could see Germany drift into a role similar to the one the US "enjoys" under Trump. It's too big (both economically and militarily) to completely disengage from, but it's suffering under a temperamental and out-of-depth leader who keeps accidentally provoking political crises. These force it to be be constantly embroiled and distracted, giving the rest of Europe room to maneuver as it tries to get a handle on itself domestically.

For added allohistorical fun, you could get Wilhelm making barely concealed racist rants in the papers about the growing threat of China Japan.
 
I mean yeah imagine what happens if the SPD is able to freely keep building up it's momentum and it and its allies continue to win outright majorities, maybe even super-majorities, while the Kaiser continues to appoint conservative Chancellors and resorts to building minority and "nonpartisan" cabinets and keeping the legislature deadlocked enough that the executive cabal is able to freely continue conservative Junker policy. That's a major legitimacy crisis just waiting to happen.
 
Another thing that could happen to make things go differently in Germany is the Harden-Eulenburg affair not happening given it apparently literally gave the Kaiser a nervous breakdown, removed all the figures that were moderating figures on Kaiser Wilhelm II and is considered a root cause of world war one by both later historians and period observers.

 
Another possibility is something with the Balkan wars. If Italy accepts a Tunisia/egypt style deal for libya that forestall open war and at least delays the collapse of the ottoman position in the Balkans.

I'm not really sure you can prevent any great power conflict, at least not without preemptively collapsing either Russia or the Austrian empire. Something like the 1905 revolution toppling the tsar, perhaps.
 
Apologies if this has already been discussed, but one thing that came to mind was the increasingly huge amounts of German investment in Latin America from c.1880s-1914. This is less so the case for the cone where Britain was the financial dominator but still the Germans were an important player. This was noticeable because it also came with German (and broader Central European) immigration to Latin America. This was huge, since it brought with it both new political ideas (its when the Latin American Left begins to form) and also extensive amounts of human capital, especially in Centroamerica where the commodities boom there, although American funded to a large degree, had its technical expertise and middle management staffed by Swiss, French, and Germans. In Haiti, the Germans became a very important commercial minority for example, and in the Dominican Republic the Germans had eclipsed the French to become the single largest trading partner of the country (The Americans only eclipsing them during the occupation). Speaking of occupations, the US occupations of Hispaniola are possibly butterflied away in the absence of a World War.

Now what do continuing decades of capital investment mean to the region? Im not sure entirely, since that depends on the economy of the German Empire. Broadly I'd surmise continuing rates of investment in primary sector extraction to fuel economic growth, with infrastructural investment quickly catching up. German investment in the Dominican Republic was mostly towards light industry, smallholding farmers, and infrastructure which aided the country's industrialization (until the Americans destroyed in 1919) Similar things occured with Guatemala and Honduras IIRC. The Americans wont like this, and so political proxy conflicts of some sort are likely to happen. For Central America, Haiti, and the Spanish Caribbean however, no WW1 is overall a blessing allowing the countries to begin industrialize earlier. There's going be a sizable human cost, as statebuilding in the region was violent, coercive, radically transformational in the lives of peasants who had any shred of autonomy stripped away to force them to work in grueling, low pay extractive industries.

Similarly pre WW1 was also the apogee of Arab immigration to Latin America who became pillars of the Middle class. These included not just Christian Arabs but also Muslims who later converted. If the Ottoman Empire remains intact and enters its demographic transition decades earlier with the resulting population boom, than Arab immigration to Latin America will steadily grow as millions join their cousins in the New World. Great for the food of the region, and the general middle classes. Unlike the Germans however, these immigrants tended to be more conservative as voters.

And now Im rambling, so I'll leave it at that. Overall I suspect Latin America would be wealthier and more populated in the short to mid run, but import substitution might be delayed as foreign capital continues to flow rather than dramatically stop in the 1920s. Well, for Colombia or Venezuela. It'll be the opposite in Cuba, DR, Haiti, and Guatemala.
 
Oh also no WW1 delays Ghanian self rule by at least a generation. 1925 reform came through agitation of Ghanaian soldiers and workers who fought and bled in Togo. From it came the example for responsible government and local voting rights in Nigeria + formation of trade unions in African soil. That's all getting delayed barring some political change.

Come to think of it, Africa as a whole is probably worse off given that WW1 caused the first major shock to the colonial structures there. But I'm also firmly biased in the "there was no good outcome of colonialism and nothing good remains from keeping it going on longer" worldview.
 
Oh also no WW1 delays Ghanian self rule by at least a generation. 1925 reform came through agitation of Ghanaian soldiers and workers who fought and bled in Togo. From it came the example for responsible government and local voting rights in Nigeria + formation of trade unions in African soil. That's all getting delayed barring some political change.

Come to think of it, Africa as a whole is probably worse off given that WW1 caused the first major shock to the colonial structures there. But I'm also firmly biased in the "there was no good outcome of colonialism and nothing good remains from keeping it going on longer" worldview.

Well, in general the wars and the depression were crucial leverage points that weakened the metropole and allowed colonies to exact greater concessions from their masters. There was also an ideological change - even if the system was still effectively colonial, the very idea of mandates meant that there was supposed to be a handoff at some point in the future. No such horizon lay in store for unreconstructed Pre-WW1 colonialism.
 
I mean Rif War, one of the most famous predecessors to 20th century style guerrilla mass resistance, did get a kick start with the Spanish-educated middle class of Abd el-Krim suddenly waking up to how unfun imperialism was what with the censorship and paranoia over German intrigues and general crackdown of society (and also some literal physical breathing room with a lot of the Spanish and especially French colonial forces drawn temporarily to a minimum to reinforce the metropole)... but at the same time Spain was a neutral power with relatively little damage to the kingdom's military fundamentals from the great war and the generals launched a fricking auto-coup in the middle of it, afraid that otherwise they would not be able to carry on and the "communists" would "betray" Spain and seek negotiation. To me this seems to say that it would only be until the colonial powers do something to galvanize the collaborating middle and upper classes against them as how the world wars galvanized them that the imperial world would remain blissfully unreconstructed. Like, say, dropping a bunch of extra military burdens on their colonies to violently maintain reactionary control against socialist majorities in the streets and in the legislatures...
 
Well, in general the wars and the depression were crucial leverage points that weakened the metropole and allowed colonies to exact greater concessions from their masters. There was also an ideological change - even if the system was still effectively colonial, the very idea of mandates meant that there was supposed to be a handoff at some point in the future. No such horizon lay in store for unreconstructed Pre-WW1 colonialism.
On the bright side, the French colonies of West and Central Africa are better off in the short term. France responded with it's horrific manpower losses through ramping up the extraction in its vast Sahelian hinterland. Example being down to destroying thousands of years of forest management and diversified crop management in favor of peanut plantations in Upper Volta. The damage is still felt today, though it is treated.
 
I feel like Russia's fucked by 1900, and especially by the Russo-Japanese war. They're still going to collapse, but it all really depends on how the government collapses. Given the lack of the schism between the hardliners and the socdems, the Russians might end up with a RSDLP(M) or SR government, as the Bolsheviks wouldn't have the power (remember, Lenin would have a hard time getting to Petrograd, and the Bolsheviks in the area during the war weren't the brightest) nor reason to want to overthrow the government. Narodniks are already pretty irrelevant and I hardly doubt that the Kadets are about to want to argue for power- so I don't really see anyone else making a grab.

Austria might actually have a better chance for survival than Russia, funnily enough. Not super knowledgeable about Austrian history right before the war, but the Hungarian issue being solved and Bosnian secession/expulsion might easily give the empire a mild chance to survive for the time being. Not that I think that AH would have made it to 2020, but that I feel like the dissolution would have been more peaceful.

The 2nd Internationale wouldn't have split, which probably means good- less partisanship on the left, and more chance of a leftist uprising later. Considering the lineup of Kaisers that were coming through (Willy III was basically just a German Nicholas II, from what I've read), there's absolutely a hole for a latent Spartacus uprising if Wilhem IV doesn't have the personality he had in OTL.

India might have been a bit better planned out as the British weren't just desperately trying to move the problem over to Delhi, which is also good- India might not be on the constant verge of nuclear war.

America would still end up the world hegemon- w/o ASB I find it difficult to make the US not a superpower with a POD past 1900.
 
Like I noted before I think Ferdinand could possibly hold the Austrian-Hungarian empire together but I don't think it could survive his death regardless of his reforms unless he had one hell of a successor.

Russia I suspect might have been vastly better off if Archduke Michael had became Czar instead of Nicholas II but that honestly wouldn't be a hard bar to clear given Nicholas II's pigheadedness and sheer belligerent incompetence.
 
Like I noted before I think Ferdinand could possibly hold the Austrian-Hungarian empire together but I don't think it could survive his death regardless of his reforms unless he had one hell of a successor.

Russia I suspect might have been vastly better off if Archduke Michael had became Czar instead of Nicholas II but that honestly wouldn't be a hard bar to clear given Nicholas II's pigheadedness and sheer belligerent incompetence.
Would he have even wanted to rule? If I remember correctly Michael really did not want the throne after Nicholas abdicated to him (admittedly, that was likely a war thing, not an "opposed to Tsardom" thing).
 
No even before the war Archduke Michael apparently wasn't happy at the idea of possibly becoming Czar though apparently some foreign official at time noted in private he had traits likely would have made him the perfect constitutional monarch and he apparently didn't really care for St. Petersburg high society which were feelings that only became intensified by the war.
 
No even before the war Archduke Michael apparently wasn't happy at the idea of possibly becoming Czar though apparently some foreign official at time noted in private he had traits likely would have made him the perfect constitutional monarch and he apparently didn't really care for St. Petersburg high society which were feelings that only became intensified by the war.
Ah.

I've always meant to do some reading up about him- he was pretty much a thorn in the side of my idea that the Romanovs were fucked post-1900, so it's good to see that there'd be basically no way for the monarchy to survive.
 
Huh, my impression was of a much more consistent line of Chinese state collapse and Japanese expansionism (along with a ton of European and American intervention that wasn't particularly distinct in the eyes of the Chinese) into the region from at least the Russo-Japanese War until the end of World War II. It might be a matter of buying into Japanese and/or PRC propaganda about the situation being enough of a power vacuum that some kind of revolution or invasion was inevitable.

I think the US might be a really big factor in this timeline's Japan, as the British control over Latin American investment brought up earlier in the thread seems likely to create more capital searching for return on investment, and no World War I or Great Depression plus a seemingly stable China might create a ton of chances for partnership. The Americans were sticking their noses into colonial and imperialist projects in OTL, but also might seem like a less hostile devil to a nationalist China than the European powers. Besides general lack of confidence in this projection, the biggest counter-weight seems to be the American ability to cut and run if things get bad, as there is nothing vital for them in the region and the United States tends to be inward focused. Even in OTL, American interest in China was most of why things went hostile with the Japanese. I would guess that American interest in this region would lead to strong resentment, but that doesn't mean it wouldn't help boost Chinese independence and strength.

Hell, the biggest winner of US-Japanese competition over China is probably well... China.

Like, it isn't to say that China somehow benefits from imperial nations that ultimately have self-serving motives, but rather that the competition between these powers provides opportunities for China to assert itself.

And tbh, so long as its own interests were protected, the USA would probably lean more towards pragmatic diplomacy and cutting deals over any kind of imperial adventurism. Popular support of the USA's Asian imperialism tended to be lukewarm at best and things like the USA's intervention in the Boxer Rebellion are the exception, not the rule.

I wonder, Japan's not going to be blind to the fact that Yuan Shikai would be keeping his head above water playing the game with different European powers and then using the European loans and resources to keep the Beiyang Army as his trump card securing his regime, nor to the fact that in general the European great powers are going to be colluding to keep Japan "in check" and without the accouterments of a great colonial empire herself. With this in mind do we have a longer lasting and tighter association between the young modernists of the world, with Japan more strongly supporting the Kuomintang and America also getting in on a little of that action as liberal democracy is still a sexy underground resistance to the powers that be?

The thing is, the balance of power between European powers in China along with the key non-European states: Japan and the USA, was a relatively equal one in the pre-WWI world. Germany was a major and growing naval presence in East Asia and even nations with minimal involvement in China still had some presence. There were some pretty important shifts (namely the Russo-Japanese War and the major power shift in favour of Japan over Russia) but overall this was mostly stable. There's no immediate reason for European nations in a world without WWI to draw down their presence in China. And the most likely cause of such a thing would be some kind of May Fourth-esque popular movement against imperialism that shatters the illusion of imperial supremacy and a Chinese populace that was complacently accepting of it.

Also, the weird thing is, even IOTL with Japan emerging in its status as the key imperial tormentor of China after WWI... there was still a pretty big amount of admiration for Japan in certain circles. Some of this was purely a practical issue: Chinese nationalists and intellectuals who wanted an example of an Asian nation that had successfully modernised and became powerful enough to challenge European powers in military conflicts didn't really have any examples other than Japan. But I would argue that for Sun Yat-Sen and certain other figures of the GMD that this emulation of the Japanese model stemmed from genuine admiration of Japan. Kind of paradoxical considering that Japan had been in no small part the author of China's misfortunes, but the politics of early 20th-century Chinese intellectuals could get pretty weird.

So, ITTL in a world with less pronounced Japanese interference in China, this would probably be an even stronger trend.

Really interesting stuff. How would Yuan Shikai have dealt with the warlords? I am not really very familiar with the contents of his reign other than he declared himself emperor. How would Sun Yat-Sen fit into this? As the major opposition to Shikai's conservative order?

America's main concern in China was threefold: One, maintain an open door for missionary work and trade. Two, prevent any European partition or invasive annexation of Chinese territory that would threaten this open door. Three, to influence China in their direction. Yuan Shikai could be a real problem for them comparatively because he may seek out friendship among some of the Europeans (especially Britain) and act as, well, a conservative emperor and nationalist rather than a liberal. But at the same time, he's a stable guide for the country, so I doubt America would stop doing business with him. It may play host to all kinds of Chinese opposition sections, though, especially if Shikai cracks down and Sun or other opposition leaders have to flee China.

Yuan Shikai is frequently remembered as "the father of warlordism" in Chinese history and it's worth giving some explanation as to why.

Yuan Shikai was, himself, something of a warlord: a powerful military leader who used a time of upheaval to seize power by force. Furthermore, during his rule over China, his base of power depended upon him installing other military officials throughout the provinces who could keep civilian leaders loyal to his regime. It worked well enough while he was alive but came apart after he was dead because without him, there was no reason for these appointed military leaders to remain loyal to the central government and thus we got mass warlordism and decentralisation. This is a fault we can most certainly ascribe to Yuan Shikai's decisions. Like a lot of failed modernising leaders throughout history: Yuan Shikai can be blamed for not looking beyond his roots as a military officer for solutions. So in that respect, he acted more in the interests of his own power.

However, it must also be remembered that Yuan Shikai was in many respects simply a victim of poor circumstances. His declaration of himself as Emperor was probably little more than political theatre. Nothing in Yuan Shikai's life or history really suggested that he was actually a genuine monarchist who believed that China should restore the Qing or create a new dynasty. And there were various conservative officers who did believe this. Perhaps most notable of whom was Zhang Xun who was a subordinate of his: Zhang Xun was actually intensely loyal to the Qing Dynasty and refused to remove his queue even after this once-compulsory hairstyle fell out of favour after the 1911 Revolution.

Yuan's declaration of himself as Emperor was really more an act of desperation: political theatre he concocted to save his failing regime after the Japanese presented the 21 Demands and his government had little choice but to agree to almost all of them. In this regard, it is simply not logical to fault his government for such actions and it was really more a fault of Japanese imperialism and simply poor circumstances that caused this.

I would lean towards arguing that, had he lived on, he probably ultimately was not the leader to reunify China, but that he probably could at least have bought a brief but much-needed period of modernisation and consolidation under some central authority. The latter of which was in rather short supply in an impoverished post-Qing China, beset by imperial powers, with an unclear concept of its identity and nationhood.
 
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I feel like Russia's fucked by 1900, and especially by the Russo-Japanese war. They're still going to collapse, but it all really depends on how the government collapses. Given the lack of the schism between the hardliners and the socdems, the Russians might end up with a RSDLP(M) or SR government, as the Bolsheviks wouldn't have the power (remember, Lenin would have a hard time getting to Petrograd, and the Bolsheviks in the area during the war weren't the brightest) nor reason to want to overthrow the government. Narodniks are already pretty irrelevant and I hardly doubt that the Kadets are about to want to argue for power- so I don't really see anyone else making a grab.

Honestly I'm not sure how much I agree with this.

It seems very deterministic and if anything terribly understates the incredible potential of Russia. It isn't by accident that the main superpower competitor to the United States in the 20th-century was a Eurasian state that included Russia and nearly all of the former Russian Empire. One of the countless reasons that the First World War happened when it did is because Germany was terrified of Russia's long-term potential as a power. Russia outbuilt Germany in artillery shell production in 1916 historically. What would things have looked like for Russia even 5 years later, let alone 10 or 20?

Russia had a lot of the challenges faced by other multinational empires of the time but were these challenges so great that they would have resulted in collapse? I'm not so sure. The First World War was so incredibly devastating and created conditions that could have broken nearly any state, let alone one so troubled as that of Russia, A-H, or the Sublime Porte.

I guess the question I have is: could have the Russian Empire have continued without WWI, and I am inclined to say that the answer is yes. Russia had its fragile and rudimentary parliamentary tradition from 1905 and the monarchy was at an all-time nadir of popular support* which put anti-reformist figures in a pretty bad position, politically and yielded the momentum to the left.

And honestly, considering that early 1900's Russia still gave rise to figures like Pyotr Stolypin, I think there's a lot of chance for the kind of "conservative reform" that Russia tended to produce. Not so much out of any great dynamic progressivism but because certain people were able to recognise that the Russian system was heading towards revolution and collapse if it didn't enact reforms.

So with Nicholas II's regime being in an incredibly bad position and not really being in much position to oppose reforms... I can honestly imagine Russia being dragged, no matter how reluctantly on the part of its leaders, into a more effective and stable form of government.

*Kind of a big deal since the Tsar had always traditionally been seen as the kindly protector who would guard the common people against the excesses of his nobles, and once that kind of connection is broken, it's extremely hard to reforge*

America would still end up the world hegemon- w/o ASB I find it difficult to make the US not a superpower with a POD past 1900.

Wholly agreed. Though the USA coming into its power gradually as opposed to suddenly and very nearly unopposed would make for a very different world. And for certain nations: namely Russia and China, it might well be a more multipolar one in the long-term.

Not to mention, in a world without WWI+WWII, the USA's potential competitors wouldn't be so incredibly weakened. Think about Russia alone: what would the Russian Empire and its environs look like without the terrible devastation of the world wars (especially WWII)? In some ways, it's nothing short of astounding that the Soviet Union was in any way able to serve as any kind of a competitor to the United States even with the horrible destruction it experienced in human and material terms.

Moreover, would an industrialised and developed Russian Empire really be a fierce enemy of the USA? The USA and the Russian Empire were quite friendly (or at least pragmatically cooperative) IOTL. It's hard to imagine there being some kind of Cold War between the two eagles that would be so intense as historically.
 
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It should perhaps be noted that US-Russian relations by the time of world war one had soured over the Pogroms from its high point after the civil war to the point it was actually a political factor in the US not joining world war one sooner.

Though on the matter of the Russian Imperial monarchy continuing but with Nicholas II still becoming czar in the first place I admittedly wouldn't consider it impossible that Nicholas II if he got really dug in against any reforms like he did historally that he eventually gets hit with a Palace coup by his extended relatives to replace him with someone else who'd be less obstinate as his OTL they had apparently had begin working towards when the revolution broke out and he finally resigned in favor of his brother(who never wanted to be czar even before the war) who in turn gave the matter of the monarchy over the Duma.
 
Honestly I'm not sure how much I agree with this.

It seems very deterministic and if anything terribly understates the incredible potential of Russia. It isn't by accident that the main superpower competitor to the United States in the 20th-century was a Eurasian state that included Russia and nearly all of the former Russian Empire. One of the countless reasons that the First World War happened when it did is because Germany was terrified of Russia's long-term potential as a power. Russia outbuilt Germany in artillery shell production in 1916 historically. What would things have looked like for Russia even 5 years later, let alone 10 or 20?

I would actually disagree here. Russia certainly would have a seat on the table as a Great Power but being a Superpower depended heavily on pretty special historical circumstances.

Let's examine Russia's performance in WW1. You mentioned increasing shell production but the single biggest issue Russia had in WW1 was the complete inability to actually leverage crushing superiority against the Germans. The Imperial Russian army performed acceptable against a chronically underfunded and neglected Austro-Hungarian army. Against second rate German troops they consistently failed to leverage crushing superiority.

WW1 itself forced Imperial Russia to actually adress crippling structual problems. The high artillery shell production in 1916 is a prime example here. We can't just assume that Russia would experience parallel developments without the pressures that WW1 exerted on the Tsarist system.

If you ask me how the situation would look 10 or 20 years down the road in ATL where WW1 is avoided:

Russia has HUGE military budget and crushing numerical superiority. A significant part of its weaponry is still imported and the Russian arms industry is underdeveloped relative to the size of it's armed forces. The lack of a professionalized general staff leads the Imperial Army to commit to military investments that turn out to be strategic mistakes.

Why do we assume that Imperial Russia would just magically tackle the deep structural problems that were clearly exposed in 1905? By 1914 deeply entrenched reactionary interests had successfully averted true meritocratic reform and any truly effective military reform. I don't see why Imperial Russia suddenly would turn into a well-run state by 1934. To me the opposite actually seems pretty likely. In IOTLs 1914 the Russian elite was clearly buying into the myth of overwhelming Russian strength and based their strategic approach to WW1 on that myth. With more time this mirage would only grow bigger leading the Russian aristocracy to drink their own cool aid even more.

Even if Imperial Russia decides to get serious about a domestic armament industry, producing more shells is not a decisive factor when your army is crippled by serious structural issues. The First Gulf War and the performance of Saddam's army is what I see when I think about an Imperial Russian Army in 1934.

And if the Tsarist system collapses I am sceptical that it is going to happen in a way that is not connected to serious, development retarding bloodshed.

Imperial Germany on the other hand always seems to be magically stagnant in this kind of scenario. Fear of the "Russian Steamroller" is what brought the SPD on board with WW1 IOTL. So if Russia grows stronger and stronger, on paper, there is a serious chance that the militarists and SPD actually overcome their differences to a degree.

In this ATL Germany isn't cut off from international markets or economically devastated by a starvation blockade and the ToV. Instead we have the pretty vibrant and healthy Imperial German economy that is just beginning to get serious about mechanized agriculture and industrialization, an incredibly strong RnD sector that is not devastated by the ToV or the Nazis and a General Staff that had the best idea of the hypothetical war to come and consistently was superior when it came to tactically adapting to a constantly changing environment.

If we pick your 20 year suggestion we are in the mid 30s. If a serious war happens then the factors that saved Russia from collapsing in 1915 don't apply anymore. By then armies are motorized enough to actually exploit decisive victories. If you ask me for my serious oppinion how a war in this ATL would look I would answer:

The early encirclements of Barbarossa + nasty chemical weapons (because the taboo around them wouldn't have developed) and a Germany that has enough strategic expertise to actually use the ethnic and ideological divides of the Russian Empire.

If we progress the TL even further the Germans would develop nukes and reliable delievery systems much sooner. My guess would be that the Kaiserliche Luftwaffe and/or Raketenstreitkräfte would glass Moscow and St. Petersburg in the 50s.

The Russians aren't the Soviets and without being the leader of a global ideological camp Russia is going to be constrained by some hard limits.
 
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I feel as if I phrased that wrong. There was no way that there was going to be any form of hard collapse & civil war like what was experienced IOTL- that was an issue forged by the war, not by internal strife. However, at this point a February-like event would still take place (although, it is fairly likely it would end up less extreme than otl), as the Tsar's position (hell, the position of Tsardom) was pretty much untenable at the time.
 
And honestly, considering that early 1900's Russia still gave rise to figures like Pyotr Stolypin, I think there's a lot of chance for the kind of "conservative reform" that Russia tended to produce. Not so much out of any great dynamic progressivism but because certain people were able to recognise that the Russian system was heading towards revolution and collapse if it didn't enact reforms.

Did it give rise to figures like Stolypin or did it give rise to Stolypin specifically? The man was assassinated and in 1914 the court was extremely hard-line. In comparison to the revolution-ridden Ottomans and the slowly yielding Austrians (leaving aside Ferdinand's potential plans) the Romanovs seemed the most entrenched of all the old monarchies. Indeed, despite literally having a revolution that took years to fully subdue, Nicholas II backpedaled as soon as he was able to. At least with him in charge the whole edifice seemed extremely rigid and inimical to any change.
 
It has come to my attention that my replies need moderators approval, I am here because I need help and I desperately need to speak with the person I replied to. I understand that posts may need to be related to the subject of the forum if so I sincerely hope this is something that can be looked past.

Not all of them do, it should wear off after a few posts.
 
Okay, uh, can you please take to conversations or somewhere else? This isn't exactly the thread for...whatever this is.
 
On the Russian discussion:

I am a bit divided on which side of collapse vs reform looks more likely, and suspect both are plausible with this PoD even if one is more likely than the other. I get the impression that Russia will resist reform as long as it can and the longer this lasts the less chance Russia has as coming through a single(ish) country. I am also unsure to what degree the expansions of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact were a requirement for Russia's superpower status in OTL vs what degree losing control was a result of decline.

I think a multipolar world would ultimately stress the Russian Empire into becoming a less capable and influential country than it could be. Rivals in Europe and Asia would require a much more diffuse strategic focus/more militarized country. A less focused, more militarized country with many hostile internal ethnic groups that are not particularly fond of their imperial masters and less ideological cohesion seems like a country rather likely to collapse or at least experience a lot of corruption and institutional decline.

On China:

I do wonder to what degree we're overestimating China's unity post-Qing. Certainly the Han ethnicity are the super-majority, but different regions of China have rather different political and strategic incentives. Without a mass movement like the Communist Party and with rival imperial powers propping up local groups we might see de facto local independence, though I expect very little "official" breakup for political reasons. I'd also expect American support to be more conditional on humanitarian conerns without the shock of the World Wars or the structure of the Cold War, which may be naive but also strikes me as a mixed bag if materialized as American humanitarian demands would likely make US support fickle and make recipients less stable.

In general: It seems that World War One led to a ton of radicalization in OTL. I do wonder how much this is actually replaced vs just delayed by the point of divergence. If the shock of modern industrial warfare hits later, with systems that have a few more decades to stagnate, I wonder if more dangerous radicals in imperial powers might become a factor, or if simply the same level of radical reactionary, socialist, or imperialist with more advanced technology might do even more damage. Something like OTL WWI Germany or OTL WWII Japan with nuclear weapons continues to strike me as very worrying, to say nothing of what a collapsing British Empire might do without OTL's existential threats and American takeover of the system.



This fact isn't relevant to someone comparing the two systems in 1914 though. At this point the old polyglot land empires were seen by the rest of Europe as rotten and decrepit, whereas maritime white colonialism still seemed like the wave of the future.

Oh, I think I misunderstood what you meant be "old." I thought you meant "as time went on, settler colonialism became more dominant" instead of "people thought that the future was settler-colonialist."
 
  • The British settler colonies in Canada, Australia and New Zealand have slower movements for autonomy and independence. I have no idea what happens with South Africa.
South Africa slowly begins moving into the orbit of Germany assuming less immigration into South Africa (which I'm unsure about, on the one hand a postwar environment is conducive to people wanting to move overseas if the immigration waves of OTL are anything to come by, on the other hand, South Africa might decide to copy Australia's policy in some manner).
If stuff like the Maritz Rebellion are any example, there's a lot of pro-German sentiment among the Afrikaners during this time, and there were a lot of people itching to ditch Britain. Another thing is that the Cape will have less influence, because the rise of the Cape and of the Afrikaner business class which started up there only came around after the end of the First World War. So basically, more anglophobic Afrikaners, a somewhat less organized and smaller Afrikaner middle class, and probably a less urbanized black population (urbanization really only got into full swing after the Second World War, which I assume wouldn't happen without a first.)

All of this means that Jan Smuts's United Party stays influential for a lot longer, and Hertzog's Nationalist Party won't take power like OTL (they were bankrolled and supported by these Afrikaner businessmen, and the Afrikaner Broederbond which served as the "inner circle" of the party was started by these types.) At the same time, Afrikaner resentment might have a larger blowback, leading to something like 1948 at a later point, and with a harder blowback. I.E. worse apartheid.

This might have the consequence of alienating Anglophone South Africans, though since the balance is tipped 2-1 for Afrikaners, there's not as much that they can do except in Natal, where the vast majority of whites are Anglos. OTL after the 1960 referendum there was some murmuring in corners that things had gone too far and Natal had to secede. Wouldn't be too hard to see things OTL leading to an independent Natal, a Rhodesia-on-the-sea. And like Rhodesia, they'd likely reach universal suffrage for all its people earlier than South Africa. The IFP would probably be pretty happy.

Then again, you could go on an alternate path, something like the Rand Rebellion taking off in the Transvaal, leading to a strange Nazbol-like state popping up. (I'm surprised that no one has done a serious timeline about a NazBol apartheid South Africa, because the idea of that is just too weird not for someone to have noticed by now. One of their slogans was literally "Workers of the World fight for a White South Africa!"
Either way, my gut feeling is that blacks will be worse off, and for a longer period of time, than OTL. I don't think you can have something like the ANC-- (which at this time was nothing more than a bunch of letter-writing, English-educated, and self-important minor chiefs' sons and activists) --without someone from Mandela's faction taking over and leading an effective insurgency campaign. There were other major groups fighting against discrimination prior to when the ANC became the most dominant force during the 70s or so, but they would have similar origins, and if not, wouldn't exist TTL.
With the white working class being poorer and in a worse state, they'd be in direct competition with blacks for jobs, and would lobby harder to slow down the use of native black workers for labor. The later ANC was deeply rooted in support from urban workers and trade unions, as well as the Soviet Union-backed Communist Party (which was headed by blacks from before the Great Depression). So without the influx of blacks into the cities, the ANC would probably be more moderate, and Mandela would be out of the picture.

This fact leads to two different things happening when it comes to apartheid policy. One would be that the homeland policy ends up being more successful, for obvious reasons. The other would be that blacks would have more kids, since those living in rural areas usually have more kids than city residents. As a result, the demographic situation of the country would be worse for the white minority by the time that blacks started moving to the cities for work.
So this either leads to a more bloody end to apartheid and an agrarian or to a more successful reign for the racist regime, which could continue into the present day given the circumstances elsewhere in Africa. I hope this was a satisfactory answer.
 
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